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Abstract 
Corporate governance is an international topic which is studied in depth in several 
research fields, such as accounting, management, finance, economics, etc. The 20
th
 
century witnessed massive growth in corporate governance issues in terms of theories, 
practices and empirical research. Thus, corporate governance, including the board of 
directors, has become one of the central issues in the running of company, due to 
worldwide and rapid change in environmental conditions and the current economic, 
financial and social context which is changeable, dynamic and globalized. Indeed, the 
board of directors of a firm, i.e. the governing body of every corporate entity, is 
ultimately accountable for company decisions and its performance. The board of 
directors, which is a fundamental asset of the firm and one of the pillars of corporate 
governance, is responsible to owners, members, and other legitimate stakeholders in 
terms of decisions, strategies and firm performance.  
This research analyses the effect of some corporate governance variables on 
performance by extending such variables and performance measures of previous 
studies. Thus, the object of the present research is corporate governance, and in 
particular the board of directors, its mechanisms and processes related with firm 
performance. The purpose of this research is to measure and quantify the relationship 
between the board of directors and performance of Italian firm listed on STAR segment 
(Italian Stock Exchange). Most studies in corporate governance analyse this 
relationship, but the majority are concerned with Anglo-American countries, emerging 
and developing markets and some European countries. Italy seems to have been left out 
of this research although it is an interesting case. Indeed, Italian corporate governance 
model presents some features in common with two archetypes existing in literature, i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models. However, the Italian model has some 
distinctive characteristics which are different from the two main corporate governance 
models. 
In particular, little research has been conducted in Italy to measure the relationship 
between board of directors mechanism and performance in listed companies by using 
single variables tested in an econometric model. This research is thus explanatory and 
has adopted positive methodology; its aim is to better understand whether agency theory 
which is the predominant approach in literature, is confirmed in the Italian context. We 
adopt agency theoretical approach of corporate governance by focusing on the 
relationship between board mechanism and corporate performance. The board 
mechanisms we study are consistent with prior research, namely board size, board 
composition (i.e. independent, non-executive, executive directors), CEO duality, Audit 
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committee and Big Four
1
. There is no relevant research which focuses on the relation 
Big Four-firm performance. On the other hand, firm performance is measured by 
Tobin’s Q (market value) and ROE (accounting measure); moreover a set of control 
variables are introduced. 
Testing our econometric model on a population of Italian firms listed on STAR 
Segment (Italian Stock Exchange), we find some interesting results. In short, not all our 
empirical hypotheses are verified, for example we do not find that an increase of 
independent and non-executives directors leads to an improvement on firm 
performance, as agency theory states. Furthermore, CEO duality is not the worst 
leadership that a firm might adopt as agency approach maintains.  
It follows that agency theory is probably not able to explain the complexity of the 
relationship between the board of directors and firm performance. This means that there 
is oversimplified vision of the company related to complexity of the environment in 
which the firm operates and to intricate mechanisms including procedures within the 
firm (Daily et al., 2003b). Agency theory provides unduly simplistic assumptions which 
do not reflect the real environment, leading to a failure of empirical findings to support 
its basic principles (Daily et al., 2003b). 
Finally, given the complexity of board mechanisms, empirical results which do not 
support agency assumptions and the increased variety of interests, it follows that our 
findings may be interpreted through a relatively new theoretical lens, i.e. multiple 
agency theory (Arthurs et al., 2008). The latter seeks to go beyond the simplistic 
assumptions of agency theory, to dismantle fortress of that overwhelming approach and 
to open the black box of the board processes (Daily et al., 2003). 
  
                                               
1 Big Four are the largest international audit firms; in particular they are Deloitte, 
PriceWaterHouseCooper, Ernst&Young, and KPMG. 
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corporate governance, 1.1.2 The board as a mechanism of corporate 
governance, 1.1.3 What is corporate governance?, 1.1.4 The objective 
of corporate governance, 1.1.5 Summary and implication for this 
research; 1.2 Purpose of the study, 1.2.1 Introduction, 1.2.2 Measuring 
the relationship between Board of Directors and Firm performance; 1.3 
Research approach, Methodology and Research Questions, 1.3.1 
Research approach and Methodology, 1.3.2 Research Questions, 1.3.3 
Potential contributions; 1.4 Limitation of the Research; 1.5 Thesis 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the background, the purpose, the objective and 
the structure of the thesis. 
This research is set within corporate governance field and considers the board of 
directors as a central element of corporate governance mechanism and structure. Its 
efficiency and performance can determine success in the monitoring of firms and 
determine successful firm operation (Aluchna, 2010). Indeed, for a company to be 
successful it must be well-governed. An effective and well-functioning board of 
directors could have a significant impact on firm performance (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992). We have conducted empirical research, using our empirical model, to measure 
the relationship between the board of directors and performance of Italian companies 
listed in STAR segment (Italian Stock Exchange). 
While the importance of this relationship has been acknowledged in international 
corporate governance literature, it has been neglected in the Italian context. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.1 the common ground on which the 
research is conducted is illustrated. The purpose of this presentation is two-fold. First, it 
is necessary to introduce the different views of corporate governance; secondly we 
present the board of directors as a fundamental corporate governance mechanism, since 
the board is the focus of this research. In the section 1.2, we describe the purpose of this 
study. Section 1.3 shows the methodological assumption of the research. Section 1.4 
identifies its limitation and Section 1.5 depicts thesis structure.  
 
1.1 Identifying the common ground 
1.1.1 Development of corporate governance 
The corporate governance issue has been an integral part of research since Adam 
Smith’s (1776) seminal study An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations and since the Berle and Means’ (1932) publication about the separation of 
corporate ownership from control. The latter seeks to explain why a company with 
dispersed shareholders (i.e. Public Company) gives control powers to managers who do 
not usually hold shares in that firm. Later Jensen and Meckling (1976) set up the 
positivist agency theory which still today dominates research in corporate governance 
field.  
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Furthermore, corporate governance research is closely connected with the economic 
development of industrial capitalism where different structures of firms are designed 
and implemented to «pursue new economic opportunities or resolve economic 
problems» (Clarke, 2004: 2). The development of corporate governance has also been 
fostered by a period of managerial hegemony (in the 1970s and 1980s) where corporate 
governance was defined from a managerial perspective, considering the board as 
“rubber stamps” for management. Those periods were characterized by abuse of power, 
corporate take-overs which led to an increase in companies’ expenditure, since 
managers paid themselves high salaries. It follows that within this turbulent context 
regulatory intervention was introduced to reduce the rubber-stamp role of the board. 
Indeed, the latter was to become more involved in business activities as the main 
purpose of the board was to create wealth for shareholders through the value creation in 
the firm. It became necessary to set objectives for firms and restrict or re-define the role 
of the board for a better monitoring of managers’ behaviour. It was necessary to align 
shareholders’ and managers’ goals in order to increase value creation for the former. 
This came as response to increased globalization experienced during 1980s. During 
those years, a great deal of attention (perhaps too much) was paid to short term increase 
in share value to satisfy institutional shareholders. Since the 2000s several financial 
scandals have occurred, the most serious example was the bankruptcy of Enron. What 
became clear from this series of dramatic events was the importance of recognising 
commitment to stakeholders, e.g. employees, suppliers, customers, etc. Basically, these 
stakeholders suffered huge losses due to managers’ opportunist behaviour. This 
recognition has led to a broader approach or perspective of corporate governance, not 
only focused on satisfying the interests of shareholders, but with an awareness that 
corporate has responsibilities towards society at large (Huse, 2007). 
 
1.1.2 The board as a mechanism of corporate governance
2
  
The board of directors is considered the most important and powerful mechanism of 
corporate governance as it is the link between whose who provide capital (i.e. 
shareholders or owners) and the users of that capital to create value (i.e. managers) 
(Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003). However, the founding risk is that the board and its 
members be considered as «pawns» (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989) where board 
importance is limited to an observance of legal regulations and board members may be 
viewed as the ornament of the corporate Christmas tree (Mace, 1971).  
                                               
2 A detailed description of the board of directors is provided in chapter 3. 
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After financial scandals and, globalization, the importance of the board of directors 
increased due to its fundamental oversight role (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Minichilli et 
al., 2007). Indeed, boards are increasingly considered as a fundamental and essential 
asset for companies with the potential to contribute to sustainable competitive 
advantage (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007). The board is expected to play an active 
role in the strategic process of firms, including defining company purposes (Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Garratt, 2007a). It follows that the board’s role is very complex; indeed it 
has to face several tensions arising from the interaction of different actors; the 
executives who work towards the implementation of their policies, non-executives who 
are there to monitor insiders, and the chairman acting as the arbiter of disputes and 
centre of internal tensions. Thus, the increasing demand of control and monitoring has 
led to fostering and strengthening of board structure and processes. Furthermore, codes 
of best practices recommend the setting up of separate committees dedicated to risk 
management, internal audit, etc.  
For these reasons, we expect to see greater involvement of the board in proving 
leadership and control in order to increase firm performance. 
 
1.1.3 What is corporate governance? 
It is not simple to answer this question, probably because one single definition does not 
exist; the notion of corporate governance can depend on the context studied, together 
with theory, approach, and perspectives adopted. Sociological, financial, managerial 
and, organizational factors also come into play. The risk is to define in a simplistic way 
a complex and dynamic issue
3
. Thus, each definition provided by scholars reflects their 
methodological assumptions, their theoretical framework and their institutional context. 
In general terms, a combined definition of corporate governance is provided by both 
The Cadbury Report (1992) and OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), 
«corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled» 
and it «involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined». 
 
                                               
3 We discuss corporate governance definitions in chapter 2. 
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1.1.4 The objective of corporate governance 
The objective of corporate governance could be two-fold, i.e. theoretical and practical. 
As regarding theoretical point of view, the objective of corporate governance varies 
according to the theory adopted. Huse (2007) gives four definitions of corporate 
governance which provide different objectives. First, agency and stewardship theories 
deem that the main governance objective is to enhance shareholders’ value. Second, 
stakeholder theory reckons that corporate governance purpose is to foster the value 
creation for stakeholders. Third, based on managerial hegemony, the objective may be 
regarded as “doing what is the best for management”. Fourth, according to resource 
dependence theory, the main corporate governance objective is to do what is best for the 
company. Theories do not, in fact, identify corporate governance objectives but the 
latter are inferred from the different board tasks which change on the basis of the theory 
adopted. 
As far as practical point of view is concerned, laws, regulations and codes of best 
practice provide the objective of corporate governance. Different hard laws (i.e. State 
regulations) and soft laws (i.e. codes of best practices) draw up different definitions and 
the objective of corporate governance. According to Spira and Page (2003), an approach 
which goes beyond single countries is sensible, as many codes have been initiated and 
developed by private organizations. It follows that there is a founded risk that each code 
may provide different perspectives regarding corporate governance objective. OECD 
outlines the concept of objective. Given that 30 countries belong to OECD, including 
UK, USA, Norway, and Italy, we may assume that its description could be 
representative in a global context. The objective as identified by the OECD is: «Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management 
to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence of an effective corporate 
governance system, within an individual company and across an economy as a whole, 
helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a 
market economy. As a result, the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to 
use resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth» (OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004: 11). It appears reasonable to assume that the principal 
objective of corporate governance may be economic growth of companies. Economic 
growth is reached by lower cost of capital and efficient use of resources by the board of 
directors, and all subjects within the firm. Economic growth may be ensured if the 
board and management pursue objectives which are aligned with those of shareholders 
and the company.  
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Finally, in this study we believe that the objective of corporate governance is to create 
value for shareholders by improving board of directors mechanisms and control 
processes. It follows that by fostering shareholders’ wealth, improving boards 
mechanisms, given the rise of investment funds, and financial globalization, good 
governance may be created. Good governance has positive effects both within the firm 
(i.e. leading to an improvement of corporate performance) and for economic growth. 
Thus, it is essential to understand all the mechanisms involved in the processes and 
procedures related to corporate governance, given that all subjects (i.e. shareholders, 
boards, managers, society, communities, etc.) could benefit from better firm 
performance. 
 
1.1.5 Summary and implication for this research 
Corporate governance is an international topic studied in depth in several research 
fields, such as accounting, management, finance, economics, etc. The 20
th
 century 
witnessed massive growth in corporate governance issues in terms of theories, practices 
and empirical research. The board of directors is identified as a fundamental governance 
mechanism, and is increasingly recognized as one of the essential assets for a firm. 
Furthermore, the objective of corporate governance may be indentified from both 
theoretical and practical perspective. The former varies mainly on the basis of the 
theoretical framework adopted; the latter is closely related with hard and soft laws. 
However, if we consider the definition given by OECD, the overall objective of 
corporate governance is economic growth, thus firm performance. This research seeks 
to investigate how main corporate governance mechanism (i.e. the board of director) 
could influence firm performance and its economic growth. Indeed, the board is an 
important mechanism in the system of corporate governance and it can probably 
contribute to the overall purpose of corporate governance.  
After having described the framework in which the research was carried out, it is now 
possible to identify the purpose of the study. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
1.2.1 Introduction 
Popper (2002) and Booth and Williams (2003) state that a thesis should be built around 
a central problem which we seek to solve. Although we are not always able to solve 
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problems we may contribute to a better understanding of the problem, and thus 
contribute to the search for solutions. 
The object of the present research is corporate governance, and in particular the board 
of directors and its mechanisms and processes related with firm performance. The 
purpose of this research is to measure and quantify the relationship between the board 
of directors and performance of Italian firm listed on STAR segment (Italian Stock 
Exchange). Most studies in corporate governance analyse this relationship, but the 
majority are concerned with Anglo-American countries, emerging and developing 
markets, together with some European countries; Italy seems to have been left out from 
this research, although it represents an interesting case
4
.  
Before presenting research questions, it may be useful to outline some perspectives on 
what kind of relation may exist between boards and performance, and its relevance in 
corporate governance context. 
 
1.2.2 Measuring the relationship between Board of Directors and Firm 
performance 
The seminal research of Jensen and Meckling (1976) caused a huge increase in 
corporate governance studies, although these were mostly limited to US listed 
companies, characterized by dispersed ownership. However, since the 1990s corporate 
governance research has been conducted in other countries, such as UK, Germany, 
Japan, and Australia. Currently research in those countries is continuing, while there has 
been a snowballing of studies in emerging and developing economies, such as China, 
Brazil and other Asian and Eastern countries. Furthermore, national comparative 
research has also been carried out thanks to pioneering research by La Porta et al. (1997 
and 1998). However, it appears that that Italian firms do not seem to have been studied 
in depth in terms of boards of directors and corporate performance. 
In addition, despite widespread belief in the importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms for solving agency problems, empirical literature looking at the effect of 
individual governance mechanisms (e.g. the board, the audit committee) has not been 
able to find consistent positive effects. According to literature, board attributes such as 
size, composition, diversity, multiple directorship influence performance. On the one 
hand, theories determine the sign (positive, negative or null) of that relationship; on the 
other hand findings from empirical research either endorse or refute theoretical 
                                               
4 We show differences among Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese and Italian models in chapter 2. 
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assumptions. It emerges that within one theory not all findings confirm the assumptions 
of the said theory; this happens when a theory is applied outside the context in which it 
was developed. For instance, agency theory was born in US context. According to 
empirical literature agency theory assumptions are not confirmed in environments 
different from the USA. It is worth pointing out that a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical research has suggested board characteristics are endogenously determined and 
that the latter vary with firm feature (Kole and Lehn 1999; Mak and Rousch 2000; 
Adams 2005).  
Moreover, there is little empirical research focusing on Italian firms with respect to the 
analysis of single variables tested within econometrical models. However, it is worth 
pointing out that some Italian research has been conducted with reference to governance 
indices which combine multiple governance dimensions into one number. Research 
regarding governance indices within Italian context appears to be more than the analysis 
of single variable tested within econometric model. This may be due to the simplicity of 
having one summery number for capturing the multifaceted issue of corporate 
governance.  
However, as Bhagat et al. (2010) stated, the conclusion to draw from this extensive 
research cannot be that these empirical studies have been a waste of time and effort. 
Rather, that there are limitations to those studies and that more work must be done to 
understand more fully the effect on performance of the board of directors mechanisms. 
It follows that the enigmatic relationship between board and firm performance may 
increasingly become less obscure, although a great deal of research may have to be done 
to fully understand the issue.  
 
1.3 Research approach, Methodology and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Research approach and Methodology 
As previously indicated, little research has been conducted in Italy to measure the 
relationship between board of directors mechanism and performance in listed companies 
by using single variables tested in a econometric model. This research is thus 
explanatory and has adopted positive methodology; its aim is to better understand 
whether agency theory which is the predominant approach in literature is confirmed in 
the Italian context.  
In this research, a deductive approach has been adopted within the existing theory of 
corporate governance (i.e. agency theory) to gain better knowledge about the effect of 
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the board mechanism on firm performance. In particular, we adopt agency theoretical 
approach of corporate governance, by focusing on the relationship between the boards 
mechanism and corporate performance. The board mechanisms we studied are 
consistent with prior research, namely board size, board composition (i.e. independent, 
non-executive, executive directors), CEO duality, Audit committee and Big Four
5
. 
There is no relevant research focusing on the relations Big Four-firm performance. On 
the other hand, firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q (market value) and ROE 
(accounting measure).  
This research is quantitative. We collected data for all firms listed on STAR segment 
(Italian Stock Exchange) over the period 2005-2007, we deliberately take into account 
the years preceding the recession so that our data is not influenced by its effects. 
Moreover, we study firms listed on STAR segment because they are the best Italian 
listed companies in terms of corporate governance. Indeed, according to Italian Stock 
Exchange rules a firm can request listing in that segment only if it respects some strict 
criteria, namely it must provide excellence in terms of transparency and communication, 
liquidity and corporate governance. 
 
1.3.2 Research Questions 
The first research question put forward is to understand how in Italy the board of 
directors, considered a fundamental asset for company, may influence firm 
performance. This can be expressed as follows: 
 
RQ 1) How can Board of Directors affect firm performance in Italian listed 
companies? 
 
Furthermore, international literature stresses the importance of monitoring processes 
within company, namely the board itself, independent directors, audit committee and 
external auditors (e.g. Big Four). Thus, the second research question can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
                                               
5 Big Four are the largest international audit firms; they are represented by Deloitte, 
PriceWaterHouseCooper, Ernst&Young, and KPMG. 
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RQ 2) How can monitoring processes affect firm performance in Italian 
listed companies?  
 
1.3.3 Potential contributions 
The starting point in all studies is to focus on the fact that the ultimate goal is to «add 
something of value to the body of accumulated knowledge and in this case accumulated 
business and management knowledge» (Remenyi et al., 1998: 24). Furthermore, 
potential contribution of research can be explained in terms of both academic and 
practical contribution (Jonsson, 2007). The former is made if research extends our 
ability to understand phenomena (Remenyi et al., 1998). In academic perspective, the 
present research will contribute to a better understanding of board mechanisms effecting 
firm performance based on agency theory in the Italian context. 
From a practical point of view, this study can contribute to fostering an understanding 
and awareness of board mechanisms impacting on corporate performance and thus 
increase their contribution towards enhancing corporate governance. The present study 
can also contribute to developing empirical research in the Italian context by using 
single variables tested in an econometric model. Indeed, most extant research in Italian 
firms focuses mainly on corporate governance indices, i.e. combining multiple 
governance dimensions into one number.  
 
1.4 Limitation of the Research 
With regards to the relation between governance and firm performance, Bohren and 
Odegaard (2004) identify four main problems with governance research which are 
consistent with our study: first, the use of partial approach due to limited availability of 
data (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Mork et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and 
the present research); second, context specificity whereby most extant studies have been 
on US public company that cannot be reproduced in other countries with different law 
origins; third, the lack of rich quality data (in terms of variable measures and number of 
years) that could make conclusions distorted; last but not least, aspects regarding 
endogeneity and reverse causality. 
One limitation of our study is the time period under investigation. Italy has witnessed 
many changes in corporate governance structure and mechanism over the last few years. 
Indeed, it would have been interesting if we had considered a longer time span in order 
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to explore other insights regarding the relationship between board and performance. 
However, we reckon that as a first study, a period of three year is sufficient to 
understand relations, insights and mechanisms existing within the board. 
We should point out that we have analysed a particular set of variables to measure the 
relationship between corporate governance structure and firm performance. However, 
our study does not consider other variables that may be important drivers of corporate 
governance structure. With regards to audit committee, we could have considered the 
level of independence of the members, their expertise, the number of meeting per year, 
as well as its presence within the company. With respect to ownership, it could have 
been interesting to consider ownership percentage; this however, was not possible 
because of lack of information. Other interesting indicators could have been those 
relating to demographic similarity variables regarding the board of directors, such as 
functional background, education and age (Zajac and Westphal, 1995). 
Moreover, our analysis does not consider empirical international comparison by virtue 
of convergence process which is underway. However, given the differences among 
countries in terms of institutional environment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), political 
and socio-cultural factors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; North 1990, 1992), 
countries have reported different effects of corporate governance on firm value and 
performance (Pagano and Volpin, 2001; Klapper and Love, 2004). Even within the 
same country, several conflicting effects have been found.  
Despite these limitations, it appears reasonable to assume that this research may 
contribute to increased knowledge regarding corporate governance issues, in particular 
regarding board of directors within the Italian context; a context which has up to now 
received little attention. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. 
In chapter 1 the common ground, on which the present research is conducted, is 
described. After a short presentation of corporate governance features we present the 
problem of description which will be explored and developed. 
In chapter 2 the general framework of corporate governance within which this research 
was conducted is presented. In particular, we compare the different corporate 
governance definitions in order to understand the humus from which models and 
theories are developed. Then, after comparing corporate governance Italian and 
International models, and focusing on international theories of corporate governance, 
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we seek to clarify the relationship between Italian and International models and 
corporate governance theories. 
In chapter 3 board of directors features are presented. After discussing corporate 
governance in general terms we focus the research analysis on the board of directors 
under different perspectives, i.e. American, English, German, Japanese, and Italian 
codes of corporate governance, international theory of corporate governance, empirical 
research. Finally, we seek to understand if convergence or divergence towards Anglo-
Saxon models and practice is underway. 
In chapter 4 the methodology applied in this research is presented and discussed. In 
particular, this chapter identifies philosophical assumptions, research process and 
phases used in the research. We also justify and give evidence for the choices of 
methodological assumption made. 
In chapter 5 different ways to measure the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, i.e. indices and single variables within econometric models are 
presented. Research hypotheses based on literature review are shown. We then build our 
empirical model to test on Italian listed companies in order to measure the relation 
between board of directors mechanisms and firm performance. Moreover, results are 
presented and discussed. 
In chapter 6 a summary of the whole research complete paper is presented; furthermore 
we propose another theory to interpret results and understand Italian companies 
corporate governance, i.e. multiple agency theory, instead of the simple agency theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Corporate Governance. 
Definitions, Models and Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents: 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Comparison of corporate governance definitions, 2.2.1 
Different interpretive logicalities of corporate governance, 2.2.2 Corporate Governance 
Approaches, 2.2.2.1 The restrictive approach, structure and process, 2.2.2.2 The 
extensive approach, structure and process; 2.3 Comparison between International and 
National Corporate Governance Models; 2.4 International Theories of Corporate 
Governance, 2.4.1 Agency Theory, 2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory, 2.4.3 Stewardship Theory, 
2.4.4 Resource Dependence Theory; 2.5 Models and Theories of Corporate 
Governance, 2.5.1 Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese models and International Theories, 
2.5.2 Italian model and International Theories; 2.6 Summary, Conclusions and 
Research Implications, 2.6.1 Summary, 2.6.2 Conclusions and Research Implications. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In recent years we are facing a worldwide and fast change in the environmental 
conditions where companies operate. The firm is not to be analysed as a unit isolated 
from the environment because it rises and growths within it (Poddighe, 2001). So the 
element to be considered with utmost care is given by turbulence and mutability of 
environment that, especially today, distinguishes all companies. In this ever-changing 
and turbulent scenario, firms have always tried to understand what are phenomena and 
reasons that cause this dynamism and environmental variability, in order to achieve, and 
enhance economic growth of company (Madonna et al., 2014). The relevance of 
corporate governance issues come out vigorously in that dynamic and changing contest 
in which it is fundamental to establish the government rules, hence governance. it is 
noteworthy that the noun governance comes from Latin verb “gubernare” that means 
“to hold the rudder” or “steering”; so it highlights that role and responsability of top 
management (e.g. Board of Directors) is fundamental for company (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009)
6
. Corporate governance has become a topic which has been 
raised in popular consciousness in recent years (Aras and Crowther, 2010).  
Company, influenced by the environmental changes, should be considered also as a set 
of relationships and the dynamics that exist between different stakeholders (Freeman, 
2010). Companies, in fact, should adopt a governance model that looks for more 
rational business (Deidda Gagliardo, 2013), considering all relations affecting 
stakeholder and firm. The company’s ability to fulfil expectations of all those who have 
interest in firms (i.e. shareholders and stakeholders) should be translated in the 
achievement of economic equilibrium (Giannessi, 1979) over time which is company 
main purpose. Economic equilibrium refers to the ability to remunerate adequately 
assets; it means earnings must “pay” or cover the input costs and the cost of capital 
(Giannessi, 1979).  
It follows that a lack of effective governance could damage stakeholders interests, 
compromise the economic equilibrium goal and thus prevent the achievement of 
positive performance. Therefore, it is evident that the relationship between corporate 
governance and economic performance. Before explaining the connection between 
corporate governance and economic performance, it is necessary to focus on the study 
of the corporate governance and more precisely on the theoretical models. 
Models are the result of the presence of different powers and interests in the corporate 
which have to take into account economic and social forces and different legal and 
                                               
6 It should be noted that the term corporate is also Latin etymology: it derives from “corpus” that means 
body, hence company, firm. 
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economic traditions. It becomes very important to analyse these models to understand 
how companies operate and to consequently be able to find out those internal and 
external elements that influence performance.  
This chapter focuses on corporate governance definitions, and then we compare the two 
main corporate governance models, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese models, 
with the Italian case which is considered as hybrid, uncommon model. After explaining 
the different corporate governance theories, the attention is focused on the relation 
between the Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese models and international theories of 
corporate governance, fully studied and clarified in literature. However, the relationship 
between the Italian model and international theories of governance is not so clear and 
evident in literature. Thus, this chapter aims to clarify what corporate governance 
theories are referring to the Italian model. It is a necessary to identify what are 
perspectives and the corporate governance theories that better explain Italian companies 
and, only after that, it is possible to identify research hypotheses. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In the section 2.2 we compare different corporate 
governance definitions in order to understand the humus from which models and 
theories are developed. In section 2.3, we compare corporate governance Italian and 
International models through a comparative conceptual map developed through main 
contributions in this field. In section 2.4, we focus on International theories of corporate 
governance, i.e. agency, stakeholders, stewardship and resource dependence theories. In 
section 2.5, we seek to clarify the relationship between Italian and International models 
and corporate governance theories. In section 2.6 we sum up our results and depict 
research implications. 
 
2.2 Comparison of corporate governance definitions 
Contributions of international literature on corporate governance are particularly 
numerous, but a unique and shared corporate governance definition has not been 
achieved, yet. Ahrens et al. (2011) believe, in fact, that - despite high contributions and 
numerous research – researchers still know too little about corporate governance. 
Indeed, different studies and conceptualizations of corporate governance depending on 
the approach adopted may exist. One of the reasons could be the specificity of each firm 
that does not allow a generalization valid for all companies. 
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It is widely believed that «corporate governance is old, only the phrase is new» 
(Tricker, 2000: 4). The term "corporate governance" is newly-minted
7
 but indeed this 
topic has always been debated. In fact, scholars have always tried to define conditions 
of effectiveness and efficiency within the company, leadership and management 
mechanisms in order to foster economic growth. In some countries (including the 
United Kingdom, United States of America), the debate on corporate governance began 
in the first half of 900; while in others (including Italy) contributions initially focused 
not on corporate governance but on principles of business administration. For instance, 
Berle and Means (1932) publish a seminal work about the separation between 
ownership and control in the United States; furthermore one of the earliest codes of best 
practice is the Combined Code enforced in Britain since 1945. It is interesting to note 
that regarding the first user of the term "governance", the English writer and poet, 
Geoffrey Chaucer (1300), made reference to the term "governance". Geoffrey 
Chaucer’s famous work is "The Canterbury Tales" where he wrote, «[...] to han 
gouernance of the hous and lond. […] In him is bountee, wisdom, gouernance». He 
used the word "gouernance" to indicate the current lemma “governance”. 
The issue of corporate governance, therefore, is likely to be an eclectic, versatile, multi-
faceted topic, inter alia, defined as a “myth”. As Rossi (2001:8) states corporate 
governance is a myth ‘because myths have mysterious and unpredictable suggestion that 
stimulates speculation and vitalize the research. In this sense, the myth of corporate 
governance therefore foresees that its rules might affect ownership structure’. The 
failure of international business giants is also caused by a poorly effective, efficient, 
transparent and accountable governance highlighting - among others - the issue of 
control mechanisms and "checks and balances" weakness. All stakeholders are 
interested in corporate governance patterns, its purposes, the balanced functioning of the 
bodies responsible for firm management. Given the complexity and vastness of the 
subject, and the aim of better understand corporate governance, different interpretations 
are identified. In other words, definitions of corporate governance are numerous and 
their systematization is able to capture different peculiarities about corporate 
governance issues. 
 
                                               
7 Conventionally, it is believed that the term corporate governance has been coined ‘in the seventies in 
countries like the UK and the U.S. from legal science in relation to the full affirmation of the modern 
financial capitalism, which emerged in the late nineteenth century with the emergence of large corporate 
firms in a capitalist basis (corporation) qualified by "anonymity", profit-making legal personality and 
limited liability equity of shareholders’ (Proietti, 2007). 
17 
 
2.2.1 Different interpretive logicalities of corporate governance 
Corporate governance interpretive logicalities proposed by literature are different. The 
shared element is to identify mechanisms within firm and features underlying corporate 
governance. In particular, it is possible to distinguish different interpretive logicalities: 
A) the structural-functional, B) the dimensional, C) the temporal, D) the accountability, 
E) the multidisciplinary and F) others. 
A) The structural-functional logicality combines the study of corporate governance 
according to a structural perspective (i.e. understanding bodies necessaries to govern a 
company) and functional perspective (i.e. understood which are all mechanisms and 
procedures necessaries for those bodies to fulfil their role). It may, therefore, indentify 
two related variables: a) the structures and mechanisms of corporate governance - which 
is in turn subdivided into: i) the board of directors, ii) a number of other structures and 
mechanisms), b) interests referred to in the process of corporate governance - which is 
in turn subdivided into i) shareholders, ii) all stakeholders. Thus, it is possible to build a 
matrix with four quadrants in which it could place the different definitions of corporate 
governance identified in the literature (Zattoni, 2004).  
B) The dimensional logicality highlights how all the definitions of corporate governance 
may have internal or external value for the company. The former refers to all those 
features or factors specific to each firm and therefore differ from company to another 
(e.g. ownership, senior management, administrators). On the other hand, the latter 
relates to a combination of factors and variables which are not company-specific, but 
which differ according to the environment in which it operates (e.g. markets, legal 
system, economic system) (Mazzotta, 2007).  
C) The temporal logicality analyses corporate governance in a temporal logic, starting 
from the end of the fourteenth century (period in which it was used for the first time the 
word "governance") until today. It analyses the evolution of corporate governance that 
has had over the centuries, singling out some milestones which often coincide with 
changes noticed in response to critical situations For instance, the 70s are characterized 
by the introduction of the audit committee, the dualistic model and the affirmation of 
the role of independent directors. During the 80s the debate on the governance of 
companies becomes greater and it is coined the term “corporate governance”) (Tricker, 
2009).  
D) The accountability logicality aims to provide “a frame of reference depicting the 
frontiers of research into corporate governance”. In particular, we can identify six 
dimensions of governance according to which it is possible to map. The six dimensions 
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identified by a prospective accountability are: i) theoretical framework, ii) mechanisms 
of accountability, iii) applied methodological approach and techniques, iv) and sectors 
to context, v) globalization, vi) time horizon (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). 
E) The multidisciplinary logicality identifies five areas of analysis of corporate 
governance which are not mutually exclusive to each other. In particular, the prospects 
for observation are: a) corporate governance and accounting b) corporate governance 
and finance, c) corporate governance and economic policy d) corporate governance and 
law, e) corporate governance and business economics (Pugliese, 2008).  
F) Other interpretive logicalities have been outlined by (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Costanzo and Priori, 2007; Chiappetta, 2007. Shleifer and Vishney, 1997; Becht et al., 
2002; Huse, 2005) 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance Approaches 
It is interesting to note that from a critical analysis of corporate governance literature is 
possible to identify a further interpretive key. In particular, we seek to create a concept 
map with the following characteristics: 
- It is preferable to study the approaches of corporate governance rather than a 
definition. The term "approach" (from the Latin "ad - prope", then "draw") is preferable 
to a "definition" (from the Latin "de - end", then "close"), because - as shown - 
corporate Governance is an eclectic, diverse, multidisciplinary issue and it is not easy to 
set bounds to (to define, in fact) exhaustively the whole issue of corporate governance. 
It may, therefore, be likely to drawn over (from which "approach") corporate 
governance outlining the different characteristics of the same. 
- It is important to consider corporate governance from a restrictive and extensive 
perspective. Zattoni (2000) divides the governance studies on into two broad classes on 
the basis of the concept of "restricted" or "extended". The former considers mainly 
shareholders interests and studies the board of directors as a body responsible for the 
resolution of any conflicts between shareholders and managers. The latter considers 
corporate governance as a set of mechanisms, procedures, rules and formal bodies in 
order to satisfy interests of all stakeholders.  
- The two perspectives in turn are interpreted according to a process and structure 
logicality. Process means, however, a set of economic resources and actors which are 
dynamically coordinated (Van de Ven, 1992; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). On the other 
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hand, structure means an organization or a group of persons willing to achieve a certain 
purpose. In this regard, it highlights the static aspect of corporate governance, i.e. a 
corporate as a structure.  
We now depict salient features of the two main approaches to corporate governance: 
restrictive and extensive, which in turn interpret corporate governance both as a process 
and as a structure (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Corporate Governance Approach 
 
 
2.2.2.1 The restrictive approach, structure and process 
The restrictive approach focuses on two main aspects:  
a) shareholders who are the only stakeholders of a company,  
b) the conflict between ownership (shareholders) and the control (managers)
8
.  
This concept, therefore, deals with the analysis of the composition, structure and 
functioning of company bodies , disregarding all aspects of other stakeholders. This 
perspective of analysis is one of the first proponents Eells (1960: 108) who in 1960 
coined the term corporate governance, calling it «[...] the structure and functioning of 
corporate policy». This approach is then defined as a shareholder view: «[...] the 
process of supervision and control [...] intended To ensure that the company's 
management acts in Accordance with the interests of shareholders» (Parkinson, 1993: 
159). Furthermore, it is possible to identify two different conceptions of corporate 
governance based on restrictive approach. The latter could be viewed as: a) process, b) 
structure. The common feature is the analysis object: the shareholders and the 
dichotomous relationship with management. The majority stream (Parkinson, 1993; 
Monks and Minow, 1995; Turnbull, 1997 Larker et al., 2007) believes that corporate 
governance is a process, i.e. it is the set of relationships among the participants in 
                                               
8 The conflict between shareholders and managers (i.e. agency theory) is explained in section 2.4 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNACE 
APPROACH 
RESTRICTIVE 
Process 
Structure 
EXTENSIVE 
Process 
Structure 
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corporate life (where participants are shareholders, management and board members) 
and it is designed to ensure that management actions are consistent with the interests of 
shareholders. Considering corporate governance as a process rather than as a structure 
(i.e. static and unchanging) means that the firm management is dynamic, changeable 
and is, therefore, able to adapt to the turbulent environment. Moreover, Zappa (1957: 
13-14) claims that ‘the company is an interconnected system continually disrupted, a 
structured process of interrelationships necessarily elusive to any static configuration of 
business economics’. According to this approach, corporate governance is therefore 
functional to the exclusive protection of shareholders interests, through various control 
mechanisms, and internal and external bodies.
 
The governance process, therefore, deals 
with managers to ensure that they act in the owners’ interests. In this regard, Larcker et 
al. (2007); Forbes and Milliken (1998) believe that corporate governance is to be 
understood as a set of mechanisms (defined as skills of the board) capable of 
influencing business performance through of effective strategic decisions. Forbes and 
Milliken (1998) also emphasize the decisive role played by the Board of Directors 
which is designed as a link between the shareholders and management (Mintzeber, 
1983), but as a group of individuals with the task to «[…] control and service. The 
board’s control task refers to its legal monitor management on behalf of the firm’s 
shareholders and to carry out this duty with sufficient loyalty and care. The board’s 
service task refers to its potential to provide advice and counsel to the CEO and other 
top managers and to participate actively in the formulation of strategy.  
On the other hand, other researchers (Eells, 1960; Cochran and Wartick, 1988; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985) argue that corporate governance is a structure or 
“structured interface” of the company, which is essential for enhancing economic 
growth. According to this point of view, the economic function is carried out 
exclusively by the Board of Directors, considered as the main body within the 
governance structure. In this sense, corporate governance is the way in which 
companies are governed
 
(Clarke, 2004
9
), or the ways in which capital providers exert 
control over management, to ensure that their interests are protected
 
(Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). 
The main difference between process and structure within the restrictive conception, 
then, is that the former emphasizes the role of the board as a set of relationships 
between the various stakeholders of a company (i.e. directors, managers and 
shareholders); while the latter focuses on the Board of Directors functioning and Senior 
Management of the company. Indeed, Tricker (1984) states that « […] the governance 
                                               
9 Clarke (2004) reckons that corporate governance is as «the cyclical nature of corporate governance 
failures, which he predicted was likely to continue» 
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role is not concerned with the running of the business of the company per se, but with 
giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive 
actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and 
regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries».  
 
2.2.2.2 The extensive approach, structure and process 
Corporate Governance extensive approach is the opposite than restrictive approach. The 
formers is ‘[...] a set of rules, institutions, practices and formal bodies that govern the 
balancing of the interests of the different stakeholders’ of the company (Zattoni, 2004). 
It emphasizes, therefore, the importance attributed to the fulfilment of the expectations 
of all those who, for various reasons, interact with firm activities. This approach is also 
referred to in the literature as the stakeholder view (Freeman, 1984), as it is emphasized 
the link between the company and the environment in which it operates. In literature 
there are many definitions of the stakeholder view/approach, for instance Salomon 
(2007: 14) argues that it is «[…] the system of checks and balances, both internal and 
external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to 
all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity».  
The focus, therefore, is the fulfilment of all the interests of the stakeholders who 
contribute to the improvement of the economic growth. Stakeholders can be defined as 
«individuals and constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its 
wealth-creating capacity and activities, and who are therefore its potential beneficiaries 
and/or risk bearers» (Post et al., 2002: 8). Like for the restrictive concept of corporate 
governance, there are two different perspectives of corporate governance. The latter 
could be studied as: a) process, b) structure. 
The majority believes
 
(Bruni, 2002; Lanoo, 1995; Ferraris Franceschi, 2008; Pilotti and 
Rullani, 2007) that corporate governance is a set of processes, rules, duties, procedures 
and mechanisms that are substantiated in enterprise system management, control and 
communication
 
systems of the firm
 
(Quagli, 2004; Mio, 2005). In this regard, interests 
to protect not only are those of the shareholders (typical of the restrictive view), but also 
those of the people who in various ways are involved in the company. The protection of 
those interests is developed through a complex system of relationships between the 
environment and institutional features of the firm. It is intended, therefore, to put in 
place a "system of mechanisms” of incentive (Del Giudice and Capizzano, 2006; 
Forestieri and Iannotta, 2005; Mathiesen, 2002; Kose and Senbet, 1998) to the creation 
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or maintenance of relationships between the company and its stakeholders. This is 
fundamental in order to satisfy all the relevant expectations, according to a logic of 
corporate social responsibility (Clarkson, 1995; Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Matten 
and Moon, 2004; Mio, 2005) and to increase corporate value
 
(Huse, 2006). The 
existence and transparency in relationships among different stakeholders contribute to 
generate and trigger a virtuous cycle that allows firm to attract resources necessaries for 
firms. Those resources consequently allow the creation of an economic production for 
the market, designed to meet interests and needs of the stakeholders, thus generating the 
so-called competitive advantage
 
(Porter, 1995). In this regard, the critical governance 
tasks is to ensure effective negotiations, coordination, cooperation, and conflict 
resolution to maximize and distribute the joint gains among all stakeholders. In the 
same vein, Rasmussen and Huse (2011) define corporate governance as a set of 
relationship between internal and external actors where the board of directors should 
create value for company 
The minority stream (Coda,
 
1997; Bussoli, 2011; Molteni, 2004), however, argues that 
corporate governance is the structure of a company. In particular, it regards the 
functioning of control and monitoring bodies of a company, with the focus on 
relationships between firm bodies and the managerial structure. We consider, therefore, 
the set of standards
10
, rules, tools, functions that binds the apical structures and 
members with all stakeholders in business, helping to determine the characteristics of 
the structure and functioning of companies. (Bianchi Martini et al., 2006).  
It is fundamental to understand rules, corporate bodies and activities through which 
stakeholders can exert control over those who act within the company (i.e. 
management), in order to protect their interests (Kose and Senbet, 1998). It is 
interesting to note that, according to this perspective, the control is no longer exerted by 
shareholders over management, but by all those stakeholders (including risk capital 
providers).  
In summa, the difference between process and structure within the extensive approach is 
that the former studies the phenomena of coordination as such processes are managed in 
a consistent manner, respecting the subject who for various reasons are business-related. 
The latter (structure) states that the firm as a nexus of specific investments (Rajan and 
                                               
10 "Standards" refers to both the economic and business rules that govern the production combinations is 
the set of legal provisions which are aimed at ‘[...] to regulate the relations of power between shareholders 
and management, [...], and achieve an equitable settlement of the expectations of all stakeholders in the 
management and results of the company and to prevent the structural crisis that could jeopardize the 
legitimacy of the institutions that underpin a market economy’. (Barile and Gatti, 2007). 
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Zingales, 1998) where rigid set of mechanisms to protect all stakeholders interests co-
exist. 
A concept which includes both cross-streams of research (structure and process), under 
the concept of corporate governance broadly, is that of institutional framework, i.e. a 
“container” for all the elements and variables that compose the enterprise system. In 
sum, the main issues are stakeholders and their contributions to the company, their 
rewards (earnings), all the mechanisms and structures that govern the relationships 
between their contributions and rewards (Airoldi and Forestieri, 1998). Defining the 
institutional framework means to determine the boundary of the firm with respect to the 
environment and, in particular, it declines in: 
- Outlining the ownership; 
- Identifying the firm legal form (cooperative, partnership, corporation, business group); 
- Establishing the composition and functioning of the organs of government and 
corporate control; 
- Specifying interaction ways between the company and stakeholders; 
- Setting the rules of relationships among companies (business groups, joint ventures, 
etc.)
 
(Santesso, 2010)
11
. 
This approach is similar to that outlined in the international arena by (Daily et al., 2003) 
define governance «as the determination of the broad uses to which organizational 
resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts myriad among participants in 
organizations». 
Ultimately, crossing the two dimensions (restrictive/extensive approach and 
structure/process) it is possible to create a matrix within which different definitions of 
corporate governance are identified. It should be noted that the four quadrants are not 
considered as black boxes, but rather "osmotic boxes." This means that the four 
dimensions identified are not mutually exclusive to each other, and there may be 
transverse definitions of corporate governance or common elements (Table 2.1). 
 
 
                                               
11 Two main criticisms are made: : a) the difficulty in creating a real balancing of the interests of all 
stakeholders, b) the weak correlation between contributions made by business actors and their rewards 
(Zangrandi, 2008) 
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Table 2.1 Summary of Corporate Governance
 
approaches
 
 
  FOCUS 
  
STRUCTURE PROCESS 
A
P
P
R
O
A
C
H
 
RESTRICTIVE 
- “Structured interface” 
- Ways in which firm is 
governed 
- Board of directors versus 
shareholders 
- Set of internal forces that affect 
firm processes 
- Set of mechanisms that 
influence firm decisions 
EXTENSIVE 
- Structure and functioning of 
the control/monitoring bodies 
- Rules, principles and 
recommendations which 
discipline relations among 
stakeholder 
- Relationship between 
shareholders and stakeholders  
- Fulfilment of all stakeholders’ 
expectations  
- High attention to social and 
economic context 
Source: our elaboration 
 
2.3 Comparison between International and National Corporate Governance 
Models  
It is necessary to point out that ‘Every country system is characterized by systems of 
corporate governance quite peculiar because of the strong influence that the laws, 
institutions and social norms, developed and consolidated with the passage of time, 
exercising on the characteristics and functioning of mechanisms of corporate 
governance’ (Zattoni, 2006: 202). Literature, however, agrees that the corporate 
governance models are based on two archetypes: the Anglo-Saxon and German-
Japanese models (Cavalieri and Ferraris Franceschi, 2008 Airoldi and Forestieri, 1998 
Fortuna, 2001; Cernat, 2004; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn, 1997, Franks and Mayer, 
1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Cernat, 
2004). The Italian model is defined as "mixed", hybrid, spurious
 
(Fabbri, 1998; Melis, 
2000; Zattoni, 2005) model that present some common and different features with the 
international models. 
The Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the United Kingdom and the United States) 
adopt the outsider-type model system (Jungmann, 2007), i.e. the financial market solves 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and management. In particular, the capital 
market is able to regulate the management and encourage the value creation for 
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shareholders. In a nutshell, this means «market for corporate control» (Singh, 1992). 
This approach is also called market-oriented, to identify the ‘strong fractionation of the 
property typical of companies listed on regulated financial markets’ (Fortuna, 2001: 90-
92), i.e. «market for corporate control» (Singh, 1992). It follows, therefore, that Public 
Company is the most prevalent type of firm in this context which is characterized by a 
pulverization of capital among a multitude of heterogeneous shareholders
 
(Fabbrini and 
Montrone, 2006; Salvioni, 2007, Zingales, 1995; Brennan and Franks, 1997). Given the 
high fragmentation of ownership, these companies are more prone to the phenomenon 
of “contestability of control” which is expressed through the mechanism of the take-
over (Perna, 1998; Cisnetto, 2000; Deaki and Slinger, 1997; Shleifer and Summers, 
1988). It is a mechanism by which a person proposes to shareholders to purchase their 
shares at a price higher than the market value, as the latter appears to be excessively 
lower than the real value that the company could generate if it were directed and 
managed efficiently. The depreciation of shares, then, in this case is not due to 
macroeconomic reasons, but rather to conduct evaluations of inefficient production unit. 
Take-over is an instrument of the “market for corporate control”, as the financial 
market is potentially in a position to exercise control of the company through the 
acquisition of the shares at a higher price than the market. 
In the case where the financial market is totally efficient, and then in case of extreme 
pulverization of the property, this could lead to dual effects: 
a) the decrease in funding by banks, as shareholders would be able to take out 
sufficient capital for the growth and development of the company; 
b) an increase in incentives and control of managers’ activities with remuneration 
schemes performance-related (e.g. stock options)
 
(Hart, 1995). 
It also notes that ‘the relationships between the various categories of economic agents 
are realized in the almost complete absence of regulatory obligations’ (Fortuna, 2001: 
117-118). This is the common law legal system. The market, therefore, monitors and 
guides the behaviour of the management. The legal framework adopted by the Anglo-
Saxon countries is monistic, i.e. one-tier system
 
(Kluge, 2005).This means that there is 
only one level (tier) for appointment by the shareholders, who co-opts board of directors 
members. One-tier system indicates that the role of management and surveillance is 
concentrated in a single body (i.e. the Board) (Reichert, 2008). Thus, it is crucial to 
distinguish between executive directors (inside directors) and external non-executive 
directors (outside directors), as the former have operational functions and delegation; 
while others do not hold or managerial duties and have the task to make a technical 
contribution - professional acquired outside the company. It should be noted that within 
the board of directors is set up the Audit Committee (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2 The monistic model  
 
Source: our elaboration 
 
Given the high fragmentation of the capital, such legal system would provide 
shareholders of the control of subjects who will manage their own firm. Indeed, board 
of directors is the direct expression of shareholders. 
It is fundamental to focus on subjects who fulfil control activities within one-tier 
system. The control activity is inherent to corporate governance patterns, as it can be 
traced to the development of processes aimed at improving the business decisions and 
the activation of mechanisms to facilitate the correct orientation of management 
behaviour in relations with firm objectives. Control, then, is characterized by a complex 
process with a multitude of mechanisms. Indeed, the latter is characterized by a 
multitude of different subjects: internal organs to the company (the board of directors, 
auditors, the audit committee, the Committee for Internal Control, Internal Audit, etc.) 
and external auditors (statutory auditor, external firms auditors, watchdogs of financial 
markets etc.) (Ruud, 2003; Jungmann, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Nordberg, 2011; Corbella, 
1999, Paletta, 2008, Gandini, 2004). 
The efficiency of financial market determines the supervision of activities carried out by 
the board of directors.
 
Directors
 
should carry out their functions in order to satisfy 
shareholders interests; indeed they act primarily to achieve their own profit goals. 
Shareholders are able to directly control the actions of managers through the direct 
appointment of directors. Recent scandals of Public Companies (Enron, WorldCom, 
Shareholders 
Audit Committee 
Board of directors  
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Parmalat, etc.) have reported deficits in the control system (Coffee, 2005; Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2007). 
However, some criticisms have been levelled at one-tier system. First, managers are 
actually persons who control the company, even if they are not owners, and may take 
advantage of their role as "internal" to ensure a power position. Second, such legal 
system has a strategic focus on the short term and an orientation towards speculative 
operations, which do not relate to the core business of the company (Ricciardi, 2002).
 
The Anglo-Saxon model mainly adopts the restrictive concept of corporate governance, 
as it focuses on the dichotomous relationship between shareholders and management 
and corporate governance is functional to exclusive protection of the interests of 
owners. 
 
By contrast, the German-Japanese model adopts the insider system, also known as 
relationship-based or network-oriented corporate systems. In this regard, there is a poor 
presence of the financial market and an effective and influential presence of financial 
intermediaries (banks) which provide risk capital. This model, in fact, adopts a 
perspective bank - oriented. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon countries, ownership of companies 
is concentrated: it includes few owners who hold the majority of shares. The 
institutional structure of these companies, then, is characterized by a high degree of 
concentration and counts among the main shareholders financial intermediaries, other 
family businesses and for international investors, i.e. the so-called blockholder
 
(Bolton 
and Von Thadden, 1998). In particular, the shareholders are distinguished mainly into 
two categories, i.e. a) "hard core", b) "horses park."  
a) The "hard core" (or "hard core" or "noyau dur") (Groenewegen, 2000; Palpacuer, 
2006; Montefiori, 2009) consists of a group of shareholders that in this case correspond 
to banks and State.
 
It should be noted that this model is characterized by a cooperative 
relationship between the company - banks - states. It is characterized by having a strong 
decision-making role, also because of the huge financial resources invested by way of 
equity capital.  
b)The "horse park" is made up of investors who hold shares for speculative purposes, or 
as a form of temporary investments. Those kinds of shareholders are not directly 
involved in business management.
 
It is interesting to note that in the German–Japanese 
model, by virtue of the presence of the "hard core" the floating capital is necessarily 
reduced, and thus the risk of hostile take-over is greatly reduced compared to the 
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archetype Anglo-Saxon. In this case, the acquisition of the majority is usually done with 
the consents of shareholders and managers, and for this reason it is defined as “friendly 
take-over” (Sorci and Faldetta, 2008). 
Last but not least, it is important to point out that the company is inclined to find a 
compromise between the interests of different stakeholders, given the presence of the 
fractional share. This model is a better development and consolidation in the context of 
civil law: the legal guarantees and protects the interests of "stakeholders." The legal 
framework that ensures the proper functioning of the corporate governance is called 
dualistic or two-tier system/model (Kluge, 2005; Andreas et al., 2012). The latter 
indicates that there are two levels (tiers) of appointments. In particular, shareholders' 
meeting appoints the Supervisory Board representing the supervisory non-executive 
director with responsibility for monitoring the performance of management (i.e. first 
level of appointment). The Supervisory Board, in turn, appoints the board of directors 
that engages in the management and business management (i.e. second level of 
appointment) (Figure 2.3).
 
 
Figure 2.3 The dualistic or vertical model 
 
 
Source: our elaboration 
It is noteworthy to point out that Japan and Germany present corporate governance 
characteristics very similar (in fact, the literature has outlined the so-called German–
Japanese model). However, two governance systems have some peculiarities that make 
it different from each other and they could be potentially viewed as two different 
models. The features related to both models are: cross-shareholding (i.e. the cross 
Shareholders 
appoint 
Supervisory board 
appoints 
Board of directors 
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holdings), the bank-company relation and banks are owners. A distinguishing feature of 
the Japanese model is the "work -centric non-institutionalized", i.e. cooperation between 
the firm and employees (represented by labour unions) which aimed to foster economic 
growth. The maximization of shareholders and employees interests fulfilment is a 
spontaneous process, established over time; while German laws impose a relationship 
between employers and the board. The German legislation requires, in fact, that the 
supervisory board is made up also by the workers. In addition, Japanese corporate 
structure is characterized primarily by large corporate groups (Keiretsu), while the 
German one is composed by medium-sized companies. Finally, despite the bank-
company characterizes both models, it is noted that banks remain owners over time in 
German companies, while in the case of Japanese banks hold shares only in the period 
in which the company needs capital funding (Bosetti, 2010; Allen and Zhano, 2007; 
Gugler, 2005). 
The German–Japanese model indeed is based on the extensive conception of corporate 
governance and stakeholder view, as it is assigned important and decisive roles to all 
stakeholders towards company.
 
Employees, in fact, are part of the supervisory board; 
therefore have the task of monitoring the management performance (Baus, 1999). The 
aim is to achieve and foster a balance between forces and interests which are internal 
and external of the firm (Williamson, 1998).
 
Unlike outsider system, in insider system control is not exercised by the capital market, 
because ownership is concentrated and majority shareholders, involved in the 
management, are able to influence strategic decisions. The control activity over 
management is then implemented by blockholder (institutional investors, lenders, etc.) 
who monitor management through the co-opting of directors.
 
It is interesting to note that 
the manager could be seen both as a subject to be checked and as the "controller". In 
other words, he/she is seen as a mediator between the shareholders and other 
stakeholders (e.g. employees), as arbitrator in terms of maximizing the economic value 
of the company, as the manager should be able to find out a point of convergence 
'objective to which all are interested (Guatri and Vicari, 1994; Podesta, 1993; Aoki, 
1994). 
Some criticisms of the German-Japanese model concern the relationship with banks 
which are shareholders. It is called relational bond which means a stable and long-
lasting relationship which involves a continuous exchange of information and ideas 
(Fiori and Tiscini, 2005). Given this type of relation, there is a business management 
barred to all those people unwelcome to banks. The strong decision-making role of the 
"hard core" tends to direct the strategic choices and operational management in the 
interest of shareholders. Minority shareholders also are not able to have an adequate 
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representation and an appropriate protection of their interests, given the lack of 
decision-making power. 
 
Melis (2005) and Molteni (1997) state that foreign literature focuses its research 
primarily on the two archetypes of governance models (Anglo-Saxon and German-
Japanese one) and that the Italian case is not directly attributable to them. Indeed, 
‘there are clear characteristics of industrial structure and corporate ownership structure, 
financing circuits’ (Airoldi and Forestieri, 1998). In Italy, there are no large companies 
which diffuse ownership (as outsider system) or financial intermediaries which are 
shareholders (as insider system). Banks, in fact, do not confer risk capital, but credit 
capital, so they do not take part in the firm management and administration. Bank 
indebtedness, in fact, represents the largest source of financing for Italian companies 
(Bianco and Casavola, 1999; Melis, 2000). 
It is interesting to note that the Italian model has two distinctive features in common 
with the German-Japanese model or insider system. In particular, in both cases, the 
property is concentrated, i.e. it detects the presence of a few strong shareholders (the so-
called blockholder). However, main shareholders in German-Japanese model are banks 
and institutional investors, while the one in the Italian blockholder are mainly members 
of the family and the State. In addition, the legal framework in which German, Japanese 
and Italian firms act, is the same, i.e. civil law. It is therefore characterized by a system 
of rules and aggregate, systemic and legal standards. 
It should be noted that the Italian model is characterized by being hybrid, spurious, not 
related to the two archetypes identified in the literature. As regards the common traits 
with the Anglo-Saxon model, we find that over the years is gradually approaching the 
shareholder view, which is mentioned in the Italian code of corporate governance for 
listed companies. 
Characteristics of the national corporate governance model present some features that 
differ from two archetypes. 
Italian firms, characterized by a high concentration of ownership, can be divided into 
two main different types: a) business groups
12
 owned by family or State (Moro 
                                               
12 Business groups can be defined as a «collection of formally independent firms under single common 
administrative and financial control» (Chang and Hong, 2002: 266). In the same vein, Hseih et al. (2010: 
560) state that business group is «collection of legally independent corporate entities that are established 
under the same control and ownership, each not only sustaining independent firm objectives, but also 
acting to meet the shared goals of the business group».  
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Visconti, 2001; Montrone, 2005), b) small and medium sized family businesses or 
SMEs aggregated into constellations. However, Zattoni (2006) identifies six different 
types of Italian companies: a) small and medium sized family businesses, b) small and 
medium-sized enterprises aggregated in form of “constellations” and located mainly 
within districts, c) the large pyramidal groups controlled by individual family or by 
shareholders coalitions, d) large companies and large groups controlled by the State and 
local authorities, e) cooperatives and consortium, f) branches of foreign multinationals 
On the other hand, Guatri and Vicari (1994) focus their study on two archetypes of firm: 
a) family and State business groups, b) Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).  
 
In general, firms are characterized by a majority shareholder or a group of shareholders 
bound by the agreement of the union. It should be noted that under the pressure of 
globalization of financial market and European integration, companies are starting to get 
a new road that would lead them to be influenced by Anglo-Saxon model and then the 
outsider system (Bianco and Trento, 1995). Main shareholders are members of the 
family or holding where the family is the controlling shareholder. It follows that 
corporate ownership is constituted by the blockholder, i.e. few owners who hold 
majority and therefore have a strong decision-making power. The latter ensures a more 
stable ownership, compared to companies such as Anglo-Saxon, as well as approve 
strategic plan which is shared and homogeneous. 
Given the high concentration of corporate ownership, the control system of 
management is entrusted to blockholders (individual owner or group of few owners), 
rather than to the market or to the board of directors. This corporate structure is typical 
of countries that have a legal system of civil law. In particular, in the Italian model there 
is a kind of insider control which is exercised by ownership. This system of governance 
is also defined insider system of the Latin type to differentiate it from the German one. 
The former foresees that the majority shareholders control managers by the board of 
directors, while the latter provides a strong participation in the control of employers and 
banks (Melis, 2000; Luo, 2006).  
The advantage of insider system of the Latin type is that the control over management is 
direct, i.e. blockholder controls directly managers’ activities. It follows that the control, 
executed by owners on managers, should avoid or minimize any opportunistic 
behaviour that the former could implement. This results in a minimization of so-called 
problems or agency costs which represent the peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
The risk, however, is the high possibility of collusion and connivance between the 
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management and the majority shareholder, to the detriment of the interests of minority 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
The criticisms of the national model of corporate governance are mainly three: 
1. difficulty in finding financial resources; 
2. little will and scarce need to increase the company due to the threat of losing 
firm control; 
3. poor communication to external investors. 
First, the difficulty in finding financial resources is due to concentrated ownership: 
belong to the same family. It follows, therefore, that there is a high level of 
indebtedness to banks and low level of equity.  
Secondly, little will and scarce need to increase the company, due to the threat of losing 
firm control, leads to two main consequences: a) the aforementioned high level of 
indebtedness to banks; b) the stock exchange does not seem to be a valid tool for 
finding financial resources. Owners, in fact, may see access to Capital Company by 
third parties which can compromise the ownership stability and decision-making power. 
Furthermore, owners have no incentive to list company on stock market due to both the 
lack of protection of minority shareholders and the no application of rules.
. 
The common 
law countries, however, would ensure greater protection of minority shareholders 
(Lazzari, 2001).  
Finally, it is often assumed that family members hold an absolute majority and thus it is 
guaranteed a stable ownership, there could be also shared strategic plans, and a lack of 
"openness" towards the environment. In other words, there may be a tendency to limit 
communication to external investors or stakeholders, making it difficult paths valuation 
put in place by the latter. 
Italian firms are then characterized by: 
- significant presence of the State; 
- poorly active role of institutional investors; 
- strong presence of households; 
- little active stock market; 
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- strong presence of banks in financial capital, rather than in the equity.
 
In this way, 
lenders do not perform the function of monitoring, typical of the German-Japanese 
model. 
The typical Italian legal framework of governance is "traditional" or otherwise called 
"two-tier horizontal" (Figure 2.4). 
 
 Figure 2.4 The traditional model or dualistic horizontal model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: our elaboration 
 
Two-tier horizontal model is coined by Lacchini (2002) to indicate that the system of 
corporate governance requires that shareholders' meeting appoints both the Board of 
Directors and the supervisory board. They are, therefore, lacking the two levels of 
appointment, which characterize dualistic vertical model or two-tier system. In the 
traditional or two-tier horizontal model, the board of directors defines the strategic and 
organizational actions. Within the board, committees (as in the one-tier model) could be 
set up which they are assigned specific tasks. The Supervisory Board (appointed by the 
shareholders) is the body responsible for the control and supervision of compliance with 
legislation in the broad sense (Lacchini, 2002; Fiord and Tiscini, 2005; Gugler, 2005). It 
should be noted that in view of European integration and globalization, the Italian 
legislator has rearranged and integrated principles and rules of corporate governance 
within single body of law. Lawmaker predicts, for example, the opportunity for Italian 
companies to adopt either one-tier system or the two-tier one, instead of traditional 
system (Gandini et al., 2009).  
Below, we report characteristics of the two archetypes of corporate governance (the 
Anglo-Saxon model and the German-Japanese model) and the Italian model (Table 2.2). 
Shareholders 
 
Board of Directors 
 
Supervisory Board 
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Table 2.2 Conceptual Map of comparative corporate governance models
 
Countries 
Governance 
Systems 
Financial 
Source 
Ownership Firm 
Board 
Systems 
UK -USA 
Outsider 
system 
Market 
Strong 
division 
Public 
company 
One tier 
D - J 
Insider 
system 
Bank 
High 
concentration 
Blockholder Two tier 
IT 
Latin Insider 
system 
“irregular 
case” 
High 
concentration 
Pyramidal 
group + 
SME’s 
Traditional 
Source: our elaboration 
 
It is interesting to note that in recent decades we are witnessing rapid economic growth 
of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) that has led 
some authors
 
(Estrin and Prefer, 2010; Epstein, 2012) to outline a third possible 
archetype of corporate governance, BRIC model. The latter is characterized by a 
stakeholder view that corporate ownership is concentrated and is characterized by the 
strong role played by the State or by some families. The system of controls, though still 
weak and fragmented, is entrusted to stakeholders but in particular to the state. What 
emerges from the BRICS model of corporate governance is strong and the real risk of 
corruption existing between the state and business, thanks to a significant weakness in 
the stock market and the lack of a solid legal system – legislation (Gerlach, 1992; 
Heugens et al., 2009; Lubrano, 2007; Campos and Iootty, 2007). 
 
2.4 International Theories of Corporate Governance 
In addition, before explaining theories on the basis of Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese 
and Italian models, it may be useful to describe main features of corporate governance 
international theories, i.e. Agency, Stakeholders, Stewardship, Resource Dependence 
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theories
13
. They are the cornerstone of corporate governance and the pillars of corporate 
governance models. It appears necessary to highlight the main features of theories to 
better understand mechanisms, properties of Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese, Italian 
models. 
 
2.4.1 Agency Theory 
The dominant theoretical perspective applied in corporate governance is agency theory 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Daily et al., 2003). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) propose agency theory
14
 as an explanation of how companies 
(especially public company) could operate, given the main assumptions that managers 
are self-interested and a context where those managers do not care about the full wealth 
effects of their decisions. In particular, they define agency relationship as a contract in 
which one party (the principal, i.e. shareholders) gives other party (the agent, i.e. 
management) decision-making power to perform business activities on its behalf. That 
may be the first adequate explanation of public companies mechanisms since Berle and 
Means (1932) observed the key problems regarding the separation between ownership 
and control.  
In this pattern, management and ownership are separated, and management, who are 
shareholders’ agents, could not necessarily act in the best interest of shareholders owing 
to the divergence of interests, and therefore resources are not expended to maximise the 
latter’s wealth (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gillan, 2006; 
Gonzalez and Garay, 2003). However, according to Fama and Jensen (1985), if there 
were fully competitive markets for products, labour and corporate control, there would 
not be costs of agency, because self-interested managers would maximize their wealth 
by maximising shareholder value.  
In general terms, basic agency problems arise because of the separation between 
decision-making which is carried out by managers and the bearing of residual risks by 
                                               
13 It is noteworthy that other theoretical perspectives may exist, such as institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Eisenhardt et al., 1997), transaction cost theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Williamson, 
1996) What is important is that every theory of corporate governance is founded on a view on the 
legitimate relationship among firm subjects and between firma and environment (Tricker, 2009). 
14 It should be noted that international contributions believe that the authorship of the agency theory is 
due to Jensen and Meckling (1976), and that - even before - Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1947) 
were the supporters and inspirers of same . Indeed, Cerboni (1886; 1894; 1902), considered the greatest 
exponent of the account personalistic theory father and accounting application called Logismography, 
hrhad the intuition of the dichotomous relationship between ownership and control. The Logismography, 
in fact, is based on the contrast between the owner and the agency (i.e., stakeholders and the 
corresponding) which exist between the economic and legal relations . It is clear, therefore, that the same 
had identified a direct relationship between the ownership and administration, intended as the only two 
subjects that characterize the firm. Cerboni then threw in fact the basis for the agency theory which in 
later years has been studied by several authors (Coronella, 2007). 
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owners. Agency problems are costly controlled due to the impossibility of perfectly 
contracting for the actions of an agent whose decisions impact both his/her own wealth 
and principal wealth (Brennan, 1995). It is interesting to point out that Clacher et al. 
(2010) identify type I and type II agency costs. Type I agency costs are defined as the 
value loss to shareholders rising from the cost of minimizing divergences of interest 
between shareholders and managers. In this regard, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
indentify three types of costs, namely monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. 
Monitoring costs are expenditures paid by shareholders to measure, observe, and control 
the agent behaviour. These costs could include audits, cost of hiring and firing top 
managers, writing executive compensation contracts. Bonding costs are related to the 
fact that agents have to set up mechanisms/structures what will see them acting in 
shareholders’ best interests. This kind of agency cost, which is borne by agent, may 
include effort of providing accurate and timely information to principal (Clacher et al., 
2010). Finally, residual loss arises from conflicts of interest between shareholder and 
managers, due to the lack of alignment of interests. Residual loss represents the net loss 
(in excess of any accrued benefits) from enforcing suboptimal incentive contracts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Clacher et al., 2010). However, agency costs type I take 
into account only the United States characterized by atomistic shareholders which do 
not own enough equity to exert influence over managers. 
Considering the importance of minority shareholder rights (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000), and family firms ownership structure (Stein, 1988/1989), type II agency costs 
arises. They may include controlling minority shareholders, investment motivates in 
family firms and cost of succession. Controlling minority shareholders problem may 
arise as a consequence of the conflict between controlling (majority) and non-
controlling (minority) shareholders, especially when founding family owners have 
control over the firm despite owning only few shares. Clacher et al. (2010: 151) suggest 
that «By controlling the firm through majority voting rights, family owners can 
undertake actions that expropriate wealth from noncontrolling shareholders». This may 
occur because the controlling stake allows family owners to marginalize non-controlling 
owners (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). Investment motivates in family firms problem may 
arise from the fact that controlling family ownership may also lead to suboptimal 
investment decisions and may undertake strategies which are in contrast with minority 
shareholders’ interests. Finally, costs of succession regards that during company 
existence, firm passes from one generation to the next leading to a loss of talent, and 
expertise (Mork et al., 2000). As a result of successive intergenerational transfers of the 
firm, performance will decrease and affect small shareholders (Clacher et al. 2010). 
It follows that agency theory seeks to identify and strength the mechanism which may 
minimize management’s opportunistic behaviour in order to reduce negative effects on 
shareholder wealth (Kosnik, 1987). 
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In this regard, agency theorists reckon that the board of directors is one of possible 
solutions to agency problems within the company through their role as the internal link 
between owners and managers and gatekeeper of shareholder interests (Certo et al., 
2006; Choi et al., 2005; Filatotchev et al., 2005).  
Finally, looking at corporate governance under the lens of agency theory enables 
researchers to study the relationship between governance processes and corporate 
performance (Tricker, 2009). In particular, they test hypotheses according to which 
casual relation between governance systems, established to control the agent, and the 
effect on principal interests may exist. Indeed, agency theory provides statistically 
rigorous insights into corporate governance processes (Tricker, 2009). Given the model 
simplicity and the availability of both reliable data and statistical tests, agency theory 
offers a powerful approach to corporate governance. Moreover, agency theory practice 
focuses at level of shareholders and boards of directors as entities. All inter-personal 
relations and level activities are considered as black box (Huse et al., 2009). Therefore, 
researcher does not need access to the boardroom or individual directors. He/she uses 
data available in the public domain, for instance data contained into annual report, 
financial database. 
Figure 2.5 depicts the interaction and relationship among principal, agent and board of 
director where the latter acts as a “platform” between two parties, i.e. it seeks to mediate 
demands and interests of principal and agent. 
 
Figure 2.5 Agency relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration on Tricker (2009) 
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2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory  
The stakeholder theory initially dealt with those groups without whose support the 
company cease to exist (Freeman, 1984). However, this view has been expanded 
including any individual or group who can affect or is influenced by the firm activities 
(Freeman, 2010; Sternberg, 1997). The pillar of stakeholder theory is that companies 
play by creating value for which others freely trade. In other words firms should be 
governed for the benefit and interests of all stakeholders, i.e. customers, employees, 
suppliers, communities as well as managers and shareholders. Hence, the firm is a 
system where its purpose is to create wealth for all its stakeholders, including 
shareholders (Clarkson, 1995), because all of them participate in business to obtain 
benefits. It follows that it becomes fundamental to understand the needs of the different 
stakeholders and how they are affected by firm activities (Freeman et al., 2004). In this 
regard, the board is seen as the means through which the company can take into account 
various interests of stakeholders group and individuals who affect the firms activities 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Freeman, 2010; Freeman et al., 2004). So, the board 
duty is consider wide range of interests when deciding how to employ firm resources, 
not only to maximize shareholders’ value but all stakeholders’ wealth. Unlike agency 
theory according to which managers are acting and serving for shareholders, 
stakeholders theorists posit that managers have a network of relationship to serve. Thus, 
the group of network is important other than owner-manager relation as in agency 
theory (Freeman, 1999). In the same vein, Turnbull (1997) points out the importance of 
a broader stakeholder view, as expectations of firms are changing with increasing 
demands for better consumer, environmental and social behaviour.  
 
2.4.3 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory is initially defined as a direct challenge to agency theory 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In particular, managers are considered as good and 
trustworthy stewards of firm assets who do not tend to have inappropriate and 
opportunistic behaviour (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). 
The stewardship theory states that managers are not prone to self-serving conduct, 
hence their behaviour and actions are aligned with those of shareholders, and this is 
possible through appropriate incentives and rewards (Davis et al., 1997). It follows that 
stewardship theory does not necessarily consider the separation with ownership and 
control like a problem, but like a positive development that may lead to an effective 
management of the company. Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory states that 
managers do not always act to maximize their own personal interests; i.e. they could 
play their role responsibly with independence and integrity. Stewardship theory 
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recognizes the importance of structures that empower the manager-steward and provide 
autonomy to act thanks to trust relationship between owner and manager (Donaldoson 
and Davis, 1991). This may minimize the costs of monitoring and controlling behaviour 
of agents (Davis et al., 1997). In this regard, each company is incorporated as a separate 
legal entity (Tricker, 2009). Shareholders appoint directors who act as stewards for their 
interests. Managers report to the former on the results of stewardship. Ownership is the 
basis of power over the company. Managers accept a fiduciary duty to be stewards of 
shareholders’ interests, indeed the belief that managers can be trusted is one of the 
pillars of the stewardship theory. Moreover, stewardship theory recommends unifying 
the role of the CEO and the chairman in order to reduce agency costs and to have 
greater role as steward within company. Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between 
shareholders and managers.  
 
Figure 2.6 Relationship between principal and agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration on Tricker (2009: 224) 
 
Indeed, the depth of knowledge, commitment, and access to current operating 
information and technical expertise of managers are fundamental to the effective 
running of the company than any potential agency conflicts that may arise (Learmounnt, 
2002). Thus, stewardship theory changes the focus; i.e. highlights the importance of the 
concentration of power and authority in the hands of managers rather than the board, in 
order to foster the firm performance. In addition, according to steward theory managers 
have to recognize the interests of all stakeholders (e.g. customers, employees, suppliers, 
etc.) but their first responsability is towards shareholders. For example, a family 
founded a firm but no longer control, so it appoints directors who look after the interests 
of family and not necessarily of other shareholders or stakeholders. 
 
Principal (shareholders) 
Agent (managers) 
Who accept a fiduciary duty to 
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To protect their interests 
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2.4.4 Resource Dependence Theory  
The Resource Dependence Theory argues that the firm’s internal resources and 
capabilities are critical for creating its competitive advantage (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990; Ayuso and Argandoña, 2007). Companies may be suffered a lack or scarcity of 
internal resources and internal knowledge (Storey, 1994). So, in order to get over this 
situation, the board of directors is a fundamental source of expertise that complements 
management with their knowledge, skills and professional experience. Boards may be 
helpful to the company in providing advice and counselling to managers in case of 
limited or lacking inside knowledge. Moreover, resource dependence theory believes 
that firm depends on its environment and other organisations for its economic success 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Johnson and Pillai, 2010). It follows that that unlike agency theory and 
stewardship one, the main issue is the relevance of external linkages and networks 
which are fundamental to increase power within society to, in turn, enhance the firm’s 
interests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pettigrew, 1992). In addition, the board of 
directors serves the means to manage the firm’s dependence on external suppliers of 
resources (Hillman et al., 2000) as well as to foster and consolidate its position and 
power in the market (Kosnik, 1987; Pettigrew, 1992). It follows that this theoretical 
approach suggests that the board is the focal link between the firm and its external 
network (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Indeed, directors are considered as «boundary-
spanning nodes of networks able to connect the business to its strategic environment» 
(Tricker, 2009). Those networks and external links are necessary in order to reduce 
uncertainty in corporate decisions. Consequently, directors are pivotal nodes within 
external network of firms and boards. For instance, chairman or CEO may be pivotal 
nodes in numerous networks, enhancing or adversely interfering with independent and 
objective governance activities. Thus, it is important to identify such networks and 
monitor their activities, providing another insight into governance powers and 
processes. Figure 2.7 simplifies the relations may exist according to Resource 
Dependence Theory. 
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Figure 2.7 Existing relationships according to Resource Dependence theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration 
 
2.5 Models and Theories of Corporate Governance 
Literature (Coase, 1947; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Parbonetti, 2006; Baker and 
Anderson, 2010; Cernat L., 2004, Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn, 1997;Franks and Mayer, 
1997) is unanimous in considering that the Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese are 
based respectively on agency theory and that of the stakeholders. There are no special 
contributions that highlight the relationship between the atypical Italian model and 
corporate governance theory. For this reason, we try to outline what theories might exist 
on the base of the national model. As the Italian case a model in its own right, having 
similar characteristics on the one hand and on the other the opposite characteristics to 
the two archetypes, the theory behind the corporate governance, therefore, cannot be 
exactly coincident with that detected in international models. 
It is noteworthy to point out that the identification of the theory of corporate 
governance is essential, in the opinion of the writer, in order to identify an empirical 
model designed to measure the corporate governance in the Italian productive 
combinations, this being the aim of the broader research project of PhD. 
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2.5.1 Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese models and International Theories 
Regarding the Anglo-Saxon model, the base theory is the agency theory focusing on the 
conflict between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers) (Jansson, 2005; 
Cernat L., 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Clarke 1998). Agency problems arise when 
there is a delegation of shareholders powers to managers, and both of them necessarily 
pursue different objectives. Indeed, shareholders require a regular income in the form of 
dividends, while management tends to maximize its own profit. It follows that the need 
of shareholders to monitor managers’ actions rises (Zattoni, 1999, 2006; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004). So it is required governance structure that safeguards the interests of 
shareholders; in the one-tier model, in fact, shareholders’ meeting appoint their 
representatives, i.e. board members. The presence of a dispersed and fragmented capital 
(i.e. Public Company) has determined, therefore, a separation between ownership and 
control. 
As for the German-Japanese model, the base theory is stakeholders one (Jansson, 2005; 
Clarke, 1998). Firm, in fact, cannot sacrifice interests of all stakeholders in order to 
maximize profit and foster economic growth (Sciarelli, 2002). The manager has the 
right and the duty to negotiate, engage and coordinate all stakeholders. In the dualistic 
model, the supervisory board is expected to attend, among others, workers' 
representatives and institutional investors. This confirms the importance that 
stakeholders play in the government of productive combinations (Guatri and Vicari, 
1994). 
 
2.5.2 Italian model and International Theories 
With regard to the Italian model, literature is not prolific on the theory of corporate 
governance that underlies such model, but it studies the function and main features of 
the “Italian case”. 
Moreover, the national model cannot lead back to two over described archetypes 
described above. The theory that is the base of the national corporate governance is not 
possible to link totally with no one of the over mentioned theories. It is noted that, in 
keeping with the contigency approach, it is not possible to identify a single theory with 
the Italian model, but some aspects of similarity with other theories can be found out. 
There is, in fact, no "one best way" to understand what is the best corporate governance 
system, so it may not exist a single theory behind the Italian model, but they may vary 
at the same changing environmental factors. Indeed, the complexity of economic and 
social context is also reflected in an expansion of possible solutions for companies, 
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leading to the coexistence of several models (Di Toro, 2010: 146) and theories of 
corporate governance. 
Indeed, it is possible to notice similar characters with agency theory, stakeholder and 
resource dependency. 
Italian companies have mainly concentrated ownership and are family businesses; 
therefore ownership structure is made up by blockholder (or "hard core") and 
minorities. One of problems is the relationship between majority and minority 
shareholder, namely some conflicts of interest between the blockholder and minorities 
could arise. Indeed, the former could take decisions that may damage minorities’ 
interests. Moreover, within pyramid group, decision-making process is centralized (i.e. 
holding decides strategic plans) and therefore decisions could be oriented to meet the 
objectives of the majority shareholders (Bianchi et al., 1997). In some cases, the 
subsidiaries may have, in fact, less discretion to act with respect to the holding, as it 
must be confined to realize the company's policy decided upstream. 
Consolidated financial statement is a powerful tool used by companies to provide clear 
and transparent information about the governance structure of the group and protections 
for minorities. However, empirical studies have shown that disclosure i does not 
provide the transparency requested by the financial market
 
(Montrone, 2004). 
The exercise of control enables its holders to benefit largely of private benefits. These 
are known as Private benefits of Control which are sources that are not shared among 
all shareholders in proportion of shares owned, but it is enjoyed by the majority 
(Barclay, 1989; Dick and Zingales, 2004). Unlike private benefits of control, shared 
benefits of control «arise from the superior management or monitoring that can result 
from the substantial collocation of decision rights and wealth effects that come with 
large-block ownership». (Holderness, 2003). In support of this, some empirical studies 
have put emphasize that «firm with cash flow valuation increases ownership in the 
hands of the largest shareholder» and «Increases in control rights by the largest 
shareholders are accompanied by declines in firm values» (Claesssens et al., 2002).  
The agency problems that characterize the Public Company could then be the same as 
those that characterize Italian firms. It is plausible to argue that the agency theory could 
be the basis of the Italian model. 
It is interesting to note that Italian researchers
 
(Bianco and Casavola, 1999; Melis, 2000; 
Fortuna, 2010) highlight the strong interaction between the company and its 
stakeholders. The fulfilment of stakeholders’ interests is fundamental to achieve and 
foster firm economic growth, since the latter is reaching safeguarding interests of all 
stakeholders. In this highly dynamic and changing environment (mainly due to the 
globalization of financial markets, crisis of all markets and companies) economic 
growth and fulfilment of stakeholders interests are closely related. The firm should pay 
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attention to stakeholders for at least two main reasons (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
First, it can be considered that their requests have intrinsic value, so the firm has the 
responsability to meet their legitimate claims. Second, addressing interests of 
stakeholders who have influence on the company can improve its profitability. In this 
regard, firm to be viable over time should demonstrate its ability both to achieve 
different objectives of different stakeholders and to distribute the value created in ways 
that maintain their commitment. 
Bankruptcies of Parmalat, Cirio, and Alitalia have shown that, there are many other 
stakeholders (e.g. employees, suppliers, customers, lenders) as well shareholders, who 
have paid consequences of company disruptions. Hence, the need to consider 
governance in a broader perspective arises; governance bodies should mediate different 
interests of the stakeholders and consider the expectations of all parties, when defining 
business objectives
 
(Huse, 2005; Solomon, 2011). It may happen that strategic decisions 
are entrusted specifically by few people, but the company's choices are placed in the 
interest of all stakeholders
 
(Fellegara, 2008). The need to establish relationships with 
various stakeholders and the fulfilment of their interests arise and develop within the 
current social-economic context which is highly dynamic and turbulent. The globalized 
market, the speed and the spread of information among different firms, and the external 
environment highlight the need to build relationships to be worth over time with all 
those who may - directly and indirectly - affect business management
 
(Salvioni, 2010). 
It also notes that the Italian business environment is characterized by the Small and 
Medium Enterprises in which shareholder coincides with the company manager. 
Ownership is highly concentrated, therefore, represents one of peculiar characteristics of 
the national system of corporate governance. It follows that the owner has a central role 
within the financial market. It is necessary to build relationships with all stakeholders 
(e.g. customers, suppliers, institutions, competitors, banks) which could contribute to 
the maximization of economic performance, as the company could have significant 
benefits from the business network and the relationships among different subjects. The 
owner-manager should create formal and informal ties aimed at increasing economic 
performance or firm value (Birley, 1985; Larson, 1992). Furthermore, it is important to 
focus not only on minorities but also on all other stakeholders that are closely related 
with firm and on fulfilment of their interests in order to create “good governance" and 
then a “good performance”. 
It follows, therefore, that the theory on the basis of Italian model could be the 
stakeholder theory. 
Another aspect to consider is that many Italian firms are characterized by being lumped 
in the form of constellations and located mainly within districts
 
(Fabiani et al., 2000). 
Industrial Districts are geographic areas where there are local agglomerations of SMEs 
specialised in one industry and sharing idiosyncratic, community-external externalities 
45 
 
(Marshall, 1921 cited by Asheim, 2003). They are characterized by strong collaboration 
links; this allows each individual company to mature a strong specialization that is able 
to bring a quid pluris within its own production cycle (Piore and Sabel, 1984). This 
concentration of firms in a specific area allows them to have a privileged access to 
inputs and resources. In order to reduce the uncertainty of external environment and 
thus to ensure the resources availability for the survival of the company, directors 
should fulfil the networking role. This means that directors of various companies (the 
so-called interlocking directors) must, therefore, intensify collaborations and synergies 
with other companies, in order to acquire information on markets and competitors in 
order to get a privileged access to resources and to counter any threats, to influence the 
activity of other companies
 
(Giubitta and Gianecchini, 2002). The networking function 
appears to be peculiar in two main situations: i) during the firm crisis, ii) on a regulated 
market, such as business districts. First, when a firm starts having negative 
performance, the board of directors or the owners seek to enter into agreements and 
partnerships with other companies in order to ensure and share the resources required to 
promote economic growth of their firm. Secondly, within a regulated market (e.g. 
industrial districts) the board of directors should consolidate the network of 
relationships, partnerships and synergies with other companies (belonging to the same 
‘filières’15) in order to obtain and share inputs needed for the achievement, maintenance 
and improvement of the economic growth.
 
These are main results obtained from an 
empirical study conducted in 2003, having as a sample of Italian firms medium – large 
(Zattoni et al., 2010). Similar results are yielded in other studies of Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Carter and Lorsh, 2004; Hillman, et al., 2000). 
Resource dependence theory focus on the need to get privileged access to inputs and 
therefore it is essential to the role of the board which has to establish and foster high 
relations between the changing environment and the company. Consequently, firms act 
in the changing and dynamic environment that binds and influences activities. It follows 
that the Italian model might have also the basis for the theory of resource dependency 
(Figure 2.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 ‘Filières’ includes complementary activities (Morvan, 1985), e.g. the production of shoe-production 
machinery if the ID is specialised in shoes (Fabiani et al., 2000). In other words, ‘filières’ or supply chain 
is a «network of organizations involved in the different processes and activities producing value in the 
form of products and services for the ultimate consumer» (Albino et al., 2007: 261) 
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Figure 2.8 Synoptic comparison and synthesis
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration 
 
Finally, it appears that the Italian model is based on three different opposing theories: 
agency theory, stakeholder and resource dependency. The coexistence of different 
perspectives is due to conditioning economic and social factors typical of national 
reality (Fortuna, 2001). The latter, in fact, is the result of the peculiar existence of 
different balances of interests and powers that characterize the company itself.  
 
2.6 Summary, Conclusions and Research Implications 
2.6.1 Summary 
Corporate governance debate becomes very important mainly in a moody, dynamic 
context as the actual one. Changes, created by the global competition, financial 
globalization and crisis, contribute to enforce the function of control, strategies 
definitions and networking of the company. 
Literature interprets corporate governance patterns using two antithetic models: the 
Anglo-Saxon and the German-Japanese ones. Corporate governance Italian model, 
instead, is an uncommon case because, although it presents some features in common 
with those two models, it owns high differences. Literature underlines the relation 
between the Anglo-Saxon model with the agency theory and the German-Japanese 
model with the stakeholders theory. However, literature does not clarify what is the base 
theory of the Italian corporate governance model. Starting from the point that the Italian 
case is a unique model, the corporate governance theory cannot be the same as the 
international models. This chapter contributes to understand the relationship between 
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the Italian corporate governance model and theories. In particular, it comes out that the 
Italian model is based mainly on three different theories: the agency, the stakeholders 
and the resource dependence theories. The coexistence of the different perspective is to 
ascribe to the influencing typical social-economic features of the national environment. 
Those ones are the result of the existence of various interests and balances marking out 
the company itself.  
Once identified the perspective or theoretical approach which better explains Italian 
model, it could be possible to identify research hypothesis, variables which could be 
tested. 
 
2.6.2 Conclusions and Research Implications 
Previous studies on the impact of governance issues of firm performance have focused 
almost solely on a single institutional setting, North America. Indeed, agency theory 
was born and developed in the US where the separation between ownership and control 
is stressed. Law and economics perspective (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000) suggests that 
countries may have different governance systems that may lead to differences in the 
nature and extent of agency problems on the firm level.  
From this chapter it emerges that Italian firms are interested to study as the lack of 
research regarding the relationship between Italian model and theories of corporate 
governance. Indeed, Italian model presents similar characteristics of both archetypes 
(Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models) and at the same it has peculiar features 
that make it hybrid, spurious, and so interesting to study. For this reason, we decide to 
focus our attention on Italian firms. 
Moreover, from this chapter it comes out that the Italian model is based mainly on three 
different contrasting theories: the agency, the stakeholders and the resource dependence 
theories. The coexistence of the different perspective is to ascribe to the influencing 
typical social-economic features of the national environment. In the next chapter we 
seek to understand if the convergence relating to Agency theory is an ongoing process 
for Italian companies. This is fundamental in order to understand which theory should 
be adopted for our research. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The board of directors is a decisive part of the corporate governance structure and its 
performance and efficiency enhance the success of monitoring and the operation of the 
company. Internet technology, market turbulence and globalization provide a complex 
set of challenges for companies and boards. The latter addressing all requests and needs 
directed at its members, facing those challenges, should carefully manage its own 
infrastructure, i.e. experienced and skilled members, capabilities and resource to ensure 
it acts at its best (Aluchna, 2010). The board has also to protect interests of shareholders 
who are a fundamental source of external financing for firms; monitor of executives; 
evaluate strategic planning; address all legal demands; ensure integrity and transparency 
for corporate disclosure, report and communication. It follows that the complexity of 
the board role is a pivotal research area to better understand inner mechanisms of 
corporate governance. 
This chapter analyses the key role and importance of the board in the corporate 
governance structure. It attempts to discuss features of the board referring to different 
perspectives, i.e. codes of best practices, corporate governance theories and empirical 
research. Furthermore, we want to understand which international theory is adopted by 
codes. Thus, it is interesting to find out if convergence process towards a single 
standard of rules is ongoing or if each code which makes up the Anglo-Saxon, European 
and Italian models adopts different theories. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses reasons which explain why 
the board of directors is so fundamental in corporate governance and within the firm. 
Section 3.3 highlights the relevance of agency theory which is the theoretical approach 
we adopt for this research. In section 3.4, key success factors of the board are explained 
and developed under the lens of codes of best practices and corporate governance 
theories. In section 3.5, we seek to understand if the convergence of codes of best 
practice relating to Agency theory or Shareholder approach is an ongoing process. 
Section 3.6 concludes this chapter and it presents research implications. 
 
3.2 Why is Board of Directors important? 
The comparative analysis of Corporate Governance shows different characteristics in 
governance and control mechanisms applied in different countries, implying a starting 
point for studies in efficiency of the mechanisms used. In fact, national differences 
could be depicted in the board model, its composition, structure, policy and practice - as 
revealed in previous chapter – the comparative analysis provides the great importance of 
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board in each country, each company and corporate governance system. According to 
all national approaches, «the board should represent the interest of company and look 
after the shareholder interests of corporate performance, generated profit and realized 
dividend» (Aluchna, 2010, p.154). 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) reckon that the Board is one among many elements of 
corporate governance, otherwise other scholars (Petrovic, 2008; Baker and Anderson, 
2010) deem that it is the highest and the most important authority in the firm and the 
key institution within company. Hence, the board plays a fundamental role with respect 
to internal and external activities. As far as the former is concerned, it has the power and 
the responsibility to hire and fire top executives (Baker and Anderson, 2010); moreover 
it has the role to design and implement firm strategy (Ruigrok et al. 2006). In particular, 
it is the major decision-making body in a company. Thus, the board is responsible for 
assessing and approving the most important strategic and financial plans (e.g. Merger 
and Acquisitions), changes in capital structure (Ferreira, 2010). This internal analysis is 
also called shareholder view (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gonzalez and Garay, 2003; Gillan, 2006). With respect to 
the board external activities, it has the role to foster links between firm and its external 
environment and seeks to address the needs of different stakeholders (Ayuso and 
Argandoña, 2007). In the same vein, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Zingales (1998) 
claim that the firm has to assure the interests of all who contribute to increase firm 
performance and value creation. For these reasons «The board is often a key institution 
for the discharge of accountability but also, more complex and more interesting, for the 
engagement of key constituents of corporate governance» (Ahrens, Filatotchev, 
Thomsen, 2011, p. 319). This external analysis is also called stakeholder view 
(Clarkson, 1995; Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Mintzberg, 1983). 
In this research, we focus our attention on internal activities of Board, so we adopt the 
so-called shareholder view, because there is not much research on Italian listed 
companies following the aforementioned approach. In the same vein, the board is an 
economic institution that has risen endogenously in response to agency problems 
regarding each company (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). It acts as a representative of 
shareholders and is considered as a major decision-making group (Kumar and Singh, 
2013). The board is corporate governance mechanism and control instrument to 
converge shareholders and management interests (Elsayed, 2011). It follows that it is 
fundamental the board task of monitoring activities of top management to ensure that 
latter acts in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). From this 
perspective the board is «the link between the people who provide capital (the 
shareholders) and the people who use that capital to create value (the managers)» 
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(Monks and Minow, 2004). Hence, it is like a platform where board has to mediate 
shareholders and management interests, as matter of fact, the former constitute the 
powerful group that runs and controls the company (Roe, 1994). The board acts on 
behalf of capital providers and achieves this task by reducing agency costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
In a nutshell, agency costs are rooted in moral hazard; i.e. shareholders face the 
information asymmetry of hidden actions that rise from the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers who are playing their own role within the framework of incomplete contracts, 
primarily in their own interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
Agency costs could be summarized in 1) monitoring costs, 2) bonding costs and 3) 
residual loss (Bowrin et al., 2006). Monitoring costs refer to the necessity of principal to 
provide suitable incentives for the agent and also establishing monitoring mechanisms 
to control any deviant activities of the agent. Bonding costs regard resources spent by 
the agent in order to guarantee that he or she would not take actions which damage the 
principle (e.g. the bond provided by the agent). Residual loss is related to the monetary 
equivalent of loss suffered by principle, because the agent’s decisions may be different 
to those that would maximize the principal’s welfare. In the same vein, Williamson 
(1988) points out that residual loss is the key cost that the principal would attempt to 
minimize. In order to reach this objective, the principal incurs monitoring costs and 
makes the agent incur bonding costs. Hence, the «irreducible agency costs are the 
minimum of these three costs» (Bowrin et al., 2006: 4). 
According shareholder view, the board is a fundamental body also because it has the 
role of monitoring, controlling (Nordberg, 2011) and advising management (Ferreira, 
2010).  
Strongly related with agency problems and shareholder view is the board effectiveness. 
The board is a central element of corporate governance mechanism and structure and its 
efficiency and performances could determine the success of monitoring and the 
operation of the firm (Aluchna, 2010). Similarly, an effective board independently 
control and monitor strategic challenges facing a company and assess managements’ 
performances in addressing them (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). As a result of 
monitoring, the board should invert poor performance, overturn weak decisions and 
change under-performing managers. In the coming years how well boards can improve 
their own effectiveness is becoming increasingly important (Bird et al., 2004). 
Effectiveness board is considered by burgeon literature as the board’s ability to perform 
its direction and control roles effectively (Petrovic, 2008); hence, «to ensure company’s 
prosperity», «genuinely add value to the organisation», «move the company closer to its 
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goals» or «bring about corporate performance that satisfies the interests of 
shareholders/stakeholders» (Renton, 1999; Langevoort, 2001; Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Sherwin, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Aguilera, 
2005). 
Taken as a whole, a company to be successful must be well-governed. Indeed, an 
effective and well-functioning board of directors could have a significant impact on firm 
performance (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Sonnerfeld, 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; 
Westphal and Bednar, 2005). The company’s board is like a heart and so it needs to be 
healthy, fit and cared for, in order company run effectively. General ill-health, lack of 
energy and weakness within the board need immediate attention (Solomon, 2011). 
Clear-cut strategy aligned to capabilities, effective implementation of strategy, free and 
accurate flow of information in and out of board, monitoring and controlling 
management could be some essential elements to the healthy operating of corporate 
body. Within the context of the numerous corporate governance mechanisms, the board 
is considered as the best solution to the problematic aspects of a particular set of 
manager-shareholder interactions (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Hence, the «key aspect 
of corporate governance is the board of directors» (Dunn and Sainty, 2009:408; Zahra 
and Pierce, 1989). Figure 3.1 shows the key role of the board within the company and 
depicts relations among directors.  
 
Figure 3.1 The board of directors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration 
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3.3 Why restrictive approach? 
Traditionally, corporate governance international studies focus on restrictive approach 
or shareholder view or agency theory, paying particular attention on resolving the 
conflict between corporate management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). The board of directors is like a 
platform where management and shareholders’ interests are mitigated. Therefore, it 
becomes a liaison between top management and capital providers, through which it is 
possible to balance different expectations, face challenges, solve shareholders conflicts 
– for instance - for electing executives. This business paradigm has been dominating 
corporate governance research from many years; board directors interest have risen 
from 1776 when Adam Smith, the first economist addressing boards of directors, deem: 
«The directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance [as owners]. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more of less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company» (p. 700). 
One hundred and fifty-six years later, Berle and Means (1932) had a similar view: 
«Control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy committee and by 
whom, the election of directors for ensuing period will be made. Since the proxy 
committee is appointed by the existing management, the latter can virtually dictate their 
own successors» (p. 87). 
Both points of view highlight the concerns of separation of ownership and control in 
large company. In particular, the former reckons that controls carried out by owners 
rather than by others (a person or group of persons) are more likely to be diluted than 
fulfilled. The latter considers Smith’s paradigm arguing that as an increasingly number 
of different subjects hold firm’s ownership; the checks to limit the use of power tend to 
disappear (McCraw, 1990). However, these positions are developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) into the agency problem in governing the firm, pointing out the 
concern of ownership and control separation and the related agency costs. 
It emerges desire to solve agency problems in order to foster the economic growth, 
create firm value, improve corporate performance. As a matter of fact, if any subjects 
(e.g. agent, principle and board) fulfil their own duties and responsibilities in a 
coordinated and synergistic way, solving the aforementioned problems - also through an 
effective role of the board - the company could achieve high performance, face 
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challenges effectively
16
. In this regard, the board of directors is seen as the solution to 
agency problems in company through its role as internal formal link between 
shareholders and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2005; 
Filatotchev et al., 2005; Certo et al., 2006; Dalton and Dalton, 2006). 
Firstly, we consider restrictive approach because it starts from board of directors 
studying which constitute both the beating heart and the brain of the company without 
which it could be impossible for a firm survive. Indeed, like a heart and a brain, the 
board of directors is an essential part of the company without which firm could not exist 
and it grows within company in order to drive and help it, and to minimize agency 
costs, and solve with other internal subjects (top management, shareholders, 
committees, control mechanisms) every kind of challenges. The board is also 
accountable for providing the checks and balances essentials for the orderly conduct of 
the business. 
Furthermore, boards are deeply regulated by state corporation laws and the stock 
exchange governance codes. Legislator is keeping on producing hard laws (State 
regulations) and soft laws (codes of Corporate Governance) concerning board of 
directors requirements, principles, policy, etc. For instance, each year Italian Stock 
Exchange issues annual reports, release and other documents about the compliance with 
the Italian Corporate Governance Code, changes on some part of the latter (e.g. 
committees). In general terms, the worldwide reforms and initiatives tend to introduce 
improvement of monitoring standards, also due to the globalization process based on 
increased capital mobility (Aras and Crowther, 2010). 
In this perspective, it follows that the board of directors is the primary and deeply topic 
studied by academics, legislators, stock exchange. 
So we seek to understand, first of all, board of directors functioning because it is the 
starting point for any company. It is a crucial corporate element from which we cannot 
disregard, also because «boards are a market solution to an organizational design 
problem, an endogenously determined institution that helps to ameliorate the agency 
problems that plague any large organization» (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003: 9). In 
this vein, the board acts as the shareholders first line of defence against self-serving and 
                                               
16 We could imagine that agent (top management), principles (shareholders) and the board of directors are 
like a boat and they have to steer it (the noun governance has a Latin origin and stands for “steering” or 
“holding the rudder”). The boat sails on a troubled waters which are the dynamic and uncertain business 
environmental (market, competitors, legislator; hence, stakeholders). In order to survive and reach the 
harbour (strategic purposes, economic performance aims), the boat must be as solid and efficient as 
possible. This can be happened if top executives, shareholders and the board cooperate and interact 
together to the same goals. 
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incompetent managers (Weisbach, 1988). Hence, the board is a mechanism to deal with 
interest conflicts may arise between managers and shareholders by bringing their 
different interests into agreement and harmony in order to foster firm efficiency and to 
maintain high levels of shareholder wealth (Johnson et al., 1993; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). 
 
3.4 Board of Directors features, Codes of Corporate Governance, Theories and 
Empirical Research 
Corporate governance represents an important topic within management studies 
especially in these last years, characterized by the global financial crisis. Indeed, 
corporate governance research has been undertaken as a reaction to different factors, 
such as globalization, industrial colossus bankruptcy (Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, 
Alitalia, etc.) and the economic-financial global crisis. The events that affected 
companies on one hand disclosed firm government and management deficit and on the 
other hand fostered sharp criticism of boards of directors and managerial conduct 
(Deakin, 2011). In this complex, dynamic and uncertain context (Zattoni, 2006) the 
need to adopt common standards for companies arises in order to secure and control 
management. These standards or principles are contained within codes of conduct or 
codes of corporate governance which have been gradually adopted by several countries; 
they describe strategies and behaviour to adopt in the event of management problems 
(Arrigo, 2006) and they represent the so called best practice of all companies. Hence, 
these codes could represent a reinforcement of market efficiency, a strategic tool for 
management and board of directors (Di Betta and Amenta, 2004), a reference standard 
for shareholders and management as well as stakeholders. It is important to stress that 
corporate frauds and scandals have provoked a strong reform process, introducing 
accountability and transparency. 
Gregory and Simmelkjaer (2002: 11) define corporate governance code as 
«systematically arranged set of principles, standards, best practices and/or 
recommendation [that is] predatory in nature [, is] neither legally nor contractually 
binding [, relates] to the international governance of corporations (covering topics such 
as the treatment of shareholders, the organization and practices of (supervisory) boards 
and corporate governance transparencies) and [is] issued by a collective body». It 
follows this definition deals with both hard law (default laws) and soft laws (principles, 
best practices, recommendations) which are fundamental when carrying out cross-
country studies. 
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Codes deal with essential corporate governance issues, e.g. fairness to all shareholders, 
accountability by directors and managers, transparency in financial and non-financial 
reporting, board composition and structure, the responsibility for stakeholders’ interests, 
and for complying with the law (Gregory and Simmelkjaer, 2002; Coombes and Chiu-
Yin Wong, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). As Zattoni and Cuomo (2008: 4) «The 
core of codes of good governance lies in the recommendations on the board of 
directors». Indeed, governance codes recommend the board of directors to play an 
active and independent role in controlling the behaviour of top management. 
Researchers and practitioners (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
Charan, 1998; Conger et al., 2001) suggest an increasing number of non-executive and 
independent directors; the splitting of Chairman and CEO roles; the creation of board 
committees (nomination, remuneration and the audit committee), composed especially 
by independent directors; the development of an evaluation procedure for the board; 
intra-annual and annual reports. These practices are considered a key success factors in 
order to minimize governance problems and to increase board and firm performance. 
Accordingly, effective board performance is perceived through the execution of a set of 
roles (Gopinath et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; Levrau and Van Den Berghe, 2007a; 
Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Maassen, 1999, Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b; Zahra and Pierce, 
1989). Thereby, it is important to understand the board’s contribution in terms of its 
ability in performing the roles expected of it (Namoga, 2011). 
 
3.4.1 Main Board of Directors features 
The study of corporate governance international theories, codes of best practice 
(Gregory, T. Simmelkjaer, 2002) and empirical research has been conducted referring 
to: 
- board of directors functions,  
- board of directors composition,  
- board of directors dimension,  
- Chairperson and CEO roles,  
- audit, nomination and remuneration committees,  
- corporate governance disclosure.  
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These variables have been chosen like the study subject, because they are ‘possible 
factors determining’ good governance (Pozzoli, 1996; Allegrini and Bianchi Martini, 
2006), i.e. critical success factors affecting company success, thus they «will have a 
predominant impact on the achievement of enterprise objectives» (Morden, 2007). We 
should note that this issue focuses especially on board of directors, Committees and 
disclosure features, because they are institutions that have arisen «endogenously in 
response to agency problems inherent in governing any organization» (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003: 20). Each key success factor has been explained according to 
international codes, different theories existing in literature and empirical research 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
In particular, boards functions are considered a key factor determining good 
governance, because the board of directors is responsible for decision-making process 
(Huse, 2005) within which strategic purposes aimed at maximisation of shareholders’ 
value and economic growth, are defined. It follows that it is fundamental to understand 
ex ante boards tasks, since the board task performance is related to the board’s ability to 
execute its service, monitoring and networking tasks (Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Furthermore, the board 
composition and its leadership structure (i.e. dimension, CEO duality or Non-CEO 
duality, audit, remuneration and nomination committees) are key factors determining 
good governance and board effectiveness (Petrovic, 2009). Board effectiveness refers to 
the ability of the board to perform its direction and control roles effectively (Petrovic, 
2009), to «ensure the company’s prosperity» (Renton, 1999), to «genuinely add value to 
the organization» (Langevoort, 2001) and to «move the company closer to its goals» 
(Denis and Mcconnell, 2003). It follows that how a director contributes to board 
effectiveness, as well as the criteria of board effectiveness constitute basic and 
fundamental element (or key success factors) to understand and analyse. 
Finally, corporate governance disclosure is the core of information processing for 
stakeholders and financial, economic communities. In particular, it represents a means 
by which firms reveal their technological expertise, managerial competences and 
processes transparency. Furthermore, corporate disclosure can be considered as proxy 
for the care managers devote to accountability and compliance (Di Betta and Amenta, 
2004). Corporate governance disclosure belong to the so-called corporate information 
system and in particular to the informatics one, i.e. the latter is the set of processes and 
resources used for the data processing, and it concerns the production of information by 
means of electronic processing (Castellano, 2003). It follows that disclosure represents a 
key factor determining good governance, since it make transparent all procedures and 
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mechanisms of corporate governance, inducing the firm to be more efficient and 
accountable.  
First of all, we compare US, UK, German, Japanese and Italian codes of best practice 
with reference to variables afore explained. Secondly, we study how international 
corporate governance theories could explain codes of best practice variables, in order to 
understand which theory is adopted by the codes. Finally, we seek to understand if 
Codes of Corporate Governance, International Theories, and Empirical research are 
interlinked. 
 
3.4.2 American, English, German, Japanese and Italian Codes of Best 
Practice and Board of Directors features 
Before starting to analyse the relationship between Codes of Corporate Governance, 
International theories and empirical research with respect to the board of directors 
features, it is fundamental to compare the international Codes, especially American, 
English, German, Japanese and Italians one. We consider those codes because – as 
discussed in chapter 2 - two archetypes of corporate governance models exist (i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese) and the Italian one is in the middle between them. 
Table 3.1 summarises comparison between US, UK, German, Japanese and Italian 
codes.  
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Table 3.1 Codes of Corporate Governance 
Variables 
Codes of Corporate Governance 
USA UK D J 
IT 
2006 2011 
B
o
a
r
d
 o
f 
d
ir
e
c
to
r
s 
Functions No obligation 
Strategic aims 
Set the 
company’s 
strategic aims 
Responsible 
for long-term 
success of 
company 
Strategic aims 
Coordinate 
the 
enterprise’s 
strategic 
approach 
Create value 
for 
shareholders 
and 
stakeholders 
Strategic aim 
Responsible 
for 
supervising 
management 
Prevent 
conflict 
owners-
management 
Create value 
for 
shareholders 
Strategic aims 
Strategic 
approach 
 
Strategic 
aims 
Create 
value for 
shareholder
s over 
medium-
long term 
Composition
17
 
ID 
Majority of 
ID 
Balance ED-
NED. ID: at 
least 50% or 2 
ID (SMEs) 
No 
recommend. 
ID: at least 
50% or 1/3 or 
1 
Adequate 
numbers 
ID: at least 
50% or 2 
NED No obligation 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
ED No obligation 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. No 
recommend. 
Dimension No obligation Reduced 
No 
recommend. 
No 
recommend. Reduced 
Chairperson&CEO No obligation 
CEO non 
duality 
No 
recommend. 
CEO non 
duality 
CEO non duality 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e
s Audit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Remuneration Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nomination Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
O
th
e
r
 
Disclosure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: our elaboration 
Codes of best practice clarify that the two main functions of board of directors are to 
identify and manage strategic aims directed at achieving, sticking to, and improvement 
the economic growth of the firm. In particular, German, Japanese, UK and 2006 Italian 
Codes explicitly mention that the function of the board is to coordinate the company 
and boards is a strategic guide for firms. Furthermore, 2011 Italian, German and 
Japanese codes stress the importance of shareholders within company, namely they 
maintain that boards should redeem the conflict between ownership and management by 
monitoring the latter and should create value for shareholders over a medium-long term. 
The fact that the board is responsible for the long-term success of the company is 
pointed out in UK code, as well. In addition, only the German code recommends that 
                                               
17 ID stands for Independent Directors; NED stands for No Executive Directors; ED stands for Executive 
Directors. 
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the board of directors takes into account not only the interests of shareholders, but also 
those of employees and other stakeholders. On the other, the American code is the only 
one that does not mention anything related to this issue. 
As far as board of directors composition is concerned, all codes of conducts, a part from 
the German one, recommend a balance between executive and non executive directors, 
with special focus on independent members. The appropriate combination of those 
kinds of directors is fundamental because they may provide different expertise, skills, 
and knowledge to the firm. More in detail, American code imposes the highest number 
of independents, i.e. the majority of board members must be independent; whereas 
Japanese code recommends in some case the presence of only one independent. UK 
code recommends that 50% or two (in SMEs) board members should be independent. 
2011 Italian code update the issue regarding independent directors; indeed 2006 Italian 
code foresaw an adequate number of outside, whereas the new version is more precise, 
establishing that for companies belonging to FTSE-Mib index, at least one third of the 
Board of Directors members shall be made up of independent directors. Anyway 
independent directors shall not be less than two. It is noteworthy to point out that no 
code provides or suggests number of executive and non-executive directors, because 
they especially focus on the number of independent, their roles, and the independence 
criteria. Only American, UK and Italian codes describe independents’ role and provide 
independence criteria to discern between an independent and non-independent directors. 
In particular, independents could increase the quality of board oversight and could 
decrease the potential conflict between shareholders and managers. UK code explicit 
that the board and in particular independents directors are like a platform (Roe, 1994) 
between ownership and management, indeed it states that independents «should be 
available to shareholders if they are concerns which contact through the normal 
channel of chairman, chief executive or other executives» (UK Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2012: 10). Furthermore, US, UK and Italian codes seek to tighten the 
notion of “independent directors”, by providing some standards which are valid for all 
companies; however codes state that each American firm must and each UK and Italian 
firm should define their own criteria in order to restrict the notion of “independence”. 
All codes state that company should consider not only the material relationship between 
directors and firm (such as, commercial, industrial, banking, consulting relations) but 
also other kinds of connections (e.g. a director who is affiliated with or employed or 
whose immediate family member is affiliated with or employed). Thus, each board 
should determine whether the director is independent also in relation to individual 
circumstances which are likely to effect.  
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Regarding the board of directors size, only two codes of best practice (UK and Italian 
ones) agree on the reduced number of members who make up the board of directors. No 
codes provide exact numbers within board, but they prefer a reduced number of 
directors, as reported within UK code «board should not be so large as to be unwieldy». 
Moreover, board size is a relevant issue to identify the number of independents, the size 
of committees. Indeed, according to Italian Code, the board should evaluate at least 
annually the performance of the Board of Directors and its committees, as well as their 
size and composition, taking into account the professional competence, experience.  
As regards the Chairman and the CEO roles, all codes of corporate governance (except 
from American and German ones; which do not specify anything) recommend that the 
roles of chairman and CEO should be split with the division of responsability between 
them; this is the case of CEO non-duality. It is recommended because it could enhance 
characteristics of impartiality and balance that are requested from the chairman of the 
Board of Directors. On the other hand, CEO duality implies that the same individual 
serves both as Chairman and as CEO. However, whether exceptionally board decides to 
CEO duality the board should take precautions which are different in UK and in Italy. 
The former recommends that in case of CEO duality the board consults major 
shareholders in advance and provide reasons to owners of the appointment of CEO 
acting as Chairman as well. On the other hand, Italy does not recommend any consult, 
but the Italian code foresees «adequate counterbalances» (Italian Code of Corporate 
Governance: 14, 2006/2011). In particular, it recommends that the designation of a lead 
independent director in the case the chairman and the CEO overlap; this circumstance 
which takes up no negative characteristics, needs, however, the creation of adequate 
counterweights. 
As far as audit, remuneration and nomination committees are concerned, all codes of 
best practice, except for German ones which does not recommend these bodies, have 
introduced them in order to solve interest conflicts between management and 
shareholders. In particular, all codes discipline the audit committee, only USA and UK 
establish a minimum of three members, just in case of English small firms two members 
are required. All codes, a part of Italian one, recommend that all members should be 
independents; whereas Italian code establishes that members could be non-executives 
but the majority should be independent. It is noteworthy that 2006 Italian Code foresees 
the Audit Committee, whereas 2011 version substitutes the former with the control and 
risk committee. All codes agree that all members or only the Chairman of the committee 
(for German code) or at least one should have recent and relevant financial and 
accounting experience. Furthermore, only German code recommends that the 
supervisory board set up an Audit Committee, in other cases the board of directors 
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should establish it. As regarding the remuneration (or compensation) committee, all 
codes establish that body. In particular, according to the UK code, the remuneration 
committee should consult the chairman and/or the CEO about their proposals regarding 
the remuneration of other directors. In addition, board should establish a remuneration 
committee of at least three, or in the case of small firm two, independent directors. 
Unlike the UK and the US code states that all remuneration committee must be 
independent. On the other hand, Italian code is less restrictive than US code, because 
the former states that the remuneration committee is made up of independent, but it may 
be made up of non executive directors, the majority of which to be independent; in this 
case, the chairman of the committee is selected among the independent directors. It 
noteworthy to point out that German code does not explicitly foresee the set up of 
remuneration committee, however it seem plausible to assume that the supervisory 
board can form that committee in order to propose «the compensation of the members» 
of the Board to shareholders (German Code of Corporate Governance, 2012: 10). It is 
interesting to notice that Japanese code does not establish neither committee size nor its 
composition, however it recommends that all committees should prevent the conflicts of 
interests between the firm and management. 
As far as nomination committee is concerned, all codes recommend establishing it. 
More in detail, only German code states that the supervisory board, instead of the board, 
should for a nomination committee composed exclusively of shareholders 
representatives. Only the American code establishes that all members must be 
independents, whereas UK and Italian one recommends a majority of members should 
be independent directors. Japanese code does not mention anything about nomination 
committee size and composition.  
Finally, it seems plausible to assume that as regarding committees the most restrictive 
disciplines are established by US and UK codes.  
As regards corporate governance disclosure, besides annual financial statement, all 
codes recommend detailed reports preparation regarding:  
- general information about company and corporate governance activities 
sufficient to evaluate the operational conditions of business, e.g. name, 
education, roles of directors, chairman, stock information programmes, etc. 
(according to all codes) 
- how the board operates (especially US, UK, Italian and German codes) 
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- audit, remuneration and compensation committee activities and their rules 
(according to US, UK and Italian codes); in particular German code requires a 
report dealing with audit processes within the firm. 
- Transparency rules about requirements for independence (according to US, 
UK and Italian codes) 
- Quantitative information on financial conditions and operating results (only 
Japanese code) 
It seems that US and UK codes present a detailed discipline about disclosure than 
Japanese code which contains little information. 
Finally, it is plausible to state that US and UK rules are more detailed and more focused 
on independence of directors and committees members. In addition, US, UK and 
Japanese codes consider shareholders as one of the pillars of the company, indeed they 
address some rules in favour of their protection. Italy is in the middle between US-UK 
and Japanese for two main reasons. First, rules are not as detailed as those British and 
American, however they are not so slack as Japanese ones. Second, Italy has started to 
address shareholders’ issue in 2011; before that year ownership was not so fundamental, 
indeed before 2011 board should not create value only for shareholders but for all 
stakeholders. On the other hand, German code seems to be a latere. It means that it 
maintains its own features without being too influenced from other countries. Such as, 
one distinctive feature is that the Supervisory board set up committees and the 
nomination committee is exclusively composed by shareholders representatives. 
Another striking characteristic is the high interest on stakeholders. Indeed, the board of 
directors should take into account interests of stakeholders, employees, as well as 
shareholders. Finally, corporate governance codes are becoming increasingly similar 
since companies trade on various stock exchanges (Nanka-Bruce, 2009). 
 
3.4.3 International Theories, Empirical Research and Board of Directors 
features 
After describing how codes discipline corporate governance issues or key success 
factors, we compare International theories with both codes and empirical research. It is 
noteworthy to point out that the first part of chapter 5 focuses on empirical research 
review of some variables aforementioned. Thus, the purpose of this paragraph is to sum 
up research regarding board of directors issues, because more accurate and detailed 
analysis of extent literature is made up in chapter 5. 
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Codes of best practice clarify that the two main functions of board of directors are 
identifying and managing strategic aims directed at achieving, sticking to, and 
improving the firm economic growth. In particular, all codes stress the importance to 
create value for shareholders. At present, the American code is the only one that does 
not mention anything related to this issue. According to different corporate governance 
theories, it is possible to distinguish the functions of boards of directors. Roles and 
responsibilities change according to perspectives and theories adopted; yet, board of 
directors relevance within the firm appears to be a shared principle (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). In particular, as regards Agency theory, the board of directors should 
control, monitor and prevent manager power abuses from occurring to the detriment of 
shareholders; directors should be able to minimize agency costs, too (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989). In this regard, the board is the solution to agency problems in firms 
through their role as the gatekeeper of shareholders’ interests and as the internal formal 
link between ownership and managers (Certo et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2005; Duncan, 
2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Filatotchev et al., 2005). According to Stakeholders 
theory, boards should facilitate, coordinate and address all the people who have interests 
in a company. Thus, directors should be able to help, foster and promote relationship 
with all stakeholders; the former manage and direct strategic choices directed towards 
shareholders and stakeholders expectations maximization (Quagli, 2004). In this regard, 
the board is considered as a means through which the company is able to take into 
account the interests of all stakeholders who can affect (or affected by) the activities of 
the firm (Freeman, 1994; Freeman et al., 2004; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Regarding Resource Dependence theory, board of directors have the role of managing 
and regulating resources or inputs that can be found in the environment. Besides 
forming relationships with other stakeholders the board of directors should seek out and 
combine resources obtained outwith the network creation, in order to increase 
innovative development, fundamental for the firm to be competitive (Mizruchi, 1996). 
Furthermore, the board is seen as the means to manage the company’s dependence on 
external suppliers of resources and to enhance its power in the market (Kosnik, 1987; 
Pettigrew, 1992). Finally, Stewardship theory views managers as trustworthy and good 
stewards of the firm who are not prone to opportunistic behaviour (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). It follows that boards should play an 
incentive role towards management and act as a facilitator in the relationship between 
manager and shareholders, with the aim of raising trustee and commitment relationship 
within the firm (Barach, 1984). It is interesting to note that there are two cross functions 
which link the four theories above described, in particular strategic and performance 
optimization role (Tiscini and Di Donato, 2005). The former consists of guiding the 
decision-making process, and of formulating strategic decisions by defining aims and 
policies that firm must pursue. As regards the latter, Tricker (1984) suggests «the duty 
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of boards is not only to protect wealth, but to create it», so directors should maximize 
economic performance. Most empirical research shows that directors’ effectiveness (i.e. 
the ability to carry out their own duties and tasks) is coupled with board’s independence 
from management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). However, there is not a great deal of 
quantitative studies relating to board roles. Some state that directors over the 50/60-year 
age bracket notably perform a control function, because entry onto Board of Directors 
represents a moment of achievement recognition in career management, it is common 
for those who have served as CEO or other apical positions to remain on the Board as 
members (Barontini and Caprio, 2006). Johnson et al. (1996) argue that directors’ roles 
are classified as control, service and dependence resource, and «the relative volume of 
research devoted to the different board roles reflects the predominance of the control 
role». In this case, codes seem to adopt agency theory, as they states that they maintain 
that the board should redeem the conflict between shareholders and management, and 
enhance owner’s wealth.  
As far as board of directors composition is concerned, all codes of conducts recommend 
a balance between executive and non executive directors, with special focus on 
independent members. However, German code does not provide any recommendations 
about neither the board composition nor the number of independents within the board. 
Furthermore, no codes suggest any particular number of executives and non-executive 
non-independent directors. Agency theory (Mallin, 2004) argues that the latter is one of 
the main subjects within a company, because they should control and monitor 
managers’ conduct in order to prevent opportunist behaviour fraud and misdemeanour. 
Independent directors should be able to minimize agency costs, (i.e. moral hazard 
(Froeb and McCann, 2009), and adverse selection (Sundaram and Banks, 1993) within 
the relationship/conflict between shareholders and managers, thanks to their extraneous 
position within firm management and their competence acquired in other job contexts. 
According to Stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972), the key 
role carried out in firm management is that of non-executive directors, considered as a 
link between company and resources as well as stakeholders in the environment. Hence, 
outside directors, thanks to their own skills externally acquired and know-how network 
with others firms, have more chances to find resources and combine inputs obtained 
outwith the network creation, in order to increase the innovative development. 
Stewardship theory (Solomon and Solomon, 2004) emphasises the role carried out by 
executive directors or inside directors, they are considered the maximum company 
experts, trustees, who identify more with the company, and who contribute towards the 
firms’ economic growth. Empirical research does not agree about the best board of 
directors composition; indeed, optimal board composition cannot exist (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Hermalin, 1994; Kole, 1997), because several variables (e.g. 
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shareholders presence on board) influence each firm (Weisbach, 1988). Some 
researchers (De Andres et al., 2005; and Adjaoud and Zeghal, 2007) find that there is no 
correlation, neither positive nor negative, between board composition and performance. 
Yet, Bausinger and Butler (1985); Klein (1998); Bhagat and Black (2002) claim that a 
positive connection exists between outside directors and performance; moreover 
Beasley (1996) shows that no-fraud firms have boards with higher percentage of 
independents than fraud firms. In contrast, Agrawal and Knober (1996) and Coles et al. 
(2001) find a negative correlation between outside director and performance (measured 
with Tobin’s Q and Market Value Added). We notice that all international rules focuses 
on independent directors or a balance between inside and outside directors, as Agency 
theory claims; whereas empirical studies do not seem to have reached a shared 
conclusion, even if the majority stream reckons that higher number of independents 
could positively impact firm performance.  
Regarding board of directors dimension, two codes of best practice (i.e. UK and Italian 
codes) agree on the reduced number of members who make up the board of directors. 
No codes provide exact numbers within board, but drawing conclusions from codes, 
however some of them recommend a reduced number of directors, as reported within 
English code «board should not be so large as to be unwieldy». Not all theories 
completely agree with codes. Agency and Stewardship theories argue that board 
directors’ number within board must not be numerous for different reasons, as 
shareholders must control managers’ behaviour, due to increased scope for malfeasance 
and empire-building. Agency theory reckons that it would be better to have a flexible, 
‘streamline’ and reduced board (Jensen, 1994). Stewardship theory is of the same 
opinion as the agency theory, but for different reasons. According to the former, the 
board must be limited in size, because all directors are considered as trustees who are 
committed to firm values, and who are intrinsically motivated, for these reasons the 
number must be limited. In contrast Stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories 
argue that boards should be large, because directors should interact with environment, 
i.e. with stakeholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Therefore, if boards fulfil all 
stakeholders’ interests, good governance quality could increase and governance 
improvement would improve firm value, resulting in greater stakeholders’ fulfilment. 
On the other hand (Resource Dependence theory), company survival depends on the 
acquisition of external resources (Burt, 1983), so it must minimize inputs supply 
uncertainty, by creating relationship with other firms, suppliers. For this reason, if the 
number of directors is high, interactions and relations with environment are boosted, 
therefore economic performance (and firm value) grows and finally company survives. 
Empirical research aims to investigate relationship between board of directors 
dimension and performance in order to understand if the former affects its efficacy. 
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There are two main findings: a) negative and b) positive correlation between board 
dimension and firm performance, even if the most predominant is the first one: inverse 
relation exists between performance (ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s Q) and directors number 
(Conyon and Peck, 1998; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996). Jensen (1993) claims 
that maximum number of board members should be seven or eight, and above this limit 
directors can no longer operate efficiently and CEO could take over. Other scholars 
Airoldi and Forestieri (1998) argue that maximum number must be nine. Few results 
about positive correlation between dimension and performance have emerged, for 
instance Daily and Dalton (1992) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find a weak relation in a 
sample of SMEs. It is interesting to highlight that size and composition of boards are 
often correlated with a board’s independence (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Thus, it 
would seem that two codes afore mentioned (UK and Italian ones) have followed 
Agency or Stewardship theories, as they recommend a small number of directors. In 
addition, several empirical studies would confirm that this as the right way to maximize 
performances. 
As regards Chairman and CEO roles, all codes of corporate governance (except from 
American and German ones; which do not specify anything) recommend that the roles 
of chairman and CEO should be split with the division of responsability between them; 
this is the case of CEO non-duality. CEO duality on the other hand implies that the 
same individual serves both as Chairman and as CEO. Different views about CEO 
duality and non-duality efficacy exist. In general terms, the relationship between the 
CEO and the board is one of the basic elements of corporate governance, because it 
involves two primary players who acts for the firm’s quest for success (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; McKee, 
2005). According to Agency Theory, duality «signals the absence of separation of 
decision management and decision control [...] the organization suffers in the 
competition for survival» (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, authors argue that it is 
fundamental to have a split leadership, because duality would lead to reduction of 
management monitoring possibility and CEO would be able to pursue personal interests 
to the detriment of shareholders more easily. CEOs tend to exercise influence on the 
board selection process by fostering personal friend and other individuals with whom 
they have close social ties (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1998; Westphal, 1999). It follows 
that the board independence from CEO or management is often compromised (Spencer, 
1983; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Walsh and Seward, 1990), prejudicing objectively 
monitor behaviour in firms (Westphal, 1999; Wu, 2008). In contrast with Agency 
Theory, other approaches assume that CEO non-duality could have significant and 
positive implications for firm performance and corporate governance. First of all,  
according to Stakeholder Theory (Alexander et al., 1993) CEO duality is fundamental 
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because non-duality «dilutes Chairman and CEO power to provide effective leadership 
of the company by increasing the probability that actions and expectations of 
management and the board are at odds with each other» (Baliga et al., 1996). In order 
to foster relationship with all stakeholders, Anderson and Anthony (1986) maintain that 
only one apical subject is better, as companies should interface with many stakeholders 
and the latter need only one ‘public spokesman’ to prevent or reduce confusion. 
Resource Dependence theory agrees that duality is to be preferred, because it calls for 
the appointment, of a so-called Lead Independent Director (in addition to the CEO and 
the Chairperson) who serves as an independent chief among all board members and 
therefore helps ensure board relationships with environment and others boards. Thus, 
CEO duality can encourage a collaborative decision-making environment which fosters 
director involvement in strategic activities (Westphal, 1999). Finally, Stewardship 
theory reckons that combined leadership structure could be considered as the best one in 
order to manage company, as power concentration in the hands of one individual (i.e. 
CEO duality) could increase commitment and motivation towards economic purposes 
achievement. Indeed, stewardship theory does not necessarily regard the separation of 
ownership and control as a problem but as a positive development which could 
potentially work to effectively manage the firm (Learmount, 2002). It follows that this 
theory encourages the concentration of power and authority in the hands of management 
rather than the board, i.e. it favours the CEO duality as the best way to enhance the firm 
performance. The last three theories suggest that duality would lead to performance 
maximization, because it would permit a clear-cut leadership for aims of strategy 
formulation and implementation. Several empirical studies have been carried out on 
CEO duality or non-duality efficacy on firm performance. They led to different and 
opposing results that can be summed up as follows, a) CEO duality has positive effect 
on performance (ROI, ROE) (Boyd, 1995); b) CEO non duality has a positive relation 
with performance (ROI, Tobin’s Q) (Rechner and Dalton, 1991); c) neither CEO duality 
nor non duality have important effects on performance (ROE, Market Value Added, 
ROA, ROI) (Baliga et al., 1996). In fact, most findings have proclivity for positive 
correlation between CEO non duality and firm performance. It is interesting to notice 
that Dalton et al. (1998) find that Joint Stock Companies with few independent directors 
and characterized by CEO non-duality are coupled positively to bankruptcy. Thus, it 
would seem that empirical research confirms what codes of best practice recommend 
(with the exception of America and German) and what agency theory claims. 
As far as audit, remuneration and nomination committees are concerned, all codes of 
best practice have introduced them in order to solve interest conflicts among 
management, board of directors, and shareholders. All corporate governance 
international theories, except for the stewardship one, agree that committees are 
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fundamental for company. Agency theory maintains that committees are able to provide 
efficient and effective answers on strategic decisions, as they are support organs to 
company government. According to Stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories, 
committees should be composed of outside directors or independent ones, because they 
are able to manage the unforeseen and deal with uncertainty in resources acquisition. 
These bodies are emblematic tools of network and connections among directors, and 
stakeholders, because, for instance, nomination and remuneration committees should 
find human and financial resources outwith the company, i.e. in the environment. 
Stewardship theory does not accept committees either for controlling (audit committee), 
or manpower and financial inputs (nomination and remuneration committees), 
composed of independent directors, because it focuses on executives who are 
‘stewards’, who are intrinsically motivated, committed to firm, and – as French and 
Raven (1959) sustain – who are ‘more likely to rely on personal sources of power-
expert and referent’. Empirical research is more fecund on audit committees rather than 
nomination and remuneration ones, probably because the former has firm control 
function a role which is particularly tough and could be structured in several systems 
and sub-systems (Anthony, 1988). Most empirical results highlight that audit 
committees are ‘cornerstones of corporate governance’ (Gramling et al., 2004) and an 
audit committee composed of external and independent directors results in better 
transparency and accountability for company (Beasley. and Salter, 2001). Research 
about nomination and remuneration committees is rather limited whilst ‘they are 
considered to have heightened importance with regard to effective board functioning’ 
(Brown et al., 2009). Some studies reveal that those bodies are not appointed, especially 
in those firms where there is only one majority shareholder who is also manager. Two 
main opposite findings emerge, on one hand positive effects on firm performances 
emerge from remuneration and nomination committees foundation (Ruigrok et al., 
2006); on the other hand research reveals an excessive opportunity cost of settings up 
those bodies (McKnight and Weir, 2009). It emerges that empirical studies confirm 
audit committees efficacy as claimed by codes (apart from German principles that seem 
to support stewardship approach). Quantitative research does not seem so convinced 
about benefit and usefulness of nomination and remuneration committees.  
As regards corporate governance disclosure, all codes (with the exception of American 
ones which do not specify anything) recommend document preparation. All theories 
also agree on the efficacy of corporate governance disclosure for different reasons 
depending on approaches adopted; however, common assumption is that disclosure has 
important and clear-cut economic consequences (Garay and Gonzalez, 2008). 
According to Agency Theory, the report is fundamental, because a better quality of 
economic-financial disclosure, reducing probability of information asymmetry between 
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management and shareholders, could lead to a decrease in risk capital. Asymmetry 
minimization could limit company risk as perceived by shareholders; therefore offer 
advantageous economic resources (Casino and Vegan, 2009). Stakeholder theory, 
symmetrically to Agency approach, maintains that corporate disclosure is necessary, 
because it can favour a decrease in information asymmetry among all stakeholders, it 
reduces risk and credit cost of capital and it increases securities traded liquidity. Indeed, 
poor quality disclosure would create more uncertainty among investors which would 
lead them to offer their own financial resources at high costs, due to uncertainty at high 
level and lack of clear-cut disclosure. Therefore, clear cut disclosure containing 
corporate governance principles could be an important tool in order to align all 
stakeholders’ interests that are likely to be divergent. Resource Dependence theory 
agrees with Agency and Stakeholder approaches regarding the connection between high 
quality disclosure and low resource costs. What changes is the definition of resources; 
agency theory defines resources as financial capital (equity and risk capital, 
respectively), whereas stakeholder theory considers resources in an extensive approach: 
financial, productive, manufacturing, human resources. The Board is considered an 
administrative body linking the corporation with its environment and «a boundary 
spanner that could help the corporation to acquire important resources from the 
environment, and thus reduce the corporation’s dependence on external stakeholders or 
protect the corporation from external threats» (Huse, 2005). According to Stewardship 
theory, as managers are inclined to see themselves as stewards, or trustees, disclosure 
does not contain substantial faults. The lack of information asymmetry has positive 
effects on disclosure, therefore on performance (because stakeholders wish to invest 
money) and on corporate governance, as management will not manipulate firm data and 
strategic information. La Porta et al. (2002) reckon that governance disclosure has 
‘positive effects of good corporate governance practices on firm valuation are explained 
by higher investor confidence’. It determines high level firm value. The risk is that 
disclosure represents only a sterile formal document, with so-called ‘watered down 
contents’, i.e. firm could omit substantial corporate aspects, as they intend only to pay 
lip service to formal prevision (Enriques, 2003). In order to test disclosure efficacy on 
corporate governance and firm performance and to minimize the risk above mentioned, 
scholars (Brown and Caylor, 2006) have created some ‘governance indices’ (Gompers 
et al., 2003) which are composed of disclosure variables, i.e. qualitative and technical 
information deduced by codes of conduct. The assumption is that codes represent best 
practice depository at international level and respect to principles contained therein lead 
to better firm accountability, responsability, and compliance (Melis, 2004). Generally 
speaking research shows that high quality disclosure coupled with a good firm 
management lead to higher performance (Shleifer and Vishney, 1997). We could accept 
that codes regulate corporate governance disclosure because they aim to prevent 
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information asymmetry and minimize conflict between shareholders and managers. 
Empirical studies support the importance of revealing all corporate features in order to 
increase accountability, market and stakeholders’ consensus, and thus improved 
performance. 
Table 3.2 contains findings obtained by the comparison among international theories of 
corporate governance, American, English, German, Japanese and Italian codes of best 
practice and empirical research. 
 
72 
 
Table 3.2 Synoptic Framework of corporate governance theories, international codes of best practice and empirical research 
Variables 
International Theories Codes of Corporate Governance 
Empirical 
Research 
Agency 
Th. 
Stakeholder 
Th. 
Resource 
Dependence 
Th. 
Stewardship 
Th. 
USA UK D J IT  
B
o
a
r
d
 o
f 
D
ir
e
c
to
r
s 
Functions 
Control, 
monitor 
Facilitate, 
coordinate 
Managing 
and 
regulating 
resources 
Facilitate, 
incentive role No 
obligation 
Strategic 
aims 
Strategic 
aims 
Strategic 
aims 
Strategic 
aims 
Control 
Cross Functions 
Guiding decision-making process, formulating 
strategic decision 
Composition ID
18 NED NED ED 
Majority of 
ID 
Balance 
ED-NED. 
ID: at least 
50% 
No 
recommend 
ID: at least 
50% or 1/3 
ID: at least 
50% or 2 
Not best BoD 
Composition 
Dimension Reduced Numerous Numerous Reduced 
No 
obligation 
Reduced 
No 
recommend 
No 
recommend 
Reduced 
Reduced Vs 
Numerous 
Chairperson&CEO 
CEO 
non 
duality 
CEO duality CEO duality CEO duality 
No 
obligation 
CEO non 
duality 
No 
recommend 
CEO non 
duality 
CEO non 
duality 
CEO duality Vs 
Non duality 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e 
Audit Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Remuneration Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No clear benefit 
Nomination Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No clear benefit 
O
th
er
 
Disclosure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                               
18 ID stands for Independent Directors; NED stands for No Executive Directors; ED stands for Executive Directors. 
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3.5 Codes, Theories and Board features: convergence or divergence? 
International business scandals, firms bankruptcy and financial frauds have fostered law 
updating process in the field of corporate governance; the need to create a system or a 
set of principles, duties and recommendations to apply to all companies operating in a 
given environment. The function of corporate governance codes is to outline 
organizational rules consistent with both corporate structure of each System-Country 
and, especially economic growth goals to be worth over time. It is necessary to study 
and analyse codes, as they represent a fundamental corporate governance tool in which 
company duties, rules and principles toward all stakeholders (e.g. minority and majority 
shareholders, employees, institutional investors, etc.) are identified. Code adoption, not 
only formal, could lead a company to become more transparent and accountable through 
a clear and visible disclosure on its governance model. It is essential that firms should 
assimilate those governance values, principles (e.g. responsability, accountability, 
transparency, etc.) required by financial market, as this could allow company to exploit 
some international competitive challenges or to obtain new financial capital (both equity 
and credit capital) especially in the current financial globalization context. 
From a comparative analysis of codes it emerges that a convergence process towards 
similar governance approaches at international level is underway. It should be noted, 
however, that each country – in spite of the convergence or standardization processes 
towards a single standard of rules – is affected by their social, historical, and economic 
background. As a matter of fact Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Levin (1997) argue that 
«the legal and political environments are critical influences on the nature of corporate 
governance and thereby on corporate governance in every country». For instance, 
German code recommends a Supervisory Board composed by employees, too; this is in 
support of stakeholder view rather than shareholder one. Furthermore, it recommends 
that the board of directors create value for all stakeholders and not only for 
shareholders. Italian code emphasises on the so-called ‘traditional model’ (existing only 
in Italy), leaving discretion to companies to adopt the Anglo-Saxon corporate structure 
(one-tier model) or German one (two-tier model). 
Thus, from a comparative study among international theories (i.e. Agency, Stakeholder, 
Resource Dependence and Stewardship approaches) and corporate governance codes it 
would emerge that variables studied and contained in the codes would be better 
explained and regulated under Agency approach. Codes and agency theories argue that 
it would be better to have a reduced board of directors, a greater number of independent 
directors, CEO non-duality, the committees institution, and corporate governance 
disclosure. In addition, all codes of best practice regulate roles, functions and principles 
of Independent directors who are believed to be more effective monitors of company 
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management (Johnson et al., 1996), and they have arisen «in response to the agency 
problems inherent in governing any organization» (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). In 
fact, codes lead towards Agency approach. However, especially German code seems to 
adopt the stakeholder theory even if, as afore mentioned, there are some references to 
shareholder view.  
Finally, we can state that convergence process is ongoing. Globalization of relationships 
in stock financial market has led to a frequent review of national laws and regulations, 
according to paths consistent with culture, traditions and internal market conditions to 
each country, but at the same time they are projected to international best practices 
application. Clearly, according to contingency approach the lack of consensus may 
result from the chosen theoretical perspective. Indeed, financial globalization, the 
integration of financial markets and the high influence of Anglo-Saxon institutional 
investors affect corporate governance issues of large companies in any country (Zattoni 
and Cuomo, 2008). However, a corporate governance practice is different across 
institutional environments (Crouch and Streek, 1997; Weimer and Pape, 1999; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Gordon and Roe, 2004) and practice is 
influenced by differences in culture, corporate ownership patterns, and legal origin 
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
Empirical research on corporate governance is widespread with the exception of studies 
concerning board of directors functions. It is interesting to note that literature intends to 
understand whether the solutions proposed by codes are indeed designed to maximize 
performance. Studies on corporate governance are very prolific and aim to demonstrate 
if standards are able to affect government efficiency and therefore economic growth 
achievement. 
 
3.6 Summary, Conclusions and Research Implications 
3.6.1 Summary 
We discuss about the importance of board of directors within corporate governance. The 
board is a crucial element of corporate governance structure. It protects shareholders’ 
company needs; it becomes a fundamental platform of monitoring of executives, 
success policy, of reviewing strategic aims, of ensuring integrity for shareholders and 
stakeholder interests guarantee disclosure transparency. The market complexity, 
globalization, financial and economic environment turbulence make the role of board of 
directors more and more complicated. 
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In the same vein, we saw as restrictive approach or shareholder view or agency theory 
is particularly widespread in research. We noticed that the agency intuition (Berle and 
Means, 1932) of more 80 years ago is still valid, studied and tested in literature. That 
theoretical perspective starts from board of directors which constitute both the beating 
heart and the brain of the company without which it could be impossible for a firm 
survive. 
Furthermore, we focused on the relationship between boards characteristics and 
international codes of corporate governance. In particular, we studied American, 
English, German, Japanese and Italians codes, because two archetypes of corporate 
governance models exist (i.e. Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese) and the Italian one is 
in the middle between them. This means that –as discussed in chapter 2- Italian case has 
some features in common with those two models and others that differ. We found out 
that US and UK codes present a detailed set of principles about independent directors, 
committees and corporate governance disclosure than the others. However, corporate 
governance codes are becoming increasingly similar since companies trade on various 
stock exchanges and financial globalization. 
Moreover, we analysed board features compared with those codes, corporate 
governance theories and empirical research. It emerged that codes are in line with 
agency approach. So, from a comparative study among international theories and 
corporate governance codes it would emerge that variables studied and contained in the 
codes would be better explained and regulated under Agency approach. However, 
especially German code seems to adopt the stakeholder theory even if there are some 
references to shareholder view.  
We can argue that convergence process exists and is ongoing. Financial globalization, 
the integration of financial markets and the high influence of Anglo-Saxon institutional 
investors affect corporate governance issues of large companies in any country. 
However, corporate governance practices differ from a country to other, because it is 
influence by cultural, social, economic, legal background of the country. 
Finally, the board is a crucial element of corporate governance structure. It protects 
shareholders’ needs and also company needs; it becomes a fundamental platform of 
monitoring of executives, success policy, of reviewing strategic aims, of ensuring 
integrity for shareholders and stakeholder interests guarantee disclosure transparency. 
The market complexity, globalization, financial and economic environment turbulence 
make the role of board of directors more and more complicated. It follows that it could 
be a fascinating research field for Academic, Professionals, and Business Practitioners 
and will remain the corporate governance core. The need for an osmotic process 
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between literature and legislation emerges; if all studies carried out by Academics, 
Professionals, Legislator could converge and a continuous exchange of information and 
results could take place in order to develop shared principles and rules system everyone 
could benefit 
 
3.6.2 Conclusions and Research Implications 
Two main conclusions emerge from this chapter. First, even though convergence 
process is ongoing, it is noteworthy that Italy differs on a number of features than other 
countries, i.e. law (Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti et al., 2006); 
corporate governance regimes (Melis, 2000; Hopt and Levens, 2004; Pendleton, 2005); 
recent corporate governance reforms (Enriques and Volpin, 2007); and age of each 
nation’s professional internal audit (Selim et al., 2009). Legislative and regulatory 
changes have fostered the ability of shareholders to engage in activist efforts (Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella Jr, 2003). These changes, from a shareholder approach, are crucial 
to the effectiveness of corporate governance system, because the concentrated 
ownership effectiveness may depend on the effectiveness of the legal system that 
protects shareholders’ rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Second, literature has been dominated by the assumptions of agency theory, and these 
continue to have a deep influence on governance reform and practice (Roberts et al., 
2005). So agency approach has an important and profound influence on the process of 
governance reform. However, as we show in previous section empirical research which 
adopted agency approach does not always confirm principles efficacy contained in 
codes of corporate governance. However, we notice that most studies would seem to 
confirm what codes recommend, e.g. all codes suggest CEO non-duality would be better 
for several reasons above explained and at the same time most empirical research 
recommend that CEO and Chairman roles should be carried out by two different people. 
Furthermore, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2004) maintain that «whilst the ambiguity of 
findings can be partly explained by the different research methodologies applied 
including sample size and the number of variables under investigation», other effects 
often ignored in quantitative studies such as a corporate culture, ethical norms of 
behaviour and the levels of honesty expected in business, also determined this broad 
spectrum of conclusions. 
Hence, agency theory is one of the best theory that could explain Italian firms and we 
decide to adopt it on our research for some reasons. First, as discussed at chapter 2, 
Italian economic context is characterized by family business (Bracci and Vagnoni, 
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2011) and companies where there is not a clear separation between ownership and 
control. Furthermore, Italy is characterized by poor capital market orientation and we 
cannot find the agency leitmotiv “market for corporate control”. However, agency 
problems arising from the conflict between owners and managers is shifted towards the 
relations among different kinds of shareholders (Melis, 2000). In particular, the conflict 
arises from majority or blockholders and minority shareholders. The former have full 
voting rights; whereas the latter does not have «any significant role in corporate 
governance, they are not guaranteed enough by the intervention of courts, because the 
device of fiduciary duties is largely unavailable and derivative suits are ineffective» 
(Melis, 2000: 352). Moreover, agency theory can better explain family business which 
is widespread in Italy. Indeed, some agency problems may arise, such as three different 
agency conflict can occur, i.e. family owner versus external manager
19
, family owner 
versus external shareholder
20
 and family owner versus family manager
21
 (Kraiczy, 
2013). Second, agency approach is consistent with prior international major studies on 
corporate governance and board of directors (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Johnson et al., 
1993; Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). In the same vein, due to the 
convergence process towards Anglo-Saxon model which adopt agency theory, it 
appears plausible to assume that agency theory could better explain Italian firms. Third, 
in competitive sectors (such as listed companies, i.e. our population of analysis) one of 
the fundamental functions of the board of directors is the behaviour control of 
management. Indeed, according to agency theory, the funding risk is that managers 
pursue short-term strategies sacrificing long-term ones; for this reason it is needful the 
strategic role of the board. Moreover, if the environment is volatile and uncertain (such 
as financial market where listed companies play), the board of directors must be 
involved in the review of strategic plans and changes in strategy. Those board roles are 
                                               
19 Family firms can employ external managers, due to the lack of capable and competent family members 
or family members cannot come to an agreement. Thus, the conflict between the principal (family owner) 
and the agent (external manager) is similar to non-family companies. The family, like a concentrate 
owner, has the power to appoint external managers and control fundamental decisions. It may occur that 
external managers use firm resources for their own purposes at the expenses of owners’ interests (Ang et 
al., 2000). 
20 Agency conflict can also arise between a dominant shareholder and minority shareholders (Morck and 
Yeung, 2003). In this regard, information asymmetries and a conflict of interests could exist between the 
dominant shareholder and minorities. In particular, family business groups adopt a pyramidal structure in 
order to separate ownership from control. Thus, family directly controls a firm, which in turn controls 
other firms, and each of which control other companies and so on. It results that finally one family 
controls a large number of firms. In this case, minorities is used only to provide capital and do not receive 
a majority of votes. The family can misappropriate minorities’ wealth by self-dealing and tunneling 
(Johnson et al., 2000). 
21 In this case, family members are both the owners and the managers of their firm. So, agency costs may 
decrease, because there is no separation between ownership and control; indeed, principal and agent act in 
the interests of the family. However, according to agency theory, some problems may arise; such as they 
include free-riding by family-members, the entrenchment of ineffective family managers, and a biased 
parental perception of a child’s performance (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003). 
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better explained by agency theory (Zattoni et al., 2010). Thus, it is plausible to assume 
that financial market and listed companies (which are the focus of the present research) 
are better understood under agency theory lens. 
On the other hand, stakeholder and resources dependence theories seem to explain only 
part of the complexity of Italian firms. In other words, they focus their attention on 
other topics without concentrating particularly on board of directors and its 
mechanisms. Thus, in order to better understand firm complexity, it appears 
fundamental deeply understand corporate governance in narrow terms (i.e. board, 
directors, leadership, etc.) and then enlarge the focus of analysis by considering 
stakeholders, resources, etc. Moreover, it appears important to adopt agency theory, 
because it can better explain the Italian economic context where firms with concentrated 
ownership and family-owned play. Indeed, the most important conflict is between 
majority and minority shareholders, where the former can expropriate benefits from the 
later (Giovannini, 2010). 
 
It follows that some research implications arise from this chapter. In particular, at this 
point we can formulate some research hypotheses which we develop and test in chapter 
5. 
More in detail, given the literature review, under the agency approach lens, and 
consistently with codes of corporate governance, we hypothesize that: 
 Firm performance exhibits a negative association with board size. 
 Firm performance exhibits a positive association with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. 
 Firm performance exhibits a negative association under leadership 
structures that combine the roles of the CEO and Board President. 
 Firm performance increases in presence of Audit Committee. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Any research in business or management, link the present study, needs that the 
methodology used should «be clearly spelt out, perhaps in a chapter of its own» 
(Remenyi, 1998: 30; Remenyi, 1990), in this way results of the research are convincing. 
For this reason, the chapter 4 deals with methodology, methods, and philosophical 
assumptions. 
Methodology deals with «the choices we make about cases to study, methods of data 
gathering, form of data analysis etc. in planning and executing a research study» 
(Silverman, 2005: 99). So methodology can be defined as «an operational framework 
within which the facts are placed so that their meaning may be more clearly exposed 
(Jonsson, 2007: 135; Leedy, 1989: 135). Methodology is therefore closely related to a 
distinct paradigm and will be expressed in terms of guidelines for an acceptable 
research practice (Sarantakos, 2005). 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and define the methodology design used in the 
present research. In the following section, we describe research process within 
philosophical assumptions. In section 4.3, the research operationalization is presented. 
In section 4.4 we describe the research theoretical approach adopted in the present 
research; whereas in section 4.5 we discuss about population sampling, data acquisition 
and data management of the present research. Finally, in the last section summary and 
research implications are presented. 
 
4.2 Research process 
The reason for carrying out research is frequently motivated by a natural human 
curiosity to add knowledge and better understanding of the world we live in and the 
mechanisms underlying. The starting point for research is the philosophical assumptions 
which guide the process of social investigation. They lead the research methodology 
and the research method choice, providing the overall context in which the research is 
carried out. 
Several proposals have been made in order to explain the research process. Silverman 
(2005) introduces seven steps of analysis which are closely linked together and a step 
higher level determines a lower one. Furthermore, it is fundamental that each research 
start from research philosophy, because it provides fundamental assumptions about the 
way the researcher interprets reality. Figure 4.1 shows the research process and the 
relation with research philosophy. 
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RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Figure 4.1 The research process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration on Silverman (2005: 98) 
 
4.2.1 Models, Concepts and Research Philosophy 
Models provide an overall framework for looking at the reality (Silverman, 2005). The 
word model used by Silverman has the same meaning of paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) which 
explains methodology in general terms. In particular, paradigms are a set of ideas and 
methods which make up a world view and a way of doing science; so as their vital 
nature they represent the framework (shared set of assumptions) for normal science. On 
the other hand, concepts are «specified ideas deriving from a particular model» 
(Silverman, 2005: 98). Before describing other steps of the research process is useful to 
dwell on research philosophy. It is expected any research should start from that, since it 
contains fundamental assumptions about the way the researchers views and interprets 
the world (Saundares et al., 2007). In other words, philosophical assumptions guides the 
research process and may be explicit or implicit according to the way the researcher 
sees the world and the way it is to be investigated. They govern the research 
methodology and the choice of research method, providing the overall context in which 
the research is carried out. 
In particular, models explain what reality is like and basic elements it contains 
(ontology) and what is the status and nature of knowledge (epistemology) (Silverman, 
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2005). Indeed, a paradigm represents an intellectual tradition with its own set of 
ontological and epistemological prescriptions for understanding the scientific world. So, 
research philosophy provides philosophical assumptions which are conventionally 
divided into two main heading: ontology and epistemology. Ontology is concerned with 
the philosophical nature of reality, as Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1) states, «whether the 
reality to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself on individual 
consciousness from without – or the product of individual consciousness». It explains 
whether reality is explicit in terms of being “out there” in the world, or otherwise 
implicit, as the creation of mind. On the other hand, epistemology is concerned with the 
assumptions about the way of inquiring into the nature of the world and communicating 
research results to others (Rosenau, 1992, Taylor, 2010). Thus, epistemology concerns 
the study of the nature of knowledge, that is «How is it possible, if it is, for us to gain 
knowledge of the world?» (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 5) 
Ontological and epistemological assumptions underpin two main theoretical approaches 
to social science research: positivism and subjectivism perspectives
22
 (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Patton, 1990). These paradigms represent the end of a continuum in 
social science research which provides the links between ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. They describes a continuum’s polar opposite with varying 
philosophical assumptions aligned with them (Holden and Lynch, 2004). 
Positivism prefers «working with an observable social reality and that the end product 
of such research can be law-like generalizations similar to those produced by the 
physical and natural scientists» (Remenyi et al., 1998 cited in Saunders et al., 2003: 
83). This paradigm states that an apprehensible reality exists and it is guided by 
immutable natural laws and mechanisms (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  
According to positivists, reality is considered to be external, ‘out there’, objective, 
governed by natural and unchangeable laws and something which can be perceived 
through senses and realisable through experience. In this perspective, social research is 
considered as a tool for studying social events and learning about them so that general 
causal laws can be discovered (Sarantakos, 2005: 36-38).  
Subjectivism, on the other hand, states that reality is subjective or dependent on 
observers since they are part of what is being observed (Vico, 1668-1744; Dilthey, 
1833-1911; Weber, 1864-1920; Patton, 1990). This approach seeks to understand the 
point of view from the subjects’ perspective and deems that researcher studies 
                                               
22 Other authors labels positivism and subjectivism in different way, e.g. Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) 
describe them as positivism and phenomenology; Hughes and Sharrock (1997) entitle them as positivism 
and interpretative alternative.  
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meaningful social action, and not just the observable or external behaviour of people to 
get the complexity of reality (Saunders et al., 2003). Unlike positivism, subjectivism 
believe that reality is not “out there” but perceived by «the minds of people, internally 
experienced and socially constructed through interaction and interpreted through the 
actors, and is based on the definition people attach to it» (Sarantakos, 2005:36). In the 
same furrow, Williams and May (1996: 60) reckon that «the world is interpreted 
through the mind […] we cannot know the ‘true’ nature of the object world, separate 
from our perception of it». Furthermore, knowledge is considered as cumulative, or as 
increasing over time. Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979) point out that good research 
should provide the casual relationship between independent and dependent variables 
and minimize the random error. 
However, there may be several perspectives that lay between the two extreme 
philosophical positions. For instance, Morgan and Smircich (1980) identify six major 
philosophical perspectives, included positivism and subjectivism. Alternatively, Ryan et 
al. (2002) describes the realistic approach or dialectical materialism which arises in the 
middle of the above mentioned perspective
23
. Moreover, critical perspective attempts to 
mediate between objectivism and subjectivism
24
 (Sarantakos, 2005; Burell and Morgan, 
1979). 
 
4.2.2 Theory 
Theories define and explain different phenomena by arranging sets of concepts 
(Silverman, 2005). They are fundamental in order to understand, develop and eventually 
modify phenomena. In general terms, theory provides answer the question Why 
(Kaplan, 1964; Merton, 1968; Jonsson, 2007) or is regarded as solution to problems 
(Popper, 1994). As Strauss and Corbin (1994: 278) point out «Theory consists of 
plausible relationships produced among concepts and sets of concept». Thus, theories 
provide a framework for understanding phenomena and the impulsion, driving force for 
research. 
                                               
23 Actually, the realistic approach criticizes positivism for «failing to deal with the meanings of real 
people and their capacity to feel and think» and subjectivism «for being too subjective and relativist» 
(Neuman, 1997: 74). 
24 In particular, critical theory stands somewhere between positivism and subjectivism. Those theorists 
suggest to «get below the surface, to expose real relations, to disclose myths and illusions, to show […] 
how the world should be, how to achieve social goals and, in general, how to change the world» 
(Sarantakos, 1988:39). Reality is an «overtly political philosophy, in that it stresses the need to follow the 
logic of one’s philosophical and sociological analysis with practical action of a radical kind» (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979 
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Theories perception can be divided into two groups (Jonsson, 2007). They can be 
considered as ideas, explaining the why of phenomenon, using the approach of 
empiricism (Llewelyn, 2003). On the other hand, theories can be seen as grand theories, 
formulated in the world of the ideas rather than practice through the rationalism 
approach (McKelvey, 2006; Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006).  
Two different approaches that consider theories in different way exist, i.e. deductive and 
inductive approach. In other words, according to deductive research (Weber, 1947), 
theories are deductively tested from existing knowledge, through developing 
hypothesized relations and proposed outcomes for study (Jonsson, 2007).. Otherwise, 
inductive approach is characterizes on the fact that there is relations between empirical 
reality, which allows the development of a valid and testable theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). More in detail, the deductive approach tends to be preferred more by positivist 
researchers than subjectivists (Ticehurst and Veal 1999). The deductive process 
involves the theory development to test the hypothesis. Otherwise, the inductive 
approach is used when data is collected first, and a theory is developed as a result of the 
data analysis. It follows that deductive research approach uses a “top-down” approach, 
i.e. hypothesis arises from theory which hypothesis is tested through observation; finally 
researcher confirms or rejects hypothesis. Thus, conclusion follows logically from 
premises. On the other hand, inductive research approach works the other way, moving 
from specific observations to broader generalizations and theory, for this reason this 
approach is also informally called “bottom up” (Aqil Burney and Mahmood, 2006). 
Thus, in general terms, theory is the basis of research. It is dynamic, and not static, so it 
means it is expected to change and improve (Black, 1999). Theories usually have been 
developed through inductive approach, i.e. a process through which observations are 
made, data are collected, general patterns are defined and relationships are pointed out. 
Moreover, the point is how to interpret phenomena through theories? The answer may 
be through deduction, i.e. «one can explain, or deduce an explanation, by matching a 
specific situation to a more general one – in other word, the circumstances fit the 
theory» (Black, 1999: 8-9). In addition, Hempel (1966) maintains that generalizations 
are so infrequent and it is possible to give explanations only in terms of trends, i.e. 
probabilistic explanations. Gilbert (1993) has good intuition about theory construction 
through induction, and how research, using both quantitative and qualitative approach, 
confirms theory by deduction which seeks to explain instances. However, theories as 
well as are confirmed by research and are limited by the nature of the research support.  
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4.2.3 Hypotheses, Methodology and Method 
Unlike theories, hypotheses are tested in research (Silverman, 2005), thus they are 
testable proposition. Methodology could be defined as «a general approach to studying 
research topics» (Silverman, 2005: 109. In the same furrow, Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002: 31) state that it regards a «combination of techniques used to enquire into 
specific situation». Thus, methodology is expressed in terms of guidelines for an 
acceptable research practice (Sarantakos, 2005). Clearly the two assumptions 
aforementioned (i.e. ontological and epistemological one) have direct implication on 
methodological nature; to quote Burrell and Morgan (1979: 2) «different ontologies, 
epistemologies […] are likely to incline social scientists towards different 
methodologies». The possible range of methodologies is large; however the most 
widespread are the quantitative methodology and the qualitative methodology. The 
former is most closely related to a positivistic philosophy resulting that reality is 
objective and human being is determined by their social world exactly as the scientific 
world is determined by fix laws. It follows that social scientists should employ the same 
methods as researchers in normal science. Quantitative research is closely related to 
empiricism (Leach, 1990) and positivism (Duffy, 1985)
25
. Such research approach is a 
formal, systematic and objective process in which numerical data findings. It explains 
tests and examines cause and effect relationship (Burns and Grove, 1987) through a 
deductive approach of knowledge attainment (Duffy, 1985). So, theories are deductively 
tested by quantitative methodologies from existing knowledge through hypothesized 
relationships and proposed results (Cormack, 1991). Finally, in this perspective, the 
researcher has a detached, objective view in order to understand the fact (Duffy, 1985).  
On the other hand, the qualitative methodology refers to subjectivist philosophy 
according to which reality is caused by human action and interpreted by human beings. 
Weber (1978) clarifies that «verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with 
the concrete course of events is, as in the case of all hypotheses, indispensable». 
Benoliel (1985) states «modes of systematic enquiry concerned with understanding 
human beings and the nature of their transactions with themselves and with their 
understandings». In particular, qualitative research is driven by certain perspectives and 
ideas dealing with the subject to be investigated (Cormack, 1991). So, a qualitative 
methodology is considered like a vehicle for studying the empirical world from the 
point of view of the subject (Duffy, 1987). Such methodology is also defined as 
humanistic and idealistic approach (Leach, 1990) or as phenomenology (Duffy, 1985). 
Moreover, qualitative research differs from quantitative one as the former develops 
theory inductively. If follows that there is no quantification of the findings which are 
                                               
25 It comes from the scientific method used in the physical sciences (Cormack, 1991). 
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instead describes in the language used during the research process (Leach, 1990). It is 
noteworthy that two methodologies are not always mutually exclusive. Indeed, Jick 
(1979) advices the use of multiple methods, i.e. a strategy referred to as triangulation 
which is defined by Denzin (1978:291) as «the combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon». However, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) recommend to 
be cautious in the use of mixed methods especially when they present «very distinct 
ontologies». The use of mixed methodologies and methods could be satisfactory «where 
the overall direction and significance of the two sources [of data] are fairly similar», 
but they caution that «there are difficulties when different kinds of data say 
contradictory things about the same phenomena» (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008:71).  
As far as method is concerned, it could be defined an «individual techniques for data 
collection, analysis etc.» (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 31). The data collected in 
quantitative research are hard and numerical which are characterized by objective and 
systematic measurement. Moreover, the reliability and validity of data may be improved 
by probability testing and correlations established by, for instance, regression 
modelling. On the other hand, as far as qualitative methods are concerned, the 
researcher is an observer, interpreter and who elicits meaning from situations and that 
meaning is not expressed in numbers but in words. Accordingly, Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 6) state that «the researcher’s role is to gain a “holistic” (systemic, 
encompassing, integrated) overview of the context under study: its logic, its 
arrangements, its explicit and implicit rules». In addition, he «attempts to capture data 
on the perceptions of local actors “from the inside” through a process of deep 
attentiveness, of empathetic understanding […] and of suspending or “bracketing” 
preconceptions about the topics under discussion» (1994:6). It is noteworthy that both 
methods demand complex sampling procedures and need to respect criteria of the data 
collection. Both research approaches need a sample or population to be indentified; in 
case of sample, this must be representative of a larger population of people or objects. 
In particular, quantitative approach requires random selection of the sample from the 
population and the random assignment of the sample to the different study groups 
(Duffy, 1985). Statistical sampling is based on the study sample to develop general 
conclusions which could be generalized to the population. On the other hand, 
qualitative approach usually studies small and selective sample, due to its in-depth 
nature of studies and analysis of data required (Cormack, 1991). 
Although quantitative and qualitative methods are different, it is fundamental to point 
out that an approach superior to the other does not exist; both are characterized by 
strengths and weakness. It follows that there is no one best method of developing 
knowledge. In addition, it is important to recognize and understand the tension and 
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debate among researchers about quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to 
create distinctive and relevant modes of inquiry in research (Charoenruk, 2012). 
 
After discussing the various phases of research process, it may be useful to consider the 
design of research. According to Saunders et al., 2007, three main kinds of research 
design may exist, i.e. exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies. The former is the 
discovery of insights and ideas, and it could be conducted by search in literature, by 
interviewing some people who are expert in that topic or conducting focus group. 
Descriptive research deals with «an accurate profile of persons, events or situations» 
(Robson, 2002: 59). Explanatory studies, instead, is typically concerned with 
establishing the relationship between variables, for instance between dependent and 
independent ones (Jonsson, 2007; Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
4.2.4 Overview of philosophical and methodological assumptions 
Before discussing philosophy assumptions, methodology, method and theory on the 
basis of the present research, it may be useful to depict an overview of two major 
philosophical approaches, i.e. subjectivism and objectivism, analysed according to their 
respective assumptions. According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), bbjectivism may have 
various synonyms: 
 Quantitative 
 Positivistic 
 Scientific 
 Experimentalist 
 Traditionalist 
 Functionalist (Holden and Lynch, 2004) 
 
On the other hand, subjectivism may be defined as: 
 Qualitative 
 Phenomenological 
 Humanistic 
 Interpretivist 
  
Figure 4.2 displays main features of subjectivism and objectivism discussed on the 
previous paragraphs. 
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Figure 4.2 Subjectivism and objectivism overview 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979); Holden and Lynch (2004) 
 
The first assumption, i.e. ontology, concerns with the nature of reality, the researcher’s 
view of reality. According to objectivist, the reality is a concrete structure, whereas 
subjectivist approach states that reality is a projection of human imagination. The 
second assumption, i.e. epistemology, relates to the study of the nature of knowledge. 
Objectivist approach believes that it is necessary to construct a positivist science; on the 
other hand, subjectivism believes that it is necessary to obtain phenomenological 
insights and revelations. The third assumption, regarding human nature, concerns 
whether or not the researcher perceives man as the controlled or as the controller. In 
particular, objectivism believes that man is a responder; it means that the relationship 
between man and society is deterministic, and so man is born into a world with casual 
laws which explain the patterns to man behaviour. The observer is independent of what 
is being observed. Whereas according to the subjectivism, man is pure spirit, 
consciousness being; the observer interacts with subject observed. The fourth 
assumption, i.e. methodology, which is the tool-kit of each researcher, regards the ways 
available to social researcher to investigate phenomena. The methodology used by 
objectivism is the so-called nomothetic which is «basing research upon systematic 
protocol and technique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employed in the 
natural science [...]. It is preoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the 
use of quantitative techniques for the analysis of data. Surveys, questionnaires, 
personality tests and standardized research instruments of all kinds are prominent 
among the tools which compromise nomothetic methodology» (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979: 6-7). On the other hand, methodology adopted by subjectivism is called 
Subjectivism ASSUMPTION Objectivism 
Nominalism ONTOLOGY Realism 
Anti-positivism EPISTEMOLOGY Positivism 
Voluntarism HUMAN NATURE Determinism 
Ideographic METHODOLOGY Nomothetic 
Qualitative METHOD Quantitative 
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ideographic which is «based on the view that one can only understand the social world 
by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject investigation. It thus places 
considerable stress upon getting close to one’s subject and [...] emphasizes the analysis 
of the subjective accounts which one generates by “getting inside” situations» (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979: 6). It follows that idiographic approach is a “subjective” approach to 
methodology which adopt qualitative data gathering techniques (method) (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Evered and Louis, 1981). On the other hand, nomothetic approach uses 
quantitative methods and techniques (Luthans and Davis, 1982). 
The following table (Table 4.1) seeks to sum up what we discuss on the previous 
paragraphs. 
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Table 4.1 Research implication of the subjectivism and objectivism 
Implications  Subjectivism Positivism 
Choice of what to 
study 
The choice of what to study 
and how to study is driven by 
researcher’s interests, beliefs, 
values and skills 
The choice of what to study 
and how to study is driven by 
objective criteria rather than 
by human beliefs 
Generalisation  Particular or specialized 
findings that is less 
generalizable 
The aim of generalisation is 
to lead to prediction, 
explanation and 
understanding 
Operationalisation
26
 Small samples investigated in 
depth or over time and 
emerging categories are 
indentified during research 
process 
Concepts must be 
operationalised in order to 
quantify and measure facts 
Causality The aim of social science is to 
seek to understand what is 
happening. There is no cause 
and effect 
The aim of social science is to 
identify casual explanation 
and fundamental 
laws/mechanisms which 
could explain regularities 
Deductive/Inductive Developing ideas through 
induction from evidence 
Research foresees a process 
of hypothesising fundamental 
laws and then deducing what 
types of observations will 
demonstrate the truth of 
falsity of hypotheses 
Research language Informal, personal voice, use 
of accepted qualitative words 
Formal, impersonal voice, use 
of accepted quantitative 
words. 
Final report Narrative report with 
contextual description and 
direct quotations from 
research participants 
Statistical report with 
correlations, comparisons of 
statistical significance of 
findings 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), Hussey and Hussey (1997), Creswell (1994), 
Remenyi et al. (2000), Holden and Lynch (2004) 
                                               
26 This term originally derives from physics to refer to the operations by which a concept is measured 
(Bridgman, 1927). 
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4.3 Research phases 
According to Remenyi (1998), it is possible to identify eight specific research phases:  
1. Literature review 
2. Formalising research questions 
3. Establishing methodology 
4. Collecting evidence 
5. Analysing evidence 
6. Developing conclusions 
7. Understanding limitations of research 
8. Producing guidelines or recommendation 
 
In particular, our research is drawn into such phases.  
 
1. Literature review 
The literature review is «a material part of the research process» (Remenyi, 1998: 66), 
and it takes significant amount of time to be developed and expended on the research 
degree. The review of the literature helps to identify the theoretical or conceptual 
framework of research. The theoretical framework informs the study organization and 
allows for results to be generalized to other settings beyond those of research (Polit and 
Beck, 2009). Theoretical frameworks identify variables, and propose relationships to be 
studied and tested (Polit and Beck, 2004). So, the literature review should show a 
suitable problem to study and give the researchers some idea of the research approaches, 
methods which have been used in this field (Creswell, 1994). It is relevant to highlight 
that the literature should not just accepted but should be critically evaluated. 
In the present research, the literature review is based on critical analysis of the 
international contributions regarding corporate governance in general terms. 
Thus, we studied and compared, in a critical way, different definitions of corporate 
governance to understand the humus from which theories and models are developed. 
Then, international (Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese) and Italian models of 
corporate governance are compared. After the analysis of the corporate governance 
theoretical models, the attention is focused on the relationship between those models 
and the international theories (agency, stakeholder, stewardship and resource 
dependence theory) to understand which theory is at the basis of models. There are no 
contributions that clarify the relationship between the atypical Italian model and the 
corporate governance theory; we tried to define what theory is on the base of the Italian 
model. It is relevant to notice that the choice of the corporate governance theory is 
fundamental to identify an empirical model to measure the relationship between the 
corporate governance and economic performance in Italian firms. Those results are 
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shown on chapter two. Furthermore, we investigated the relation among international 
literature about corporate governance (i.e. international theories of corporate 
governance), codes of best practice of Anglo-Saxon, German-Japanese and Italian listed 
companies and empirical research. In particular, we studied some ‘variables’ contained 
in codes of conduct which deal with key success factors of the board of directors. Those 
variables regard the board of directors that according to agency theory is one of the 
main tools for monitoring opportunistic behaviour of management on behalf of 
shareholders. Those findings are shown on chapter three. After that we analysed in 
particular the main important variables, based on agency theory, in order to build the 
econometric model. Those results are drawn on chapter four. Finally, we use a ”top-
down approach”, i.e. we started studying corporate governance in general terms and 
finished analysing typical aspects of boards under the agency theory lens. 
 
2) Formalising Research Question 
As aforementioned, the literature should be critically studied and evaluated and not just 
accepted on face value. It is fundamental because it leads to the formulation of suitable 
research questions (Remenyi, 1998). Research questions should be focused on the 
subject area and specific in terms of the problem which researcher try to answer. In 
general, business and management researchers ask questions related to how and why 
(Remenyi, 1998). 
In particular, after critical analysis of literature about corporate governance and the 
board of directors and audit mechanisms, we formulated two research questions (see 
chapter one).  
RQ 1) How can Board of Directors affect firm performance in Italian listed companies? 
RQ 2) How can monitoring processes affect firm performance in Italian listed 
companies?  
 
3) Establishing methodology 
It is noteworthy to point out that the literature review should uncover a suitable 
methodology which has been applied to previous research, as well as suitable problem 
to be researched. It follows that researcher knows the range of methodologies, research 
strategies available and is familiar about their individual strengths and weakness 
(Remenyi, 1998). 
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Indeed, the topic to be researched and the specific research questions is one of the first 
drivers in the choice of methodology (Silverman, 2005). Moreover, the choice of 
research methodology is driven by some different factors. For instance, it may 
influenced by the issue of time and money which could be of critical importance, 
especially when there is little budget, as well as by previous research. 
As afore discussed, the present research adopt a quantitative methodology grounded in 
the philosophy of positivism (Rudestam and Newton, 1992) which generates 
quantifiable data related to measurable and observable phenomena. 
 
4) Collecting evidence 
One of the most important aspects of research process is to answer the research 
questions and verify research hypotheses, by providing suitable evidence supported by 
proper arguments. As specified in the following paragraph, we collected data regarding 
Italian firms listed on STAR Segment (Italian Stock Exchange). Data collected regards 
board size, the number of independent, non-executive, executive directors, the CEO 
duality, the supervisory board size, the presence of Audit Committee and the Big Four. 
Such data has been acquired by the annual report of corporate governance. Moreover, 
we also collected data regarding financial and economic performance and accounting 
indices for all companies, in particular ROE and Tobin’s Q, logarithm natural of total 
asset, capital intensity, ROA, firm leverage. We used database
27
 called Datastream 
provided by Thomson Reuters.  
 
5) Analysing evidence 
Once evidence has been collected, it is necessary to analyse it (Remenyi, 1998). The 
analysis of evidence changes hugely. It depends on if quantitative or qualitative 
evidence has been acquired. The amount of quantitative analyses depends on the 
information technology facilities, e.g. the software available, and the mathematical 
sophistication of the researcher. Furthermore, interpretative analysis relies on a different 
skill set of researcher. Those skills regard the ability to conceptualise on the basis of the 
evidence available and the patterns arising from it (Remenyi, 1998). 
                                               
27 The use of the database has the advantage of designing the structure of the business data in a unique 
way, then, avoiding redundancies and ensuring data integrity. Essentially all business processes refer to a 
single reporting structure which gathers the entire “corporate knowledge” (Castellano, 2003). 
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After defining research questions and hypotheses and collecting suitable data, we started 
analysing evidence applying quantitative approach. As discussed in the following 
section, we created an (unbalanced) panel data and tested our hypotheses by using OLS 
pooled, fixed-effects and random-effects models. 
 
6) Developing conclusions 
Drawing conclusions from the evidence can be the most creative part of research project 
(Remenyi, 1998). Conclusions should convince the reader that something of value has 
been added to knowledge. Indeed, conclusions should be carefully argued in such a way 
that they will convince the research community (Collins, 1994).  
In our research after analysing data collected (i.e. descriptive statistics) and testing 
hypotheses, we find out some interest results which are discussed in detail in chapter 
five. One striking findings is that the overwhelming dominant agency approach is not 
totally verified in the Italian context. 
 
7) Understanding limitations of research and 8) Producing guidelines or 
recommendation 
Discovering research limitation in a key part of the development of the researcher and 
this self-discovery should be demonstrated within the research project. It may represent 
the «main opportunity the researcher has to reflect on his or her work and to be self-
critical of the approach taken as wall of the findings produced. This is a critical part of 
a research degree, especially at the doctoral level» (Remenyi, 1998: 69) 
It is relevant to recognize the limitation of research which, in our study, are depicted in 
chapter one. 
Moreover, in the last chapter we present some guidelines or suggestion for further 
research. In particular, after finding that agency theory could not totally apply on the 
Italian firms we suggest to adopt the so-called multiple agency theory which focuses not 
just on the relationship between agent and principle but also on the relations among 
multiple agents and principles. It is noteworthy to point out that according to Remenyi 
(1998) the conclusion may be to reject the theoretical approach from which the research 
has been developed. «The refutation of a conjecture is generally regarded as just as 
important a contribution to the body of knowledge as the confirmation of a conjecture» 
(Remenyi, 1998: 68). 
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4.4 Research Theoretical Approach  
After discussing research process, research philosophy and assumptions in general 
terms, we describe the research theoretical approach adopted in the present research.  
This research will adopt the positivism approach due to its relevance to this type of 
research and so quantitative methodology is used. Indeed, the quantitative research is 
grounded in the philosophy of positivism (Rudestam and Newton, 1992; Bryman and 
Bell, 2007; Sauders et al., 2007) which generates quantifiable data related to measurable 
and observable phenomena. So the adopted approach deals with establishing the 
strength of the relationships between variables (independent and dependent ones) and 
applies statistics to test hypotheses (Neuman, 1997; Cavana et al., 2001). It follows that 
we want to find common patterns that categorise population without focusing on 
specific features of individual firms (Bentz and Shapiro, 1998; Owtscharov, 2007). 
Consistent with Johnson and Harris (2002), we aggregate numbers into statistics to ease 
the interpretation of data results in depicting conclusions. Moreover, the deductive 
approach is preferred more by positivist researchers than subjectivist (Ticehurst and 
Veal 1999). The deductive research process, indeed, involves the development of a 
theory or hypothesis to test; whereas the inductive approach is adopted when data is 
collected first, and then a theory is developed as a result of the data analysis. 
Positivism is related to scientific, experimental, quantitative and deductive frameworks 
where the researcher seeks specific quantifiable observations thus using statistics and 
experiments to test their hypotheses (Neuman 1997). Thus, this research uses a 
deductive approach. It is an explanatory study. In particular, quantitative methods – e.g. 
the analysis of financial data - are often used to determine corporate governance relation 
with firm performance in empirical studies.  
As far as theory is concerned, «empirical research must be fundamentally rooted in 
theory and it is in fact impossible to conduct such research without the researcher 
taking a specific theoretical standpoint» (Remenyi, 1995:9). This research is based on 
agency theory which focuses on the relationship between principal and agent and the 
board of directors acting as monitoring “device”. In particular, we studied the board of 
directors under agency theory lens with regard to Italian listed companies. As explained 
in chapter three, we consider restrictive approach or agency theory because it starts from 
board of directors which constitute both the beating heart and the brain of the company, 
without which it could be impossible for a firm survive. Indeed, like a heart and a brain, 
the board of directors is an essential part of the company without which firm could not 
exist and it is growing or originating from within company in order to drive, help it, 
minimize agency costs, and solve with other internal subjects (top management, 
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shareholders, committees, control mechanisms) every kind of challenges. The board is 
also accountable for providing the checks and balances essentials for the orderly 
conduct of the business.  
As regarding quantitative method, data are necessary to measure the board 
characteristics (size, composition, CEO duality), audit processes (Audit Committee, Big 
Four) and firm performance (ROE and Tobin’s Q) in listed companies. The methods 
used to obtain data are mainly two. First, listed companies disclose some information on 
their annual report or their annual Corporate Governance report. The latter which is the 
document analysed for each company of our population for the period 2005-2007 is 
available from the website of Italian Stock Exchange. Indeed, the companies studied 
(which are analysed on the following paragraph) have to publish annual corporate 
governance report, as well as financial statement. Hence, data related to board size, 
composition (i.e. the number of independent, executive and non-executive directors), 
CEO duality, the presence of Audit Committee and Big Four are available from 
corporate governance reports. However, some companies omitted to present and publish 
the necessary data; therefore we dismiss those firms from our analysis. Second, in order 
to obtain data related with performance (namely, ROE and Tobin’s Q), firm size 
(logarithm natural of total asset), capital intensity, ROA, firm leverage, we used 
database called Datastream provided by Thomson Reuters.  
This research aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in Italian listed companies. Consequently, the 
research employed a quantitative approach where relationships between corporate 
governance features and a set of dependent financial and non-financial variables on 
listed companies is tested using analysis of data. The main purpose of this method is to 
identify, test and measure the relationship between firm performance (measured by 
ROE and Tobin’s Q) and a set of explanatory variables, namely, board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, the presence of Audit Committee, and Big Four and a 
comprehensive set of control variables (i.e. natural logarithm of total asset, ROA, 
capital intensity, firm leverage, year of acceptance of Corporate Governance Code). 
 
4.5 Implementing the present research 
After describing philosophical framework of the present research, in the follow sub-
paragraphs we discuss about population sampling, data acquisition and data 
management. 
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4.5.1 Population Sampling 
In the present research we did not consider a sample of companies, but a population of 
listed firms. In particular, we focus our attention to Italian companies which belong to 
Italian Main Market (MTA) which is a regulated market for mid and large size 
companies subject to stringent requirements. Within the MTA market, the STAR 
segment is dedicated to mid cap companies that voluntarily comply with requirements 
of excellence in terms of liquidity, information transparency and high quality of 
corporate governance. Given the emphasis on liquidity, information transparency and 
corporate governance, we considered Italian companies listed on STAR segment which 
are 68. Since our research focus is Italian firms during the period 2005-2007, we 
eliminated all non-Italian companies, namely three (including two from Luxemburg and 
one from Switzerland). Moreover, consistent with Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998); 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998); O’Connell and Cramer, 2010, we excluded all the eight 
financial companies, because they are different due to the special regulatory 
environment in which they operate. «Regulation masks efficiency differences across 
firms, potentially rendering governance mechanisms less important» (Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998: 391). We removed other two companies, because they started 
adopting corporate governance code from 2008, thus out of our studied period. Finally, 
one company did not publish any disclosure regarding corporate governance; hence we 
had to exclude it from our population. In the end, our population counts 54 Italian 
companies listed in the STAR segment. Figure 4.3 depicts different industrial sectors to 
which belong firms investigated.  
 
Figure 4.3 Firms population and industrial sectors 
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We notice that the majority of the listed companies belong to Industrials; where only 
2% of firms play into Health Care, Basic Materials and Telecommunications sectors. 
No company listed in STAR segment deals with Oil and Gas. 
 
4.5.2 Data acquisition 
As mentioned before, we acquired data through two different ways. Firstly, all 
companies listed in segment STAR have to publish the annual Corporate Governance 
report. It is possible to find in that document data regarding board size, number of 
independent, executives, non-executives directors, CEO duality, the supervisory board 
size, the presence of Audit Committee, and firm auditing (Big Four or non-Big Four). 
Secondly, in order to obtain financial and non-financial data we used the database called 
Datastream provided by Thomson Reuters and which is a financial and macroeconomic 
database covering equities, stock market indices, currencies, fixed income securities and 
key economic and financial indicators for 175 countries and 60 markets. All data 
collected refers over period 2005-2007, so before global financial crisis. Indeed, the 
population period was chosen because we did not want that financial crisis influences 
our data, especially firm performance data, since our purpose is to test and measure the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance not 
during financial crisis. 
 
4.5.3 Data Management 
After collecting data, we manage it through a statistical software, namely STATA 10. To 
estimate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, audit committee, Big Four) and firm performance, the thesis 
relies on panel data
28
; that is a combination of cross-section and time series data. Like 
most panel data sets, the data set used in the present research is more orientated toward 
cross-section analyses than time series analyses. In other words, there are a quite large 
number of cross-sectional units and only a few time period, that is the case of the so-
called short panel. More concretely, the data set follows a population of Italian 
companies listed in STAR segment over a three-year period (2005-2007) and thus 
provides multiple observations on variable for each firm. In the following sub-
paragraphs we describe the statistical techniques both available and used in the present 
research for analysing panel data. 
                                               
28 The literature on panel data studied is Baltagi (2001); Greene (2003); Gujarati (2003, Chapter 16); 
Hsiao (2002); Kennedy, (2003, Chapter 17); Petersen (2004); and Wooldridge (2006, Chapters 13 and 
14).  
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4.5.3.1 Panel data  
Using panel data may have two main reasons. Firstly, panel data allows us to analyse 
change over time. However, in the present research some variables are largely time-
invariant
29
. Secondly, repeated observations on each firm make it possible to control for 
unobserved independent variables. Panel data also is used for the purposes of obtaining 
more information on the issues studied and so limiting the effect of any short-term 
irregularity inherent in annual data.  
It is important to understand why we should care about controlling for omitted 
variables; thus it may be useful to address the homoskedasticity assumption underlying 
the classical regression model, i.e. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. According 
to this assumption, the error term should have the same variance given any value of 
independent variables. It follows that the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables does not change across different cross-sectional firms and through 
time. The intercept is constant across different cross-sectional units and through time. 
This assumption may be violated if we take into account the individuality of each firm 
(i.e. unit). Furthermore, two kinds of variation exist, one between cross-sectional units 
and one within cross-sectional units (firm-specific effects). The reason why firm-
specific effects are possibly observed relates to the operation of excluded variables. 
Indeed, one major benefit of panel data is that the latter help to control for such 
unobserved firm-specific effects. 
 
4.5.3.2 Panel data Models 
Panel data can be analysed by three models: Pooled OLS, the fixed-effects models and 
the random-effects model. The pooling OLS model is to what would be specified and 
estimates with cross-sectional data, only with more observations. Pooling of data 
implies that each observation (i.e. firm) is treated as a separate observation without 
considering that it may come from the same firm. Furthermore, pooled OLS has the 
assumption that the error terms are not correlated across time (assumption of no serial 
correlation). The panel data structure implies that each firm is surveyed repeatedly over 
several years (three years in our study), so the error term could be carried over from one 
year to the next. Because the pooled OLS standard errors ignore this correlation, they 
will be incorrect, as will the test statistics. It is possible that with pooled OLS t-values 
may be biased, which would lead to invalid outcomes for marginal effects. This is 
particularly likely to occur in the case when there is little within variation in one or 
                                               
29 The descriptive statistics discussed on chapter 5 shows that some of the independent variables little 
within variation. For instance, board size, number of independent, non-executive and executive director 
vary between company rather than within firm. 
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more of the independent variables and when the dependent variable remains fairly stable 
over time. It follows that the use of pooled data would imply that the ‘same’ 
observations are counted several times.  
On the other hand, fixed-effects and random-effects models account for the presence of 
firm-specific effects in that they separate the error term into one time-invariant and 
firm-specific component, and one idiosyncratic component which changes within and 
between firms. In particular, fixed-effects model allows unobserved variables to be 
correlated with the error term, thus resolving the endogeneity problem which is related 
to omitted variables. Fixed-effects models purpose to «study the causes of changes 
within an entity (i.e. firm). A time-invariant characteristic cannot cause such a change, 
because it is constant for each person» Kohler and Kreuter (2009: 245). 
Unlike fixed-effects model, the random-effects model posits that the independent 
variables are strictly uncorrelated with the error term. That model takes advantage of 
both cross-sectional and within-unit variation and it assumes that these effects are the 
same. In addition, random-effects models accounts for the fact that some observations 
belong to the same company. While the between estimator (fixed effect) makes 
comparisons between firms in their average outcomes (by taking the mean value of each 
variable for each firm across time), the within estimator (random effect) uses the intra-
firm variation (by subtracting from each variable its mean value over time for the firm). 
The intercept is the mean value of all time-invariant and firm-specific intercepts, 
whereas the time-invariant and firm-specific component of the error term are the 
random deviation of individual intercepts from this mean value. The random-effects 
models consider the intercepts as being randomly drawn from a larger population – so 
they may be interpreted as random and treated as though they were part of the error 
term. 
How could we decide among OLS pooled, the fixed-effects models and the random-
effects model? The random effects model can be consistently estimated by both the 
Random Effect estimator and the Fixed Effect estimator. This is usually tested by a 
(Durbin-Wu-)Hausman test. In particular, we use Hausman test to discriminate between 
FE and RE. This test differences between FE and RE estimates is statistically 
significantly different from zero. In particular, to decide between fixed and random 
effects we run Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is 
random effects versus the alternative the fixed effects (Greene, 2003). In particular, If 
the Hausman test does not indicate a significant difference (p > 0.05), however, it does 
not necessarily follow that the random effects estimator is “safely” free from bias, and 
therefore to be preferred over the fixed effect estimator (Clark and Linzer, 2012). 
Furthermore, we use Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) which helps us deciding 
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between a random effects regression and a simple OLS regression. The null hypothesis 
in the LM test is that variances across entities are zero. This is no significant difference 
across units (i.e. no panel effect). 
In our analysis, we have a short and unbalanced panel data which means that the 
number of time periods is not the same for all individuals (i.e. firms). We ran Hausman 
test for all models and it suggested to use fixed effects coefficients. In particular, we 
tested models considering also sector dummies and Hausman test confirmed that fixed 
effects are unbiased.  
Furthermore, in order to ensure valid statistical inference when some of the underlying 
regression model’s assumptions are violated, it is common to rely on “robust” standard 
errors (Hoechle, 2007). Thus, all fixed effects coefficient analysed and described are the 
outcomes of robust test. Dielman and Rose (1997: 293) state that «estimating regression 
models using ordinary least square (OLS) yields parameter estimates that are unbiased 
and have minimum variance when the disturbances are independent and identically 
normally distributed. In the presence of non-normal errors, however, the performance 
of OLS can be quite impaired, especially if the errors follow a distribution that tends to 
produce outliers». One possible way to correct for heteroskedasticuty is to use a robust 
model (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 2005). Therefore STATA 10 is used to perform robust 
coefficient and robust Standard Errors. In Stata 10, heteroscedasticity consistent or 
“White” standard errors are obtained by choosing option vce(robust) (Baum, 2006). 
Thus, the use of robust standard errors does not change the coefficient estimates 
provided by fixed-effects models, but they change the standard errors and significance 
tests (Wooldridge, 2006). 
 
4.6 Summary and Research Implications 
In the present chapter, research methodology has been indentified and discussed. The 
chapter started by giving arguments for why issues are done from a philosophical and 
methodological prospective. In addition, it explains how and what has been done in the 
process. We discussed also about research phases which fundamental to carry out 
research. Last section is devoted to provide information concerning the approach, 
methodology, and methods used. This is fundamental in order to enable the reader to 
better understand the findings of our research. 
So, we point out that we adopt a positivism approach due to its relevance to this type of 
research; moreover we apply quantitative methodology for us explanatory study. A 
deductive approach is adopted, it means that theory are deductively tested from existing 
knowledge, through developing hypothesized relations and proposed outcomes for 
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study. The purpose of the present explanatory study is to test and measure the 
relationship between board of directors mechanism and firm performance in Italian 
listed companies. We take into account a population of 54 Italian firms listed on STAR 
segment, given the emphasis on liquidity, information transparency and corporate 
governance. We collected data through two methods, manually by studying annual 
corporate governance report and by using Dastastream. After collecting all the 
necessary data, we elaborated it in Stata 10 by creating unbalanced panel data, as we 
studied 54 companies during three year with around 154 observations. We tested OLS 
pooled, fixed effects and random effects models. However, both Hausman test and 
Breusch-Pagan test confirm that fixed effect model is the best one and the unbiased one. 
For this reason, we adopted for our result fixed effect model. However, in order to 
obtain more robust coefficient, we made the robustness test. 
Finally, we considered only results coming from fixed effect model improved by 
robustness test. 
The next chapter will present research hypothesis based on literature review, the model 
construction, and findings with their interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 5 - Model Application and 
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5.1 Introduction 
The present chapter describes different research on corporate governance with respect to 
the impact of board of directors or the overall governance mechanisms on firm 
performance. There are two main streams of research, one studies one or more corporate 
governance variables and their relationship with firm performance; one analyses the 
liaison between whole corporate governance (or corporate governance choices) and firm 
performance by using corporate indices. The present research follows the first stream of 
research. Furthermore, based on literature review we describe our research hypotheses 
which are tested in a population of Italian companies listed on STAR segment (Italian 
Stock Exchange). Then, after depicting the Italian context, we show descriptive 
statistics related to our population. Finally, we present our results obtained by running 
the model. 
In particular, in section 2 we present two main streams of research with reference to the 
relationship corporate governance and performance. In section 3, we present the Italian 
context; in section 4 we describe our research hypotheses we want to test; then in 
section 5, we present the model and its variables. In section 6, we compare variables 
studied in chapter 3 and 5. Finally, results as well as descriptive statistics are shown in 
section 7. In section 8, we depict conclusions of this study. 
 
5.2 Measuring the relationship between Corporate Governance and firm 
performance 
There have been innumerable studies exampling the effect of board mechanisms on firm 
performance (Bhagat et al., 2010). Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) states 
that there should be a clear connection between the strength of a company’s governance 
structure and firm performance. This information could be useful to creditors and 
investors in making financial decisions (Dunn and Sainty, 2009). 
Generally, research focusing on relationship between board of directors features and 
firm performance starts from the assumption that an inherent conflict exists between 
principal and agent and it is necessary to overcome this problem by overlapping 
shareholders and management interests.  
Two main veins of research exist:  
1) Studies analysing one or more corporate governance variables and their 
relationship with firm performance; 
2) Studies analysing the liaison between whole corporate governance (or corporate 
governance choices) and firm performance by using corporate indices. 
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5.2.1 Corporate Governance Single variable 
There is considerable research on corporate governance single variables and firm 
performance in order to identify what kind of relationship between board of directors 
and performance exists. Since the board has multifaceted tasks (O’Connel and Cramer, 
2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006), it seems reasonable to assume that boards may affect firm 
performance; thus scholars are interested to understand what types of board structures 
are the best to maximize shareholder’s wealth (Monda and Giorgino, 2013), firm value, 
and growth (Maher and Andersson, 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). According to 
McIntyre and Murphy (2007), the mainstream of corporate governance literature studies 
the board of directors features in relation to a number of different variables. 
In this study, we can distinguish at least four types of current research. In particular, 
a) Studies aimed to analyse the relationship between the board of directors size and 
performance. 
b) Studies aimed to analyse the relationship between the board of directors 
compositions (executive, non-executive, independent directors) and 
performance. 
c) Studies aimed to analyse the relationship between leadership structure (e.g. top 
management turnover, board change, CEO and Chairperson, ownership) and 
performance. 
d) Studies aimed to analyse the relationship between internal and external control 
(independent directors, audit committee, supervisory board if existing, etc.) and 
performance. 
These studies were outlined in chapter 3 (section 4) and chapter 5 (section 4). For this 
reason, we will not depict a detailed view of that research in this section. 
The first research vein deals with the studying of relationship between board of 
directors size and firm performance. It shows both advantages and disadvantages of 
having a large or small board. Forbes and Milliken (1999) and Goodstein et al. (1994) 
point out that a greater number of directors bring their skills and expertise that an 
individual can not possess. Thus, on the boards of larger size new strategic perspectives 
can be more easily developed to contrast the CEO power (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) 
and ensure more effective control over the management (Zhara and Pearce, 1989 and 
Ocasio, 1994). In this vein, Daily and Dalton (1998) find positive correlation between 
board size and firm performance, especially for small medium enterprises. On the other 
hand, even though a greater board size could increase control over top management, 
benefits from larger boards are lower than the costs incurred. Indeed, a higher number 
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of directors could be related to slowness in decision-making, difficulties in coordinating 
and organizing directors, inability to maintain high motivational levels (Lipton and 
Lorsh, 1992), and CEO predominant role (Mintzberg, 1983). It follows that a negative 
correlation between the board size and firm performance (De Andres et al., 2005) – 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Yermack, 1996), ROA (Eisenberg, Sundrgren, and Wells, 
1998; Bhagat and Black, 1998/2002), and ROE (Conyon and Peck, 1998) exists. 
The second research current concerns analysis of the relationship between the board of 
directors compositions (executive, non-executive, independent directors) and 
performance. Research does not agree on the best board of directors composition, 
indeed optimal board composition cannot exist (Hermalin, 1994 and Kole, 1997) 
because several variables (e.g. shareholders presence on board, regulations) influence 
each firm (Weisbach, 1988). Several studies (De Andres et al., 2005 and Adjaoud et al., 
2007) find that there is no correlation, either positive or negative, between board 
composition and performance. Yet, Klein (1998) and Bhagat and Black (2002) claim 
that a positive connection exists between outside directors and performance; in contrast 
Agrawal and Knober (1996) and Coles et al. (2001) find a negative correlation between 
outside director and performance (measured with Tobin’s Q and Market Value Added). 
We notice that Italian, English, American, Japanese and German Codes of Conduct 
focus mainly on independent directors or a balance between inside and outside 
directors, as Agency theory claims; whereas empirical studies do not seem to have 
reached a shared conclusion. Moreover, there are few studies related to executive 
directors, because discussion on the board composition is centred on role and effects of 
independent directors. Executives are an important source of firm-specific information 
for the board, but perhaps do not monitor CEO due to lack of independence from the 
latter and private benefits (Raheja, 2005). In fact, inside directors should provide first-
hand information on the company operation to other board directors (Boumosleh and 
Reeb, 2005). In addition, «inside directors are usually aligned with the CEO» (Shakir, 
2008). An implicit relationship with CEO exists, because the latter - who is the highest-
ranking executive within the company – has power in appointment insiders who are 
loyal to CEO. For this reason, executives do not contribute towards effective monitoring 
of CEO and fail to enhance firm performance (Sirmans, et al., 2006).  
The third research current deals with relationship between leadership structure (e.g. top 
management turnover, board change, CEO and Chairperson, ownership) and 
performance. According to Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Kaplan 
(1994a, 1994b) and Denis and Sarin (1995), turnover of management board increases 
significantly with performance (e.g. stock performance), directors who have performed 
poorly have a significantly higher probability of losing their position within the 
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company. On the other hand, Franks et al. (1996) reveal that a high turnover, observable 
in the presence of unsatisfactory performance, is more sensitive to losses. Regarding 
board change and performance, some studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Yermack, 
1996; Einseberg et al., 1998) reveal that poor performance leads to changes in board 
composition, whereas board size does not change. However, Gilson (1990) – studying 
financial firms – highlights intense turnover accompanied by a reduction in the board of 
directors size in the case of poor performance. Consistent with monitoring of the board 
over management, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find that the 
appointment of outsiders, rather than insiders, is more likely in the case of companies 
with poor performance and with a large board of directors. Similarly, Fich (2005) finds 
that outside CEOs are more likely to be appointed in firms with higher growth 
opportunities, because they provide the knowledgeable counsel needed to foster firm 
performance. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) show that new outsiders will be appointed in 
the case of top executives reducing dividends by 50%. The research of Brickley et al. 
(1999) reveals that directors of underperforming firms suffer from tarnished reputations 
in the market for directors. Finally, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990/1997) find that stock 
prices rise around the announcement of new outside directors, but they do not observe 
any effect of the appointment of new inside directors. As regards CEO duality
30
, studies 
on the role of CEO and Chairperson find conflicting results that can be summed up as 
follows. CEO duality has positive effect on performance, measured by ROI, ROE 
(Boyd, 1995; Coles et al., 2001); on the other hand CEO non-duality has a positive 
relation with performance measured by ROI and Tobin’s Q (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; 
Yermack, 1996). However, Baliga et al. (1996) suggest that neither CEO duality nor 
non-duality have important effects on performance measured by ROE, Market Value 
Added, ROA, and ROI. In fact, most findings have proclivity for positive correlation 
between CEO non-duality and firm performance. It is interesting to notice that Dalton et 
al. (1998) find that Joint Stock Companies with few independent directors and 
characterized by CEO non-duality are coupled positively to bankruptcy. Thus it would 
seem that empirical research confirms what codes of best practice recommend (with the 
exception of America and German) and what agency theory claims. Finally, some 
research on company ownership has centred on the fact that firms (especially US ones) 
are owned by dispersed shareholders and are controlled by managers who own few or 
no firm shares. Holderness (2003) examines US literature studying the effects of insider 
and blockholder ownership on firm value. He finds different results. On the one hand, 
some scholars (Mehran, 1995; Himmerlberg et al., 1999; Claessens and Djankov, 2000; 
Miguel et al., 2001) show no significant relationship between firm performance and the 
holdings of variety by different types of blockholder. In contrast, Morck, Shleifer, and 
                                               
30 CEO duality implies that the same individual serves both as Chairman and as CEO; whereas CEO-non 
duality the roles of chairman and CEO are split. 
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Vishny (1988) and McConnel and Servaes (1990) find that, when inside ownership 
increases beyond a certain level, the so-called entrenchment effects of inside ownership 
is linked with lower firm value. On the other hand, other academics (Carline et al., 
2002; Lins and Servaes, 1999) find a positive impact on performance in the case of 
managerial equity holdings. 
The forth research current focuses on relationship between internal and external control 
(independent directors, audit committee, supervisory board if existing, etc.) and 
performance. Corporate governance studies have also centred on monitoring and control 
role of the board (including independent directors, audit committee) and barely studied 
the supervisory board, and external control. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that 
external auditors introduction is fundamental to stimulate and control competition 
among top managers. In this context, research is more fecund with independent 
directors and audit committees rather than supervisory board, probably because most of 
the studies focus on Anglo-American companies where the latter does not exist. Several 
studies have focused on independent directors as an essential tool to supervise the 
board. The majority of these studies have confirmed the importance of independent 
directors within the company, both when analysing impact on the company value 
(Baysinger and Buttler, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Pearce and Zahara, 1992; 
Cotter and Silvester, 2003) and when studying the impact where mangers and 
shareholders’ interests are in conflict (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; 
Bricklet et al., 1994; Borokhovich et al., 1996). The presence of independent directors 
allows the board to fill its role of control with efficiency (Chouchene, 2010). Audit 
committee, like the board of directors, has been studied under different aspects, such as 
independence (Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Bradbury, 2006), expertise (Song and 
Windram, 2004; Bedard et al., 2004), meetings (Xie et al., 2003; Ebrahim, 2007), size 
(Lin et al., 2006; Baxter and Cotter, 2009) related with performance. The audit 
committee has a control and monitoring role of managers’ discretion over the 
accounting policy. An effective audit committee may add more quality to the audit 
process, by overseeing the financial reporting process, by coordinating the internal and 
external audits, and assuring the independence of external auditors from managerial 
pressure (McMullen and Raghunanadan, 1996). Parker (1992), as cited in Collier and 
Gregory, (1996) defined an audit committee as «A committee appointed by a company 
as a liaison between the board of directors and the external auditors, this committee 
normally has a majority of non-executive directors and is expected to view the 
company's affairs in a detached and dispassionate manner». Supervisory board efficacy 
(when existing)
31
, has significantly increased in recent years; in fact it is involved in the 
                                               
31 It is noteworthy that supervisory board does not exist in UK and US companies, because its role is 
played by the audit committee (i.e. one tier model); whereas in German and in Italy (respectively, two-tier 
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decision-making process on management decision and on company strategy (Lieder, 
2010). Indeed, the main responsibility of the supervisory board is to supervise the 
board, ensuring directors act on the best interest of the company’s shareholders. The 
need for this kind of supervision may be rooted in the agency theory which suggests that 
«management opportunism arises as a result of the separation of ownership and 
management». (Peij et al., 2012: 4). External audit (e.g. the so-called Big4) is an 
external corporate mechanism that assesses and evaluates internal company controls and 
audits their financial statements to prevent mis-statements. The external auditor may 
have an impact on the efficacy of the control and monitoring role of the company 
(Habbash, 2010) and as a consequence on performance. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) 
argue that researchers are interested in the monitoring and control role of the board with 
respect to three factors a) the growing legislation of board duties; b) corporate scandals; 
and c) the increasing popularity of agency theory. Recent legislation has increased 
significantly the board’s control and oversight duties (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009). These developments occurred because stakeholders want 
greater standards of governance, professionalism from boards and higher accountability 
(Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). So, legislation has improved existing company by-
laws and market listing rules that require the board to exercise control over management 
in the shareholders interests (Vagliasindi, 2008). Several corporate governance scandals 
occurred in developed countries
32
, exposing significant weaknesses in corporate 
governance which led to destruction of shareholder value (Burrough and Helyar, 1990; 
Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a; Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 
2006). The third factor identified by Nicholson and Kiel (2004) is the increasing 
importance of agency theory, according to which the increase in management power 
may enable them to follow self-interests that may differ from those of shareholders 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Herman, 1981; Pathiban and Rahul, 1996). Capital providers 
lack the resources or incentives to monitor, and control managerial actions that may go 
unchecked, causing a decrease of shareholder wealth (Pathibul and Rahul, 1996). In 
light of the above, «internal and external control mechanisms can be collectively 
employed to address the conflicting interests of firm managers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders» (Waymire, 2008:1). 
                                                                                                                                         
and “traditional” models), for instance, the institution of this board is more common and in Italy only few 
companies appoint the audit committee. 
32 Including USA (Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson), Australia and New Zealand (HIH Insurance, 
OneTel, Qantas NZ, Air New Zealand, Ansett Australia), Italy (Parmalat, Cirio, Italease, Alitalia, Riva), 
UK (Bear Stears, Northen Rock), France (Vivendi), Germany (Mannesmann), Netherlands (Ahold), 
Canada (Nortel and Hollinger), and Japan (Tokyo Electric Power). 
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5.2.2 Corporate Governance Indices 
There have been many attempts to quantify the quality of corporate governance – by 
using rating or indices – and the effect on firm performance. Those studies examine the 
relationship between a composite measure of corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
One of the most important indices was built by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
called G-index. They start from using information - provided by Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) - on 24 different features of corporate governance divided into 
five groups (Delay, Voting, Protection, Other and State). In order to proxy the level of 
shareholder rights, they construct “Governance Index”, using the incidence of 24 
governance rules (called “provisions”). The results show that «firms with stronger 
shareholders rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
capital expenditures, and more fewer corporate acquisition» (Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003: 1). In the following years, several scholars started from aforementioned 
research in order to improve or build other indices measuring good governance. 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), using the same database (i.e. IRRC), built another index, 
called “Entrenchment index”, composed of only six of the twenty-four elements of 
corporate governance studied by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Bebchuck et al. 
(2005: 39) find that those variables «are negatively correlated with firm valuation, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, as well as with stock returns during the 1990-2003 period». 
Cremers and Nair (2005), like the academics previously mentioned, focus their research 
on USA financial market, studying the period from 1990-2001. They reckon that 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick index considers only partially corporate governance. For 
this reason they added a further measure of external governance, based only on three 
variables, called Alternative Takeover Index, as well as two more measures of internal 
governance (the percentage of share held in each firm by firm’s largest institutional 
blockholder and by the largest public pension funds). The results, even though based on 
indices plurality, confirm what other scholars have claimed, i.e. «external and internal 
mechanisms are strong elements in being associated with long-term abnormal returns 
and accounting measures of profitability». 
Moreover, Brown and Caylor (2006) built another index called “Gov-Score” which 
considers 51 internal and external factors of corporate governance, divided into eight 
categories. These academics, unlike the researchers aforementioned, use another data 
source provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Finally Brown and Caylor 
(2006: 31) find that all governance internal and external elements «are associated with 
good firm performance, suggesting that these exchange requirements may facilitate 
good performance». 
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Another study on American firms was conducted by Aggarwarl et al. (2007) who 
compare US and foreign firms listed on stock exchange in the US, using seven 
dimensions of corporate governance. They find that in firms with board independence 
board and audit committees have more value than other firms. Moreover, most foreign 
companies have worse governance mechanisms than US based firms. 
Research based on quantifying the quality of corporate governance in the firm by using 
ratings is common not only in the US market. Klapper and Love (2004) developed an 
index for 14 emerging markets, using a composite of 57 qualitative binary questions 
issued by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). In Europe, Drobetz et al. (2004) 
built a governance score for German companies, gathering 30 governance elements 
divided into five categories (corporate governance commitment; shareholders’ rights; 
transparency; management and supervisory board matters; and auditing). He found a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and expected stock return. 
Ødegaard and Bøhren (2003) studied firms listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway 
and they found a significant effect of good corporate governance ratings on firm value 
(measured by Tobin’s Q). In Italy, Colarossi and Giorgino (2006) built a specific index 
based on 31 variables, aimed to verify the relation between governance quality and 
financial performance in Italian listed companies. Mazzotta (2007) developed the 
governance quality index, obtaining results that show a positive connection between 
governance quality and firm performance. Regalli et al. (2011) formulated a specific 
index (Sir Index) taking into account the main variables useful in understanding the 
asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders, applied to Italian listed 
companies. 
Other research has been conducted in different contexts such as South America (e.g. 
Garay and Gonzalez, 2008, analysed Venezuela; Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2006, 
studied Mexico); and Asia (Black, Jang and Kim, 2005) 
Finally, Mintz (2005) dealt with 2003 Governance Metrics International (GMI) survey 
including 23 countries where UK, Canada and US hold respectively the first three 
positions in good governance practices; while Japan and Greece rank the lowest. 
Although the results reported seem to assign a prominent role to corporate governance 
in relation to firm performance, it should be noted that the findings arrived at by the 
studies cited are not conclusive. Indeed, several scholars raise some doubts on obtained 
results. First, as Donker and Zahir (2008) believe, «there is a weak relationship between 
the enterprise performance and the rating score obtained by this rating system» and 
«instead of single period analyses, panel data analysis should be used in empirical 
corporate governance research to measure the influence of changes in corporate 
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governance on firm performance». In the same vein, Bhagat et al. (2007) deem that 
indices cannot predict future stock market performance, because they are just one of 
many “pieces of information” relating to corporate governance quality. Another 
criticism of indices comes from the causality relation; Lehn et al. (2007) finds that G-
index and Entrenchment index «are inversely related to lagged market-to-book ratios 
but not to subsequent market-to-book ratios. These results also are consistent with the 
hypothesis that causation runs from valuation to governance». Last but not least, some 
studies (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Lewellen and Metrick, 2010) have tried to apply US 
indices (such as G-index) outwith that context and have found a weak relation between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Environmental differences (La Porta et al., 
2000; Martynova and Renneboog, 2010) make it difficult to repeat the results obtained 
outside the context in which a specific model has been developed.  
In sum, many indices are built starting from principles contained in codes of best 
practices in order to measure the existence of the link between good governance and 
financial performance. Indeed, many companies still remain unconvinced and the 
«adoption of good governance principles has been “patchy” at best, with “form over 
substance” often the norm (Bradley, 2004: 8-9). Albeit many indices or scores have 
been built to measure corporate governance from a compliance perspective, there is 
currently no worldwide benchmark with which to measure governance principles or 
standards. 
 
5.3 Italian context  
Before analysing research hypotheses and findings, it is useful to resume the Italian 
context and the main features of Italian companies. 
Italy is dominated by small and medium enterprises. Italian context is different from the 
other developed countries and may reflect different ownership structure, corporate 
governance conduct and firms financial performance (Fauzi and Locke, 2012). 
In Italy, company law permits Italian companies to choose between either one-tier 
(typical of Anglo-Saxon system) or two-tier (typical of German-Japanese system) or 
‘horizontal’ two-tier structures (it is also defined as “traditional model”); the last two 
compromise a supervisory board and a management board. However in practice, 
according to Soana and Stefanelli (2009) Italian companies do not often adopt one-tier 
and two-tier models; whereas the traditional one is more widespread among Italian 
firms. 
The corporate governance system in Italy has three distinctive features. 
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Firstly, the Italian Governance structure is characterized by the so-called traditional 
model or ‘horizontal’ two-tier model. The expression points out that the shareholders’ 
assembly appoints both the board of directors and the supervisory board (Fiori, 2003). 
Thus, there are not the two appointment’s levels, like the two-tier system. The board of 
directors has the task of directing/managing the company in terms of making the 
industrial and financial strategic plans. Directors are proposed by the chairperson or 
blockholder and appointed by shareholder’s meeting. On the other hand, the supervisory 
board is called to ensure that laws and by-laws are observed, respecting the principles of 
best practice. It is composed by at least three members and they have the power to call 
the shareholders meeting when they reckon that it is necessary because of board of 
director decisions. The supervisory Board ‘has partially remained “non-political” (i.e. 
not involved in strategic issues), but also become closer to German Supervisory Board’ 
(Melis, 2000). Figure 5.1 shows the horizontal two-tier model or traditional model 
which is very common in Italy. 
 
Figure 5.1 ‘Horizontal’ two-tier or Traditional model 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our elaboration  
 
Secondly, the stock ownership of large Italian companies is more concentrated than that 
of large US and UK companies. The Italian firms characterized by a high ownership 
concentration can be divided in two different classes: a) family or public pyramidal 
group (Moro Visconti, 2001); b) small/medium family enterprises or joined together 
(Guatri and Vicari, 1994). As a general fact, firms are distinguished by a majority 
shareholder or a shareholders group linked by a union agreement. There is only a 
limited separation between ownership and control firm, due to family capitalism 
(individuals, often linked by family relationships to other investors in the firm, control 
almost half of the companies).  
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In order to protect the high concentration of the company ownership, the management 
control system is committed to the board of directors instead of the stock market 
(Bianco and Casavola, 1999). The Italian system is connoted by a limited role of the 
financial market; indeed Melis (2000) argue that ‘Self-financing and bank debts are the 
main sources for corporate founding’. 
Thirdly, even if the majority of Italians listed companies adopts ‘horizontal’ two-tier 
model or traditional one, banks have not control of shareholder votes like in Germany. 
Banks usually have a minor role in corporate governance in Italy. They provide external 
financing to the companies; indeed the practice of multiple loans is widespread, because 
firms may spread the risk, but also decrease ‘the incentives for the banks to have a stake 
and monitor corporate management, since it never happens that a bank has a large share 
in a single firm’ (Melis, 2000). Hence, banks and financial institutional as well do 
usually not directly influence board of directors strategies and decisions, as far as firms 
manage to honour its debts. However, a bank may influence indirectly management 
decisions, by recalling its credits. 
Furthermore, it appears fundamental to focus the attention on the concept of 
"independent" which is different internationally, and is closely related to how Board of 
Directors is structured in different corporate governance systems
33
. For this reason, 
some independence features of Italian corporate governance systems are shown. In 
general terms, «Independent directors are supposed to introduce ideas and perspectives 
from the outside, serving as a “window to the world”» (Andrews, 1981: 175). In narrow 
terms, in Italy the independence requirement of board members si regulated by Italian 
Code of Corporate Governance. In particular, 2011 version and 2006 version (article 3) 
remain unchanged about criteria to define an independent director. According to these 
codes, a director usually appears independent in the following events: 
1) if he/she does not control, directly or indirectly, the firm through 
subsidiaries, trustees and third parties; he/she does not have dominant influence 
over the firm and shareholders’ agreement; 
2) if he/she is not a significant representative of the firm, and subsidiaries 
and he/she has not been an employee in the preceding 3 fiscal years; 
3) if he/she has never had significant commercial, financial and professional 
relations with the firm or who controls that firm; 
                                               
33 I would like to thank you the referees for their suggestions about independence issue within Italian 
context. 
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4) if he/she has not received in the preceding 3 fiscal year a significant 
addition remuneration from the firm, subsidiaries or holding; 
5) if he/she is not vested with the executive director office in another 
company in which an executive director of the issuer holds the office of director;  
6) if he/she is not a shareholder or a close relative of directors, person who 
controls the firm, subsidiaries, holding and trustees. 
We should say a few words about the complex internal control system of the Italian 
companies. Indeed, as far as the Italian legislation is concerned, unique regulation 
which companies have to comply with does not exist, but there are different rules which 
are fundamental in relation to the internal control matter (Arena et al., 2006). 
Three levels of internal control exist: 
1
st
 Level Control Activity (Line Control). This deals with operating areas that identify 
and access risk, implementing specific actions for management of that risk. 
2
nd
 Level Monitoring Activity (Risk Management, Compliance, Controller). This 
department is responsible for risk control and identifies methodologies and instruments 
for managing risk and monitor that risk. 
3
rd
 Level Assurance Activity (Internal Audit). This provides independent evaluations of 
the whole Internal Control System, aiming to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. 
In particular, the board of directors, the CEO, the Supervisory Board, the Surveillance 
Body
34
, the Audit committee/Internal control and risk committee
35
 belong to the 1
st
 
level of internal control. Whereas management control, Risk Management, Compliance 
Officer and other control functions (such as Quality, Security Control) belong to the 2
nd
 
level; finally Internal Audit belongs to the 3
rd
 one.  
As far as 1
st
 level of internal control system is concerned, the board of directors: 
a)  define the guidelines of the internal control system, so that the main risks 
concerning the issuer and its subsidiaries are correctly identified and adequately 
measured, managed and monitored, determining, moreover, the level of 
                                               
34 Surveillance Body was set up with Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 which introduced the responsibility 
of Italian firms for public crimes and the so-called white-collar crimes, with particular interest relating to 
frauds against the public administration (Arena et al., 2006). 
35 The control and risk committee was introduced in 2011 by the Italian Code of Corporate Governance. It 
replaced the previous Audit Committee which identified with the Supervisory Board, according to 
Legislative Decree no. 39/2010, art. 19. In particular, the control and risk committee plays the role of 
«supporting, on the basis of an adequate control process, the evaluations and decisions to be made by the 
Board of Directors in relation to the internal control and risk management system, as well as to the 
approval of the periodical financial reports» (Italian Codes of Corporate Governance, 2011: 30). 
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compatibility of such risks with the management of the company in a manner 
consistent with its strategic objective  
b) identify an executive director (usually the CEO) who is in charge of monitoring 
the internal control system functionality
36
 
c) provide strategic guidance and evaluation on the overall adequacy of the system  
d) appoint and revoke the person in charge of the internal audit function37. 
The Supervisory Board supervises: 
a) compliance with laws and statute of the association, 
b) compliance with fair administration principles, 
c) adequacy of the organizational structure in relation to competences, internal control 
system, administrative and accounting system, fairness of these systems in representing 
relevant item (Legislative Decree number 58, 1998, the so-called Draghi Law). 
Furthermore, according to Legislative Decree no. 39/2010, art. 19, the Supervisory 
Board is identified with Audit Committee, this means that the former fulfils the same 
tasks and duties of the latter. Indeed, the latest version of Italian Code of Corporate 
Governance (2011) recommends the establishment of the Control and Risk Committee. 
It has to support, on the basis of an effective control process, the assessment and 
decision to be made by the board of directors related to the internal control and risk 
management system with the approval of the periodical financial reports. 
The Surveillance Body has to implement an organizational model for risks identification 
and assessment, and the implementation of an appropriate control system.  
The audit committee recommended by the Italian Code of Corporate Governance (1999, 
2002, 2011)has to  
(a) assess the adequacy of the internal control system,  
(b) monitor the work of the corporate internal auditing staff,  
(c) report to the board of directors on its activity at least every six months and  
                                               
36 This task was abolished in 2011 so the board of directors companies studied during the period 2005-
2007 had to fulfill that role. 
37 The main four tasks aforementioned were presented in 2006 Italian Code of Corporate Governance. 
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(d) deal with the external auditing firm.  
According to Melis (2002), it has a similar role to that of British audit committees 
(Spira, 1998; Windram and Song, 2004). It is appointed by the board of directors and 
should be composed of non-executive directors in order to be able to carry out its 
functions autonomously and independently. 
As regarding the 2
nd
 level of internal control system, in general the bodies who are in 
charge of this level of control oversee the process of identification, assessment, 
management and control of the risks associated with firms actions to ensure consistency 
with business objectives. In particular, management control systems (Brimson, 1994; 
Norton and Kaplan, 1996; Lorino, 1992; Del Bene et al., 2005) in line with the 
prevailing strategic orientation, increasingly improve those aspects related to 
effectiveness, to quality, client satisfaction, to a transversal vision of the healthcare 
organizations, to outward orientation, to a multidimensional analysis of management, to 
emphasis the strategic sphere. 
As regarding the 3
rd
 level of internal control system, the person in charge of monitoring 
the internal audit has the task of verifying the functioning and adequacy of the internal 
control and risk management system. In particular, Internal Audit has to: 
a) verify the adequacy and effective functioning of the System of Internal Control 
and Risk Management through an audit plan, approved by the Board of 
Directors, based on a structured analysis and ranking of the principal risks  
b) gain direct access to all information necessary for the execution of his 
responsibilities  
c) prepare periodic reports containing adequate information on Internal Audits 
activities, and on the Company’s risk management process, as well as adherence 
internally to plans established for risk mitigation 
d)  submit the above reports to the Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors, 
the Internal Control and Risk Committee, the Board of Directors, the Director 
responsible for the System of Internal Control and Risk Management  
e) Verify the reliability of information systems, including accounting systems 
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Finally, as regards external auditing, the external auditing firm is appointed by the 
shareholders’ assembly, although the supervisory board should express opinion about 
that external gatekeeper. 
 
5.4 Hypotheses Development  
The present research takes into account eight key critical factors of corporate 
governance, namely we consider five aspects regarding Board of Directors structure (i.e. 
Board size, Independent directors, Executive directors, Non executive directors, CEO 
duality) and three aspects related to Auditing mechanisms (i.e. Supervisory board 
members, Audit Committee, the so-called Big Four). Each of these aspects represents an 
independent variable of the econometric model that we are trying to build. For each of 
the eight variables we develop eight different research hypotheses based on the existing 
international literature.  
 
The impact of Board size on firm performance 
Board of directors is considered as one of the primary internal corporate mechanisms 
(Brennan, 2006). A well-established board with optimum number of directors could 
monitor effectively management and drive value enhancement for shareholders. The 
board size, therefore, is a key factor that influences firm performance (Kumar and 
Singh, 2013). Board of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, plays a central role 
as an internal mechanism and is considered as a major decision-making body within 
companies. Due to the complexity of role played by board, it is hard to have 
unambiguous answers related to the optimum number of directors on the board (or 
board size). Different and opposing theoretical evidence is presented to support efficacy 
of both large and small board dimension on firm performance. Some scholars (Coles et 
al., 2008; Dwivedi and Jain, 2005; Ehikioya, 2009) find a positive correlation between 
board size and corporate performance. Advocates of large board size argue that a larger 
group of directors could improve the efficacy of the decision-making process due to 
information sharing (Lehn et al., 2009). Given the variety of board type, directors come 
from diverse professionals fields, and have different expertise, and different skills. Two 
principal positive consequences however, can be outlined. Firstly, the knowledge of 
wide pool of experts can be useful for making some strategic decisions which can 
enhance firm performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Secondly, they could assist in the 
establishing of external links with the environment, obtaining scarce resources and 
‘bringing more highly qualified counsel’ (Dalton et al., 1999). 
119 
 
On the other hand, several researchers (De Andres et al., 2005) maintain that a larger 
board is less effective in enhancing corporate performance. The majority of academics 
find a negative association between board size and performance (Jensen, 1993; Huther, 
1997; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Ahmed et al. (2006) and Dalton et al. (1999) suggest that 
new ideas and opinions are less likely to be expressed in large pool of directors, and the 
monitoring process becomes milder. Larger boards increase problems of 
communication and coordination (Jensen, 1993; Bonn et al. 2004; Cheng, 2008) and 
higher agency costs (Lipton and Lorsh, 1992; Cheng, 2008). Furthermore, larger boards 
could face the problem of greater levels of conflict (Goodstein et al., 1994) and of lower 
group cohesion (Evans and Dion, 1991). Poor coordination among directors leads to 
slow decision making and information transferring and cause inefficiency in firms with 
larger board size (Goodstein et al., 1994). In fact several empirical studies confirm that 
when board size increases firm performance decreases progressively (Mark and 
Kusnadi, 2005; O’Connell and Cramer, 2009). For instance, Conyon and Peck (1998) 
find a negative association between board size and return on equity for a sample of 
European companies. 
It is relevant to highlight that other scholars reveal no relations between board size and 
firm performance (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). So it would seem that board size is not a 
key success factor for companies. 
The above discussion clearly emphasizes how the relationship between board size and 
corporate performance has been studied in depth and how it represents a central topic 
within corporate governance. Table 5.1 outlines empirical research conducted at 
international level. 
We could hypothesize:  
Hp 1: Firm performance exhibits a negative association with board size. 
  
120 
 
Table 5.1 International Empirical Research on Board size 
 Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
1.  Adams and Mehran 2003 Board size 
Tobin’s Q, market-
to-book ratio 
35 publicly traded 
bank holding 
companies 
1986-1996 
1997-1999 
Positive relationship 
2.  
Basu et al. 
 
2007 Board size 
Accounting 
performance 
174 large Japanese 
companies 
1992-1996 
Negative 
performance – 
Large boards 
destroy corporate 
value 
3.  Beiner et al. 2004 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Swiss Public listed 
companies 
2001 
No consistent 
relationship 
4.  Belkhir 2004 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
USA financial 
companies 
1995-2002 
No convincing 
evidence 
5.  Bennedsen et al. 2004 Board size ROA Danish companies 1999 
Non linear 
relationship 
6.  Bhagat and Black 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q 
USA Large Public 
companies 
1988-1993 
No consistent 
relationship 
7.  Bozec and Dia 2007 Board size Technical efficiency 
Canadian Public 
owned companies 
1976-2001 
Large companies is 
more effective at 
coping with a 
complex and 
uncertain 
environment 
8.  Cheng 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
USA listed 
companies 
1996-2004 
Firm with large 
boards of directors 
have less variable 
performance 
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9.  Coles et al. 2008 Board size Tobin’s Q 
USA large 
companies 
1992-2001 
Positive relationship 
(Tobin’s Q 
increases in board 
size for complex 
firms) 
10.  Conyon and Peck 1998 Board size ROE 
UK listed 
companies 
1991-1994 
Negative 
relationship 
11.  Dalton et al. 1999 Board size 
Market based 
measures 
Us companies 
Meta-analysis of 27 
studies with a total 
of 131 companies 
Positive relationship 
12.  De Andres et al. 2005 Board size 
Market-to-book 
ratio Tobin’s Q 
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 
1996 
Negative 
relationship 
13.  De Andres et al. 2005 Board size 
Tobin’s Q, Market 
to book value 
10 OECD countries 
companies 
1996 
Negative 
relationship 
14.  Di Pietra et al. 2008 Board size Share price 
Italian non-financial 
listed companies 
1993-2000 Limited relationship 
15.  Dwivedi and Jain 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q, 
340 large, listed 
Indian firms - 24 
industry groups. 
1997–2001 Positive relationship 
16.  Ehikioya 2009 Board size 
ROA, ROE, PE and 
Tobin’s Q 
107 firms quoted in 
the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange 
1998-2002 Positive relationship 
17.  Eisenberg et al. 1998 Board size ROA 
Small and midsize 
Finnish firms 
1992-1998 
Negative 
relationship 
(negative board size 
effect) 
18.  Guest 2009 Board size 
Profitability, share 
returns, Tobin’s Q 
2,746 UK listed 
firms 
1981-2002 
Negative 
relationship 
19.  Huther 1997 Board size Total variable cost 
US Electricity 
companies 
1994 
Negative 
relationship 
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20.  Jensen 1993 Board size 
R&D, capital 
expenditures, 
depreciation, 
dividends, market 
value 
1,431 firms on 
COMPUSTAT 
1979-1990 
Negative 
relationship 
21.  Kamran et al. 2006 Board size Earnings New Zealand firms 1991-1997 
Negative 
relationship 
22.  Kathuria and Dash 1999 Board size ROA 
504 Indian 
companies 
belonging to 18 
industries 
1994-1995 Positive relationship 
23.  Kaymak and Bektas 2008 Board size ROA Turkish banks 2001-2004 No relationship 
24.  Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size Tobin’s Q, ROA 
Australian Public 
listed companies 
1996 
Positive relationship 
(board size is 
correlated positively 
with market value) 
25.  Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Board size ROA, Tobin’s Q 
348 of Australia’s 
largest publicly 
listed companies 
1996 Positive relationship 
26.  Klein 2002 Board size abnormal accruals 
S&P 500 Sample 
US 
1992–1993 Positive relationship 
27.  Larmou and Vafeas 2009 Board size 
Market to book 
value, Raw stock 
return, Abnormal 
return 
Firms with poor 
operating 
performance 
1994-2000 Positive relationship 
28.  Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size Tobin’s Q Swiss firms 
1980-1995 interval 
5 years 
Negative 
relationship 
(negative board size 
effect 
29.  Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size ROA Swiss firms 
1980-1995 interval 
5 years 
No consistent 
relationship 
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30.  Loderer and Peyer 2002 Board size 
Market value of 
equity 
All firms traded on 
Switzerland Stock 
Exchange 
1980,1985,1990, 
1995 
Negative 
relationship 
31.  
Mak and Kusnadi 
 
2005 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Singapore Public 
Listed companies 
1995-1996 
Negative 
relationship (using 
OLS) – No 
consistent 
relationship (using 
2SLS) 
32.  Mak and Kusnadi 2005 Board size Tobin’s Q 
230 Singapore firms 
and 230 Malaysian 
firms 
1999-2000 
Negative 
relationship 
33.  
O’Connell and 
Cramer 
2009 Board size 
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET38 
Irish listed 
companies 
2001 
Negative 
relationship 
34.  
Ødegaard and 
Bøhren 
 
2003 Board size Tobin’s Q 
Norwegian Public 
listed companies 
1989-1997 
Negative 
relationship 
(negative board size 
effect) 
35.  Postma et al. 2003 Board size 
ROA, ROS, ROE, 
Market To Book 
Value 
Dutch 
manufacturing 
companies 
1996 
Negative 
relationship 
(negative board size 
effect 
36.  Yermack 1996 Board size 
ROA, ROS, Tobin’s 
Q 
Us Large companies 1984-1991 
Inverse (negative) 
relationship 
 
  
                                               
38 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period. 
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The impact of Board composition on firm performance 
The board composition concerns three different kinds of directors who make up the 
Board of Directors: Independent (or outside), Non-Executive (or Grey) and Executive 
(or inside) directors. Boards are generally composed of a mix (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003), so the distinction between those types of directors is essential because they 
provide specific benefit to the firm they serve (Mizruchi, 1983). 
Independent outside directors are those ‘who have no affiliation with the firm except for 
their directorship’ (Clifford and Evans, 1997). Independent director role is to monitor 
management decisions and activities by corporate boards (Fama, 1980). This implies 
that they become more responsive to investors, because they have to ensure that 
management decisions are made in the best interests of shareholders. Independent 
directors (non-management) have a very high effectiveness due to their independence of 
CEO and firm (Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996). Executive or Insider directors are 
‘typically corporate officers, retirees or family members’ (Clifford and Evans, 1997). 
They provide valuable information to independent directors concerning ‘the criteria 
necessary for evaluating the performance of senior manager’ (Baysinger and Butler, 
1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Non-executive directors are defined as a source of 
managerial wisdom (Mace, 1971) who are fundamental to improve decision making. 
They are financiers, lawyers, consultants and bankers who may provide advice as well 
as counsel to inside managers. They may serve to create relations and interlocks with 
other organizations, firms, minimizing transaction cost (Thompson, 1967). They are 
also defined as “grey” or “affiliated” directors, because they are ‘not full time employees 
of the firms but [are] associated in some way’ (Clifford and Evans, 1997). 
A good and efficient Board of Directors may be composed of a mixture of Independent, 
Non-Executive and Executive directors, because they provide different expertise, 
contribution to the company and they must fulfil different roles which are fundamental 
for every firm. Scholars have tried to unveil which is the best composition or proportion 
of board members that effect firm performance. Hermalin (1994), Kole (1997), 
Hermalin and Wallance (2001), however, argue that it is not possible to define a specific 
board composition which is optimal for all companies. Thus, «the impact of board 
composition on performance could be difficult to identify cross-sectionally» (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). These results are consistent with Baysenger and Butler (1985) 
who suggest that it is not possible to define a priori the precise and optimum 
composition of Board of Directors which suits every company. This compositional mix 
depends on contingent factors, and environment which vary from country to country 
and from firm to firm. However, some scholars have tried to define a number or a range 
of number which may be considered the best composition (Jensen, 1993; Airoldi et al., 
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1998). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest a ratio of at least two independent directors to 
one non-independent and board committees that consist solely of independent directors, 
one of whom should be the chair. However, public policy or codes of corporate 
governance require at least 50% independent directors within the board.  
Empirical research is more fecund on Independent directors rather than executive (or 
inside) and non-executive ones, probably because they have a difficult role of 
monitoring management and of making sure that managers’ behaviour is aligned to 
shareholders interests. Consequently they are mediators between manager and stock 
owner in order to minimize agency costs, due to the well-known conflict between Agent 
and Principal. Thus, they represent one of the pillars of agency theory which is the 
theory underlying the Anglo-Saxon model (Berle and G. Means, 1932; Carroll, 1993). 
This is the reason why UK and US literature study outside directors role, and their 
effect on firm performance in depth. In addition, International Codes of Best Practice 
focus their attention also on outside directors in order to guarantee Board independence 
and monitoring role. 
 
The impact of Independent directors on firm performance 
There have been mixed results relating to existing relationship between independent 
directors and corporate performance. On the one hand, Fosberg (1989), Caselli and 
Gatti (2007), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (2002) find no 
relationship between the proportion of outsider (or independent) directors and firm 
performance, measured by sales, ROE, Tobin’s Q, ROA, asset turnover and stock 
returns. It seems that independent boards (i.e. board composed in majority by 
independent directors) do not affect firm performances which are probably influenced 
by other endogenous factors (such as corporate strategy, efficacy of decision-making 
process) and exogenous ones (market, competitors, customers, law). 
On the other hand, scholars (Brickley et al., 1994) find a positive relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and corporate performance. Furthermore, Anderson et al. 
(2004) show that the cost of debt, as proxy by bond yield spreads, is inversely related to 
board independence. Consistent with this research, Brown and Caylor (2004) find that 
boards with higher number of independent directors have higher returns on equity, 
higher profit margins, larger dividend yields, and larger stock repurchases. Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) suggest that shareholder wealth is influenced by the proportion of 
outside directors by documenting a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of 
the appointment of an additional outside director. This means that the monitoring and 
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controlling role on management provided by Independent directors is fundamental in 
order to prevent likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996) and increase 
shareholder benefit (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). In the same vein, Del Guercio et al. 
(2003) reveal that smaller boards with a higher proportion of independent directors are 
more effective. 
It is interesting to note that only a fraction of empirical research has found negative 
relationship between the number of independent directors and firm performance (Klein, 
2002; Khumar and Singh, 2012). 
It emerges that there are still no clear benefits of independent directors on firm 
performance. «These mixed results may be reflective of a corporate culture wherein 
corporate boards are controlled by management and the presence of outside 
independent directors has no discernible impact on management decisions» (Petra, 
2005). However, most empirical research suggests that outside independent director 
play an important and central role within board of directors. Those studies have shown a 
positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance. 
Taken as whole, these internationally-based results are consistent with Fama (1980) 
who claimed that a higher proportion of Independent directors on Board would result in 
more effective monitoring of boards and limit managerial opportunism. This leads to an 
enhancement of economic and financial performance of firms (Waldo, 1985; Vancil, 
1987). Table 5.2 shows prior international literature about the relationship between 
Independent Directors and corporate performance. 
The preceding discussion leads to our second research hypothesis: 
Hp 2: Firm performance exhibits a positive association with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board 
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Table 5.2 International Empirical Research on Independent Directors 
 Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
37.  Agoraki et al. 2009 
Independent 
directors 
Stachastic frontier 
model 
57 large European 
banks 
2002-2006 Inverted U-shaped 
38.  Agrawal and 
Knober 
1996 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 400 US companies 1983-1987 
Negative 
relationship 
39.  Barnhart and 
Rosenstein 
1998 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
321 firms from 
Standard and Poor’s 
500 dataset 
1990 Positive relationship 
40.  Baysinger and 
Butler 
1985 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q US 266 firms 1970-1980 No relationship 
41.  Baysinger and 
Butler 
1985 
Independent 
directors 
ROE US 266 firms 1970-1980 Positive relationship 
42.  Beasley 1996 
Independent 
directors 
Accounting fraud 
US 75 fraud and US 
75 no-fraud firms 
1980-1991 
Negative 
relationship (ID 
reduces likely of 
fraud) 
43.  Bhagat and Black 1998 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
market adjusted 
stock price returns 
334 large US public 
corporations 
1985-1995 
No convincing 
evidence 
44.  Bhagat and Black 2002 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
Ratio of sales to 
assets, Market 
adjusted stock price 
934 large US public 
corporations 
1988-1991 No relationship 
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returns 
45.  Borokhovich et al. 1996 
Independent 
directors 
Abnormal returns 
969 CEO 
successions at 588 
large public firms 
1970-1988 Positive relationship 
46.  Brickley et al. 1994 
Independent 
directors 
Stock market 
reaction 
247 firms adopting 
poison pills 
1984-1986 Positive relationship 
47.  Brown and Caylor 2006 
Independent 
directors 
ROE, profit 
margins, dividend 
yields, stock 
repurchases 
1868 US firms 
Stock Exchange 
2003 Positive relationship 
48.  Byrd and Hickman 1992 
Independent 
directors 
Abnormal stock 
returns 
128 tender offer 
bids 
1980-1987 Positive relationship 
49.  Campa, Marra 2008 
Independent 
directors 
ROI 
Italian Listed 
companies 
2005-2006 Positive relationship 
50.  Cotter et al. 1997 
Independent 
directors 
Target shareholders 
gains; tender offer 
premium 
169 tender offer 
target – traded on 
NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ 
1989-1992 Positive relationship 
51.  Daily and Dalton 1992 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
100 fastest-growing 
small publicly held 
US firms 
1990 Positive relationship 
52.  
De Andres and 
Vallelado 
 
2008 
Independent 
directors 
market-to-book 
value ratio 
69 commercial 
banks from six 
OECD countries 
(Canada, the US, 
and the UK, Spain, 
France, and Italy). 
1996–2006 Inverted U-shaped 
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53.  De Andres et al. 2005 
Independent 
directors 
Market-to-book 
ratio Tobin’s Q 
10 OECD countries 
(450 companies) 
1996 No relationship 
54.  Dulewicz and 
Herbert 
2004 
Independent 
directors 
Cash Flow Return 
on Total Assets, 
Sales Return 
137 Manufacturing, 
Transport, Service 
Sector UK firms 
1997 No relationship 
55.  El Mir and Sebui 2008 
Independent 
directors 
EVA 357 us firms 1998-2004 Positive relationship 
56.  Elloumi and Gueyie 2001 
Independent 
directors 
financial distress 
status of the firm 
92 Canadian 
publicly traded 
firms, 
1994-1998 
Small likelihood of 
financial distress 
(with proportion of 
higher ID) 
57.  Erickson et al. 2005 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
Canadian public 
firms 
1993-1997 
Negative 
relationship 
58.  Ezzamel and 
Watson 
1993 
Independent 
directors 
Return on capital 
employed 
113 UK companies 1982-1985 Positive relationship 
59.  Hermalin and 
Weisbach 
1991 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
142 NYSE 
companies 
--- No relationship 
60.  Hill and Snell 1988 
Independent 
directors 
Value added per 
employee, ROE, 
122 Fortune 500 
firms 
1979-1981 Positive relationship 
61.  Hossain et al. 2001 
Independent 
directors 
Firm performance 
New Zealand 
companies 
Before and after 
1994 
Positive relationship 
62.  Kaplan and Minton 1994 
Independent 
directors 
Company stock 
returns, sales 
growth, change in 
pre-tax income 
119 traded Japanese 
companies 
1981 Positive relationship 
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63.  Kaplan and Reishus 1990 
Independent 
directors 
dividend 101 companies 1979-1973 Positive relationship 
64.  Klein 1998 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, market value of 
equity minus ROA, 
market returns 
485 US firms listed on 
the S&P 500 
1992-1993 
Insignificant 
relationship 
65.  Klein 2002 
Independent 
directors 
Earnings management 
692 US listed 
companies 
1992-1993 Negative relationship 
66.  Laing and Weir 1999 
Independent 
directors 
ROA 
115 randomly selected 
UK listed companies 
1992, 1995 
No significant 
relationship 
67.  Mehran 1995 
Independent 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA 153 manufacturing firms 1979-1980 
Insignificant 
relationship 
68.  O’Connell and 
Cramer 
2009 
Independent 
directors 
TOBIN’S Q, ROA, 
RET39 
Iris listed companies 2001 Positive relationship 
69.  Pearce and Zahra 1992 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, Earnings 
per share 
119 Fortune 500 
industrial companies 
1983-1989 Positive relationship 
70.  Rosenstein and 
Wyatt 
1990 
Independent 
directors 
Stock prices reaction US listed companies 1981-1985 
Positive relationship 
between stock prices 
and announcement of 
new IDs 
 
 
 
                                               
39 RET = market-based measure. It is calculated as the change in stock price plus dividend for the period. 
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71.  Schellenger et al. 1989 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROE, RET, 
risk-adjusted 
shareholder’s 
annualized total 
marker return on 
investment 
750 firms listed on the 
Compustat Industrial 
1986-1987 Positive relationship 
72.  Vafeas and 
Theodorou 
1998 
Independent 
directors 
Market-to-book ratio, 
ROA 
250 UK publicly traded 
firms 
1994 No relationship 
73.  Weisbach 1988 
Independent 
directors 
Stock returns, 
earnings, 
367 US listed 
companies 
1974-1983 Positive relationship 
74.  Yermack 1996 
Independent 
directors 
ROA, ROS, Tobin’s 
Q 
Us Large companies 1984-1991 Negative relationship 
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The impact of Non-executive directors on firm performance 
Non-executive directors, with a business relationship related to the firm they serve have 
been defined as “grey directors” or affiliated directors (Daily et al. 1998) because they 
are both non-executive and non-independent (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Such 
directors could be management consultants, legal counsel, bankers with any 
designation, including executive director, CEO, chairman, or member of any committee 
(Clifford and Evans, 1997; Ameer et al., 2010). Furthermore, according to Yermack 
(2004) «Directors who sit on a large number of boards also are more likely to become 
grey, probably because they represent greater possibility for future interlocks with the 
CEO». 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Daily et al. (1998) reckon that grey directors are less 
objective and less effective monitors than independent directors. They often have 
conflicts of interests because of their current and future business relationship with the 
firm which could reduce their role to discipline and monitor (Arosa et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, Corbetta and Salvato (2004a, 2004b) these directors are placed to the board 
in order to provide other skills, perspectives and competence. Hence, both grey and 
independent directors exert positive influence on firm performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004).  
The majority of empirical studies fail to delineate the difference between non-executive 
non-independent (grey) directors and outside independent directors. Hence, little 
research focuses its attention on non-executive/grey/affiliated directors. It emerges that 
in some cases the relationship between grey directors and corporate performance is 
ambiguous or insignificant (Choi et al., 2007), even though some scholars (Arosa et al., 
2010) unveil a positive effect of affiliated directors on performance. 
Puchniak (2003) reckons that grey directors are at least as effective as completely 
independent directors. Puchniak (2003) claims also that «what grey directors lack in 
independent monitoring they make up for in the incentive to monitor». Nottage et al. 
(2008) argue that those affiliated directors who have a business relationship with the 
firm or key officers in the company are able to have access to better information which, 
in turn, increases their ability to monitor. However, the affiliation that they have may 
breach the monitoring role as specified agency theory for outside directors (Wang and 
Oliver, 2009). Table 5.3 outlines some empirical research about the relationship 
between Non-executive directors and firm performance. 
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Based on the issues presented above, we hypothesize: 
Hp 3: Firm performance exhibits a positive association with the low proportion of Non-
executive directors on the board. 
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Table 5.3 International Empirical Research on Non-Executive Directors 
 Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variable Sample 
Year(s) of 
analysis 
Findings 
75.  Anderson and Reeb 2004 
Non-executive 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, Economic 
Value Added (EVA) 
Publicly traded firms 
(S&P 500) 
1992-1999 
Insignificant 
relationship 
76.  Arosa et al. 2010 
Non-executive 
directors 
ROA, ROE 
369 Spanish family 
firm 
2006 Positive relationship 
77.  Bhagat and Black 1998 
Non-executive 
directors 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
Market adjusted stock 
price returns, ratio of 
sales to assets 
934 large U.S. public 
corporations 
1985-1995 
Insignificant 
relationship 
78.  Choi et al. 2007 
Non-executive 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
457 Korean listed 
companies 
1999-2001 
Ambiguous 
relationship 
79.  Klein 1998 
Non-executive 
directors 
ROA, market value of 
equity minus ROA, 
market returns 
485 US firms listed 
on the S&P 500 
1992-1993 
Insignificant 
relationship 
80.  Kumar and Singh 2013 
Non-executive 
directors 
Tobin’s Q 
200 Indian listed 
companies 
2008 
Negative 
relationship 
81.  Yermack 2004 
Non-executive 
directors 
Pay-performance, 
stock options 
766 non-executives 
appointments in 
Fortune 500 Boards 
1994-1996 Positive relationship 
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The impact of Executive directors on firm performance 
Board of directors consist in outside/independent directors, non-executive directors and 
executive ones, but discussions on Board are always centred on role, and the effects of 
independent directors. Hence, literature about benefit of inside directors’ role is limited. 
Executive directors are important because they provide information to top management 
and outsiders (Mace, 1971). Two opposing views of the role and efficacy of inside 
directors exist. According to the first view, inside and outside directors play a role in 
monitoring Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Thus, if insiders play an effective 
monitoring role and decrease information asymmetries (Adams et al., 2005; Harris and 
Raviv, 2008), they could enhance corporate governance structure and board decision 
making (Acharya et al., 2009) which could lead to better firm performance (Shakir, 
2008). Nicholson and Kiel (2007) argue that «inside directors live in the company they 
govern, they understand the business better than outside directors and so can make 
better decisions». The contrasting point of view outlines that executive directors are 
influenced by CEO, because the latter who is the highest-ranking executive can appoint 
executives. Given this relationship, insiders may not contribute effectively to a 
monitoring of CEO. Furthermore, they are unlikely to take a stance in the boardroom 
and be recalcitrant to take position again CEO decision. Raheja (2005) maintains that 
Executive directors are an important source of firm-specific information for the board, 
but perhaps do not monitor CEO due to lack of independence from the latter and private 
benefits. Sirmans et al. (2006) identify a negative relationship between performance and 
management change from a period of three months prior to the change of in 
management. 
The above research shows that a relationship exists between inside directors and firm 
performance (Table 5.4). Parallel with previous hypotheses, the following is predicted: 
Hp 4: Firm performance exhibits a negative association with the proportion of 
Executive directors on the board. 
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Table 5.4 International Empirical Research on Inside Directors 
 Author Publication Year Dependent Variable Independent Variable Sample 
Year(s) of 
analysis 
Findings 
82.  
Daily and 
Johnson 
1997 Inside directors 
ROE, ROA, risk-
adjusted 
100 firms selected 
Fortune 500 firms 
1987-1990 
No significant 
relationship 
83.  
Hermalin and 
Weisabach 
1991 
Inside directors 
(Board composition) 
Tobin’s Q 134 NYSE firms 
1971, 1974, 
1977, 1980, 
1983 
No relationship 
84.  Kesner 1988 Inside directors 
Profit margin, ROE, 
ROA, earnings per 
share, stock market 
performance, total 
return to investors 
250 firms from Fortune 
500 companies 
1983 
Positive 
relationship 
85.  Klein 1998 Inside directors 
ROA, market value of 
equity minus ROA, 
market returns 
485 US firms listed on 
the S&P 500 
1992-1993 
Positive 
relationship 
86.  
Mallette and 
Fowler 
1992 Inside directors 
ROE, Debt to Equity 
Ratio, Net sales 
714 US Industrial 
manufacturing firms 
1988 
No significant 
relationship 
87.  Molz 1988 Inside directors 
ROE, ROA, Total 
Return to Shareholders 
50 firms from the 
Fortune 500 Industrial 
1983 
No significant 
relationship 
88.  
Rosenstien and 
Wyatt 
1997 Inside directors Stock market reaction 
170 inside directors 
announcement 
1981-1985 
Positive 
relationship 
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The impact of CEO Duality on firm performance 
CEO duality (whether CEO simultaneously serves as board chairman) has become a 
topic subject to particular analysis (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Brickley et al. 1994; 
Mallin, 2010) in international debate on the impact of the separation of ownership and 
control. «Interest in duality has emerged primarily because it is assumed to have 
significant implications for organizational performance and corporate governance» 
(Baliga et al., 1996) 
CEO duality is a double-edged sword (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Two main 
opposite schools exist. According to academic literature, the arguments against dual 
leadership can be summarized in three classes of evidence, which are closely connected 
each other: control system, independence of the board, decision making. With respect to 
control system, merging the role of chairman and CEO board means that capacity to 
monitor and oversee management is decreased as a result of lack of independence and 
conflict of interest (Lorsch and Maclever, 1989; Fizel and Louie, 1990; Dobrzynski, 
1991; Millstein, 1992; Daynton, 1984). Splitting the role of chairman and CEO could be 
a corporate governance initiative that could maximize the effectiveness of the control 
system and exemplify the conflict of interests (Yang and Zhao, 2013). Indeed, the board 
is the apogee of the decision control system which could mitigate agency problems due 
to separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For this reason, CEO 
has decision rights but not control rights over shareholder capital, the latter has 
conflicting interests and does not always play to maximize shareholder value. Strictly 
connected with control system problem is the independence of the board. Indeed, if the 
monitoring role is poor, board independence is hampered, due to the high influence of 
management. The board cannot ‘discipline the management appropriately as it is the 
management who controls the board and will over-rule such initiatives’ (Abdullah, 
2004). The independent structure of board is important to help companies to avoid some 
crises (Lorsch, 1989), and to foster more objective assessment (Boyd, 1995). In a 
similar vein, Baliga et al. (1996) and Dalton et al. (1998) suggest that CEO duality 
seriously damages the independence of the board. Indeed, when only one person leads a 
company, the role of independent directors becomes ‘hypothetical’ (Rechner and 
Dalton, 1989; Daynton, 1984). In the words of Rechner (1989), dual leadership 
structure is «likely to function as rubber stamp board given the total control of the 
CEO». The two above issues are closely connected with the final evidence class, 
decision making process. When one person is in charge of both tasks, managerial 
dominance is deeply fostered because «that individual is more aligned with 
management than with shareholders and is likely to act to protect his or her job and 
enhance personal well-being» (Mallette and Fowler, 1992: 1016). However, if there is a 
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lack of management domination, decision making is more effective and aligned to 
shareholder interests. This means that a more effective governance could be provided in 
terms of minor hostile takeovers (Morck et al., 1989), the failure adoption of ‘poison 
pills’ (Mallette and Fowler, 1992) and higher firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
The contrary school of thought views CEO duality as a leadership structure which could 
lead to many benefits for firms in terms of leadership, cost savings, and decision 
making process. Regarding leadership, two top executives (CEO non-duality) could 
introduce potential conflict at the top, and thus damage firm performance (Li and Li, 
2009). Furthermore, separation of CEO and chairman posts could create confusion 
among employees over who is in charge of running firms (Goodwin and Seow, 2000). 
Hence, consolidated power provides clarity about leadership and direction to the 
company, «which promote[s] effective dealing with external parties» (Dalton et al., 
1998). CEO has better coordination of board activities and actions, so he or she is able 
to enhance and improve decision making process. In other words, CEO duality 
facilitates more timely and more effective decision making (Peng et al., 2009); hence, 
decisions could be reached faster (Abdullah, 2004) and strategies could be implemented 
more swiftly. This is also due to the fact that CEO «may often have the best specific 
knowledge of the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the firms» (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1995). Dual leadership structure provides cost savings by eliminating 
information transferring and processing costs connected with non-CEO chairman (Yang 
and Zhao, 2013; Goodwin and Seow, 2000).  
Several studies have examined the impact of CEO duality on corporate economic-
financial performance (Mueller and Barker, 1997; Lam e Lee, 2008; Abatecola, Farina 
and Gordini, 2010). Three contrasting views emerge from the extant literature on the 
effect of CEO duality on firm performance. Some research (Boyd, 1995) reveals a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and accounting-based performance measure 
(i.e. ROA, ROE). Similarly, Donaldson and Davis (1991) find CEO duality to be 
positively associated with higher levels of ROE. However, according to some research 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992; Elsayed, 2007) it is not possible to establish a relationship 
between CEO duality and financial performance (i.e. ROA, ROE, price-earnings ratio). 
In the same vein, Certo et al. (2001) – examining IPO-stage firms – found no 
relationship between CEO duality and IPO under-pricing. Finally, several studies have 
underlined the fact that splitting the role has indeed led to significantly higher financial 
performance (Peel and O’Donnell, 1995). Some related studies (Palmon and Wald, 
2002; Pi and Timme, 1993; Rechner and Dalton, 1991) focusing on US and UK firms 
found a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance; the latter is 
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based both on accounting measures (i.e. ROA, ROE, ROI) and market-based measures 
(abnormal accruals). 
The key findings of existing empirical studies are reported in Table 5.5. 
In line with the core findings from prior international literature, we predict that CEO 
duality is negatively associated with firm performance. 
Hp 5: Firm performance exhibits a negative association under leadership structure that 
combines the roles of the CEO and the Board’s President 
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Table 5.5 International Empirical Research on CEO duality 
 
Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
89.  
Abatecola et al. 2010 CEO duality --- 
40 quantitative 
articles published in 
26 journals 
1985-2008 
Positive 
relationship 
90.  
Abdullah 2004 CEO duality 
ROA, ROE, EPD, 
profit margins 
Kuala Lumpur 
Listed Companies 
1994-1996 No relationship 
91.  
Baliga et al. 1996 
CEO duality (the 
announcement 
effect of changes in 
duality structure on 
organizational 
performance) 
Daily excess returns 
of stocks are 
selected as they are 
measures of 
organizational 
performance 
Fortune 500 
companies 
1980-1981 
Superior 
performance for 
firm Split CEO-
chair position. 
Positive 
relationship 
1) the market is 
indifferent to 
changes in a firm’s 
duality status, 
2) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect on 
the firm’s operating 
performance; 
3) the duality-
structure has no 
significant effect on 
the firm’s long-term 
performance 
92.  Ballinger and 
Marcel 
2010 CEO duality 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
bankruptcy 
540 CEO 
succession events at 
S&P 1500 firms 
1996-1998 
Poor negative effect 
of interim CEO 
successions 
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93.  
Berg and Smith 1978 CEO duality 
ROI, ROE, stock 
price 
Fortune 200 firms --- 
Negative 
relationship of 
duality with ROI, 
and no relation with 
ROE or change in 
stock price 
94.  
Boyd 1995 CEO duality ROI 
192 publicly traded 
US companies 
1980-1984 
Positive 
relationship 
95.  
Brickley et al. 1997 CEO duality 
ROI, Stock return, 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
661 US firms in the 
1989 Forbes 
compensation 
1989 
Firm with separate 
leadership do not 
perform better. 
Duality firms 
associated with 
better accounting 
performance 
96.  Cannella and 
Lubatkin 
 
1993 CEO duality ROE 
472 succession 
events 
1971-1985 
Weak positive 
relation of duality 
with ROE 
97.  
Chaganti et al. 1985 CEO duality 
No firm 
performance 
Banking industry – 
comparing 21 
bankrupts firms 
with 21 surviving 
firms 
1987-1990 No relationship 
98.  Daily 
 
1995 CEO duality 
Outcomes of 
bankruptcy: 
successful 
reorganization 
(good), liquidation 
(bad) 
70 publicly traded 
firms filing for 
bankruptcy 
protection 
1980-1986 
No effect on firm 
performance 
99.  
Daily and Dalton 1992 CEO duality 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
100 fastest-growing 
small publicly held 
US firms 
1990 No relationship 
100. Daily and Dalton 
 
1994a CEO duality bankruptacy 
114 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms 
1972-1982 
Negative effect on 
performance 
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101. Daily and Dalton 
 
1994b CEO duality bankruptacy 
100 publicly traded 
US manufacturing, 
retail, and 
transportation firms 
1990 
No main effect on 
firm performance, 
but strengthened the 
positive effect of 
board independence 
on firm 
performance 
102. 
Dalton and Kesner 1993, 1987 CEO duality 
ROA, ROE, Price-
Earnings ratio 
186 small publicly 
traded US firm. 
Randomly selected 
of 50 large 
Japanese, United 
Kingdom and 
United States 
industrial 
corporations for a 
total sample of 150 
19901986 
CEO duality n 
performance 
negative 
relationship1) In 
Japan, it is 
evidently unusual 
for the same 
individual to serve 
as CEO and 
chairperson of the 
board. 2) This is 
much more frequent 
in United Kingdom 
103. 
Dalton et al. 1998 CEO duality 
Market and 
accounting 
performance 
indicators 
Meta-analysis of 31 
studies US 
companies (69 
samples, N= 
12,915) 
1987 
NO overall 
relationship with 
firm performance 
104. 
Davidson et al. 2001 CEO duality 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
421 CEO 
succession event at 
332 Businessweek 
1000 firms 
1992 
CEO-board chair 
consolidation has 
negative effect only 
if heir apparent is 
no present 
105. 
Dey et al. 2011 CEO duality ROA 
760 companies 
from Compustat 
and ExecuComp 
databases 
2001-2009 
Positive 
relationship 
106. Donaldson and 
Davis 
1991 CEO duality ROE, stock return 
329 and 321 US 
companies 
1988 
Positive 
relationship 
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107. 
Elsayed 2007 CEO duality Tobin’s Q 
92 firms from 
Egyptian Capital 
MarketAgency 
2000-2004 
No significant 
relationship 
108. Faleye 
 
2007 CEO duality Tobin’s Q 3,823 US firms 1995 
Dual leadership 
increases Tobin’s q 
only in complex 
firms 
109. Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 
1994 
CEO duality and 
board vigilance 
ROA 
Fortune 200 
companies 
1984 and 1986 
This association 
changes with 
circumstances-with 
a vigilant board 
considering duality 
to be less desirable 
when firm 
performance is 
good and the CEO 
possesses 
substantial 
information power. 
110. He and Wang 
 
2009 CEO duality 
Market to book 
ratio 
215 large US 
manufacturing 
firms 
1996-1999 
Strengthened 
positive effect of 
innovative 
knowledge assets 
on firm 
performance 
111. Krause and 
Semadeni 
2013 CEO duality 
Stock return, mean 
analyst rating 
1,053 S&P 1500 
and Fortune 1000 
firms 
2002-2006 
CEO-board chair 
separation has 
positive effect 
following negative 
weak performance; 
nut negative effect 
following strong 
performance 
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112. 
Lam and Lee 2008 CEO duality 
ROA; ROE; return 
on capital 
employed, market-
to-book value of 
equity 
Hong Kong listed 
companies 
2003/2004 
Positive 
relationship in non-
family companies. 
No significant 
relationship in 
family companies 
113. 
Mallette and Fowler 1992 CEO duality ROE 
673 publicly traded 
U.S. 
industrial 
manufacturing 
firms 
1985 and 1988 
Weak positive 
relationship of 
duality with roe 
114. Mueller and Barker 
III 
1997 CEO duality ROA 
US manufacturing 
listed firms 
1977–1993 
Positive 
relationship 
115. Palmon and Wald 
 
2002 
CEO duality 
announcements 
abnormal returns 
304 companies 
from 
COMPUSTAT 
1986-1999 
Small firms = 
negative abnormal 
returns when 
changing from dual 
to separate 
leadership. Large 
firms=positive 
abnormal returns 
116. 
Peel and O’Donnell 1995 CEO duality 
Ownership of 
equity and 
participation in 
share 
132 UK industrial 
firms 
1992 
Negative 
relationship 
117. Pi and Timme 
 
1993 CEO duality ROA 112 US bank 1987-1990 
Positive 
relationship – 
Superior 
performance for 
firm Split CEO-
chair position 
 
 
145 
 
118. Quigley and 
Hambrick 
 
2012 CEO duality ROA, stock return 
181 CEO 
succession events at 
publicly traded US 
high-technology 
firms 
1994-2006 
Former CEO 
staying on as board 
chair reduced 
performance change 
following a CEO 
succession 
119. 
Rechner and Dalton 1989 CEO duality Shareholder return 
141 Fortune 500 
firms 
1978-1983 No relationship 
120. 
Rechner and Dalton 1991 CEO duality 
ROE, ROI, profit 
margin 
141 Fortune 500 
firms 
1978-1983 
CEO duality and 
performance 
negative 
relationship 
121. 
Rhoadesv et al. 2001 CEO duality various 
Meta-analysis of 
following database: 
Business, 
Psychology, 
Economics and 
Public Affairs 
Business (1971-
1996), Psychology 
(1974-1996), 
Economics (1966-
1996) and Public 
Affairs (1972-1996) 
Positive 
relationship 
122. 
Worrell et al. 1997 CEO duality 
Cumalative 
abnormal return 
522 CEO plurality-
creating events at 
438 Businessweek 
1000 firms 
1972-1980 
Consolidation of 
CEO and board 
chair roles had 
negative effect 
123. 
Yang and Zhao 2013 CEO duality 
Tobin’s Q, ROE, 
ROA, EBIT 
Canada-United 
States Free Trade 
Agreement (1989) 
1988-1998 
Duality firms 
outperform non-
duality ones 
no relationship 
(ROE, ROA) 
124. 
Yermack 1996 CEO duality 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ROS 
US Large 
companies 
1984-1991 
Positive 
relationship 
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Auditing processes 
Corporate Governance activities should be amply supported by control systems which 
should be effective, pervasive, and integrated monitoring mechanisms. In particular, we 
highlight auditing systems which are both internal and external and whose 
characteristics are structured to sustain achievement of Board of Directors decisions and 
the related value creation. Auditing is a fundamental element within governance 
framework and an effective auditing function plays a key role in assisting the board to 
carry out its governance responsibilities (Melville, 2003). The demand for audit 
activities arises from the agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) connected with 
the separation of ownership and control of companies. Agency problems are strictly 
associated with the asymmetric information in the Principal-Agent contracts and 
conflict of interests between shareholders (Principal) and management (Agent). Thus, a 
third subject (auditor) may mitigate agency cost related to financial statement prepared 
by management. Anderson et al. (1993) claim that «The value of the auditor in the 
arbitration role is dependent on the auditor being sufficiently independent of 
management to report any detected discord between the intentions of the contracting 
parties and the revealed states» (see also Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Antle, 1982). 
In particular, external audit is corporate financial audits conducted on the financial 
statements of firms by an outside subject (i.e. a registered public accounting firm – such 
as Big Four – or a qualified individual auditor). External auditing is «part of the set of 
monitoring mechanisms available to a firm» (Anderson et al., 1993). Internal audit 
refers to control function set within corporate. Gray and Manson (2011) referring to 
internal audit speak about an ‘extended arm of management’ to ensure the efficacy of 
internal control systems. 
Internal auditing of Italian listed companies that adopt traditional system or two-tier 
model is composed of audit committee and supervisory board. The former assists the 
board of directors in monitoring on internal controls and financial reporting. The latter 
supervises firm management, in particular compliance with the law and statute; it also 
deals with internal controls and financial reporting. 
 
The impact of Supervisory board members on firm performance 
Two-tier board system leads to a rigid institutionalized separation between the 
company’s management and its monitors, leading to enhanced organizational 
transparency (Bremert and Schulten, 2008). Board of directors conducts the day-to-day 
147 
 
firm management, and is accountable to both shareholders and supervisory board. 
Membership overlapping is not allowed between two boards to ensure the independence 
of supervisory board (Abdullah, 2009). Vinten and Lee (1993: 24) summarize the 
supervisory board’s function as follows «the determination of company policy; setting 
of management directors’ remuneration; approval of financial accounts; engagement in 
strategic decisions on investment and planning; authorization of specific commercial 
transactions; and the right to request and evaluate management reports on important 
manners». So, board of directors is bound by decisions and assessment of supervisory 
board and the former may require the attendance of the auditors before giving its 
opinion on the accounts (Collier and Gregory, 1996). In Italy, company law allows 
Italians companies to choose among unitary board, two-tier system and the so-called 
traditional system or ‘horizontal’ two-tier system. However, the most common model 
adopted by Italian listed company is the former.  
While the monitoring role of the board has been studied extensively the advisory role 
has received little attention (Adams and Ferreira, 2003). In particular, existent literature 
focuses mainly on Board of Directors mechanisms, probably because the major studies 
concern UK and US companies that adopt only one-tier board system in which 
supervisory board is not mentioned. For this reason, it is possible to find little empirical 
research about the potential connection between Supervisory Board and firm 
performance. Andres (2008) and Bremert and Schulten (2008) find empirical evidence 
that a positive relationship between Supervisory Board and firm performance (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q, and ROA) exists. In particular, the average supervisory board director 
compensation is consistently connected with market and accounting based performance 
measures. In contrast, Postma et al. (2003) show a negative association between 
remuneration and size of supervisory boards (as a whole) and performance (accounting 
measure). Finally, Van Hamel et al. (1998) find general support for the two-tier system, 
however, through interviews with 25 top Dutch executives and directors different point 
of views emerge. Supervisory board ranges from being considered a hindrance to 
making a real contribution (Table 5.6). 
In summa, according to agency theory, Supervisory Board is able to foster monitoring 
within the company, thus members may take a wider view because they are general 
officers of other organizations or firms. 
We could hypothesize that: 
Hp 6: Firm performance increases in presence of high number of Supervisory board 
members 
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Table 5.6 International Empirical Research on the Supervisory Board 
 
Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
125. 
Andres et al. 2008 Supervisory Board ROA, Tobin’s Q 275 firms 1998-2004 
Positive 
relationship 
126. Bremert and 
Schulten 
2009 Supervisory Board ROA, Tobin’s Q 
160 German listed 
companies 
2006-2007 
Positive 
relationship 
127. 
Postma et al. 
 
2003 Supervisory Board 
ROA, ROS, ROE, 
market to book 
value of equity; 
94 Dutch listed 
non-financial 
(mainly 
manufacturing) 
firms 
1996 
Negative 
relationship (size 
and remuneration) 
128. 
Schilling 2001 Supervisory Board --- 
100 members of 
supervisory and 
executive boards of 
major German 
companies 
2000 
Ineffective 
Supervisory Board 
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The impact of Audit Committee on firm performance 
The audit committee has a critical role within the framework of corporate governance, 
because its role concerns the overseeing and monitoring of board and the internal and 
external audit processes (Braiotta, 2004). Furthermore, it has assumed an increasingly 
important role for the assurance of corporate governance as the audit committee is 
expected to oversee financial reporting process, internal control system, as well as the 
work of the internal and external auditors (Hermanson and Rittenberg, 2003). 
Two main schools of thought exist regarding the benefit of Audit Committee within 
corporate governance mechanisms. On the one hand, researchers maintain that 
mechanisms such as audit committees are needed in order to help management control 
company (Sierra Garcìa et al., 2012). Indeed Gramling et al. (2004) state that corporate 
governance mechanisms are defined by at least four mechanisms, including Audit 
Committees. Hence, the former has become part of governance paradigm with «its own 
right, driving, and being driven by, a logic of auditability, characterized by an 
increasingly precise codification of the operational dimensions of the audit task and a 
reliance on formal, externally verifiable processes system» (Mennicken and Power, 
2013; Power 1997). On the other hand, some scholars reckon that audit committees 
exist only for «the purposes of appearances rather than for the enhancement of 
stockholders control [over] management» (Menon and Williams, 1994). In the same 
vein, Sommer (1991) highlights that appointing an audit committee does not necessarily 
mean that it will be effective in providing benefits of improved financial reporting and 
auditing. This statement is well supported by Verschoor (1989 and 1990) who points 
out the ineffectiveness of the audit committees in some major company failures. Audit 
committee is also criticized for its lack of independence (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; 
Carcello and Neal, 2000).  
Most empirical results highlight the fact that audit committees are «cornerstones of 
corporate governance» Gramling et al. (2004) and these studies (Beasle and Salterio 
2001) conclude that an audit committee composed of external and independent directors 
results in better transparency and accountability for company. Chan and Li (2008) find a 
positive relationship between audit committee and firm performance; other scholars 
(Anderson et al., 2004) show that independent audit committees have lower debt 
financing costs. However, other minor empirical research finds that, neither negative 
relationship nor any other type of connection exists between audit committees and firm 
performance, probably due to the fact that «Enhanced control limits the risk position of 
a company and narrows the room of man[o]euver for the management» (Bremert and 
Schulten, 2009: 36). Furthermore, some scholars have studied the relationship between 
the presence of audit committee and likelihood of fraud; mixed results have been 
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yielded by literature. On the one hand, Beasley (1996) finds that a higher proportion of 
independent directors is associated with a lower likelihood of fraud. On the other hand, 
Abbott and Park (2000) do not find any significant correlation between fraud and the 
percentage of outside directors within Audit Committee. 
Table 5.7 shows empirical research providing evidence of the connection between audit  
committee and firm performance. 
In line with the core findings from prior international literature, we predict that: 
Hp 7: Firm performance increases in presence of Audit Committee 
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Table 5.7 International Empirical Research on Audit Committee 
 
Author Publication Year 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Sample Year(s) of analysis Findings 
129. 
Anderson et al. 2004 Audit Committee 
Debt financing 
costs, Tobin’s Q 
Standard&Poor’s 
500 firms 
1992-1999 
Independent audit 
committees have 
lower debt 
financing costs 
130. Bremert and 
Schulten 
2009 Audit Committee ROA, Tobin’s Q 
160 German listed 
companies 
2006-2007 
Negative 
relationship 
131. 
Brown and Caylor 2004 Audit Committee dividend yield 
US listed 
companies 
2002 
Independent audit 
committees are 
positively related 
132. 
Brown and Caylor 2004 Audit Committee 
operating 
performance 
US listed 
companies 
2002 
Not positive 
relationship 
133. 
Chan and Li 2008 Audit Committee Tobin’s Q 
First top 200 
publicly traded 
Fortune 
500companies 
2000 
Positive 
relationship 
134. 
Klein 2002 Audit Committee40 
earnings 
management 
692 US listed 
companies 
1992-1993 
Negative relation 
between audit 
committee 
independence and 
abnormal accruals 
135. Managena and Pike 
 
2005 
Audit Committee 
size 
Interim disclosure 
index 
262 UK listed 
companies 
2001-2002 No relationship 
136. 
Xie et al. 2003 Audit Committee 
earnings 
management 
110 US listed 
companies 
1992, 1994, 1996 
Proportion of audit 
committee members 
with corporate 
backgrounds 
negatively related to 
the level of earnings 
management. 
                                               
40 Several research about AC and independency, financial reporting process, monitoring role exist (Aldamen et al., 2012). 
152 
 
The impact of Big Four on firm performance 
External auditing is a fundamental process and involves examining financial statements 
and testing the underlying accounting records of the firm (Braiotta, 2004). The 
assessment is conducted by an independent external auditor who has to disclose an 
objective opinion regarding compliance of financial statement to auditing principles. 
Thus external auditors provide additional assurance both to shareholders and financial 
market. Indeed managers are discouraged from manipulating accounting statements and 
this increases confidence in capital providers, therefore increasing liquidity of capital 
market (Mennicken and Power, 2013). For these reasons Coffee (2005) considers 
external auditing as a clear example of gatekeeper defined as «some form of outside or 
independent watchdog or monitor, someone who screens out flaws or defects or who 
verifies compliance with standards or procedures». 
There is extensive academic literature that studies audit quality connected with the 
presence of the so-called Big Four (Francis and Yu, 2009). Despite some limitations 
(Power, 1997), most of these studies classify the largest international accounting firms 
(i.e. the Big Four firms) as high quality auditors (De Angelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1988). 
Beasley et al. (2005) state that «it is possible that organizations committed to engaging 
such high quality auditors are also more committed to risk management». Hence, we 
could argue that if audit quality is enhanced, the risk of financial misstatement, frauds is 
minimized, encouraging potential shareholders to invest in company and thus fostering 
firm value. 
This leads to our hypothesis stated in alternative form:  
Hp 8: Firm performance increases in presence of the so-called Big Four 
 
5.5 New model construction 
As discussed above, the objective of this study is to build a valid econometric model 
according to literature review that measures the association between, on the one hand 
Board of Directors structure and Control mechanisms, on the other hand firm 
performance.  
Performance Variables (Dependents one). Two different measures of firm performance 
are used in the present research, Tobin’s Q and ROE which according to the mainstream 
can capture different aspects of corporate performance. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm 
market value to the replacement cost of its assets (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). ROE is 
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a «popular measure, primarily because it takes into account a firm’s liabilities and pays 
homage to the dispersed ownership represented by shareholders» (Hoque, 2006). ROE 
is a profitability-based measure of firm performance which is calculated by dividing 
firm profits before taxes by its total equity. Overall, ROE and Tobin’s Q ‘may be 
viewed as complementary rather than competing metrics which capture different aspects 
of firm performance’ (O’Connel and Cramer, 2009). 
Variable of interests (Independents one). Eight variables that will be used to test our six 
final hypotheses
41
 are board size, Independent directors, Executive directors, Non-
executive directors, CEO duality, Supervisory board size, Audit Committee and Big 
Four. In common with international studies in the field, board size is measured as the 
sum of the number of Independent, Executive and Non-executive directors. Independent 
directors, Executive directors, Non-executive directors are the percentage of those 
directors on the board. CEO duality is a binary variable which takes a value of one if it 
is found that CEO also serves as the chairman (i.e. CEO duality), and a value of zero 
otherwise (Boyd, 1995; Daily and Dalton, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998). Supervisory board size is the number of its members. Audit committee is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if it is established within company or 
otherwise a value of zero. Big Four is a dummy variable. It takes on a value of one if 
firm auditing belongs to one of Big four, and a value of zero otherwise 
Control Variable. Different control variables have been included in the study. These 
variables have been considered in model in order to remove the problem of endogenity. 
These variables have been used in many prior studies, and are correlated with firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Bonn et al., 
2004; Boone et al., 2007; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010). In particular, we consider 
Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets (Eisenberg et al., 
1998); Firm Leverage measured by the ratio of total debt to total asset (Baliga et al., 
1996), Capital intensity which is utilized to express firm growth and is measured by the 
ratio of net fixed asset to total assets (Elsayed and Paton, 2009); Year of acceptance 
code of corporate governance which is the period from acceptance date to the years of 
analysis; finally ROA which is computed by dividing firm profits before taxes by its 
total assets (Hsu, 2010). 
 
                                               
41 It is worth noting that at the beginning of the present research we hypothesized that eight independent 
variables would have been necessary in order to build our econometric value. However, studying 
international literature it has emerged that it is not possible to find effective evidence that Board of 
Director size and Supervisory Board size affect firm performance. For this reason, our econometric model 
contains six independent variables rather than eight. 
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Table 5.8 summarizes all variables included in our model with their respective 
definitions. 
Table 5.8 Variables Definitions 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Variable Definition 
Tobin’s Q 
Sum of market capitalization plus long and 
short-term debt over the book value of total 
assets 
ROE Profit for the year over shareholders’ equity 
Board size 
Sum of independent, executive and non-
executive directors 
Independent directors 
The percentage of Independent directors on the 
board 
Executive directors 
The percentage of Executive directors on the 
board 
Non-executive directors 
The percentage of Non-executive directors on 
the board 
CEO duality 
Dummy variable. 1 = CEO duality; 0 = CEO 
non-duality 
Supervisory Board Number of supervisory board members 
Audit Committee Dummy variable. 1 = exists; 0 = not exist 
Big Four 
Dummy variable. 1 = Big Four; 0 = Not Big 
Four 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Firm size Natural log of total asset 
Leverage Total liabilities/total asset 
Capital intensity Fixed asset/total asset 
Year of acceptance code 
of corporate governance 
Period from acceptance date to the years of 
analysis 
ROA Profit before interest and tax over total assets 
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5.6 Variables 
Before presenting and discussing our results, it is important to highlight that in our 
model we consider different variables, related to the board of directors, than those 
described in chapter 3. Table 5.9 shows those differences. 
 
Table 5.9 Comparison between variables 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS FEATURES 
Chapter 3 Chapter 5 
Functions ----- 
Board size Board size 
Board composition Board composition 
IDs IDs 
NEDs NEDs 
EDs EDs 
CEO duality CEO duality 
Audit committee Audit committee 
Nomination committee ----- 
Remuneration committee ----- 
Disclosure ----- 
----- Supervisory Board 
----- Big Four 
 
First of all, we notice that the variable “board function” is presented in chapter 3 but not 
in chapter 5, so it is not mention in our model. The reason lies in the fact that we seek to 
measure the relationship between board mechanisms and firm performance, and board 
tasks are not measurable and it cannot be tested. Thus, we dismiss that variable, even if 
it is essential to draw board functions based on codes of corporate governance and 
international theories. Secondly, we do not consider in our econometric model both 
nomination and remuneration committees, because they do not reflect the purpose of the 
present research. Indeed, we are particularly interested to examine how boards and their 
monitoring mechanisms can impact on firm performance. This is the same reason for 
which we decide, consistent with literature, to focus on Supervisory and Big Four which 
are not described in chapter three. Indeed, they could be essential monitoring “device” 
as well as the board. However, not all codes of best practice recommend to set up 
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supervisory board (only Italian, German codes) and to choice Big Four as external 
auditor.  
 
5.7 Findings 
In the following section, descriptive statistics (mean, median, minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation and variance) for all variables (i.e. dependent, independent and 
control ones) is presented. Moreover, we present the results based on fixed-effect 
regression with robust coefficient. In appendix other models tested are presented, in 
particular there are Pooled OLS and random-effects models, Hausman and Breusch-
Pagan tests.  
 
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics and Preliminary analysis 
The population consists of all Italian companies listed in STAR segment at Italian Stock 
Exchange (i.e. 54 firms) for over the period of 2005-2007. Our panel data counts 150 
globally observations, thus it means that we have dropped some companies for the 
reasons mentioned on the Chapter 4. It follows that we have an unbalanced panel data. 
Table 5.10 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables.  
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Table 5.10 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
ROE 148 11.19642 12.35 -36.02 50.58 13.10092 171.6341 
Tobin’s Q 143 1.673846 1.39 .57 7.19 1.135258 1.288811 
Board Size 146 8.965753 9 5 14 2.453469 6.019509 
Independent 
Directors 
146 2.993151 3 1 6 .9719981 .9447803 
Executive 
Directors 
146 2.993151 3 1 6 1.27845 1.634436 
Non-
Executive 
Directors 
146 3 2 0 9 2.21904 4.924138 
CEO 
duality 
150 .44 0 0 1 .4980499 .2480537 
Audit 
Committee 
150 .94 1 0 1 .2382824 .0567785 
Supervisory 
Board 
146 3 3 3 3 0 0 
Big Four 150 .82 1 0 1 .3854745 .1485906 
Ln asset 148 12.32198 12.33673 10.37205 14.55249 .9553357 .9126663 
Firm 
Leverage 
148 .5644073 .5723127 .0541416 .9207293 .1747812 0305485 
Capital 
Intensity 
130 1.160846 1.095 -9.46 5.79 1.171937 1.373437 
ROA 130 7.882538 7.445 -10.82 29.43 7.01761 49.24685 
Year 
Acceptance 
of Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
150 4.56 5 0 7 2.274693 5.174228 
 
The mean (median) value of firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q is 1.673846 
(1.39) with a range of 0.57 to 7.19, suggesting that the majority of firms have low 
performance. Tobin’s Q value from 0 to 1 is considered as a poor performance, and it 
may indicate that the stock is undervalued (Fauzi and Locke, 2012). We have 143 out of 
150 observations, it means that 7 are missing. As far as the second firm performance 
measure (i.e. ROE), the mean (median) is 11.19642% (12.35%) with a range from -
36.02% to 50.58%, resulting that shareholders of the majority of firms gain 11 € for 
each 100 € invest in that company. In addition, only 19 observations out of 148 present 
a negative ROE. It is interesting to notice that the majority of our population firms 
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(44%) present a ROE included from 12% to 30%; whereas the 36% of the firms counts 
a ROE ranged from 0,1% to 11,9%. Missing companies position themselves at the 
antipodes, in particular the 13% of the firm has ROE with a range of -36.02% and 0%, 
on the other hand the top performing companies (i.e. ROE between 30% and 50.58%) 
are 7%. It means that before the financial crisis outbreak, companies of our population 
register ROE medium-high, thus it plausible to assume that apparently there are not still 
evident signs of crisis in the period 2005-2007. 
Board size in Italian listed companies ranges from 5 to 14 directors, with 8,96 (9) being 
the average (median). Empirical research by Lipton and Lorsh (1992) suggest that a 
board composed of around 8 or 9 members is the optimum in terms of monitoring, so 
board members for the present population would appear to be within the range of their 
suggested target. The mean board size is below 11.67 reported by De Andres et al. 
(2005) for 10 OECD countries, but is smaller than 14 reported by (Allegrini, and 
Bianchi Martini, 2006) for all Italian listed companies. It is interested to notice that the 
board size of the present population appears to be generally larger than that of US 
companies (Linck et al., 2008) which is 7.5, and on the other hand it appears to be 
larger than the 8.07 reported by (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998) for the UK.  
Examining the relationship between the mean of ROE for different board sizes (Figure 
5.11), ROE increases until it reaches a maximum of 6 directors and declines with 7. 
Moreover, we observe increases in profitability even for board size of 8, 11 and 12 
members, but ROE decreases almost abruptly afterwards. This pattern of ROE and 
board size is similar to the pattern illustrated by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren 
and Wells (1998) and Mak and Yuanto (2003), and Shakir (2008), although they 
consider Tobin’s Q instead of ROE. 
Figure 5.11 ROE and Board Size 
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The range of non-executive directors sitting on board is from 0 to 9, with an average of 
3. When compared to the average of board size of 8.96, non-executive directors appear 
to be 33.3%. As regarding independent directors, they range from 1 to 6, with a mean of 
2.99. It means that independents, non-executives, as well as executives represent on 
average 33.3% of board size. Two issues are relevant to point out. Firstly, the mean 
percentage of independents are similar than the 39% reported by Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) for the UK; even though in the recent year the proportion of independents in the 
UK has considerably risen (Pye, 2000). Indeed, De Andres et al. (2005) show a mean 
proportion of outsiders of 50% for UK companies. Secondly, Italian Code of Corporate 
Governance (2006) recommends an «an adequate number» of independent directors. Is 
the 33% of independents an adequate number? Probably a unique and correct answer 
does not exist, it may depend on various factors: board size, firm size, the percentage of 
non-executives and executives, etc. In our population, executive directors (or inside 
ones), exactly like outsiders are on average 2.99, ranging from 1 to 6.  
It is interesting to notice that if we consider simultaneously board size and independent 
directors, we find that larger board size higher number of independent directors, even if 
56.25% of firms having board size between 10-14 members have 3 outsiders (which is 
the mean of independent directors). More in detail, we divide independents into three 
main categories, if they are one or two within board of directors they belong to first 
category, if they are three (i.e. the mean) or four belong to the second one, finally if they 
are five or six they belong to the third one. On the other hand, based on our data we also 
divide board size into three main groups: small (5-7 members), medium (8-10 members) 
and large (11-14 members) size. Table 5.12 shows the result. 26% of Independent 
directors between 1 and 2 (1
st
 category) acts in small board of directors; whereas 44% of 
independent directors between 3 and 4 (2
nd
 category) plays within the medium and large 
size of board, respectively 8-10 and 11-14 members. Finally, 11% of independent 
directors between 5-6 (3
rd
 category) acts their role within board of medium and large 
size. That shows that larger board size have higher number of independent directors. 
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 Table 5.12 Board size and Independent Directors 
Board Size Independent Directors 
Percentage of 
Independent Directors 
Small 
(5-7 members) 
1-2 1st category 26% 
3-4  2nd category 11% 
5-6  3rd category 0% 
Medium 
(8-10 members) 
1-2 1st category 7% 
3-4  2nd category 22% 
5-6  3rd category 3% 
Big 
(11-14 members) 
1-2 1st category 1% 
3-4  2nd category 22% 
5-6  3rd category 8% 
 
Moreover, if we consider the relationship between executives and board size, we 
discover that smaller board of director have more executive directors. We divide 
executives into three main categories, if they are one or two within board of directors 
they belong to first category, if they are three (i.e. the mean) or four belong to the 
second one, finally if they are five or six they belong to the third one. On the other hand, 
based on our data we also divide board size into three main groups: small (5-7 
members), medium (8-10 members) and large (11-14 members) size. Table 5.13 shows 
results. The 2
nd
 category of executive directors, which includes the mean of them, is 
24% in correspondence with medium size of board of directors. However, bigger board 
of directors seems to prefer independents rather than executives. Indeed, 12% of bigger 
board (11-14 members) have 1 or 2 executives. So, even if the board size increases, the 
number of the executives remains always around 1-2 members (1
st
 category) or 2-3 (2
nd
 
category). 
 Table 5.13 Board size and Executive Directors 
Board Size Executive Directors 
Percentage of Executive 
directors 
Small 
(5-7 members) 
1-2 1st category 15% 
3-4  2nd category 22% 
5-6  3rd category 0% 
Medium 
(8-10 members) 
1-2 1st category 7% 
3-4  2nd category 24% 
5-6  3rd category 2% 
Big 
(11-14 members) 
1-2 1st category 12% 
3-4  2nd category 10% 
5-6  3rd category 8% 
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If we study the connection of non-executives and board size, we discover that the 
number of non-executives is directly proportional to the size of the board. Table 5.14 
displays findings. We have adopted the same approach used before. So, we divide non-
executives into three main categories, if they are either zero or one or two within board 
of directors they belong to first category, if they are three (i.e. the mean) or four belong 
to the second one, finally if they are five or more they belong to the third one. On the 
other hand, based on our data we also divide board size into three main groups: small 
(5-7 members), medium (8-10 members) and large (11-14 members) size. A smaller 
number of non-executives acts in board smaller; whereas huge number of non-
executives (3
rd
 category) plays in bigger board of directors. 
 
Table 5.14 Board size and Non-Executive Directors 
Board Size Non-Executive Directors 
Percentage of Non-
Executive directors 
Small 
(5-7 members) 
0-1-2 1st category 29% 
3-4  2nd category 8% 
5-more  3rd category 0% 
Medium 
(8-10 members) 
1-2 1st category 16% 
3-4  2nd category 13% 
5-more  3rd category 4% 
Big 
(11-14 members) 
1-2 1st category 7% 
3-4  2nd category 5% 
5-more  3rd category 18% 
 
Furthermore, classification of the firm according to their board leadership structure (i.e. 
CEO duality or CEO non-duality) shows that same person holds the role of CEO and 
chairman (i.e. CEO duality) is about 44% of the sample. In contrast, the roles of CEO 
and chairperson in 56 percent of the population firms (84 out of 150 observations) are 
held by two separate persons. It means that the majority of the present population 
comply the Code of Corporate Governance recommendations and it is consistent with 
agency theory approach which suggests the CEO non-duality (Rechner and Dalton, 
1989/1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994a).  
As far as supervisory board is concerned, we notice that there is no variation within and 
between company, i.e. supervisory boards of every firm have three members for all the 
period studied (2005-2007). Indeed, according to Italian law, Italian listed companies 
must have a supervisory board composed by a minimum of three members. Given the 
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lack of variation we have to reject Hp 6 Firm performance increases in presence of high 
number of Supervisory board members.  
As regarding Audit committee presence, table 5.10 shows that 94% of the firms adopt 
that auditing body. Some firms consider their own internal audit committee like the 
audit committee. This is consistent with Malguzzi (2006), Meruzzi (2011), and 
Allegrini and Biachi Martini (2006) claims. With respect of the presence of Big Four, 
the 82% of the firms rely on one of the Big Four, and the minority prefers non-Big four 
auditing firms. 
As far as control variables are concerned, ROA registers a mean of 7.88%, with a range 
of -10.82% to 29.43%. So it means that management is able to yield 7.88 € for each 
100€ invested on core business. The mean (median) of natural logarithm of total asset, 
which is considered a proxy of firm size (Eisenberg et al., 1998), is 12.3 (12.33673), 
ranging from 10.37205 to 14.55249. Furthermore, the mean (median) value of leverage 
is 0.56 (.5723127), with a range of 0.0541416 to 0.9207293; whereas the mean 
(median) of capital intensity is 1.16 (1.095) with a range of -9.46 to 5.79. Finally, as 
regarding the year in which companies have adopted code of corporate governance rules 
is concerned, it is noteworthy to point out that firms have adopted the Italian Code for 5 
years with respect of the period 2005-2007.  
 
5.7.2 Discussion of results 
After describing statistics descriptive of all variables, we focus our attention on models 
and discussing results obtained through fixed-effect models. All results obtained with 
OLS pooled, random-effects and fixed-effects without robustness test are shown in the 
appendix. Furthermore, all correlation matrixes regarding independent and dependent 
variables are displayed at the appendix.  
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 shows results (i.e. robust coefficient) considering as dependent 
variables ROE and Tobin’s Q respectively. 
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Table 5.15 Results Fixed-Effects Models, Robust Coefficient 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 SPECIFICATION (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Board size -1.856303 
(1.18728) 
-2.09047* 
(1.225065) 
-1.876758*** 
(.5428453) 
  
CEO duality  4.56657 
(2.933366) 
 5.068885 
(3.339515) 
 
Audit Committee   -6.670061 
(4.173499) 
 -10.31354*** 
(1.844535) 
Big 4   .5783773 
(1.600048) 
 -4.565908*** 
(1.47187) 
Independent Directors    -2.119013** 
(1.065663) 
-2.29745 
(2.063288) 
Executive Directors    -2.358839* 
(1.378463) 
 
Non-Executive Directors    -1.968755** 
(.9043147) 
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Firm Leverage -26.95668 
(18.03651) 
-29.87637* 
(15.51854) 
-27.53681 
(17.49355) 
-29.57142* 
(16.15406) 
-33.11587 
(23.04797) 
ROA 1.361252*** 
(.3673366) 
1.338003*** 
(.3573244) 
1.32143 
(.3350928) 
1.308784*** 
(.3642693) 
 
Firm size 1.441648 
(4.349771) 
-1.519384 
(4.021135) 
 .2983063 
(3.712212) 
5.349245 
(5.232698) 
Capital Intensity .1520901 
(.977499) 
.071302 
(.9705447) 
  1.739299 
(.7637535) 
Year of Acceptance Code    -.4775907 
(1.047974) 
.949092 
(1.010967) 
 Firm Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes 
ROBUST Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*)  
164 
 
Table 5.16 Results Fixed-Effects Models, Robust Coefficient 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
 SPECIFICATION (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Board size -.001415 
(.0641991) 
-.0060076 
(.0641983) 
-.0178886 
(.0299378) 
  
CEO duality  .0972271 
(.2558647) 
 .1162588 
(.3172164) 
 
Audit Committee   -.07707 
(.0725545) 
 -.0856577 
(.1246645) 
Big 4   .1235336*** 
(.0148315) 
 .1814037 
(.1298048) 
Independent Directors    -.1345574* 
(.0784501) 
-.1314131** 
(.0587344) 
Executive Directors    -.0205967 
(.0648565) 
 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
   -.0335565 
(.0486882) 
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Firm Leverage 1.714012 
(1.457934) 
1.642559 
(1.320109) 
.6033737 
(1.241874) 
.6440582 
(1.126538) 
.947701 
(1.565615) 
ROA 064846*** 
(.0156854) 
.0639848*** 
(.0139544) 
   
Firm Size -1.084004** 
(.3138529) 
1.085727** 
(.3092585) 
  -1.203235** 
(.3801551) 
Capital Intensity -.0878199 
(.0575887) 
-.08914 
(.0577776) 
  -.0610774 
(.0374015) 
Year of Acceptance 
Code 
    .051766 
(.0872311) 
 Firm Fixed Effect yes yes  yes yes 
ROBUST Standard Errors are in brackets. Statistically significant at 1 % (***), 5 % (**) and 10 % (*) 
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Table 5.17 shows summary results, highlighting confirmed and rejected research 
hypotheses. 
 
Dependent Variables: ROE 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected sign Effective sign 
Verification of 
Research Hp 
Board size - -  
Independent Directors + -  
Non-executive 
Directors 
+ -  
Executive Directors - -  
CEO Duality - + ^^ ^^ 
Audit Committee + -^^ ^^ 
Supervisory Board + dismiss --- 
Big4 + +/- / 
^^: not statistically significant 
Dependent Variables: Tobin’s Q 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected sign Effective sign 
Verification of 
Research Hp 
Board size - -  
Independent Directors + -  
Non-executive 
Directors 
+ -^^ ^^ 
Executive Directors - -^^ ^^ 
CEO Duality - +^^ ^^ 
Audit Committee + - ^^ 
Supervisory Board + dismiss --- 
Big4 + +  
^^: not statistically significant 
 
The impact of Board size on firm performance 
Hp1 states that Firm performance exhibits a negative association with board size. 
The empirical findings reported above suggest that a larger board size is associated with 
poorer firm performance, showing that an increase in the number of board members means 
a decrease in performance measured by ROE. According to the models (1), (2) and (3) [(6), 
(7) and (8)] if board size increases by one unit, company performance drops respectively 
by 1.86, 2.09, -1.88 [0.01, 0.06, 0.18] giving support to Hp1. In fact, the coefficient for 
board size is negative for all the models considered, which may indicate that companies 
with larger board size are less likely to have high performance. Our results support a 
statement by Jensen (1993) who deems that for a firm to be effective in its monitoring, it 
should have a relatively small board, since those with too many directors is «less likely to 
function effectively». Our results are consistent with prior research (Yermack, 1996; 
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Eisenberg et al., 1998; Hossain et al., 2001) which points out that the larger the board size 
is, the less efficient the monitoring function of the directors will be; large board size thus 
corresponds to a reduction in firm value and performance. 
From this perspective, the Italian experience is similar to other research findings regarding 
different countries (for US, Cheng (2008); Huther (1997), Guest (2009) for UK (Conyon 
and Peck (1998); Carlin et al. (2002), for New Zealand, Kamran et al. (2006); for Norway, 
Boheren and Odeggard, 2001)
42
. 
In this vein, boards should be small to be effective, to be more cohesive and to ensure more 
discussion and participation (Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Furthermore, our results 
are consistent with the Italian Code of Corporate Governance which recommends a low 
number of directors within the board. Our results confirm agency theory assumptions, 
according to which greater board size means more problems for communication, 
coordination, and decision-making (Eisenberg et al, 1998 and Beiner et al., 2006). 
Similarly, smaller size boards are more effective and organizationally functional as 
compared to larger boards in making decisions, and it is somewhat easier for top 
management (e.g. Chief Executive Officer) to control a smaller board of directors. Hence, 
boards with low number of directors may minimize agency costs. Our result is consistent 
with the findings of Ibrahim and Samad (2006), and Sajid et al. (2012); they also find that 
smaller board size plays a significant role in reducing agency costs. Accordingly, Florackis 
and Ozkan (2004) show that board size has a negative effect on agency cost proxy asset 
turnover, i.e. higher board size will result in higher agency costs because of reduced 
efficiency. Furthermore, Beiner et al. 2004 and Eisenberg et al. 1998 support findings 
above mentioned with evidence that board size is negatively correlated with asset turnover. 
These findings are consistent with previous results (e.g., Yermack, 1996, Eisenberg et al, 
1998) and propose that large boards do not create value because their size worsens the free 
riding problem among directors relating to the monitoring of management (Lasfer, 2002). 
In light of the above, our results seems to confirm that a large board of directors could lead 
to:  
 problems of coordination and communication, because it is difficult to arrange 
board meetings, reach consensus, causing slow information transferring, a less-
efficient decision-making process (Judge and Zeithamal, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Bonn 
et al., 2004; Cheng, 2008),  
 problems in terms of board cohesiveness, because directors could be less likely to 
share a common goal and to communicate with each other (Evans and Dion, 1991; 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), causing greater levels of conflict (Goodstein et al., 1994); 
                                               
42 It is interesting to notice that other studies (Andres et al., 2005; Collins et al., 1987) consider firm size as a 
control variable rather than an independent one, so they do not test directly the impact of board size on 
performance. 
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 free rider problems because the cost to any individual board member of not 
exercising diligence falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, 
Guest, 2009); 
 greater agency costs, because if board size increases beyond a certain number, 
disadvantages greatly outweigh the initial advantages of having more directors to 
draw on, causing a lower level of corporate performance Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993). 
Although Jensen (1993), Guest (2009), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Airoldi and Forestieri 
(1998) suggest that the board should be composed respectively of 7 or 8, 3, 8 or 9, and 9 
members, we do not believe that an optimum number of directors exists, because each firm 
is different, even though they operate within the same environment. For instance, while 
research might show that the optimal number of board members is 7, it is relevant to point 
out that this result cannot be generalized for all firms. This number may be optimal only 
for the specific period analysed and for those firms belonging to a determined and precise 
context. In fact, the codes of corporate governance do not mention any precise number, but 
they leave the choice of board size to the discretion of the company, without fixing any 
maximum number. 
We have tested our models considering also Tobin’s Q. Consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996); Bhagat and Black (1998); Yermack (1996); Klein (1998); Baxter (2006) 
and Reddy et al. (2008), Reddy et al. (2010), our results are mixed, even though not all of 
them are statistically significant. This means that Tobin’s Q (the measure of firm value 
depending on financial market) fails to capture and explain the relationship between board 
size and firm performance. This is probably due to the fact that Tobin’s Q reflects a more 
long term outlook for the firm (Mausulis and Mobbs, 2011) and means that in the long-
term it does not seem plausible to evaluate the impact of board composition on firm 
performance because the environment is too dynamic and changeable. Our results could 
thus be influenced by a wide range of unstable factors (e.g. investor psychology, market 
forecasts) that lead to lack of significance with reference to Tobin’s Q. (Reddy et al., 
2010). It is noteworthy that consistent with Elsayed (2011), our findings do not show a 
clear pattern, since it seems that the relationships between board size and firm performance 
vary with the proxy used for corporate performance and for control variables.  
 
The impact of Board composition on firm performance 
Some research shows that board composition varies with both firm endogenous factors and 
the institutional environment (e.g., Brickley and James, 1987; Denis and Denis, 1995; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), this suggests that imposing a homogeneous composition of 
the board may be optimal for some companies but not for others. 
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Independent, Non-Executive and Executive directors have negative and significant 
coefficient. This is partially consistent with literature and our research hypotheses. Indeed, 
we predict positive effect for Independent and Non-Executive directors on performance 
and on the other hand, negative impact for Executive directors. 
It is noteworthy that the coefficient of board size on performance is negative as is the 
coefficient of independent, non-executive and executive directors. So the sum of director 
effect on performance is equal to board size effect, i.e. negative. Board composition results 
confirm Board size research hypotheses (Hp 1). 
One possible explanation for this negative impact is that board composition «simply does 
not matter» (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991: 111). Independent, Non-Executive and 
Executive directors could be equally bad (or good) at representing shareholder interests. 
This is consistent with top management’s control of the board-selection process (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991). 
Another plausible reason to explain why board composition has negative effects on 
corporate performance could be explained by considering the so called interlocking 
directorates (Fich and Shivdasani, 2003; Devos, 2009) which is a very rife phenomenon 
among Italian listed companies (Ciocca, 2007). One of the best definition of interlocking 
directorates is given by Mizruchi (1996: 271) who states that it is the situation «when a 
person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another 
organization». Following the recent Italian regulatory interventions
43
 and the Italian Code 
of Corporate Governance changes, there has been a reduction in the number of multiple 
assignments in each Board of Directors, however, the fundamental characteristics of the 
interlocked directors network have remained practically intact (Santella et al., 2007). 
Analysis across the country shows that the Italian network, like the French network and 
unlike the English one, has a centralized form with pervasive and redundant links that may 
reflect the needs of collusion rather than coordination of the business (Santella et al. 2008). 
In the same vein, Rinaldi and Vasta (2005) state that interlocking directorships have been a 
crucial characteristic of Italian capitalism for considerable time and they still prevail even 
after recent law changes in corporate governance. They reckon that interlocks could help 
consolidate and defend controlling positions in the main Italian corporate groups. 
However, according to research on Italian context (Bertoni and Randone, 2006), network 
building requires a long period of time and the interlocked firm increase the risk of 
expropriation, because directors could act jointly at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, as this kind of board network becomes stable in time and because of the fact 
that the highest number of interlocking relationship is found among the largest companies, 
the extent of these relationships could cripple competition (Santella et al., 2007). Literature 
                                               
43 Draghi Law (Legislative Decree no 58/1998), Vietti Reform (Legislative Decrees no. 61/2002, no. 6/2003, 
no. 37/2004); Saving Law (Law no. 262/2005); Rescue-Italy Law Decree (Law Decree 6/2011, ratified with 
amendments by Law 214/2011). It is interesting to notice that – as discussed by Monks and Minnow (2008), 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act resulted in a reduction of multiple interlock relationships among boards in the US. 
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based on agency approach
44
 has two distinct and opposing points of view relating to the 
advantages and disadvantages of interlocking directorates. On the one hand, Fama (1980) e 
Fama e Jensen (1983) show evidence that directors, playing an effective role with their 
own board, are remunerated by the conferring of new directorship mandates on other 
boards. These directors will consequently have high expertise and reputation; this is also 
recognised by other boards whose firms may gain prestige and visibility by appointing 
highly qualified directors (Mizruchi, 1996). Thus, interlock directors contribute positively 
to creation of value. Similarly, the appointment of an executive as outside director on 
another board may increase firm value if the executive’s company has no agency problems 
(Perry and Peyer, 2005). On the other hand, research currents point out the negative effects 
of interlock directors on internal and external control systems (Shivdasani, 1993; Cotter et 
al., 1997). In the same vein, Larcker et al. (2011) maintain that control efforts played by 
the board decrease because directors are too busy; this leads to a potential negative effects 
on firm performance (Croci and Grassi, 2013). This effect is also enhanced by the fact that 
firms have to choose among a reduced group of potential directors who share the same 
values or origins (Mizruchi, 1996). Furthermore, interlocking directorship could increase 
the reputational risk faced by the firm; a director with an interlock role in a company 
involved in a financial scandal could destroy value in other companies (Fich and 
Schivdasani, 2007). In light of the above, we can conclude that one possible reason for 
negative association between board composition and firm performance is due to the high 
presence of interlocking directorates.  
There may be three other possible reasons why directors have negative effects on firm 
performance. Firstly, as Ruigrock et al. (2006) argue, a high level of interlocks may have 
negative effects on strategic decision-making and compromise firm performance. This is 
due to the fact that «The more board mandates an individual director has, the more limited 
the time and attention he or she can devote to a single company. Active involvement in 
strategic decision-making requires significant knowledge about the company and its 
industry. To build up such knowledge is time intensive» (Ruigrock et al. 2006:1219). 
Secondly, the problem of a lack in monitoring can arise. Indeed, according to the agency 
approach, a high level of interlocks may compromise director independence due to the lack 
of monitoring and control by directors who are too busy and sit on a number of boards. The 
high levels of board interlocks in Italy does not help the quality of the role fulfilled by 
outside directors, leading to a worsening of firm performance. So our “negative” results are 
                                               
44 The mainstream of Resource Dependence Theory and Stewardship approach is focused mainly on the 
advantages and disadvantages of interlocking directorates. Interlocking is a means to reduce environmental 
uncertainty and strengthen relationships with other subjects, including also possible customers (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 2003). This is done by creating informal communication channels through which an exchange of 
valuable information can take place (Palmer, 1983; Useem, 1984) the main results are a) a decrease of 
environmental uncertainty and of transaction costs (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Gulati and Sytch, 
2007); b) the spread of innovations and an improvement of organizational learning (Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998; Davis, 1991). Furthermore, as interlocking directors create strong network among different 
boards of directors (Burt, 1980; Hillman and Keim 2001), they could provide knowledge necessary to the 
company for improved efficiency through project proposals which have already been implemented in other 
companies (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
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consistent with those of Fich and Shivdasani (2007) who display a negative effect on firm 
performance (in terms of lower market-to-book ratios, and weaker profitability
45
) as 
interlocked directors are too busy. Similarly, directors have incentive to accept directorship 
on different boards because their personal marginal benefits are equal to the personal 
marginal costs (Booth and Deli, 1996). However, this leads to the impossibility of an 
effective control effort by the director because of a higher number of directorships than the 
optimal amount for the firm. Thirdly, as ownership structure of Italian companies is 
concentrated, interlocking directorates are a widespread phenomenon because controlling 
shareholders are members of several boards. Majority shareholders could have different 
incentives from professional directors with no large ownership stakes in several 
companies. In addition, controlling shareholders are often top executives of the companies. 
As they sit on several boards of directors they could steal valuable time from the firm 
management (Croci and Grassi, 2013), resulting in a reduction of firm value and 
performance. So, finally – as Fich and Shivdasani (2006) state - interlocking directorates 
may generate weaker corporate governance. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that 
director independence may be weakened when directors hold multiple board seats. 
Consistently with the claims of O’Connel and Cramer (2010), our results reveal a negative 
effect because of the high presence of interlocking which consequently has a negative 
impact on firm performance for many reasons.  
We have also tested our models by taking into consideration a dependent variable -Tobin’s 
Q- which may be considered a financial performance measurement (Reddy et al., 2010). 
Our findings confirm that all directors may have a negative impact on performance, even 
though not all coefficients are statistically significant. It follows that executives, non-
executives and independents could be equally bad or good at representing shareholders’ 
preferences. Indeed, Tobin’s Q focuses on investors, and it captures the extant of the 
wealth created by shareholders over a given long-term period of time. So, our results may 
be explained by the fact that the alignment of shareholders with those of managers is not 
clear-cut. In particular, our findings may show that the high complexity of corporate 
mechanisms go beyond the agency approach, i.e. the relationship principal-agent and the 
board which is considered a monitoring “device”.  
 
Independent directors 
Hp 2 states that Firm performance exhibits a positive association with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board 
                                               
45 Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find a positive reaction of the financial market when a firm announces the 
dismissal of a busy director. 
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The mean of independent directors is 3; on average, independent directors make up 33% of 
the board of directors. Italian 2011 code of corporate governance recommends that one 
third of the directors shall be independent
46
. As the mean of the board size is 9, it follows 
that companies comply with regulatory requirements (even if Code in 1999 and 2006 
version does not specify any minimum number); indeed, independents are on average 
three.  
Our results [models (4), (5), and (9), (10)] point out that the presence of an independent 
director has a negative effect on firm performance, and these findings are consistent with 
those displayed in prior research (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002). It 
follows that our results contradict the assumption that firm boards should be composed 
mostly by independent directors. 
Corporate governance is strengthened when directors are independents and remunerated 
with equity. On the one hand, when the board is independent, directors are less likely to be 
controlled by management and on the other hand, remunerating directors with equity could 
mean aligning the interest of the board with those of shareholders (Hillman and Dalzei, 
2003; Dunn and Sainty, 2009). Furthermore, agency theory and codes of corporate 
governance enhance the key role of independent directors. However, our research fails to 
establish a positive link between independent directors and firm performance, so we must 
reject Hypothesis 2. 
The coefficient for independent directors for ROE is negative [models (4), (5) and (9), 
(10)] but not always significant [models (5)], showing that the greater the number of 
independent directors on the board is the lower firm performance will be. The result of this 
study is similar to that found by Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
respectively for US and New Zealand context. However, this is in contrast with Hossain et 
al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2010) research. They find a non-significant effect of 
independent directors on firm performance. Even though results are not significant, they 
show a negative coefficient which is similar to the coefficient yielded in this research. Our 
negative result could be explained by the fact that compliance with Italian Code of 
Corporate Governance has meant increased costs which have had a negative impact on 
firm performance. This is consistent with Fauzi and Locke (2012) results. 
The relationship between independent directors and performance may differ not only 
because of firms’ specific characteristics but also because of national institutional 
characteristics. This assumption is similar to what Guest (2009) has shown in his research 
with reference to board size in UK firms. Our results confirm recent findings in literature 
that show good governance practices are not universal but may depend on market and firm 
characteristics (Black et al. 2010; Coles et al. 2008; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; 
Duchin et al. 2010; Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2012).  
                                               
46 Before 2011, no specifications are issued. 
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Another explanation for negative impact of independent directors on performance could be 
due to the fact that, as the directors constitute a low percentage of board, they spend 
valuable time and energy on enhancing their firms’ specific human capital. The lack of 
information with reference to all firm activities and additional time can be costly and can 
be justified only when there are important changes in firm management (Masulis and 
Mobbs, 2009). The difference between our results and those for other countries is that the 
percentage of independent directors on board of directors in Italy is 33%, which is not in 
line with agency theory and international codes of corporate governance
47
. In fact, 
literature points out that board independence increases effectiveness in monitoring (Byrd 
and Hickman, 1992; Clifford and Evans, 1997), leading to a reduction of management 
opportunism and a subsequent improvement of firm performance (Fama, 1980; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000). As suggested by Hart (1995) and Mura (2007), independents board members 
may not have sufficient financial incentives to motivate effective monitoring. 
In addition, the negative relationship between independent directors and ROE may 
constitute evidence of the lack of effective governance structures in inducing management 
to undertake long-term value enhancing projects. This assumption is consistent with Coles 
et al. (2001) who claim a contrariis; a lack of connection between outside directors and 
short-term performance measure (Economic Value Added) may mean that firms are 
characterized by «effectiveness of proper governance structure» (Coles et al., 2001: 47) 
which lead management to take on long-term projects which are not necessarily reflected 
in EVA results. 
Another possible reason – far from mutually exclusive – for the negative association 
between independents and performance, arises from the way in which outsiders are 
employed on the board as part-time members; this may limit their ability to understand the 
complexities implied in decision-making process. (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
In fact, the Italian laws have become more stringent since 2011 regarding independent 
directors, this is the reason why the percentage of independents are low in the period 2005-
2007. Indeed, although the European House-Ambrosetti
48
 founded the Advisory Board in 
2004, it becomes a permanent observatory on corporate governance only in 2011. The 
board is composed by both academics and professionals in order to mix expertise, know-
how, skills, and knowledge. In particular, it aims to provide concrete suggestions and 
proposals to enhance and develop the achievement of excellence in listed companies 
corporate governance. The observatory intends to optimize the overall efficacy of the 
functioning of the board of directors and also analyse the efficacy of the different director 
categories (Independent, Non-Executive and Executive). In the same vein, Italian Code of 
                                               
47 It is noteworthy that our companies population comply perfectly with the Italian Code recommendation 
regarding independent directors.  
48 The European House – Ambrosetti is a professional group founded in 1965 by Alfredo Ambrosetti which, 
over the years, has developed a number of activities in Italy, Europe and the rest of the world. 
http://www.ambrosetti.eu/en 
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Corporate Governance was updated in 2011 regarding board composition and role, 
committee roles and functioning. As far as independent directors regulatory updates are 
concerned, it is interesting to point out two issues. The first one deals with independent 
directors who should make up at least one third of the Board of Directors (never less than 
two members) for listed companies. In fact, the previous Code versions (i.e. 1999 and 
2006
49) recommended only an “adequate number of independent directors”. Secondly, the 
2011 Code recommends that the board designates an independent director as lead 
independent director where there is CEO duality and where the office of chairman is held 
by the person controlling the company
50
. However, in listed companies, the board shall 
designate a lead independent director only upon request of the majority of independent 
directors
51
. In particular, he/she represents a reference and coordination point for the 
requests and contributions of non-executive directors and, in particular, independent ones. 
Lead Independent Directors should also cooperate with the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors in order to ensure that directors receive timely and complete information (Italian 
Code of Corporate Governance, 2011). In sum, it seems that only in recent years has Italy 
begun to focus attention on corporate governance quality, and on board of directors 
structures and composition. So it follows that, in the 2000s Italy was not so effective and 
attentive to the question of independent directors as the Code did not deal with these 
issues
52
 and there were not many institutions dealing with corporate governance quality 
and efficacy (as aforementioned only in 2011 was the permanent observatory on corporate 
governance founded). It follows that our negative results may be influenced by these weak 
regulations and the fact that scarce attention was paid to the role and efficacy of outsiders. 
These factors could lead to a decrease in monitoring of executives, who are free to take 
decisions which may even go against shareholders interest. This could result in increased 
agency costs and could compromise firm performance. Consistently with Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Levine (1997, 1999), the nature of corporate governance and thereby 
corporate performance in every country is influenced by the political and legal 
environments. 
Another possible reason for the negative relation between independents and performance 
could lay in the fact that Italian listed companies are characterized by concentrated 
ownership (Volpin, 2002) and independent directors do not have the same power as 
directors of public company. For instance, they cannot fire the CEO, who is the expression 
of controlling owner or controlling shareholder, in the case of poor performance. 
                                               
49 It is noteworthy that in 2005 companies followed 1999 Code of Corporate Governance; whereas in 2006 
and 2007, they complied with the 2006 version. 
50 1999 Italian Code did not recommend Lead Independent Directors, so no directors fulfill this role; whereas 
in 2006 Code recommended, for the first time the designation of the latter. Finally, in 2011 this issue was 
rationalized so as to make it clearer and easy to comply. 
51 Except in the case of a different and grounded assessment carried out by the Board to be reported in the 
Corporate Governance Report. 
52 It is interesting to notice that the first American code of corporate governance (the NACD Report) was 
introduced in 1996; whereas the English one (the Cadbury Report) in 1992. In Italy code of best practice 
(The Preda Code) is dated 1999. It is interesting to highlight that the first code of corporate governance was 
introduced by The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (The Hong Kong Code of Best Practice) in 1989. 
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Moreover, independents could deem that potential actions and plans could be effective for 
firms and lead to improved firm performance, but controlling shareholders – in 
concentrated ownership context - may dismiss those plans, because the latter could lose 
their majority position. This could be the case, for example in situations where new 
investment may result in high value creation for the company, but this increase in the share 
capital might deprive the majority shareholders of company control. In such circumstances, 
there could be a conflict between majority and minority interests, in terms of shareholder 
value maximization. According to the majority shareholders point of view, the added value 
generated by new investment may be offset by the loss of control and the related benefits 
(so-called private benefits) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bourjade and Germain, 2012). 
Large shareholders may be detrimental to firm performance and value, due to these private 
benefits (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). From a different perspective, majority shareholders 
are less interested in the stock shares price, because they are “stable owners”, whereas the 
minority ones measure the profitability of their investment by the share price. In this 
respect we can see the usefulness of independents for the protection of investors or 
potential shareholders, even when the effective actions that the former can adopt are, once 
again, limited by majority interests. It follows that very high ownership concentration may 
influence effective governance of the firm. Even though independent directors should play 
a crucial role in effective governance of the firm, they may not be able to fulfil their duties 
effectively and to maximize firm performance. Independent directors could thus affect firm 
performance in a negative manner; they could make decisions that do not maximize firm 
performance in order to avoid hindering controlling shareholders’ interests. So, once again, 
it could be reasonable to note that the potential lack of independence of outside directors 
could leading to a worsening of performance. 
Another possible reason for the negative impact of outsiders on firm performance could be 
explained by the fact that they might not be so effective in their role because CEOs may 
employ several tactics to neutralize the power of independent directors (Peng, 2004). For 
instance, CEOs could appoint directors with experience on other passive boards and 
exclude those with experience on more active boards (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). CEOs 
may also appoint directors who are from strategically irrelevant backgrounds who do not 
have the knowledge base to challenge CEOs power and to effectively take part in strategic 
decision making (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Alternatively, CEOs may appoint 
outsiders who are demographically similar, and more sympathetic to the former (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996).  
Finally, our results confirm the claims of Agrawal and Chadha (2005), i.e. in cases of 
serious accounting problems which could lead to a worsening of performance, independent 
directors have no incentives to aid the firm in covering up this data for two main reason. 
First, Independents are not employed by the company, thus do not have as much invested 
interest, unlike managers who have their jobs at stake in the firm. Second, if they help the 
company in covering up serious accounting problems, they will probably suffer a loss of 
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reputational capital and face substantial liability for which they are not covered by director 
and officer’ liability insurance. It follows that outsiders «have little to gain and much to 
lose from hiding the firm in a cover-up scheme» (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005 :402). 
 
Non-executive directors 
Hp3 proposes that Firm performance exhibits a positive association with a low proportion 
of Non-executive directors on the board 
The models (4) and (9) display that the coefficient for non-executive directors for ROE and 
Tobin’s Q is negative and significant, showing that the greater the number of non-
executive directors on the board is, the lower firm performance will be. So we reject Hp 3. 
Our findings are similar to Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for U.S. companies, Fauzi and Locke 
(2012) for New Zealand context. 
The negative relationship between non-executive directors and firm performance may be 
due to the high blockholder ownership concentration which is one of the typical 
characteristics of Italian companies. The high concentration of ownership could interfere 
with effective corporate governance, and so the non-executive directors are unable to play 
a crucial and key role in effective governance of the firm. This assumption is consistent 
with the results of Fauzi and Locke (2012). 
Furthermore, non-executive directors may connive with executive directors in deciding on 
high remunerations for top managers, because of the fact that they use this as benchmark in 
negotiating remunerations where they act as top management in their own company 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 2002). «Remuneration communities on the board of directors have 
been found to have a mixed effect on top management pay for performance» (Nanka-
Bruce, 2009:32). As Conion and Peck (1998) and Ezzamel and Watson (2002) argue, the 
directors may increase top management compensation which might have a negative effect 
on firm performance. It is noteworthy that a collusion between concentrated ownership and 
managers may exist, too. Indeed, highly concentrated ownership could generate 
operational inefficiencies if the shareholders are interested in short term outcomes rather 
than long term gains maximisation. This is because managers could be persuaded to adopt 
high, risky short-term strategies not aimed at cost minimisation (Kohler, 1990). Hence, 
blockholders may connive with managers to subtract resources from minority shareholders 
(Short, 1994). Managers, colluding with blockholders, may implement strategies at the 
detriment of minority shareholders, resulting in a decrease of firm performance and value 
(Lange and Sharpe, 1995). In literature there are three main kinds of collusion: i) one 
between agent (managers) and supervisor (board of directors) against the principal 
(shareholders) (Tirole,1986
53
); ii) one between the principal (blockshareholders)-agent 
                                               
53 This study is seminal work on agent and supervisor collusion against principal. 
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(management/Board of directors) against principal (minority shareholders)(Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2006; Bloch and Hege, 2003; Volpin, 2002); iii) one between board of directors 
(especially Independents) and Executives (especially the CEO) against principal 
(shareholders) (Faleye et al., 2011; Ferreira et al., 2011; and Bourjade and Germain, 2012). 
The common features of these kinds of collusion are: a) board members may on occasions 
collude to the detriment of third parties (e.g. minority shareholders, dispersed 
shareholders); b) colluders, whether they are blockholders, managers or, directors, will 
have benefits as well as costs in connive (Bourjade and Germain, 2012); c) lack of 
information exchange necessary to assess plans and projects. Generally, only the CEO 
knows in detail characteristics of different projects and he could hide the risk level of 
projects from shareholders. Indeed, choosing a very risky project that might not be so 
optimal for the firm yields private benefit to the CEO. Collusion takes place through a 
secret agreement
54
 between the CEO and some directors when the CEO convinces them 
not to reveal certain information to shareholders. This could be related for example to poor 
decisions by CEO which have had negative effect on the company. Furthermore, those 
collusive directors may favour CEO propositions and allow him/her to receive, for 
instance, severance packages, high retirement pensions and bonuses (Bourjade and 
Germain, 2012). This may lead to performance worsening for two main reasons. First, due 
to the collusive agreement between the CEO and directors, projects may be undertaken to 
maximize their own wealth exclusively; this may lead to an increase in costs or/and 
decrease in revenue. Secondly, granting such benefits to the CEO may lead to an increase 
in costs and resources siphoning. In the same vein, we can argue that, in general, 
shareholders of our firms population do not seem to have implemented any actions in order 
to limit the CEO’s discretion or to monitor CEO behaviour by the board. According to 
Faleye et al. (2011); Ferreira et al. (2011); and Bourjade and Germain (2012), five 
important actions can be listed to reduce or prevent collusive behaviour: a) increase the 
number of independents; b) avoid CEO duality; c) limit the number of mandates held by 
each director; d) limit the number of interlock directors; e) increase the power and 
independence of committees within the board, in particular audit committee. In Italy, most 
of these possible strategies to prevent or minimize collusive behaviour do not seem to have 
been adopted by the firms and law. Italian code states that one third of directors should be 
independents, the majority of the firms studied has one third of outsiders, not more. CEO is 
also Chairman in 44% of the companies analysed; only since 2011 have Italian Code and 
Public law tried to limit interlock directorates and the number of mandates held by each 
director. As the means for limiting connivance between CEO and the board are poor 
projects may be approved simply because they maximize CEO interests. One reason as to 
why shareholders do not implement any of the aforementioned actions to limit collusion 
could be due to a secret agreement between blockholders and the board against minorities. 
With increased differences between ownership and control rights we also see an increase in 
                                               
54 As Bourjade and Germain (2012) state such collusive pact may be a monetary or a non-monetary transfer 
(benefits, perks, salary increases, insurance to stay in the board, and so on). 
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the entrenchment effect, which results in opportunist behaviour to the detriment of 
minorities (Morck et al., 1988). This kind of connivance may be frequent in Italy, because 
Italian companies are characterized by concentrated ownership, the presence of 
blockholders, and high influence of family within the board and ownership. Voting 
syndicates
55
 among shareholders are also very frequent which lead to collusive agreements 
among large families aimed at preserving the stability of control (Volpin, 2002). This 
could be a reasonable explanation for the negative relationship between independents and 
non-executives and firm performance; blockshareholders may foster and approve projects 
which result in high benefits for shareholder wealth, but at the same time result in higher 
costs and subsequent poor performance. Our interpretation is consistent with the claims of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They find that in the case of family ownership the family play 
an active role in management even when the necessary skills are no longer present; this 
may result in lower performance compared to non-family companies. Moreover, Barclay 
and Holderness (1989) show that concentrated ownership lowers the possibility of 
accessing external contributions thus reducing firm value. This kind of connivance may be 
frequent in Italy, because Italian companies are characterized by concentrated ownership, 
the presence of blockholders, and high influence of family within the board and ownership. 
In the same vein, Bracci and Maran (2012) and (Schein, 1983) argue that owner-manager 
can influence both the firm and the family in terms of impact on culture, values and 
performance. 
It is relevant to note that independent directors coefficient has the same negative sign of 
non-executive directors coefficient. A possible explanation as to why independent and non-
executive directors have both negative impact is that – consistently with Clifford and 
Evans (1997) – there are no monitoring effects when affiliated or grey directors are 
included as independents They find that board effectiveness will improve if the board is 
composed of a majority of independents, but only in the case where independence is 
carefully defined. Italy started defining independence criteria in 2006 and in more depth in 
2011. We studied the period 2005-2007 where in 2005 independence was not clearly 
defined, and 2006-2007 are transition years where firms boards had not completely 
adopted the updated independence criteria.  
Non-Executive directors have a hybrid role because they belong to the directors category 
which is somewhere between that of Independent and Executive directors. Non-executive 
or affiliate outside directors (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) are non-executive (but not 
independent) board members who are not employed by the firm, but nonetheless have 
business ties and affiliation (Hossain et al., 2001). They are not full time employees but are 
related with company in different ways. For instance, they could be interlock directors, 
bankers who have made loans, lawyers who have provided services, consultants. Our 
results show a negative effect of non-executive directors on firm performance which is in 
                                               
55 «A voting syndicate is a coalition of relevant shareholders who sign a binding agreement to vote together 
for a few years» (Volpin, 2002: 63) 
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contrast with our research hypothesis Hp 3. As affiliated directors could be also interlock 
directors, we find in the previous section a negative correlation between this kind of board 
member and firm performance. The negative effect of non-executives on performance are 
consistent with the claims aforementioned in regard to interlocking directors. As grey 
directors are affiliated with the firm and simultaneously engage in other professions 
(Academics, Professionals, bankers, lawyers, consultants), they may also lack: time, access 
to information, and interest which is fundamental for effective decision control (Lorsch 
and MacIver, 1989). Consequently, the negative impact of non-executive directors on firm 
performance may be due to a scarce control on firm projects that have led to poor 
performance. This view is consistent with Fich and Shivdasani (2006) claims. They argue 
that the majority of boards consisting of busy directors are linked to weak corporate 
governance and poor firm performance, suggesting a connection between over-boarding 
and director ineffectiveness. In the same vein, Beasley (1996) argues that a higher 
probability of accounting fraud exists among firms in cases of over-busy directors and 
Core et al. (1999) display that companies with busy directors may offer excessive 
compensation and have weak performance. 
 
Executive directors 
Hp 4 states that Firm performance exhibits a negative association with the proportion of 
Executive directors on the board. 
The impact of the number of insiders is also negative [model (4)] but not always 
significantly [model (9)] so, it depends on the performance measure. Our findings, of a 
significant and negative relation between executive directors and performance, is 
consistent with our research hypothesis and with theoretical expectations.  
As shown in the descriptive statistics section, the mean of executive directors is of 3 
members out of the mean board size of nine directors. This means that generally firms 
adopt the recommendation of the Italian Corporate Governance code which states insider 
percentage must not be high. In our firms population executive directors represent about 
33% of the board. However, consistent with agency framework, they have a negative 
impact on firm performance, probably because they are dependent on CEO for their 
employment and compensation (Helmich and Brow, 1972; Helmich, 1974; Fee and 
Hadlock, 2004). Indeed, inside directors – as well as outside ones – have the role of 
monitoring and controlling the CEO; however the former is under the evaluation and 
control of CEO. Thus, they are not likely not adopt positions which go against the CEO. 
This could weaken the overseeing and control roles, resulting in lower firm performance 
(Masulis et al., 2009). If executive directors played an effective overseeing role and 
channelled relevant information (i.e. reduced information asymmetry) to outside directors, 
this could improve corporate governance structure of the firm which would lead to better 
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firm performance. According to our results, it seems that Italians executive directors fail to 
monitor CEO behaviour and minimize information asymmetry as evidenced by the 
negative coefficient of insiders. In the same vein, it does not seem that inside directors are 
able to enhance board functionality and board decision making, factors which should lead 
to higher performance and shareholders wealth according to some scholars (Raheja, 2005; 
Harris and Raviv, 2008; Acharya et al., 2009). It is possible that the negative association 
between executives and firm performance might have increased if the former had been 
more than the mean of three. However, it is important not to increase the number of 
executives, because this could cause worsening performance. An optimal number of 
insiders does not exist and depends on different elements, such as firm size, industrial 
sector, country, laws principles, and so on.  
The results may also be interpreted as evidence that affiliated directors who are members 
of the top management team are closely tied to the CEO (Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson, 
2002), leading to be a favouring of actions which are associated with low risk (Mizruchi, 
1983) for several reasons
56
. Insiders may be more careful in choosing actions and projects 
that maximize firm performance. On the other hand shareholders favour actions which 
have riskier outcomes because they can select stocks for their portfolio diversifying against 
risk. Thus, stockholders could approve projects with higher risk leading to poor 
performance. Shareholders prefer firms to aim for outcomes that maximize returns, even if 
they are associated with higher risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); whereas managers prefer 
lower risk projects as they cannot diversify their portfolio. It follows that, as insiders have 
a negative impact on firm performance, they may be obliged by blockholders to implement 
projects with higher risks leading to weaker performance. 
Another possible reason for the negative association between executives and firm 
performance could be explained by considering the so-called cross directorship
57
 which is 
part of the wider topic of interlocking directorates. Indeed, the former deals specifically 
with the intertwining of CEO and other directors positions. In particular, this is the case 
where the CEO of a company (Alfa) is appointed director of another company (Beta) 
which does not belong to the same corporate group, and where the CEO of company (Beta) 
is a director of a firm (Alfa). On the other hand, the interlocking directors issue refers to 
every member of board regardless of executive and non-executive offices. It is noteworthy 
to point out that the Italian Code of Conduct explicitly prohibits the CEO appointment of 
an Italian listed company director of another company not belonging to the same corporate 
group. This is to avoid potential conflict of interest; however, it is not possible to exclude 
that, depending on the circumstances, sometimes this may be justified (Italian Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2012). This principle became valid only from 2011, indeed before 
2011 the CEO of a company could be appointed director of another firm. This same 
                                               
56 Ellstrand, Tihanyi and Johnson (2002) find out three main reasons. First, less risky actions may ensure that 
the CEO will retain his or her position. Second, less risky projects could mean job security. Third, less risky 
outcomes will lead to more rewards for managers. 
57 This term is used by Annual Report 2012 issued by Italian Stock Exchange. 
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principle may cause - based on agency perspective – lack of monitoring, resulting in 
negative impact on firm value, because managers can follow projects that maximize their 
own interests. Indeed, cross directorship, and interlocking directorates, over-commit a 
director who is more likely to avoid his/her duties and responsibilities (Ferris et al., 2003). 
If the Italian lawmaker decides to prohibit cross directorship
58
 this practice could lead to 
negative consequences to the company in terms of firm performance and shareholder 
wealth (Fich and Shivdasani, 2003; Devos et al., 2009).  
 
The impact of CEO Duality on firm performance 
Hp 5 proposes that Firm performance exhibits a negative association under leadership 
structures that combine the roles of the CEO and Board President.  
The correlation between duality and ROE, Tobin’s Q is positively unexpected, and not 
statistically significant [models (2), (4), (7), (9)]. It seems that duality should lead to 
superior firm performance as it permits a single leadership structure for purposes of 
strategy formulation and implementation, even though the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. There is no evidence that CEO duality significantly affects firm performance as 
agency approach states. 
Our results are consistent with Coles and Hesterly (2000) and Conyon and Murphy (2000), 
CEO duality and CEO non-duality do not differ in their effect on firm performance and 
this relationship may depend on board composition. Hence, Kand and Zardkoohi (2005) 
deem that duality is a «non-random phenomenon» (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005: 786), 
depending on different conditions, the presence of powerful CEOs who over-ride board 
members, rewards for good CEO performance; and on other conditions which in part 
recede from agency approach, such as a solution to environmental resource scarcity, 
complexity and dynamism, and conformity to institutional pressures. 
Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of other research (Chagati et al., 1985; 
Molz, 1988; Baliga et al., 1996, Abdullah, 2004). Probably the use of ROE for short-term 
performance measure is not able to capture any significant association with CEO duality 
(Forsberg, 1989; Abdullah, 2004). Furthermore, the marked-based measure (Tobin’s Q) 
confirms ROE findings. 
                                               
58 It is relevant to highlight that as Italian legislator have abolish the possibility of cross directorship, it means 
that there are more costs (disadvantages) rather than benefits (advantages). This implies that lawmaker have 
implicitly adopted the agency theory (Emmons and Schmid, 1999). However, resource dependence theory 
deems that cross directors and interlock ones provide positive consequences to the firm because of the 
contribution cross directors and interlocking ones bring to social and relational capital of a company (Pfeffer 
e Salancick, 1978) enhancing strategic (Pfeffer, 1991; Carpenter e Westphal, 2001) and networking (Burt, 
1980; Hillman et al., 2001) role of the board of directors.  
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Another possible reason for lack of relationship could be that there is no single optimal 
leadership structure, as both duality and separation perspectives have related costs and 
benefits (Brickley et al. 1997). On the one hand, the potential monitoring benefits of non-
duality imply the separation of management and control. On the other hand, the potential 
costs of non-duality regard information asymmetry, inconsistent decisions, and extra 
remuneration in maintaining two directors. The potential benefits and costs are to be 
assessed ex ante. Our results confirm that board leadership structure is found to be 
contingent on several factors, namely organizational and ownership structure, board and 
firm size, industry and business environment and decision context (Boyd, 1995; Rhoades et 
al., 2001; Palmon and Wald, 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Faleye, 2007; Lam and Lee, 
2008). Our findings find that environmental uncertainty may influence the impact of CEO 
duality on performance. In high environmental uncertainty CEO duality provides speed of 
decision making and, unity command which are fundamental to manage uncertainty (Boyd, 
1995). This may be a possible explanation for our apparently positive coefficient. 
However, our results, consistent with those of Boyd (1995), show that there is no 
significant relation, this could mean that, because of environmental uncertainty and 
complexity, and dynamism changes, it may be hard to capture the exact impact of CEO 
duality on performance. This is probably due to fact that the positive or negative influence 
of combined or separate CEO and chair roles may depend solely on other factors (e.g. 
laws, country characteristics, models of corporate governance, firm structures, personal 
skills and expertise). Thus, our findings confirm that it is generally arduous to argue 
whether CEO duality is uniformly good or bad for firm performance (Peng et al., 2007). 
The challenge is to identify the contingencies under which CEO duality could enhance or 
worsen performance. According to Peng et al. (2009) a key to specify such contingencies 
is to differentiate firm’s ownership types.  
Another possible explanation for the insignificant relationship between CEO duality could 
be due to the fact that our results capture some factors which are not easily measurable. In 
other words, the likelihood that CEO duality may harm shareholders wealth because of the 
lack of inefficient monitoring – as agency scholars state – may depend on other elements, 
such as CEO personality, his/her beliefs, values priorities, personal characteristics, 
principles. This claim is consistent with recent research on CEO organizational behaviour 
carried out by Boivie et al., 2011; Lange, Boivie, and Westphal, 2011). Moreover the 
absence of significance may suggest that CEO duality is a more complex issue than the 
simple splitting of roles (Krause et al. 2014). For instance, Quiegley and Hambrick (2012) 
argue that in many companies the separate Chairman is the former CEO. This leads to an 
increase of agency costs, as the former CEO who serves as current Chairman is not so 
objective in monitoring, and may be a hurdle to strategic change.  
Moreover, our results support the claims expressed by Anderson and Anthony (1986), 
Stoeberl and Sherony (1985), Alexander et al. (1993), and Sridharan and Marsinko (1997). 
These finding might mitigate some concerns among shareholders, the government, 
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regulatory institutions and corporate governance watchdogs and investors and lack of 
board independence. Indeed, even though CEO duality may indeed reduce board 
independence (Rhoades et al., 2001), this does not necessarily mean that the firms with 
CEO duality will perform worse than CEO non-duality companies. On the other hand, 
firms with CEO duality may benefit from having strong consistent leadership at the top, 
and may minimize some costs of conflicts between the CEO and the board. CEO duality 
may provide the firm with strong leadership and consistent vision fundamental for firm 
success.  
It is interesting to point out that the lack of coefficient significance may mean that even 
though competition unambiguously promotes efficiency (Nickell, 1996), its impact on 
profitability is not so clear (Nickell, 1996; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Frésard and Valta, 
2012). Furthermore, accounting measures are possibly subject to managerial manipulation 
(Yang and Zhao, 2013). In this vein, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2011) show that in response 
to competition, firms may increase or decrease financial misreporting. In addition, the non- 
significant effect of CEO duality on firm performance may be due to possible existence of 
endogeneity in CEO duality, meaning that the corporate leadership structure is 
endogeneously and optimally determined, given company features and ownership structure 
(Faleye, 2007; Chen, Lin, and Yi, 2008). Our findings cast doubts on the claims that 
performance improves switching from dual to non-dual leadership structure. 
It is relevant to bear in mind that according to agency theory, the relationship between 
CEO and shareholders is inevitably problematic; management decisions, required by 
shareholders, are taken to improve the latter’s health, and at the same time owners must 
prevent CEO from maximizing only his/her wealth. Shareholders protection could be 
guaranteed by the presence of a chairman who is fully independent of executive 
management. The CEO in fact, is responsible for initiation and implementation of strategic 
decision; whereas the board of directors is accountable for ratifying and monitoring 
decisions taken by the CEO (Felton, 2004). Thus, according to agency theory, the latter is 
an opportunist who aims at maximising his/her personal wealth at the detriment of 
shareholders. It follows that when CEO is also board chairman, the duty of the board as an 
internal monitoring and control mechanism fails (Fama and Jense, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989), 
because those people who are responsible for the firm’s performance are the same as those 
who evaluate efficiency (Gillan, 2006; Harris and Helfat, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). However, our results suggest that this claim is not so clear-cut. It is not possible to 
define ex ante whether the presence of CEO duality within the company may compromise 
performance. This is due to the fact that there are other elements to be evaluated, before 
affirming that CEO-Chairman duality effectively harms the company, for instance the 
interaction between CEO and institutional shareholders, blockholders and/or, top 
management ownership.  
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As Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) claim, the statistically non-significant coefficient could 
be due to insufficiently powerful tests. However, this “negative” result could be interesting 
to consider in order to understand the reasons underlying it; these could be useful to 
understand relations between corporate governance structure (in this case CEO duality) 
and firm performance and any implications within theoretical framework. 
We have tested our models, taking into account not only accounting measure (i.e. ROE), 
but also financial performance measure (i.e. Tobin’s Q). The results show a positive but 
not statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Those 
are consistent with previous research (Dalton et al., 1998, Adnan et al., 2011; Baliga et al., 
1996; Chaganti et al., 1985; Cooper, 2009; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Daily and Dalton, 
1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Valenti et al., 2011). These inconclusive 
findings may be a signal that the issue is not whether CEO duality is uniformly good or 
bad for companies, but that it is necessary to advocate and enrich a contingency 
perspective. In the same vein, Dalton et al. (1998) argue that markets are fairly apathetic to 
CEO duality. The latter therefore may benefit from high environmental uncertainty, as 
CEO duality confirms unity of command and speed in terms of decision making (Boyd, 
1995). 
Another possible reason may lie in the fact that external factors (e.g. economic conditions, 
political instability) or internal ones (e.g. individual experience, expertise, education) may 
affect firm performance much more than the overlapping of CEO and Chairman roles. 
Thus, consistently with a meta-analysis by Johnson et al. (1996) and Kang and Zardkoohi 
(2005), there are no differences in terms of performance between firms with CEO duality 
and non-duality. Consistent with Dalton et al. (1998), the direction of the relationship 
changes according to different performance measures and correlation is not large enough to 
be meaningful. Finally we can argue that CEO duality may be a random phenomenon 
(Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005) the presence of which is not able to explain ex ante the exact 
sign and intensity of CEO duality-firm performance. 
 
The impact of Audit Committee on firm performance 
Hp 7 states that Firm performance increases in presence of Audit Committee.  
We have tested our research hypothesis considering as dependent variables both ROE and 
Tobin’s, and our results show a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between 
the presence of Audit Committee and firm performance. Indeed, model (5) shows the 
significant and negative relation between the presence of Audit committees and ROE; 
whereas model (3), (8) and (10) display the negative and not statistically relationship 
between Audit committees and both ROE and Tobin’s Q. So we have to reject Hp 7. This 
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institutional body, which serves shareholders in the monitoring of management activities 
does not provide any explanation for the changes in firms’ performance. 
According to agency prospective, monitoring function is a fundamental issue not only as 
regards board composition but also regards the composition and the structure of 
committees within the board, especially those relating to audits (Xie et al., 2003). Kesner 
(1988) claims that the most important decisions come from committee level. These claims 
are not consistent with our negative results, although they are not significant. Indeed, the 
audit committee is accountable for overseeing performance, and the presence of 
independent members is related to the controlling abilities of this committee. The fact that 
our results are negative and not statistically significant may mean that, while audit 
members can potentially have positive effects on firm performance, this is not actually the 
case, probably because of the negative influence of outsiders on performance discussed 
earlier. Thus, our results are consistent with concerns that committee independence and 
objectivity may be compromised (Brody and Lowe, 2000; IIARF, 2003). In particular, 
some concerns have been raised about internal audit’s dual role of consulting and 
assurance in the light of its need for independence (Brody and Lowe, 2000; McCall, 2003). 
The possible reason for the negative and not statistically significant results may lie in 
Italian companies features. Indeed, in Italy the independence issue is not perceived to be as 
crucial as in the UK because of the particular structure of shareholding (Melis, 2000). Even 
though we did not collect data on firms ownership structure, Italian companies are often 
concentrated in family-owned businesses (Bianco and Casavola, 1999). In addition, there 
has not been a tradition of concern regarding the problem of independence. It is only in the 
last ten years, following adoption of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance codes, that the 
independent director and audit committee have been created. As Selim et al. (2009) state, 
we also have to consider that until recently, in most Italian firms, internal auditors were not 
independent from management and were reporting functionally to the Accounting 
Manager, the CFO and the CEO (Melis, 2005). In the same furrow, our non-significant 
findings are consistent with Spira (1999) assumption, i.e. committees are largely 
ceremonial and ineffective in improving performance. 
Our results contrast with agency approach which foresees that given the well-known 
conflict between the principal and the agent, firms have to adopt control mechanisms to 
minimize agency costs and information asymmetry such as audit committees (Knapp 
(1987; Kalbers et al., 1998) Thus, audit committee plays a pivotal role where agency costs 
are high in order to improve the quality of information flows from the agent to the 
principal (Pincus et al., 1989; Beasley, 1996; Felo et al., 2003). In fact, McMullen (1996) 
argues that the presence of audit committee ensures a high quality of financial statements 
and firm performance. However, our results are consistent with Treadway (1987) research 
according to which the mere presence of that committee does not necessarily mean that it 
is effective in performing its control role. It is not apparent that it is possible to identify a 
priori a positive relationship between the presence of the audit committee and firm 
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performance. Finally, consistently with Spira and Page (2003), the audit committee may be 
not such an effective body for protecting shareholders’ interests.  
A possible reason for the lack of or otherwise for the negative relationship between the 
Audit Committee and performance could be that in Italian context an intricate control 
system exists. As aforementioned, there are two kind of auditing, i.e. internal and external, 
as in international best practices. However, the internal control system is more complicated 
than the UK, US, German and Norwegian systems (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). Italian 
companies, which adopt the so-called traditional model, have to adopt different kinds of 
internal controls, internal audit, supervisory board which are mandatory, the audit 
committee and/or the control and risk committee
59
 which are recommended. Furthermore, 
there is no unique regulation which firms have to respect, but different directives which are 
relevant in relation to the internal control matter exist. It follows that the Italian control 
system implies duplication and/or overlap with resulting uncertainties in the areas of 
competence and, therefore, responsibility. Moreover, some members of those internal 
control bodies are entrenched with each other or they are greatly influenced by the Audit 
Committee (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). On the one hand, multiplicity of control power 
may encourage stringent moves by individual controllers, to avoid strategic decisions 
which may harm the firm (Malguzzi, 2006; Selim et al., 2009). On the other hand, this 
complex internal control system may represent a negative phenomenon leading to role 
confusion, task and responsibility overlapping, and uncertainty of responsibilities. Thus, 
our findings may highlight the lack of coordination of internal control system and the 
overlapping issue of internal roles. Some typical audit committee duties, for example are 
fulfilled by the supervisory board (Ferrarini and Giudici, 2005). Furthermore, the Italian 
internal control system lacks a clear legislative definition and is not regulated by a general 
discipline (Gasparri, 2013). This may contribute to the unclear functions of the bodies 
within the internal control system. Finally, «control bodies in Italy are substantially 
undeterred, not because of substantive rules, but because of poor enforcement» (Ferrarini 
and Giudici, 2005:5). 
Another explanation of the absence of coefficient significance could be due to the fact that 
we should also consider other factors related with Audit Committee (Klein, 2002; Bryan et 
al., 2004). We believe that testing the presence of audit body within company is essential 
to understand whether Italian companies generally comply with the Code of Corporate 
Governance and are aligned with the international best practices. However, it is also 
fundamental to test other drivers (Klein, 1998), such as the degree of independence in audit 
committee members, expertise (Chan and Li, 2008), education, professional background, 
                                               
59 The control and risk committee was introduced in 2011 by the Italian Code of Corporate Governance. It 
replaced the previous Audit Committee which identified with the Supervisory Board, according to 
Legislative Decree no. 39/2010, art. 19. In particular, the control and risk committee plays the role of 
«supporting, on the basis of an adequate control process, the evaluations and decisions to be made by the 
Board of Directors in relation to the internal control and risk management system, as well as to the approval 
of the periodical financial reports» (Italian Codes of Corporate Governance, 2011: 30).  
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number of meeting per year, interaction of committee members with other internal or 
external control bodies. Further research may address these additional elements. 
 
The impact of Big Four on firm performance 
Last but not least, Hp 8 states that Firm performance increases in presence of the so-called 
Big Four.  
Our results confirm that hypothesis even if not in all cases. Indeed, models (3), (8) and (10) 
confirm the positive effect of Big Four on firm performance; whereas models (5) display a 
negative impact on firm performance.  
The international Big Four auditing firms have «brand-name reputations and are widely 
viewed as producing higher quality auditing» (Francis et al., 1999: 17
60
) than non-Big 
Four firms. External auditors are appointed by the shareholders’ meeting for three years 
and are chosen from the firms registered with the Ministry of Justice. They are the 
expression of shareholders’ will and they may constitute a means to reduce agency costs.  
As far as we know, there is no research about the impact of Big Four presence on firm 
performance. The extant few studies focus on the relation between big four and audit 
quality (DeAngelo, 1981, Francis et al., 1999), earnings quality (Francis and Wang, 2008), 
earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) accounting fraud (Lennox and Pittman, 
2010), economic dependence created by large clients (Reynolds and Francis, 2001), 
industry experience (Bonner and Lewis, 1990; Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Johnson et al., 
1991; Wright and Wright, 1997). 
Our results show a positive effects of Big four presence on firm performance. A reasonable 
explanation could be that larger audit firms provide a higher level of audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981); moreover the larger the auditor is, the less incentive there is for the 
auditor to behave in an opportunist manner and the perceived quality of the audit will be 
higher. In the same vein, Francis et al. (1999) argue that entrusting the audit function to the 
Big Four is strictly connected to mitigating the likelihood of opportunist management of 
accruals-based earnings. It follows that agency problems affect the demand for external 
monitoring by auditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the specific request by firms for 
higher quality Big 4 audits (Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992; Craswell et al., 
1995; Francis et al. 1999). Hiring a higher quality auditor as external monitor (such as the 
Big Four) may help outsiders and especially shareholders to minimize opportunist 
behaviour of management, because audit firms size could be a proxy for independence as 
well as audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Reynolds and Francis, 2001). Our findings are 
consistent with these claims, because, by choosing the biggest auditing firms, private 
                                               
60 It relevant to point out that Francis et al. (1999) research focusing on the role of Big 6 Auditors rather than 
the Big 4, simply because the biggest auditing firms became four in 2002. 
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benefits undertaken by management may be reduced. This means company implements 
actions that maximize profit and shareholders’ wealth. The auditing service provided by 
the Big Four is more costly than non-Big Four; however agency costs (i.e. asymmetric 
information) seem to be higher than the expense related with auditing, because the Big 
Four auditors provide increased protection against top management opportunist behaviour. 
Furthermore, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) point out that auditor size is a synonym for 
audit quality, because the larger audit size has a comparative advantage in monitoring 
individual behaviour. In the same vein, DeAngelo (1981) claims that the likelihood of an 
external auditor discovering a breach may depend on the auditor’s capabilities and, the 
auditor procedures employed. The probability of reporting a detected breach is a measure 
of an auditor’s independence. So, it follows that Big Four firms are more capable of 
monitoring and are more independent than the non-big four, leading to an increase of firm 
performance. The firm performance may be enhanced with the presence of the Big Four 
probably because they can prevent and monitor strategic actions which, on the one hand, 
could harm the company, and, on the other hand favour some subjects within the company 
(such as the CEO, top management). Similarly, Lennox and Pittman (2010) find that 
companies whose external auditor is one of the Big firms register lower incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting than companies whose external auditor is non-Big firms. 
According our results, Big4 have a positive effect on firm performance, so it may mean 
that they are independents enough. It follows that they are able to carry out all work that 
they consider necessary to enable them to fulfil their duties without any restrictions by 
shareholders, management and board of directors. 
Another possible reason for the positive correlation could lie in the fact that Big four 
auditors are more interested in the cost of firm misreporting and its effect on auditor 
reputation. Whereas non-Big Four auditors have less reputation capital at risk and less 
chance to risk client dismissal by applying a higher level of earnings quality (Francis and 
Wang, 2008). Similarly, Simunic and Stein (1987) point out that Big Four have incentives 
to improve and maintain reputation around the world, because they are international firms 
with global and widespread operations. Under this perspective Big 4 should have more 
incentive to protect their reputation than non-Big 4 firms. Furthermore, Big 4 auditing 
firms are specialist auditors who have expertise in detecting management opportunist 
behaviour and incentive to report such behaviour (Krishnan, 2003). They also show greater 
compliance with auditing standards rather than non-Big 4 auditors (O’Keefe et al., 1994). 
It follows that firm performance could increase with Big Four audits because they may be 
able to siphon costs related to with opportunist managerial behaviour, costs of 
misreporting, etc. 
In light of the above, our findings appear consistent with Craswell et al. (1995), Francis et 
al. (1999), Francis and Krishan (1995), Reynolds and Francis (2001), Francis et al., (2003) 
who point out that international Big 4 auditing firms have brand-name reputation, so they 
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can charge additional audit fees (Palmrose, 1986), and behave qualitatively better than 
smaller non-Big 4 auditors
61
.  
Some connections between internal and external auditing exist. For instance, a high 
proportion of audit committees may mean that they are active in the engagement or 
retention of external auditors (Parker, 1997). Similarly, Abbott and Parker (2000a, 2000b) 
show that audit committees which have minimum levels of both activity and independence 
are more likely to engage higher quality external auditors. Our findings confirm this claim, 
as the presence of audit committee – not only the Big Four has a positive (albeit not 
statistically significant) effect on firm performance  
It is noteworthy that testing the relationship between the presence of Big Four and firm 
performance – measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q – we have found that all the results are 
not statistically significant and positive, except for model (5). The latter, that measures the 
impact of Big four on ROE shows a negative result.  
However, the fact that the majority of coefficients of Big Four are positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q may mean that the measure of financial market (i.e. Tobin’s Q) is 
positively related with investor protection laws (Francis et al., 2003). It follows that 
countries with higher investor protection have national accounting and auditing standard 
that are more accrual based, and greater quality auditing as an enforcement mechanism 
(Francis et al., 2003). So, as those researchers argue, the role of auditing in corporate 
governance may be driven by national legal systems. At any rate, accounting and auditing 
rules could compensate for "weak" investor. The presence of Big Four auditing firms is 
associated with more developed financial markets (Francis et al., 2003), like segment 
STAR which is the market where our firms population is listed.  
However, the fact that only one coefficient shows a negative impact of Big Four on ROE 
may be explained in the words of Coffee (2005: 306), «all gatekeepers
62
 are not alike» and 
they develop proposals with entirely different content for auditors and for securities 
lawyers (Coffee, 2005) 
On the table 5.18 we sum up our results and possible explanations may stand. 
 
                                               
61 Research above mentioned refers to Big Six or Big Five auditing firms, because those studies were 
conducted before 2002, the year in which elite international auditing firms became Four. 
62 In the present research the noun “gatekeepers” is used as a synonym of “Big Four”. It is noteworthy that 
some scholars define “gatekeepers” with a wider subjects category, i.e. auditors, lawyers, board of directors, 
rating agencies, securities analysts, as well as Big Four firms (Coffee, 1999/2004). 
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Table 5.18 Results and possible explanations 
Dependent Variables: ROE/Tobin’s Q 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
Effective 
sign 
Explanation 
Board size - -/- 1. Smaller board is more effective 
2.Less problems of communication, coordination and 
decision-making 
3.Minimize agency costs 
4.Less problems of board cohesiveness and “free rider” 
5.In long-term not possible to evaluate impact, because of the 
environment too dynamic and changeable 
Independent 
Directors 
+ -/- 1.compliance with Code of CG increases costs 
2.national institutional characteristics 
3.low percentage on board size (less effectiveness of 
monitoring) 
4.lack of governance effectiveness structures in inducing 
management to undertake long-term project 
5.Part-time directors 
6.Italian laws have become more stringent since 2011 (poor 
regulation and scarce attention on ID) 
7.Concentrated ownership 
8.Neutralized power by CEO 
9.No incentives in covering up accounting problems 
Non-executive 
Directors 
+ -/- 1.Blockholders ownership concentration 
2.Family business structure 
3.Connivance between non-executives and executives 
4.They fail to monitor agents 
5.Hybrid role 
Executive 
Directors 
- -/- 1.Connivance between non-executives and executives 
2.Dependence on CEO 
3.Cross-directorship 
CEO Duality - +/+ 1.ROE is not able to capture any relations 
2.There is no optimal leadership structure 
3.Factors not easily measurable 
4.Accounting measures are likely to managerial manipulation 
5.Not clear connection between CEO duality and board 
monitoring role. 
6.Powerful test 
7.Internal and external factors affect firm performance 
Audit 
Committee 
+ - 1.Monitoring function not verify in toto 
2.Independence and objectivity are compromised 
3.Ceremonial body 
4.Measuring the presence of Audit Committee may be not 
sufficient 
5.Intricate control System in Italy and lack of clear legislation 
6.Considering other variables related with Audit Committee 
Big4 + -/+ 1.Higher level of audit quality 
2.Improving in monitoring of firm procedures 
3.Cost of firm misreporting  
4.Internal and external auditing 
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5.8 Conclusions 
The most influent theoretical framework for studying corporate governance is agency 
theory (Bricley et al., 1997; Roberts et al., 2005; Fauzi and Locke, 2012). Board features 
have been the topic of a lot of research with various theoretical framework, especially 
agency one. The latter examines the well-know conflict between shareholders (principals) 
and managers (agents) and the intermediary body which is the board of directors. Indeed, 
agency approach addresses to monitoring mechanisms, such as the board of directors 
which acts on behalf of shareholders, independents directors, the splitting role of the CEO 
and the Chairman, internal and external audit systems. Agency approach is very rooted into 
the most of research, rather than stakeholder, stewardship and resource dependence 
theories. This may be due to the fact that agency theory explains in a very simple way 
some complex dynamics within every firm (Huse et al., 2011). It does not actually focus its 
attention on drivers different from shareholders, management, board of directors, 
monitoring roles, and their consequences.  
As we have found in chapter 2, agency theory may be on the basis on Italian corporate 
governance model which is in the middle, in terms of characteristics, of the two 
archetypes, i.e. Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models. Thus, we decide to formulate 
our research hypotheses in accordance to agency theory and in line with the mainstream of 
corporate governance literature. 
Testing these characteristics on our population of Italian listed companies (Segment 
STAR) shows mixed results, not even in accordance with the agency theory. In fact, it 
seems that this theoretical perspective does not pay enough attention to the interconnection 
between board features and firm performance. Our empirical results are not even consistent 
with research hypotheses which are based on agency approach. 
In the Italian context, testing the relationship between board size and composition, CEO 
duality, Audit Committee and Big Four as a proxy of corporate mechanisms, which could 
be considered a tool to mitigate agency problems, and firm performance displays mixed 
and sometimes inconclusive findings.  
Daily et al. (2003) emphasize the lack of clear empirical support for a monitoring and 
oversight approach to governance which one of main agency theory principle. It seems that 
the problem lays on the inadequate attention to the potentially large number of variables 
between the board and firm performance (Roberts, Mcnulty and Stiles, 2005).  
Econometric analysis using a population of Italian listed companies (STAR segment) 
provides evidence board size and board composition negatively affect corporate 
performance. In addition, our findings demonstrate that firm performance increases in the 
presence of CEO duality (i.e. board leadership structure that does not split the CEO and the 
chairman roles). This is confirmed by using like performance measure both ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. In addition, our empirical evidence on the association between the presence of 
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independent directors and firm performance contradict agency theory, consistently with 
research by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Bhagat and Black (2002); Dalton et al. 1998); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Yermack (1996); Klein et al. (2004, 2005); Lawrence and 
Stapledon (1999); Black et al. (2010).  
Furthermore, the negative impact of Independent directors and not statistically significance 
of audit committee on firm performance may be confirmation that the internal control 
system has failed (Cuccu, 2011). It is sufficient to remember all the recent scandals and 
frauds in order to have evidence that gatekeepers are not so effective. Our results of the 
period 2005-2007 seem to confirm that assumption. In the same furrow, Big Four auditing 
results shows a positive but not statistically effect on firm performance, except only for 
one model which highlights a negative and not significant effect. This leads to confirm that 
Big Four firms boast of brand-name reputation (Francis et al., 2003) and they are more 
capable to oversee and be independent than the non-Big four (DeAngelo, 1981). However, 
there could be differences among all gatekeepers (Coffee, 2005), and Big Four firms does 
not necessarily provide a better quality of auditing services than Non-Big Four (Lennox 
and Pittman, 2012).  
Our results confirm recent findings in the literature that good governance practices are not 
universal but may depend on market and firm characteristics (Black et al., 2010; Coles et 
al., 2008; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; Duchin et al., 2010). That implies that boards 
are not always effective and imposing a single board model for all firms is likely to create 
agency problems and result in a contraction of shareholder value. 
Another issue which is noteworthy to point out is the choice of performance measures, i.e. 
ROE and Tobin’s Q which are consistent with previous studies (Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al., 2004; Coles et al., 2008; Bozec and Dia, 2007). As Pham et 
al. (2007) argue, Tobin’s Q is not always the best measure of the firm performance. It 
could actually embody growth opportunities connected not with managerial decisions but 
with external conditions. The effects of independent variables on firm performance may 
differ depending on the performance measures used, and so different measures of firm 
performance may produce different results (Krivogorsky 2006; Lawrence and Stapledon 
1999).  
Notwithstanding the mixed results, this study also contributes to the limited existing 
literature on the association between corporate governance structure, auditing mechanism 
and firm performance in Italian economies. Indeed, little research has been conducted so 
far on the relationship between board mechanism and performance of Italian listed 
companies. For instance, Marra and Rizzo (2010) study the impact of board size, 
independent directors, audit committee on ROI and Abnormal Working Capital Accruals 
(AWCA) like proxy of earnings management in a sample of Italian Listed companies. 
Finally, they find that the presence of audit committee, independent directors may improve 
firm performance (ROI). The presence of independent directors, who monitors the 
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managers actions, enhance earnings management. Thus, that research based on agency 
approach finally confirms its assumptions. Bachiller et al. (2011) analyse the relationship 
between the board composition and financial, social performance of Italian family and 
non-family firms (year 2009). They find that an improvement in firm profitability is 
associated to a decrease board dimension and an increase of independent directors. 
Another Italian research focus on whether the gender could influence performance of 
Italian listed companies, for the year 2009 (Bianco et al., 2011). They show that board size 
and market capitalization of the company are positively correlated with the presence of at 
least one woman in boards. Furthermore, they find no correlation between women 
directors, jointly considered or classified according to family affiliation, and companies’ 
performance. In the same furrow, Drago et al. (2011) find that female interlock director is 
negatively related with firm value for Italian listed companied, period 2003-2010. 
In a nutshell, our findings could be synthesized with Forbes and Milliken (1999: 490) 
claims, «The influence of board demography on firm performance may not be simple and 
direct, as many past studies presume, but, rather, complex and indirect. To account for this 
possibility, researchers must begin to explore more precise ways of studying board 
demography that account for the role on intervening processes». 
Our findings are in line with previous studies that show that the success of board of 
directors as a corporate governance mechanism may depend on different contextual 
variables, as well as on the power of key internal and external actors (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003; Aguilera 2005; Huse 2005). In addition, the net influence of one corporate 
governance mechanism is more likely to be contingent on the other applied governance 
mechanisms (Adams et al., 2005). It is fundamental to understand what the best corporate 
governance mechanisms are, because as Claessens et al. (2002) reckon, a good corporate 
governance framework gives advantages to the firm in terms of easier financing, lower 
costs of capital, improved stakeholder favour, and overall better company performance 
(Fauzi and Locke, 2012). 
Thus, the empirical results have not shown a clear and well-defined relationship between 
governance and performance. Consistent with Bhagat et al. (2010: 100) who reviewed 
empirical literature and found the same our findings, «the appropriate conclusion to draw 
from this extensive line of research is not that efforts at improving corporate governance 
are a waste of time and effort». Rather, there could be some limitation with a research 
design which tries to capture and explain in few variables numerous and complex 
interactions within governance mechanisms. Thus, it appears plausible to assume that 
agency theory alone may not adequately gives sufficient evidence about the relationship 
between the board structure-mechanisms and firm performance. So a multi-theoretical 
approach is required to explain the board-performance relationship (Lam and Lee, 2008).  
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6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize this research paper, present conclusions and 
identify possible future research areas. In particular, in section 6.2 summary of the overall 
study is presented; in section 6.3, the conclusions and an alternative theoretical approach is 
drawn up; in section 6.4 areas for future research are identified. 
 
6.2 Summary of the research  
The purpose of this research is aimed at a better understanding of the relationship between 
board mechanisms and firm performance in the Italian context. Although the board of 
directors is considered one of main pillars of corporate governance; it has received 
considerable attention in international literature and in codes of best practices, little 
research has been done to study board effect on performance of Italian listed companies. 
Thus, this research analyses the effect of several corporate governance variables on Italian 
listed firms’ performance by extending the variables and performance measures of 
previous international studies. Consistent with prior research, we start by adopting agency 
theory in order to formulate research hypotheses and interpret results. However, as 
discussed below, given the mixed results obtained we decided to adopt a different 
theoretical approach, which considers multiple relationships within the board and firms and 
recognizes the complexity of corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. multiple agency 
theory.  
An important purpose of chapter one is to identify the common ground on which this 
research is conducted. Given that the present study develops and analyses the board of 
directors as one of the main corporate governance mechanisms, it is fundamental to define 
and discuss corporate governance, the board as corporate mechanism, and the 
“quantitative” relationship between board and firm performance. As discussed in chapter 
one, the role of the board has changed and is changing. From a legalist point of view, it 
could be seen simply as an ornament on the Christmas tree (Mace, 1971); however, its 
importance has become increasingly important. The board is recognized as being a 
fundamental asset for an organisation with the potential to contribute to sustainable 
competitive advantage (Huse et al., 2005; Minichilli et al., 2007). Furthermore, we 
underline the difficulty related to how corporate governance can be interpreted and 
defined. In addition, we find two main purposes of corporate governance which change by 
virtue of theoretical or practical prospective adopted. On the one hand, there is the 
corporate governance definition provided by the Cadbury Report (1992) which has 
received a great deal of consensus, and is described as «the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled». On the other hand, one of main purposes of corporate 
governance may be «to ensure economic growth» of the firm (OECD, 2004:13).  
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Chapter two provides a comprehensive view of corporate governance, in particular, 
different definitions of corporate governance are compared in a critical way, to understand 
the humus from which theories and models are developed. In particular, two principal 
approaches of corporate governance are detailed: the restricted and the extensive, which 
interpret in turn corporate governance both as a process and as a structure. After 
discussing the main theories of corporate governance (i.e. agency, stakeholder, stewardship 
and resource dependence theories), international and Italian models of corporate 
governance are compared by means of a comparative conceptual map. In particular, 
literature agrees that two model-archetypes exist: the Anglo-Saxon model and the German-
Japanese model, which focus on agency and stakeholder theories respectively. It is 
important to note that the Italian model does not belong to either of the two archetypes 
above mentioned and presents some features which contrast with these models. In addition, 
the relationship between the Italian case and international corporate governance theories is 
not clear. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to understand the connection between the Italian 
model and international theories of corporate governance. It is fundamental to understand 
the type of theory that underlies the Italian model, in order to define theoretical 
assumptions capable of explaining Italian firms. Finally, the Italian model is based mainly 
on three different contrasting theories: the agency, the stakeholders and the resource 
dependence theories. The coexistence of different perspectives can be ascribed to the 
typical social-economic features of the national environment. These are the result of 
various interests and power balances marking out the company itself. 
Chapter three describes the importance of the board of directors under the restrictive 
approach, i.e. agency theory. Boards act as a representative of shareholders and are 
considered as a major decision-making group (Kumar and Singh, 2013). The board is a 
corporate governance mechanism and control instrument to converge shareholders and 
management interests (Elsayed, 2011). Thus, we follow a “top-down approach”, i.e. we 
start by describing and discussing corporate governance in general terms using the 
principal theoretical approaches, then we focus our research on the particular mechanism 
of corporate governance, i.e. the board of directors related to firm performance. 
Furthermore, we describe the features of board of directors according to the US, UK, 
German, Japanese and Italian codes of best practice. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese models represent the two main corporate governance 
archetypes; whereas the Italian one is considered as mixed, a hybrid, i.e. it has some 
features in common with the above mentioned models while it also differs in some aspects. 
In particular, we study some ‘variables’ contained in codes of conduct which deal with 
what some boards of directors have defined as key success factors of corporate 
governance. Basically, we focus on: board of directors’ functions, composition and 
dimension, CEO duality and non-duality, committees and corporate governance disclosure. 
Secondly, we analyse those topics according to the main corporate governance 
international approaches, i.e. Agency, Stakeholder, Resource Dependence and Stewardship 
theories. Finally, we consider empirical research dealing with corporate governance topics 
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mentioned above. We find that the convergence of codes of best practice relating to 
Agency theory or Shareholder approach is ongoing. Globalization of relationships in stock 
and financial markets has led to a frequent review of national laws and regulations, 
according to paths consistent with culture, traditions and internal market conditions in each 
country, but at the same time, they are projected to international best practices application. 
Chapter four focuses on research methodology. We describe research process and phases 
within the framework of philosophical assumptions. Indeed, models, concepts, theories, 
hypotheses, methodology and methods are explained. In particular, we point out that the 
present study adopts a positivism approach due to its relevance in this type of research; 
moreover, we apply quantitative methodology for our explanatory study. A deductive 
approach is adopted; theories are deductively tested from existing knowledge through 
developing hypothesized relations and proposed outcomes for study. We collected data 
through two methods: by studying annual corporate governance report and by using 
Dastastream. After collecting all the necessary data, we elaborated it in Stata 10 by 
creating an unbalanced panel data; we studied 54 companies over three years with around 
154 observations. We tested OLS pooled, fixed effects and random effects models. 
However, both Hausman test and Breusch-Pagan test confirm that fixed effect model is the 
best and the most unbiased solution. For this reason, we adopted fixed effect model for our 
results. However, in order to obtain more robust results, we carried out the robustness test. 
Chapter five makes up the bulk of the present research. There is considerable research on 
corporate governance single variables and firm performance in order to identify the kind of 
relationship that exists between board of directors and performance. Since the board has 
multifaceted tasks (O’Connel and Cramer, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006), it seems reasonable 
to assume that boards may affect firm performance. The present research takes into 
account seven key critical factors of corporate governance based on agency approach, 
namely we consider five aspects regarding Board of Directors structure (i.e. Board size, 
Independent directors, Executive directors, Non-executive directors, CEO duality) and two 
aspects related to Auditing mechanisms
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 (i.e. Audit Committee, the so-called Big Four). 
Each of these aspects represents an independent variable of the econometric model that we 
built. For each of the seven variables we developed seven different research hypotheses 
based on existing international literature. We considered two different measures of firm 
performance, one based on market value (i.e. Tobin’s Q) and the other on accounting 
measure (ROE). In addition, different control variables have been included in the study 
based on prior studies, namely firm size, firm leverage, capital intensity, year of 
acceptance code of corporate governance. In particular, our research hypotheses are: 
Hp1: Firm performance exhibits a negative association with board size. 
                                               
63 Initially we considered as independent variables supervisory board size, too. However, we notice that there 
is no variation within and between company, i.e. the supervisory board of each company have three members 
for over the period 2005-2007. 
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Hp2: Firm performance exhibits a positive association with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. 
Hp3: Firm performance exhibits a positive association with a low proportion of Non-
executive directors on the board. 
Hp4: Firm performance exhibits a negative association with the proportion of 
Executive directors on the board. 
Hp5: Firm performance exhibits a negative association under leadership structures 
that combine the roles of the CEO and Board President. 
Hp 6: Firm performance increases in presence of high number of Supervisory board 
member (dismiss) 
Hp7: Firm performance increases in presence of Audit Committee. 
Hp8: Firm performance increases in presence of the so-called Big Four. 
 
We collected data for all Italian firms listed on STAR segment (Italian Stock Exchange) 
over the period 2005-2007, we deliberately left out the years prior to the recession: this 
was done in order to avoid its consequences influencing performance and consequently our 
results. Moreover, we studied firms listed on STAR segment, because they are the best 
Italian listed companies in terms of corporate governance. Indeed, according to Stock 
Exchange rules a firm can request listing in this segment only if it respects some strict 
criteria, namely it must provide excellence in terms of transparency and communication, 
liquidity and corporate governance. Furthermore, we present descriptive statistics about 
our unbalanced panel data consisting of 130-150 observations. The next research step was 
to test board features and its influence on firm performance; testing these characteristics on 
our population of Italian companies listed on STAR segment (Italian Stock Exchange) 
shows mixed results, not in accordance with agency theory. Our findings do not seem to be 
consistent with research hypotheses based on agency approach. In particular, we consider 
board size and composition, CEO duality, Audit Committee, Big Four, as a proxy of 
corporate governance and boards mechanisms, and firm performance measured by ROE 
and Tobin’s Q. Unlike agency theory assumptions, board composition (in particular 
independent and non-executive directors) negatively affects corporate performance. In 
addition, our findings show that the presence of CEO duality increases, rather than 
decreases, performance. Furthermore, we jointly tested the main control “device” within 
and outside board (i.e. independent directors, audit committee and Big Four) which should 
have influenced firm performance positively based on agency theory assumptions. 
However, mixed results were found. We do not find the clear and positive relationship 
between the control “device” and ROE, Tobin’s Q. In particular, Audit committee shows a 
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negative impact on firm performance this is however, not statistically significant; Big Four 
displays positive sign but no significant effect on performance, with the exception of one 
model. This model shows negative impact. Independent directors display negative 
correlation with performance, which is in total contrast to agency theory approach. 
However, our results confirm that good governance practices are not universal and may 
depend on market and firm characteristics (Black et al., 2010; Coles et al., 2008). 
Notwithstanding the mixed results, this study also contributes to the limited amount of 
existing literature on the association between corporate governance structure, auditing 
mechanism and firm performance in Italian economies. 
Considering these mixed findings, it appears plausible to assume that we could adopt a 
different approach, which deals with complexity of board mechanisms and all multiple 
relationships existing within the board and the firm. 
 
6.3 Final results: New Perspectives 
Given that our results are mostly in contrast with our previous assumptions based on 
agency theory, we should probably adopt another approach, i.e. an alternative lens under 
which to interpret corporate governance mechanisms.  
The need to build and develop alternative orienting theoretical frameworks is emerging 
(Huse 2007, 2009). Consistent with Dalton et al. (1998), our findings support the need to 
consider and adopt multiple theoretical framework in order to explain and better 
understand corporate governance mechanisms and processes. 
After describing an alternative theoretical framework, it is useful to outline the reasons 
which explain why agency theory is so dominant in research and also outline its 
criticalness. 
 
6.3.1 From Agency Theory ... 
Our results are particularly interesting, because we can reach important conclusions. 
Indeed, our model, and our hypothesis is based on the analysis of the board of directors 
according to the well-known agency theory. In fact, the majority of board research has 
been dominated by agency theory perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Studies in this stream of research point out formal incentives and 
monitoring mechanisms, in particular they emphasize the way in which boards can protect 
their own interests from opportunist managers through monitoring and bonding activit ies. 
The board of directors is considered as simply an information system –acting as a 
monitoring body for overseeing opportunist management behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). It 
has also been treated as a shareholders’ tool, a tool through which those same shareholders 
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can protect their own interests against opportunist management behaviour by appointing 
board members (Kosnik, 1987). Furthermore, independent directors are seen as the central 
monitor of the company, because they are likely to be less compromised by agent 
influences than executive directors (Walsh and Seward, 1990). As the board should be 
independent from management to avoid managerial entrenchment (Eisenhardt, 1989), CEO 
duality negatively affects firm performance, because it directly conflicts with 
independence issue (Jensen, 1993; Lorsch and MacIver, 1993). 
However, it is fundamental to highlight that related empirical research, like ours, has 
yielded conflicting and ambiguous findings. Before seeking to understand why agency 
theory may offer a limited view of the firm and before outlining new theoretical 
approaches, it is important to point out the possible reasons why agency theory is so 
widespread in research.  
The popularity of agency theory in corporate governance literature is likely due to various 
factors. Firstly, it is a very simple theory in which only one relationship between agent and 
principal (shareholders and management) exists within a complex firm (Nordberg, 2011). 
Secondly, agency approach provides a plausible (Duska, 1992) and satisfactory 
explanation of the problems related with the separation between ownership, control, and 
governance mechanisms to solve the interests conflict between owners and managers 
(Huse et al., 2009). Thirdly, the issues of self-serving and self-interested managers and 
subjects unwilling to sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others are «both age 
old and widespread» (Daily et al., 2003: 372). Fourthly, agency theory has been treated as 
a universal theory which can be applied equally well in various institutional contexts 
(Ahrens et al., 2011). Fifthly, as Roberts et al. (2003) argue, agency theory can provide a 
rational explanation on how corporate governance mechanisms, structures and procedures 
work within the firm through two main control mechanisms: one external, the market for 
corporate control and the other internal, the board of directors with its independent 
directors. 
It is difficult to really understand why empirical research of corporate governance – 
especially focusing on the board of directors – fails to explain universal constants (Ahrens 
et al., 2011). This is probably due to the fact that other factors influence firm performance; 
omitted and relevant variables, together with complex interactions could be fundamental 
drivers which, up to now, have not been considered or studied in depth. Daily et al. (2003) 
point out that several research studies conducted with primary data have a limited view of 
corporate governance processes and mechanisms. However, it is difficult to obtain data on 
board behaviour, even though some proxies are used (Huse et al., 2009). It is worth 
considering the fact that the availability of different kinds of data leads to limitations in 
terms of research outcomes.  
Nonetheless, agency approach is common in corporate governance research. Increasingly 
literature has started to look more critically at the efficacy of agency theory and its 
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assumptions (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, Jr, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Johnson, et al., 1996, Roberts et al., 2003). The main criticism are shown on table 6.1 
 
Table 6.1 Some Agency theory criticism 
Agency theory criticism 
 Lack of contingency perspective 
 Lack of behavioural perspective 
 Lack of outside relationship  
 Lack of temporality  
 Oversimplified vision of the Company  
 Overly narrow theory 
 Single institutional setting (i.e. US) 
 Focus mostly on shareholders-management 
conflict and monitoring role of the Board 
 Lack of analysis of economic competence  
 
Several studies based on agency theory have been criticized for lacking both a contingency 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Davis and Useem 2002) and a behavioural (Finkelstein and 
Mooney 2003; Forbes and Milliken 1999) perspective. The contingency approach is 
characterized by an emphasis on the context, considering the board as an open system, 
including broader stakeholder perspective and board interaction with the external context. 
The behavioural studies deal with actors, processes, and decision-making (Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2004). The agency model does not deal with outside relationship of principal and 
agent. The only existing connection is with the contracting power (Hoskisson et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, agency theory does not have a sense of temporality. This means that changes 
in contract (i.e. agent’s dismissal in case of poor firm performance) may happen, however 
the contracting period is indefinite, with both principal and agent playing their own roles as 
if they expect to be part of the contract/relationship for a long period of time (Hoskisson et 
al., 2013). 
It follows that the complexity of the situation does not correspond to the simple view of 
agency approach, i.e. singular identities, lack of outside relationship, a scarce sense of 
temporality. It means that agency theory has an oversimplified vision of the company; it 
fails to consider the complexity of the environment in which the firm operates and fails 
also to take into account the intricate mechanisms and procedures within the firm (Daily et 
al., 2003b). Thus, the agency theory has been criticized because its unduly simplistic 
assumptions do not reflect the real environment, and because empirical research has failed 
to support its basic principles. For instance, it has been shown that agency theory provides 
a simplified explanation for executive and board behaviour (e.g., Cohen and Holder-Webb, 
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2006; Hendry, 2005; Kaufman and Englander, 2005; Lubatkin, 2005; Lubatkin et al., 
2005; Brennan, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1994). Indeed, the theory adopts various basic 
principles, including a separation of ownership from control, information asymmetry 
caused by that separation, and self-interested behaviour of principal and agents (Cohen and 
Holder-Webb, 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Noreen, 1988; Ferraro et al., 2005). In this 
regard, Cohen and Holder-Webb, 2006: 23) argue that «the theoretical inclusion of 'self-
interest' in agency theory as a vehicle that narrowly advances the interest of the individual 
is at best debatable and, at worse, dubious». It follows that scholars (Ahrens et al., 2011; 
Filatochev and Boyd, 2009) point out that the agency theory with its focus mostly on 
shareholders is overly narrow, because it does not consider other stakeholders who may 
have different interests (Hirsch and Friedman, 1986).  
In addition, some criticisms regard the limited scope of agency theory (e.g., Cohen and 
Holder-Webb, 2006; Lubatkin, 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very, 2005; Roberts, 
McNulty, and Stiles, 2005). Accordingly, the agency theory has largely been defined by 
considering the US context, i.e. large, for-profit enterprises with mature capital markets 
and dispersed ownership. This institutional context has affected outcome, and also theory 
principles, for instance the nature of ownership and board involvement. However, the law 
and economics perspective (La Porta et al., 2000) reckon that different countries may have 
various corporate governance systems, leading to differences in the extent of and nature of 
agency problems within the company. In the same vein, Hall and Gingerich (2001) show 
that besides legal and economic features of a country, other factors may also influence the 
effectiveness and efficiency of national corporate system, such as stakeholder involvement, 
reputational consideration, minority’s protection, etc. It follows that agency theory is most 
likely not applicable in toto for most business companies located outside the U.S. 
(Lubatkin, 2005; Lubatkin et al., 2005). 
Agency problems (conflicts arising from divergence between agents’ and principals’ 
interests and goals) are real and intractable (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). Indeed, directors’ 
primary duty is to maximize shareholder value and similarly Blair and Stout (2001: 407) 
state that «Provided the firm does not violate the law, directors ought to serve and be 
accountable only to the shareholders». However, the board of director role cannot be seen 
merely as a tool to monitor opportunist behaviour of management and to maximize 
shareholders value (Blair and Stout, 2001); rather directors’ tasks should be extended 
(Nordberg, 2007), for instance they serve as «mediating hierarchs’ charged with balancing 
the sometimes competing interests of a variety groups that participate in public 
corporation» (Blair and Stout, 2001: 409). 
To quote Ahrens et al. (2011), agency approach does not consider economic competence 
of directors, principals, and agents. Indeed, measuring experience, expertise, skills, 
education among all parties involved within governance could change the primary goal of 
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corporate governance studies, i.e. independence. Similarly, Kirkpatrick (2009) 
recommends board members have industry experience to fulfil their role effectively. 
These results suggest that an alternative theoretical framework is needed to effectively 
understand the potential of corporate governance (Daily et al., 2003). However, agency 
theory should not be totally discarded because it provides «a unique, realistic, and 
empirically testable perspective on problems of cooperative effects» (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
72). So, agency theory is a starting point. Indeed, using the principal-agent relationship as a 
basic theoretical framework of research, this liaison could be expanded to a more complex 
setting of relations taking into account the existence of multiple principles of an agent 
(Daily et al., 2003).  
These claims are consistent with the growing consensus among academics of boards and 
corporate governance regarding the need for theoretical pluralism (Hoskisson et al., 2002; 
Arthurs et al., 2008; Van Ees et al., 2009). In fact, some scholars deem that different 
theories provide complementary perspectives, and that none of these alone can give a full 
explanation, (e.g., Hung, 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 
2003). The need to go beyond and to broaden agency approach has been recognised among 
scholars (Daily et al., 2003b; Roberts et al., 2005; Ahrens et al., 2011). In this vein, 
academics seek to extend agency theory by considering the increased number of interests 
among managerial agents, agent-owners, principals, and other contracting subjects that 
play a fundamental role within company governance (Hoskisson et al., 2013). For instance, 
agency theory only takes into account the fact that agents have their own interests that can 
conflict with those of principles, but it does not consider the possibility that outside 
loyalties of agents may interfere with their ability to serve principals. Furthermore, 
academics are trying to move towards a more holistic view of the board, considering it as a 
group of individuals with their own intellectual capital (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004).  
 
6.3.2 ... to Multiple Agency Theory 
Given the increased variety of interests and potential conflict, not only between agent and 
principal but also among various interrelated parties, a new aspect of corporate governance 
analysis has been introduced. In particular, as Arthurs et al. (2008: 277) state «traditional 
agency theory examines conflicts of interest between a principal and agent; multiple 
agency theory examines conflicts of interests among more than one agent group when at 
least one of those agent is connected to a different principal». 
Some scholars (Hung, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Huse et al., 2009; Hoskisson et al., 
2013) introduce this different approach, even though it is not always defined as multiple 
agency theory. However, the principle and shared features are: 
- Multiples principles and multiples agents  
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- Potential Conflicts among different parties (not only between agent and principal) 
- Cooperation between principal and agents (not only opportunist behaviour) 
- Focus on principal, agents, board members’ behaviour 
- More attention paid to external context 
- Analysis of quality, ability, expertise of board members as firm performance 
drivers 
These characteristics lead to another interpretation of the main corporate governance 
success factors, such as the board of directors’ role, member independence, executives, 
non-executives, and CEO duality.  
Multiple agency theory uses agent-principal relationship as basic tenet of analysis (Hung, 
1998). In particular, the former considers many-to-many relationship, rather than one-to-
one relationship, to clarify outcomes. It follows that this theoretical framework defines a 
situation in which “conflicting voices” among different principal groups may arise 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002) and circumstances in which each agent may deal with conflicting 
choices regarding interests of principals (Filatotchev, 2013). Furthermore, potential 
conflict between different agent-owners with various preferences regarding – for instance - 
innovation and the expenditures needed for innovation may arise (Kockhar and David, 
1996; Bushee, 1998; Zahra, 1996). Other differences in opinion among owners could arise 
from firm strategies and their impact on the composition on the firm’s ownership 
(Connelly et al., 2010; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Woidke, 2002). This leads to claims that 
substantial ownership heterogeneity exists in many companies (Bennet et al., 2003), and 
that there are not only conflicts of interest between agent and principal – as agency theory 
deems – but also among principals; this is one of the assumptions of the multiple agency 
approach. In particular, both theoretical frameworks share the same tenet concerning the 
possibility for agent self-interested-seeking behaviour (Williamson, 1996). However, there 
are some differences between the two theories. First, multiple agency theory studies the 
dual identities of contracting parties (Pratt and Foreman, 2000), this means that some 
agents serve multiple principals, the latter could have multiple agents, and some companies 
could be both principal and agent (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Second, many contracting 
parties could have transcending relations (outwith the usual principal-agent relationship) 
which affect their behaviour as principal or agent. Third, when the relation among those 
contracting parties goes beyond principal-agent relationship, the former can lead to 
different investment horizons, which may affect appropriate incentives and undercut 
current responsibilities (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Thus, multiple agency theory extents the 
agency theory setting in terms of traditional conflict principal-agent; the former also 
considers the potential conflict among agent-owners representing ultimate principals, and 
other business parties and governance partners. Indeed, multiple agency theory points out 
that, unlike agency approach, principals could implement actions which are detrimental to 
the contracting relationship (agents, firms, etc.). Therefore, it seems plausible to assume 
that it is not always true that managerial behaviour is opportunist and self-seeking and 
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aimed at damaging agents’ interests. In fact, according to multiple agency approach, 
owners could fulfil guileful actions against contracting parties and managers should defend 
the company against opportunist behaviour by principal (Dalziel et al., 2011). It follows 
that the firm and its performance could benefit from managerial efforts to minimise 
opportunistic behaviour risk of principals.  
In addition, multiple agency theory, unlike agency theory, focuses on the opportunities for 
cooperation between principals and agents. Hoskisson et al. (2009) claim that overseeing 
and bonding over time might be complementary rather than concurrent effects of corporate 
governance (Deutsh et al., 2011; Sunsaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). There is some evidence 
suggested by Hoskisson et al. (2013) of cooperation and complementarities between agent 
and principal. For instance, Allcock and Filatotchev (2010) show that complementarities 
and cooperation may exist in case of incentive effects among IPO (Initial Public Offering) 
firms. In the same furrow, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004: 24) argue that «configurations of 
interdependent elements, and various governance structures should be seen as 
complements or substitutes». It is important to point out that it is in sharp contrast with 
agency theory assumption to consider behaviour as cooperative rather than conflictual. 
However, the importance of considering different theories as complementary, rather than 
competing allows for greater understanding of factors which may influence effective board 
governance (Shen, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) 
Multiple agency theory also purposes to address internal and external powers
64
 that are 
exerted within the company, and it aims at understanding how the firm responds to those 
forces, through, for instance the functioning of the board of directors which may be 
considered as an agent for management (Hung, 1998). One of the internal forces may be 
contracting parties (e.g. agent, principal, directors) behaviour, whereas one of the external 
forces may be the context in which the firm performs. 
Multiple agency theory focuses on behaviour (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004) and 
behavioural processes (Hambrick et al., 2008) within the company, in contrast to agency 
approach in which behavioural insights are limited. In particular, on the one hand the latter 
considers agent as passive, opportunist and self-interested people who have to be 
controlled to avoid shirking (Mc Gregor, 1960). On the other hand, multiple agency theory 
(Hung, 1998) seeks to reconcile this view with the assumption of altruism and trust 
(Barney, 1990; Jones, 1995). Hambrick et al. (2008) research deals with behavioural 
perspectives on boards and governance, and its fundamental importance in understanding 
processes inside and outside the board of directors (Huse et al., 2009). In particular, 
multiple agency theory intends to borrow principles from the behavioural theory of the 
firm (Cyert and March, 1963; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia) which focuses on 
understanding decision-making in companies. In brief, behavioural theory deals with 
                                               
64 Power is defined by Huse et al. (2009) as the ability to influence others. According to those researchers, 
powers or forces could be divided into four main categories: direct power, indirect power, conscience-
controlling power and institutional power (Foulcat, 1982; Giddens, 1984 from Huse et al., 2009). 
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interactions and behavioural processes among subjects within and outside the board of 
directors. However, as Huse et al. (2009: 13) state, «more work remains to be done on 
boards», so it may be a challenge for scholars to investigate in depth the relationship 
between interactions and behavioural processes on boards and firm performance. 
As regards the context, multiple agency theory does not focus on precise agency problems 
alone, because these may depend on national settings. It implies that scholars should 
combine agency perspective with the institutional analysis to predict robust assumption 
(Ahrens et al., 2011). In fact, fundamental governance factors may vary across countries 
and the nature of agency conflicts and their implications may differ from country to 
country (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Similarly, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004: 25) state 
that «documenting and explaining the diversity of governance systems between various 
contexts and organizational settings may then be of help to bring together past research 
findings. That will also help in recognizing problems stemming from previous 
universalistic approaches and general theorizing in research on boards and governance». 
Different legal traditions (e.g. common and civil law), and levels of economic 
development, together with different attitudes to rules and regulations contribute towards a 
diversification of content and environment where companies act (Emmons and Schmid, 
1999). This is even more true if we consider that the recession has reinforced the 
importance of national context; some countries (e.g. Canada, Australia) have been less 
affected by financial crisis through a more conservative regulation system (Ahrens et al., 
2011). The ability to subscribe investment, strategic and financial contracts may depend 
also on a number of factors relating to the institutional environment (Kaplan et al., 2004; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Douma et al., 2006) For this reason, it is difficult to consider a 
single and dominant model (Hung, 1998) of corporate governance, i.e. agency theory. It is 
necessary to take into account the complexity of internal and external forces which are 
entrenched with governance mechanisms involving multifaceted issues (Hung, 1998). 
Finally, multiple agency theory takes into account intellectual capital, especially regarding 
board members (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). In particular, in order to capture the 
complexity of governance mechanisms in terms of a more holistic view, scholars split 
intellectual capital into four categories: 1) human capital (individual director’s skills, 
knowledge, expertise); 2) social capital (implicit and tangible resources which derive from 
internal and external relationship); 3) structural capital (policies, processes and procedures 
developed by directors over time); 4) cultural capital (external social expectations of the 
firm and the board). It follows that agency theory can interpret only part of the complexity 
of the relationship issue, and it fails to represent a satisfactory and acceptable version of 
reality (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Solomon, 2011). 
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6.3.3 New interpretation attempts of governance mechanisms 
As stated before, multiple agency theory has a broader approach than agency one and 
introduces the notion of complexity which exists both within and outside the company 
(Arthurs et al., 2008) Re-conceptualization of board composition, and roles have been 
proposed. 
According to multiple agency theory, the board of directors is an agent of the management, 
and directors of the board have, in turn, multiple principals (Hung, 1998). This multiple-
principal model highlights the fact that board members can serve more than one principal. 
Indeed, the board should not only monitor management – as agency theory posits – but it 
should assist and collaborate with the latter. At the same time, considering the fact that the 
director can be agent of a certain group of stakeholders, he or she has to be accountable to 
this group for the decisions that the board takes (Hung, 1998). Furthermore, Finkelstein 
and Mooney (2003) reckon that board effectiveness may also depend on quality of 
directors, and their ability. The accent is placed on how to develop group and team 
dynamics. In sum, multiple agency theory goes beyond control of managers who act on 
behalf of owners. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003: 9) point out that «the press 
regularly chides boards for being insufficiently vigilant guardians of other people’s money 
and being too much in management’s hands». This could mean that board of directors 
issues could be complex and entail more than a monitoring and controlling role with 
respect to potential opportunist managerial actions (Norderberg, 2011). Some elements 
which are pivotal and fundamental are not considered within agency theoretical 
framework. For instance, to be effective the board should assist and not control 
management of their firm (Hung, 1998). The challenge for directors is to build and hold 
trust in their relationship with managers, executives, and other parties (Daily et al., 2003). 
The board of directors is redefined or re-conceptualized; Hung (1998: 4) argues that it is «a 
socio-economic statutory institution that acts as strategic bonding agent of the 
management of an organization to lead, assist, and support the management in achieving 
the objectives of its organization». As aforementioned, the board of directors’ task is not 
only to monitor management, but also should fulfil a multiple role which involves, 
assisting, supporting, mediating, leading, etc. 
As regards board composition, multiple agency theory states that the board is agent of 
management and those directors, especially independent ones, could have different 
principals of their own: the management is the principal of the board and stakeholders are 
links; shareholders, creditors, creditors and suppliers are multiple principals of independent 
directors (Hung, 1998). This approach considers independent directors not only as a 
monitoring device of the board but also fundamental for formulating strategies, co-opting 
external threats, securing valuable external resources. As far as executive directors are 
concerned, agency theory deems that they are one of the creators of agency problems. 
However, according to multiple agency theory, insiders are conceived as directors who 
provide monitoring protection against agents and principals with shorter-term horizons 
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(Arthurs et al., 2008). In general terms, the multiple agency theory takes into account sets 
of preferences and values of board members (Fredrickson et al., 2008), because it may 
have significant effect on firm performance (Hung, 1998). In addition, it posits that 
directors are agents of different stakeholders, their presence should indicate that the firm 
looks after these stakeholders. «This in fact reflects the organization’s perception and 
prioritization of the impact of the external environment. The composition of a board of 
directors should therefore give a picture of how the organization responds to the external 
challenges» (Hung, 1998: 13). In the same vein, Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) and Huse 
et al. (2009) suggest that board effectiveness does not only depend on the ability of the 
board to monitor agents, but also on the quality of single members, his/her own skills, 
expertise, and the ability to create a real coordinate pool of directors.  
One of the main assumptions of agency theory is the avoidance of CEO duality; it 
recommends that chairman is independent and therefore CEO cannot fulfil the role of 
chairperson. However, there is not much evidence supporting multiple agency theory 
claims. Krause et al. (2014) argue that agency and stewardship theories present some 
limitations, so the need for alternative theoretical approach arises. They propose 
institutional theory which, according to Hung (1998) acknowledges the fact that directors 
have multiple principals, this, could be reconciled with agency approach in the study of 
board performance and effectiveness. Krause et al. (2014) admit that there is too little 
research on CEO duality. One of the main drivers is legitimacy. This is «a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate» (Suchman, 1995: 574 through Krause et al., 2014: 279). Scholars question 
firm choice regarding CEO duality, is it chosen due to genuine concern for board 
independence (as agency theory indicates) or does it reflect the desire for greater 
legitimacy in the financial context? It seems that there is neither a single nor a clear-cut 
answer to this question. On the one hand, CEO duality may compromise firm legitimacy in 
some contexts, but on the other hand, it may sustain firm legitimacy in other environments. 
Besides legitimacy, other pivotal and crucial factors must be considered in terms of CEO 
duality choice under institutional lens. The choice between CEO duality and non-duality 
depends on firm history influence, preferences, values of its leaders, and founders 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Nelson, 2003). 
In light of the above, multiple agency theory may help us to understand various aspects of 
corporate governance that go beyond the «traditional narrow incentive and monitoring 
notions of traditional agency theory» (Hoskisson et al., 2013: 696). The breadth of the 
former could allow researchers to explore fundamental issues related to the agent, 
principal, and board of directors, which are not explained by agency theory. 
It is noteworthy that some scholars claim that multiple agency theory should be integrated 
with other theoretical approaches, such as stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and 
resource dependence theory. In other words, multiple agency theory adopts the basic 
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assumption, i.e. agency-principal relationship, and then scholars reconcile the former with 
other theories and perspectives (Hung, 1998). It is reasonable to infer that there is an 
increasing need for theoretical pluralism. Indeed, the belief that the different theoretical 
approaches provide complementary perspectives, and that none of them alone can provide 
a full explanation, seems to have gained consensus among researchers (e.g., Hung, 1998; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 2003; Van Ees et al., 2009). This 
is consistent with the claim of Krause et al. (2014) who reckon that corporate governance 
literature tests much theory but builds little theory. This is due to the fact that data for 
building theory is not readily available, whereas data for testing theory is easier to obtain. 
 
6.4 Answers to Research Questions 
Research questions should focus on the subject area and be specific in terms of the 
problem which researcher tries to answer (Remenyi, 1998). In general, business and 
management researchers ask questions related to how and why (Remenyi, 1998). 
In particular, after critical analysis of literature related to corporate governance and board 
of directors and audit mechanisms, we formulated two research questions. As far as the 
first one is concerned,  
RQ 1) How can Board of Directors affect firm performance in Italian listed 
companies? 
We maintain that the board of directors can affect firm performance in Italian listed 
companies through its size and composition, and the kind of leadership adopted (i.e. CEO 
duality or Non-CEO duality). We find that a larger board size is associated with poorer 
firm performance, showing that an increase in the number of board members means a 
decrease in performance. Thus, consistent with codes of best practices the board should not 
be so large as to be unwieldy. Moreover, all types of directors (independents, non-
executives and executives) affect negatively firm performance probably because of the 
high presence of interlocking. However, directors do not affect long-term performance; 
thus, board composition does not really matter (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). It follows 
that executives, non-executives and independents could be equally bad or good at 
representing shareholders’ preferences. 
We should consider all multiple relations, not only the basic one, i.e. agent-principal. 
Indeed, the board is not only the link between shareholders and management, but it is also 
an agent of management and directors have in turn multiple principals (Hung, 1998). Thus, 
the positive effect of CEO duality, in contrast with agency theory, may be due to the fact 
that the board should assist, support, mediate, advice managers and not simply monitor 
them. 
As far as the second Research Question is concerned,  
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RQ 2) How can monitoring processes affect firm performance in Italian listed 
companies? 
We could argue that monitoring processes are implemented by the board, its committees 
and the external auditor, namely Big Four or Non-Big Four. According our results, those 
gatekeepers do not seem to be particularly effective in monitoring firm processes, 
opportunist behaviour, and do not affect firm performance. For instance, we should also 
consider other factors related with Audit Committee (Klein, 2002; Bryan et al., 2004). We 
believe that testing the presence of different audit bodies within company is essential to 
understand whether Italian companies generally comply with the Code of Corporate 
Governance and are aligned with the international best practices. However, it is also 
fundamental to test other drivers (Klein, 1998). Furthermore, the mere presence of 
monitoring processes within the company is not sufficient to affect firm performance. 
Compliance with the code which recommends: the setting up of audit committee, the 
presence of a certain number of independents and compulsory external audit is in itself not 
enough. Consistent with O’Neal and Thomas (1995), it is the lack of appropriate board 
structures that could contribute to the common perception that boards are ineffective. 
 
6.5 Areas for Future Research 
Future research should expand on multiple agency theory and explicitly examine the nature 
of agency conflicts and their implications in different institutional contexts.  
As Daily et al. (2003) and Huse et al. (2009) suggest, researchers should 1) dismantle 
fortresses of the agency approach; 2) open the black box of the board processes; 3) focus 
on actual board behaviour. In brief, it is necessary to develop a more comprehensive and 
holistic view of board of directors, relationship ownership-management. There is a need to 
re-conceptualize the corporate governance issues within the agency theory approach. Daily 
et al. (2003) suggest that researchers should go beyond protecting their own fortress of 
study.  
However, in order to adopt new approach methods and analyse results according to new 
viewpoints it is necessary to clear hurdles which are beyond researchers’ control. One new 
approach, as Daily et al. (2003) suggest, is to gain access to the types of process-oriented 
data which may improve understanding of corporate governance mechanisms. Indeed, to 
gain access to this kind of data is very difficult and, the cooperation of board of directors is 
needed. Another hurdle may be the so-called empirical dogmatism. Scholars prefer to 
«embrace a research paradigm that fits a rather narrow conceptualization of the entirety 
of corporate governance to the exclusion of alternative paradigms» (Daily et al., 2003: 
379). Researchers are not favourably disposed towards adopting theoretical frameworks 
which contradict dominant governance models and theories. In addition, an over-reliance 
on agency theory approach is rooted in various disciplines, such as economics, law, 
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finance, and management (Huse et al., 2003). It would be desirable to consider more 
aspects and also different aspects to enhance future research. 
We measure firm performance using two proxies ROE and Tobin’s Q which are consistent 
with previous works (Yermack, 1996, Bebchuck et al., 2005). However, Tobin’s Q does 
not always measure effectively firm performance (Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2012). It 
may also represent growth opportunities connected not with managerial decisions but with 
external conditions (Pham, et al., 2007). It follows that we could use other performance 
measures. For instance, Elali (2006) argues that Economic Value Added (EVA) 
outperforms Tobin’s Q in explaining shareholder wealth. Moreover, there have been a 
limited number of research studies that directly study the impact of independent directors 
on firm performance using EVA, some from Adjaoud et al. (2007), Pham et al. (2008), and 
Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012). 
A future study may include other variables which could help explain the relationship 
between board of director structures, controlling mechanism and their impact on firm 
performance. For instance, the board size alone, without detailing how their responsibilities 
are delegated, does not reveal board effects on performance. Other variables, which must 
be tested, are the number of different “chairs” that director should, the ownership 
composition, even though data on the latter is not so easy to collect for Italian companies. 
We should also consider other factors related with audit committee (Klein, 1998, 2002; 
Bryan et al., 2004), such as the degree of independence in audit committee members, 
expertise (Chan and Li, 2008), education, professional background, number of meeting per 
year, interaction of committee members with other internal or external control bodies. The 
literature review and our contribution indicate that other research is needed in this direction 
so as to be able to compare firms in cross-country studies. 
Indeed, consistent with Hansmann and Kraakman (2004); Sudarsanam and Broadhurst 
(2012), as convergence towards Anglo-American model exists, it would be interesting to 
compare Italian and UK listed companies to analyse similarities and differences between 
those European countries. Furthermore, before comparing Italian and UK listed 
companied, it may be useful to extend the research to all Italian firms listed on Italian 
Stock Exchange in order to understand if they confirm the same features, trends, and 
results found with respect to firms listed on STAR segment.  
In order to obtain a clearer pattern (if one exists), the study period should be increased to 
analyse those periods where economic conjuncture is negative; hence, the value of good 
corporate governance is potentially higher. Furthermore, it could be interesting to analyse 
how effects of board of directors on firm performance change over 10 years. 
  
211 
 
REFERENCES 
Abatecola, G., Farina, V., and Gordini, N. (2011) “Empirical Research on Corporate 
Distress: Assessing the Role of the Boards of Directors”, XX Tor Vergata 
Conference on Money, Banking and Finance: “Actors, Rules and Policies after the 
Global Financial Crisis”, Tor Vergata University, Rome, December, 5th-7th. 
Abbott, L. J., and Park, Y. (2000) “The Effects of Audit Committee Activity and 
Independence on Corporate Fraud”, in Managerial Finance, vol. 26, no. 11, pp. 55-
63. 
Abbott, L. J., and Parker, S. (2000a) “Auditor Selection and Audit Committee 
Characteristics”, in Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 
47-66. 
Abbott, L. J., and Parker, S. (2000b) “Audit committee characteristics and auditor 
selection: evidence from auditor switches”, working paper, University of Memphis. 
Abdel-Khalik, A. R., and B. B. Ajinkya (1979) “Informational Efficiency of the Securities 
Markets: A Discussion of the Evidence and Implications for Accounting”, ARC 
Working paper no. 79-4, University of Florida. 
Abdullah, S. N. (2004) “Board composition, CEO duality and performance among 
Malaysian listed companies”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 47-61. 
Acharya, V., Myers, S., and Rajan, R. (2009) “The internal governance of firms”, NBER 
Working paper 15568, New York University. 
Adams, R. B. (2005) “What do boards do? Evidence from committee meeting and director 
compensation data”, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., and Ferreira, D. (2005) “Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on 
Corporate Performance”, in The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 
1403-1432. 
Adams, R. B., and Ferreira, D. (2007) “A Theory of Friendly Boards”, in The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 217-250. 
Adams, R., and Mehran, H. (2003) “Is corporate governance different for banking holding 
companies”, in Economic Policy Review – Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 123-142. 
Adjaoud, F., Zeghal, D., and Andaleeb, S. (2007) “The effect of board’s quality on 
performance: a study of Canadian firms”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 4, no. 15, 
pp. 623-635. 
Adnan, M. A., Htay, S. N., Ab Rashid, H. D., and Meera, A. K. (2011) “A panel data 
analysis on the relationship between corporate governance and bank efficiency”, in 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Economics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-15. 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R. M., and Williamson, R. G. (2007) “Do U.S. Firms have the 
Best Corporate Governance? A Cross-Country examination of the Relation between 
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Wealth”, in Fisher College of Business 
Working Paper, no. 2006-03-006. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=954169 
Agoraki, M., Delis, M. D., and Panagiotis, S. (2009) “The effect of board size and 
composition on bank efficiency” in MPRA, paper no. 18548. Available at: 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18548/1/MPRA_paper_18548.pdf 
212 
 
Agrawal, A., and Chadha, S. (2005) “Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals”, in 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLVIII, pp. 371-406. 
Agrawal, A., and Knoeber, C. R. (1996) “Firm performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders”, in Journal of financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 377-397. 
Aguilera, R. V., and Jackson, G. (2003) “The Cross National-Diversity of Corporate 
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants”, in Academy of Management Review, 
vol. 28, pp. 447-465. 
Aguilera, R. V., Goyer, M., and De Castro, L. R. K. (2013) “Regulation and Comparative 
Corporate Governance”, in Wright, M., Siegel, D. S., Keasey, K., and Filatotchev, 
I. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Aguilera, R., and Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009) “Codes of Good Governance”, in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 376-387. 
Aguilera, R.V. (2005) “Corporate governance and director accountability: an institutional 
comparative perspective”, in British Journal of Management, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 39-
53. 
Ahmed, K., Hossain, M., and Adams, M. (2006) “The effect of board composition and 
board size on the informativeness of annual accounting earnings”, in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 14, pp. 418-431. 
Ahrens, T., Filatotchev, I., and Thomsen, S. (2011) “The research frontier in corporate 
governance”, in Journal of Management & Governance, no. 3, pp. 311-325. 
Airoldi, G., and Forestieri, G. (ed.) (1998) Corporate Governance. Analysis and 
Perspective of Italian case, Milan: EtasLibri. Airoldi, G., and Forestieri, G. (ed.) 
(1998) Corporate Governance. Analisi e Prospettive del caso Italiano, Milan: 
EtasLibri. 
Albino, V., Carbonara, N., and Giannoccaro, I. (2007) “Supply chain cooperation in 
industrial discricts. A simulation analysis”, in European Journal of Operational 
Research, vol. 177, pp. 261-280. 
Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., McNamara, R., and Nagel, S. (2012) “Audit 
committee characteristics and firm performance during the global financial crisis”, 
in Accounting and Finance, vol. 52, pp. 971-1000. 
Alexander, J. A., Fennell, M. L., and Halpern, M. T. (1993) “Leadership Instability in 
Hospitals: The Influence of Board-CEO Relations and Organization Growth and 
Decline”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 38, pp. 74-99. 
Allcock, D., and Filatotchev, I. (2010) “Executive Incentives Schemes in Initial Public 
Offerings: The Effect of Multiple-Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance”, in 
Journal of Management, vol. 36, pp. 663-686. 
Allegrini, M., and Bianchi Martini, S. (2006) Corporate governance in Italy, United 
Kingdom and United States of America. A Comparison between Models and 
practices, Milano: FrancoAngeli. Allegrini, M., and Bianchi Martini, S. (2006) La 
corporate governance in Italia, Regno Unito e Stati Uniti. Modelli e pratiche a 
confronto, Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
Allen, F., and Zhano, M. (2007) “The Corporate Governance Model of Japan: 
Shareholders are not Rulers”, in PKU Business Review, no. 36, pp. 98-102. 
213 
 
Aluchna, M. (2010) “Corporate Governance - Responsibilities of the Board”, in Aras, G., 
and Crowther, D. (ed.) A Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility, Surrey: Gower. 
Ameer, R., Ramli, F., and Zakaria, H. (2010) “A new perspective on board composition 
and firm performance in an emerging market”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 10, 
no. 5, pp. 647-661. 
Anderson D., Francis J. R., and Stokes, D. J. (1993) “Auditing, Directorships and the 
Demand for Monitoring”, in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 12, pp. 
353-375. 
Anderson, C. A., and Anthony, R. N. (1986) The New Corporate Directors, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Anderson, C. R., and Reeb, M. D. (2004) “Board composition: Balancing family influence 
in S&P 500 firms”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 49, pp. 209-237. 
Anderson, J. C., Lowe, D. J., and Reckers, P. M. J. (1993) “Evaluation of auditor 
decisions: Hindsight bias effects and the expectation gap”, in Journal of Economic 
Psychology, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 711-737. 
Anderson, R. C., Manci, S. A., and Reeb, D. M. (2004) “Board characteristics, accounting 
report integrity, and the cost of debt”, in Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
vol. 37, pp. 315-342. 
Andreas, J. M., Rapp, M. S., and Wolff, M. (2012) “Determinants of director 
compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel data”, in Review of 
Managerial Science, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 33-79. 
Andres, C. (2008) “Large shareholders and firm performance - An empirical examination 
of founding-family ownership”, in Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 14, pp. 431-
445. 
Andrews, K. R. (1981) “Corporate Strategy as a Vital Function of the Board”, in Harvard 
Business Review, no. 1, pp. 174-184.  
Ang, J., Cole, R., and Lin, J. (2000) “Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, in The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 55, no.1, pp. 81-106.  
Anthony, R. N. (1988) The management control function, Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Antle, R. (1982) “The auditor as an economic agent”, in Journal of Accounting Research, 
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 503-527. 
Aoki, M., (1994) “The Contingent Governance of Teams: An Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity”, in International Economics Review, no. 35, pp.657-675. 
Aqil Burney, S. M., and Mahmood, N. (2006) “A Brief History of Mathematical Logic and 
Applications of Logic in CS/IT”, in Karachi University Journal of Science, vol. 34, 
no. 1, pp. 61-75.  
Aras, G., and Crowther, D. A (2010) Handbook of Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility, Surrey: Gower.  
Arena, M., Arnaboldi, M., and Azzone, G. (2006) “Internal audit in Italian organizations. 
A multiple case study”, in Managerial Auditing Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 275-
292. 
214 
 
Arosa, B., Iturralde, T., and Maseda, A. (2010) “Outsiders on the board of directors and 
firm performance: Evidence from Spanish non-listed family firms”, in Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, vol. 1, pp. 236-245. 
Arrigo, E. (2006) “Codes of conduct: a corporate governance instrument”, in Symphonya 
Emerging Issues in Management, no. 2, pp. 34-45. 
Arthurs, D. J., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., and Johnson, R. A. (2008) “Multiple 
Agents watching other agents: multiple agency conflicts regarding underpricing in 
IPO firms”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 277-294. 
Asheim, B. T. (2003) “Industrial Districts: The contributions of Marshall and Beyond”, in 
Clark, G. L., Gertler, M. S., and Feldman, M. P. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Economic Geography, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ayuso, S., and Argandoña, A. (2007) “Responsible Corporate Governance: towards a 
stakeholder board of director?”, la Caixa” Chair of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Corporate Governance (IESE Business School), working Paper no. 701, pp. 1-
18. 
Bachiller, P., Giorgino, M. C., and Paternostro, S. (2011) “The relationship between the 
board of directors and the performance. Analysis of family and non family firms in 
Italy”, paper presented at XVI Conference of AECA “Nuevo modelo económico: 
Empresa, Mercados y Culturas”, 21st – 23rd September 2011, Granada (Spain). 
Bachrach, P., and Baratz, M. S. (1975) “Power and its two faces revisited: A reply to 
Geoffrey Debnam”, in American Political Science Review, vol. 69, pp. 900–904.  
Baghat, S., Cohen, A., and Ferrel, A. (2007) “The promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices”, in Ecgi – Law working paper, no. 89. 
Baker, H. K., and Anderson, R. (2010) Corporate Governance. A synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice, Hoboken (USA): John Wiley & Sons. 
Balakrishnan, K., and Cohen, D. (2011) “Product market competition and financial 
accounting misreporting”. Working paper. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1927427 
Baliga B. R., Mayer R. C., and Rao R. S. (1996) “CEO duality and firm performance: 
what’s the fuss?”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 41-53. 
Ballinger, G. A., and Marcel, J. J. (2010) “The use of an interim CEO during succession 
episodes and firm performance”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 31, pp. 
262-283. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2001) Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 2
nd
 edition, New York: Wiley. 
Barach, J. A. (1984) “Is there a Cure for the Paralyzed Family Board?”, in Sloan 
Management Review, vol. 2, no. 17, pp. 3-12. 
Barclay, M. J., and Holderness, C. G. (1989) “Private Benefits of Public Corporations”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 371-395. 
Barile, S., and Gatti, M. (2007) “Corporate governance and value creation in vital systems 
perspective”, in Sinergie, no. 73-74, pp. 157-158. Barile, S., and Gatti, M. (2007) 
“Corporate governance e creazione di valore nella prospettiva sistemica vitale”, in 
Sinergie, no. 73-74, pp. 157-158. 
Barney, J. B. (1990) “The debate between traditional management theory and 
organizational economics: Substantive differences or intergroup conflict?, in 
Academy of Management Review, vol. 15, pp. 382-393. 
215 
 
Barnhart, W. S., and Rosenstein, S. (1998) “Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, 
and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis, in The Financial Review, no. 33, 
pp.1-16. 
Barontini, R., and Caprio, L. (2006) “The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and 
Performance. Evidence from Continental Europe”, in European Financial 
Management, vol. 5, no. 12, pp. 689-723. 
Basu, S., Hwang, L., Mitsudome, T., and Weintrop, J. (2007) “Corporate governance, top 
executive compensation and firm performance in Japan”, in Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, vol. 15, pp. 56-79. 
Baum, C. F. (2006) Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, USA: Stata Press. 
Baus, T. (1999) “The system of corporate governance in Germany and its recent 
developments”, in Journal of the Society, no. 44. 
Baxter, P. (2006) “The relationship between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality: a pilot study”, unpublished. 
Baxter, P., and Cotter, J. (2009) “Audit Committees and Earnings Quality”, in Accounting 
and Finance, vol. 49, pp. 267-290. 
Baysinger, B. D., and Hoskisson, R. E. (1990) “The composition of board of directors and 
strategy control: effects on corporate strategy”, in Academy of Management Review, 
vol. 15, pp. 72-87. 
Baysinger, B., and Butler, H. (1985) “Corporate Governance and Board of Directors: 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition”, in Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, vol. 1, pp. 101-124. 
Bazerman, M. H., and Schoorman, F. D. (1983) “A Limited Rationality Model of 
Interlocking Directorates”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 
206-217. 
Beasley, M. (1996) “An empirical analysis of the relation between board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud”, in The Accounting Review, vol. 17, no. 
4, pp. 443-465. 
Beasley, M. S., and Salterio, S. E. (2001) “The relationship between board characteristics 
and voluntary improvements in audit committees composition and experience”, in 
Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 539-570. 
Beasley., M. S., Clune, R., and Hermanson, D. R. (2005) “Enterprise risk management: An 
empirical analysis of factors associated with the extent of implementation”, in 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 24, pp. 521-531. 
Bebchuk, L. A., and Cohen, A. (2005) “The Costs of Entrenched Boards”, in Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol.78, pp. 409-433. 
Becht, M., Bolton, P., and Roell, A. (2002) “Corporate Governance and Control”, in ECGI 
- Finance Working Paper, no. 2. 
Bedard, J., and Biggs, S. (1991) “The effect of domain-specific experience on evaluation 
of management representation in analytical procedure”, in Auditing; A Journal of 
Practice & Theory (Supplement), pp. 77-95. 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., and Courteau, L. (2004) “The Effect of Audit Committee 
Expertise, Independence and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management”, in 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, vol. 23, pp. 55-79.  
216 
 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, F., and Zimmermann, H. (2004a) “An Integrated 
Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation: Evidence from 
Switzerland”, in ECGI paper, no. 34/2004. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, F., and Zimmermann, H. (2004b), “Is Board Size an 
Independent Corporate Governance Mechanism?”, in KYKLOS, vol. 57, pp- 327-
356. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, F., and Zimmermann, H. (2006) “An Integrated 
Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation – Evidence from 
Switzerland”, in European Financial Management, vol. 12, p 249-283.  
Belkhir, M. (2004) “Board Structure, Ownership Structure, and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Banking”, in Applied Financial Economics, vol.19, no. 19, pp. 
1581-1593. 
Bennedsen, M., and Wolfenzon, D. (2000) “The balance of power in closely held 
corporations”, in Journal of financial Economics, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 113-139. 
Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H. C., and Nielsen, K. M. (2004) “Board size Effects in closely 
held corporations”, Centre for Applied Microeconometrics, Institute of Economics, 
University of Copenhagen, paper no. 25. 
Bennet, J. A., Sias, R. W., and Starks, L. T. (2003) “Greener Pastures and the Impact of 
Dynamic Institutional Preferences”, in The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 16, pp. 
1203-1238. 
Benoliel, J.Q. (1985) “Advancing qualitative approaches”, in Western Journal of Research, 
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 1-8. 
Bentz, V. M., and Shapiro, J. J. (1998) Mindful Inquiry in Social Research, London: Sage. 
Berg, S., and Smith, S. (1978) “CEO and board chairman: A quantitative study of dual v. 
unitary board leadership”, in Directors and Boards, vol. 3, pp. 34-49. 
Berle, A., and Means, G. (1932) The modern corporation and private property, New York: 
MacMillan. 
Bernanke, B., and Gertler, M. (1989) “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations”, in American Economic Review, vol. 1, no. 79, pp. 14-31. 
Bertini, U. (2009) “Models of governance, stakeholders' expectations and value creation”, 
in Maggioni, V., Potito, L., and Viganò, R. (ed.) Corporate governance: 
governance, control and financial structure, Bologna: Il Mulino. Bertini, U. (2009) 
‘Modelli di governance, aspettative degli stakeholders e creazione del valore’, in 
Maggioni, V., Potito, L., and Viganò, R. (ed.) Corporate governance: governo, 
controllo e struttura finanziaria, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Bertoni, F., and Randone, P. A. (2006) “The small-world of Italian finance: ownership 
interconnections and board interlocks amongst Italian listed companies”, working 
paper, Milan Polytechnic. 
Bhagat, S., and Black, B. (1998) “Board independence and long-term performance”, 
working paper, no. 143, Centre for Law and Economics Studies, Columbia Law 
School, New York. 
Bhagat, S., and Black, B. (2002) “The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and 
long term firm performance?”, in The Journal of corporation law, vol. 57, no. 27, 
pp. 231-273. 
217 
 
Bhagat, S., and Bolton, B. (2008) “Corporate governance and firm performance”, in 
Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 14, pp. 257-273. 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., and Romano, R. (2010) “The effect of Corporate Governance on 
Performance”, in Baker, H. K., and Anderson, R. (ed.) Corporate Governance. A 
Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hobekon, 
New Jersey, pp. 97-122. 
Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P. (2003) “Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings 
and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors”, in The 
Journal of Business, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 455-475. 
Bianchi Martini, S., Di Stefano, G., and Romano, G. (2006) Listed Companies 
Governance. Between the best international practices and traditions of Italian 
business, Milano: FrancoAngeli. Bianchi Martini, S., Di Stefano, G., and Romano, 
G. (2006) La governance delle società quotate. Tra best practice internazionali e 
tradizioni aziendali italiane, Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., and Enriques, L. (1997) “Ownership, pyramidal groups and 
separation between ownership and control in Italy”, in European Corporate 
Governance Network. Available at: 
http://www.tcgi.org/research/control_europe/documents/italy.pdf 
Bianco, M., and Casavola, P. (1999) “Italian corporate governance: Effects on financial 
structure and firm performance”, in European Economic Review, vol. 43, pp. 1057-
1069. 
Bianco, M., and Trento, S. (1995) “Capitalism compared: control models for enterprises”, 
in State and Market, no. 43, pp. 90-95.  
Bianco, M., Ciavarella, A., and Signoretti, R. (2011) “Women on Boards in Italy”, in 
Quaderni di Finanza Consob, no. 70. 
Bird, A., Buchanan, R., and Rogers, P. (2004) “The seven habits of an effective board”, in 
European Business Journal, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 128-132. 
Birley, S. (1985) “The role of networks in the entrepreneurial process”, in Journal of 
Business Venturing, vol. 1, pp. 107-117. 
Black, B. S., De Carvalho, A. G., and Gorga, E. (2010) “Corporate governance in Brazil”, 
in Emerging Market Review, vol. 11, pp.21-38. 
Black, B. S., Jang, H., and Kim, W. (2005) “Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms 
Market Values? Evidence from Korea”, in Ecgi-working paper series in finance, 
no. 86/2005. 
Black, B. S., Jang, H., and Kim, W. (2006) “Does corporate governance predict firms’ 
market values? Evidence from Korea”, in Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization, vol. 22, pp. 366-413. 
Black, B., de Carvalho, A. G., and Gorga E. (2010) “Corporate Governance in Brazil”, in 
Emerging Markets Review, vol. 11,pp. 21-38. 
Black, T. R. (1999) Doing quantitative research in the social sciences: an integrated 
approach to research design, measurement and statistics, London: Sage.  
Blair, M. M., and Stout, L. A. (2001), “Corporate accountability: Director accountability 
and the mediating role of the corporate board”, in Washington University Law 
Quarterly, vol. 79, p.. 403-447. 
218 
 
Bloch, F., and Hege, U. (2003) “Multiple Shareholders and Control Contest”, in MPRA, 
Paper no. 42286, University of Munich, Germany. 
Boatright, J. R. (1999) Ethics in Finance, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Boivie, S., Lange, D., McDonald, M. L., and Westphal, J. D. (2011) “Me or we: The 
Effects of CEO organizational identification on agency costs”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 54, pp. 551-576. 
Bolton, P., and von Thadden, E. (1998) “Block, liquidity, and corporate control”, in 
Journal of Finance, no. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., and Phan, P. H. (2004) “Effects of board structure of firm 
performance: a comparison between Japan and Australia”, in Asian Business and 
Management, vol. 3 no. 1, pp. 105-125. 
Bonner, S., and Lewis, B. (1990) “Determinants of auditor expertise”, in Journal of 
Accounting Research, vol. 28, pp. 1-28. 
Boone, A. L., Field, L. C., Karpoff, J. M., and Raheja, C. G. (2007) “The determinants of 
corporate board size and compositions: an empirical analysis”, in Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 85, no. 1, pp. 66-101. 
Booth, J., and Deli, D. (1996) “Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held 
by CEOs”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 40, pp. 81–104. 
Borokhovich, K., Parrino, R., and Trapani, T. (1996) “Outside directors and CEO 
selection”, in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 31, pp. 337-362. 
Bosetti, L. (2010) Corporate Governance and Global Markets, Milan: Franco Angeli. 
Bosetti, L. (2010) Corporate Governance e mercati globali, Milan: Franco Angeli. 
Boumosleh, A. S., and Reeb, D. M. (2005) “The Governance Role of Corporate Insiders”. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=674082 
Bourjade, S., and Germain, L. (2012a) “Collusion in Board of Directors”, in MPRA, Paper 
no. 34814, University of Munich, Germany. 
Bourjade, S., and Germain, L. (2012b) “Optimal Monitoring and Collusion in Board of 
Directors”, paper presented at the Conference, EARIE, Rome, 2nd-4th September 
2012. Available at: http://www.earie.org/r/default.asp?iId=JKKED 
Bowrin, A., Sridharan, V. G., Navissi, F., and Braendle, U. C. (2006) “The Theoretical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance”. Available at http://virtusinterpress.org 
Boyd, B. K. (1995) “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model”, in 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 301-312. 
Bozec, R., and Dia, M. (2007) “Board structure and firm technical efficiency: Evidence 
from Canadian state-owned enterprises”, in European Journal of Operations 
Research, vol. 177, pp. 1734-1750. 
Bracci, E., and Maran, L. (2012), “The role and use of management accounting systems 
(MAS) in family firms: a case study”, in Piccola Impresa, vol. 2, pp. 129-153. 
Bracci, E., and Vagnoni, E. (2011) “Understanding Small Family Business Succession in a 
Knowledge Management Perspective”, in The IUP Journal of Knowledge 
Management, vol.9, no. 1, pp. 7-36. 
Bradbury, M., Mak, Y., and Tan, S. (2006) “Board Characteristics, Audit Committee 
Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals”, in Pacific Accounting Review, vol. 18, no. 
2, pp. 47-68. 
219 
 
Bradley, N. (2004) “Corporate Governance Scoring and the Link Between Corporate 
Governance and Performance Indicators: in search of the Holy Grail”, in Corporate 
Governance, vol. 12, no. 1, pp.8-10. 
Braiotta, L. Jr. (2004) The Audit Committee handbook, New York: Wiley. 
Bremert, M., and Schulten, A. (2009) “The Impact of Supervisory Board Characteristics on 
Firm Performance”, working paper. 
Brennan, M. J. (1994) “Incentives, rationality, and society”, in Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, vol. 7, pp. 31-45. 
Brennan, M. J. (1995) “Corporate finance over the past 25 year”, in Financial 
Management, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 9-22. 
Brennan, M. J., and Franks, J. (1997) “Underpricing, ownership and control in initial 
public offerings of equity securities in the UK”, in Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 391-413. 
Brennan, N. (2006) “Board of directors and firm performance: is there an expectations 
gap?”, in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 577-
593. 
Brennan, N., and Solomon, J. (2008) “Corporate governance, accountability and 
mechanisms of accountability: an overview”, in Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, vol. 21, no. 7, pp. 885- 906. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., and Jarell, G. (1997) “Leadership structure: Separating the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board”, in Journal of Corporate Finance, no. 3, pp. 189-
220. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., and Terry, R. L. (1994) “Outside directors and the adoption of 
poison pills”, in Journal of Financial Economics, no. 35, pp. 371-390. 
Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., and Coles, J. L. (1999) “What happens to CEOs after they 
retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives”, 
in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 341-377. 
Brickley, J., and James, C. (1987) “The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, 
and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking”, in Journal of Law Economics, 
vol. 30, pp. 161-180. 
Bridgman, P. W. (1927) The logic of Modern Physics, London: Macmillan. 
Brimson, J. A. (1994) Activity-based management for service industries, government 
entities and nonprofit organizations, New York: Wiley. 
Brody, R. G., and Lowe, D. J. (2000) “The new role of the internal auditor: Implications 
for internal auditor objectivity”, in International Journal of Auditing, vol. 4, pp. 
169-176. 
Brown, I., Steen, A., and Foreman, J. (2009) “Risk management in corporate governance: 
A Review and Proposal”, in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 
17, no.5, pp. 546-558. 
Brown, L. D., and Caylor, M. L. (2006) “Corporate governance and firm valuation”, in 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 25, pp. 409-434. 
Brown, L. D., and Caylor, M. L., (2004) “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance”, 
Working Paper, Georgia State University, USA. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423 
220 
 
Bruni, G. (2002) “The value strategy between conflicts and interests balance”, in Rivista 
italiana di Ragioneria e di Economia Aziendale, no. 1-2. Bruni, G. (2002) “La 
strategia del valore tra conflittualità ed equilibrio di interessi”, in Rivista italiana di 
Ragioneria e di Economia Aziendale, n. 1-2. 
Bryan, D., Liu, M. H., and Tiras, S. L. (2004) “The Influence of Independent and Effective 
Audit Committee on Earnings Quality”. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=488082 
Bryman, A., and Bell, E. (2007) Business Research Methods, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bujaki, M., and McConomy, B. (2002) “Corporate Governance: factors influencing 
voluntary discolosures by publicity traded Canadian Firms”, in Canadian 
Accounting Perspectives, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 105-139. 
Burkart, M., and Panunzi, F. (2006) “Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal 
shareholder protection”, in Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 
1-31. 
Burns, N., and Grove, S. K. (1987) The practice of research, conduct, critique, and 
utilization, Philadelphia: Saunders. 
Burrell, G., and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis, 
London: Heinemmann. 
Burrough, B., and Helyar, J. (1990) Barbarians at the gate: The fall of RJR Nabisco, 
London: Jonathan Cape. 
Burt, M. R. (1980) “Cultural Myths and supports for rape”, in Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 217-230. 
Burt, R. S. (1980) “Actor interests in a social topology: foundations for a structural theory 
of action”, in Sociological Inquiry, vol. 49, pp. 107-132.  
Burt, R. S. (1983) Corporate profits and cooptation: Networks of markets constraints and 
directorate ties in the American economy, New York: Academic Press. 
Bushee, B. J. (1998) “The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment 
behavior”, in Accounting Review, vol. 73, pp. 305-333.  
Bushee, B. J., and Noe, C. F. (2000) “Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional 
Investors, and Stock Return Volatility”, in Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 38, 
pp. 171-202. 
Bussoli, C. (2011) “Corporate Governance and Bank Performance in Italy”, paper 
presented at the Conference ADEIMF.  
Byrd, J., and Hickman, K. (1992) “Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from 
tender offer bids”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 195-221. 
Campa, D., and Marra, A. (2008) “Corporate governance, firm performance, earnings 
management in Italians companies”, SDA Bocconi, Osservatorio di Revisione, 
working paper.  
Campos, N. F., and Iootty, M. (2007) “Institutional barriers to firm entry and exit: Case 
study evidence from the Brazilian textiles and electronics industries”, in Economic 
Systems, no. 4, pp. 346-363. 
221 
 
Cannella, A. A., Jr., and Lubatkin, M. (1993) “Succession as a sociopolitical process: 
Internal impediments to outsider selection”, in Academy of Management Journal, 
vol. 36, pp. 763-793. 
Carcello, J. V., and Neal, T. L. (2000) “Audit Committee Composition and Auditor 
Reporting”, in The Accounting Review, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 453-467. 
Carline, N. F., Linn, S. C., and Yadav, P. K. (2002) “The Influence of Managerial 
Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market Revaluation of 
Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence”, working paper, EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings 
Discussion Paper. 
Carpenter, M., and Westphal, J. D. (2001) “The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic 
decision making”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 44, pp. 639-660. 
Carroll, A. B. (1993) Business and society: ethics and stakeholder management, 3
rd
 ed., 
Cincinnati: South-Western. 
Carter, C. B., and Lorsh, J. W. (2004) Back To The Drawing Board. Designing Corporate 
Boards For A Complex World, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.  
Caselli, S., and Gatti, S. (2007) “Can agency theory recommendations affect family firms’ 
performance? An evidence from the Italian market”, in Journal of Corporate 
Ownership & Control, vol. 4, no. 3. 
Castellano, N. (2003) Management and Information Control. An integrated Approach, 
Milan: Giuffrè. Castellano, N. (2003) Controllo di gestione e di informazioni. Un 
approccio integrato, Milan: Giuffrè. 
Castellano, N. (2012) Performance Measurement for SMEs. Measuring Instruments and 
Control Processes, Torino: Giappichelli. Castellano, N. (2012) La misurazione 
della performance per le piccole medie imprese. Strumenti di misurazione e 
processi di controllo, Torino: Giappichelli, 
Cavalieri, E., and Ferraris Franceschi, R. (2008) (ed.) Management, Torino: Giappichelli. 
Cavalieri, E., and Ferraris Franceschi, R. (2008) (ed.) Economia Aziendale, Torino: 
Giappichelli. 
Cavana, R. Y., Delahaye, B. L., and Sekaran, U. (2001), Applied Business Research: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Cerboni, G. (1886) La ragioneria scientifica – I prolegomeni, Rome: Loescher. 
Cerboni, G. (1894) La ragioneria scientifica – Il metodo, Rome: Dante Alighieri. 
Cerboni, G. (1902) Saggio riassuntivo dei concetti filologico-tecnici, seconda edizione, 
Rome: Tipografia Elzeviriana.  
Cernat, L. (2004) “The emerging European corporate governance model: Anglo-Saxon, 
Continental, or still the century of diversity?”, in Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 11, pp. 147-166. 
Certo, S. T., Covin, J., Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. (2001) “Wealth and the effects of 
founder management among IPO-stage new ventures”, in Strategic Management 
Journal, vol. 22, pp. 641-658. 
Certo, S. T., Lester, R. H., Dalton, C. M., and Dalton, D. R (2006) “Top Management 
Teams, Strategy and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analytic Examination”, in 
Journal of Management Studies, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 813-839. 
222 
 
Cestari, G., Madonna, S., and Pierotti, M. (2012) The Difficult Union Of Effectiveness and 
Efficiency Of The Forecasting Models In The Corporate Crisis Prediction: A 
Comparative Analysis, Milan: Giuffrè. 
Chaganti, R. S., Mahajan, V., and Sharma, S. (1985) “Corporate board size, composition 
and corporate failures in the retailing industry”, in Journal of Management Studies, 
vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 400-417. 
Chan, K. C., and Li, J. (2008) “Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside 
Top Executives as Expert-Independent Directors”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 
16, no. 1, pp. 16-31. 
Chang, S. J., and Hong, J. (2002) “How much do business groups matter in Korea”, in 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 23, pp. 265-274.  
Charan, R. (1998) Boards at Work: How Corporate Boards Create Competitive 
Advantage, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
Charoenruk, D. (2012), Communication Research Methodologies: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Methodology. Available at: 
http://utcc2.utcc.ac.th/amsar/PDF/Documents49/quantitative_and_qualitative_meth
odologies.pdf 
Chen, C. J. P., and Jaggi, B. (2000) “Association between independent non-executive 
directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong”, in Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 19, pp. 285-310. 
Chen, C., Lin, B. J., and Yi, B. (2008) “Ceo Duality and Firm Performance – An 
Endogenous issue”, in Corporate Ownership and Control, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58-65. 
Cheng, S. (2008) ‘‘Board size and the variability of corporate performance’’, in Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 157-176. 
Chhaochharia, V., and Grinstein, Y. (2007) “Corporate governance and firm value: The 
impact of the 2002 governance rules”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 62, pp. 1789-
1825. 
Chiappetta, F. (2007) Law of corporate governance. The corporate governance of listed 
companies, Rome: CEDAM. Chiappetta, F. (2007) Diritto del governo societario. 
La corporate governance delle società quotate, Rome: CEDAM. 
Choi, J. J, Park, S. W., and Yoo, S. (2005) Do outside directors enhance firm 
performance?: Evidence from emerging market, Temple University, Changwon 
National University. 
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., and Sehyun, S. (2007) “The Value of Outiside Directors: Evidence 
from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea”, in Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 941-962. 
Chong, A., and Lopez de Silanes, F. (2006) “Corporate Governance and Firm Value in 
Mexico”, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, working paper 
no.564. 
Chouchene, I. (2010) “The Determinants of the Presence of Independent Directors in 
French Board Companies”, in International Journal of Business and Management, 
vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 144 – 153. 
Ciocca, P. (2007) Reach forever? An Italian Economic History (1976-2005), Torino: 
Bollati-Boringhieri. Ciocca, P. (2007) Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica 
d’Italia An (1976-2005), Torino: Bollati-Boringhieri.  
223 
 
Cisnetto, E. (2000) The game IPO, Milan: Sperling & Kupfer. Cisnetto, E. (2000) Il gioco 
dell’OPA, Milan: Sperling & Kupfer. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. H. P. (2000) “The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in East Asian Corporations”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 58, 
pp. 81-112. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., and Lang, L. H. P. (2002) “Disentangling the 
incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”, in The Journal of 
Finance, no. 57, pp. 2741-2771. 
Clarcher, I., Hillier, D., McColgan, P. (2010) “Agency Theory: Incomplete Contracting 
and Ownership Structure”, in Baker, H. K., and Anderson, R. (ed.) Corporate 
Governance. A synthesis of Theory, Research and Practice, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Clark, T. S., and Linzer, D. A. (2012) “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?”, working 
paper 1315. Available at: 
http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/ClarkLinzerREFEMar2012.pdf 
Clarke, T. (1998) “The stakeholder corporation: A business philosophy for the information 
age”, in Long Range Planning, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 182-194. 
Clarke, T. (2004) “Cycles of crisis and regulation: the enduring agency and stewardship 
problems of corporate governance”, in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, no. 2, pp. 153-161. 
Clarkson, M. E. (1995) “A stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating 
Corporate Social Performance”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 20, no. 1, 
pp. 92-117. 
Clifford, P., and Evans, R. (1997) “Non-Executive Directors. A question of 
Independence”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 224-231. 
Coase, R. H. (1947) “The Nature of the Firm”, in Economica, no. 16, pp. 386-405. 
Cochran, P., and Wartick, S. L. (1988) Corporate Governance: A review of the literature, 
New Jersey: Financial Executives Research Foundation. 
Coda, V. (1997) “Information transparency and proper management: content and context 
conditions”, in Writings of Business in memory of Raffaele Oriano, Padua: Cedam. 
Coda, V. (1997) Trasparenza informativa e correttezza gestionale: contenuti e 
condizioni di contesto, in Scritti di Economia Aziendale in Memoria di Raffaele 
d’Oriano, Padua: Cedam. 
Coffee, J. C. (2005) “Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reform” in Hopt, K. J., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H., and Baum, H. (ed.) 
Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, 
Japan and the US, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Coffee, J. C. (2006) Gatekeepers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coffee, Jr. J. C. (1999) “Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern 
Securities Regulation”, in The Business Lawyer, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 1195-1233. 
Cohen, J., and Holder-Webb, L. (2006) “Rethinking the influence of agency theory in the 
accounting academy”, in Issues in Accounting Education, no. 21, pp. 17-30. 
Colarossi, F., and Giorgino, M. (2006) “Corporate Governance and market value: analysis 
of Italian Blue Chips”, 17th AilG Meeting, 12th-13th June 2006, Rome. 
224 
 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., and Naveen, L. (2008) “Boards: Does one size fit all?”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 87, pp. 329-356. 
Coles, J. W., and Hesterly, W. S. (2000) “Independence of Chairman and Board 
Composition: Firm Choices and Shareholder Value”, in Journal of Management, 
vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 195-214. 
Coles, J. W., McWilliams, V. B., and Sen, N. (2001) “An examination of the relationship 
of governance mechanisms to performance”, in Journal of Management, vol. 27, 
pp. 23-50. 
Collier, P., and Gregory, A. (1996) “Audit Fees and Auditor Change: An Investigation of 
Persistence of Fee Reduction by Type of Change”, in Journal of Business and 
Accounting, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 13-28. 
Collins, D., Kothari, S., and Rayburn, J. (1987) “Firm size and the information content of 
prices with respect to earnings”, in Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 9, 
pp. 111-138. 
Collins, R. (1994) Four Sociological Traditions, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Conger, J. A., Lawler III, E. E., and Finegold, D. L. (2001) Corporate Boards – New 
Strategies for Adding Value at the Top. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., and Certo, S. T. (2010) “Ownership as a 
form of corporate governance”, in Journal of Management Studies, vol. 47, pp. 
1561-1589. 
Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori commercialisti, Consiglio Nazionale dei Reigioneri e 
Periti Commercialisti, and The Association of Chartered Accountants (2006) A 
Review of Italian and UK Company Law, London: The Certified Accountants Trust. 
Conyon, M. J., and Peck, S. I. (1998) ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top 
Management Compensation’, in Academy of Management, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 146-
157. 
Coombes, P., and Chiu-Yin Wong, S. (2004) “Why Codes of Governance Work”, in 
McKinsey Quarterly, vol. 2, pp. 48-53. 
Cooper, E.W. (2009). Monitoring and governance of private banks, The Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Finance, 49, pp. 253-264. 
Corbella S. (1999) “The internal control system”, in Corbella, S., and Pecchiari N. (ed.) 
Internal Auditing, Milan: Egea. Corbella S. (1999) “Il sistema di controllo interno”, 
in Corbella, S., and Pecchiari N. (ed.), Internal Auditing, Milan: Egea. 
Corbetta, G., and Salvato, C. (2004b) “Self-serving or self-actualizing? Models of man and 
agency costs in different types of family firms: A commentary on comparing the 
agency costs of family and non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory 
evidence”, in Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 355-362. 
Corbetta, G., and Salvato, C. A. (2004a) “The board of directors in family firms: One size 
fits all?”, in Family Business Review, vol. 17, pp. 119-134. 
Core, J., Holthausen, R., and Larcker, D. (1999) “Corporate governance, chief executive 
officer compensation, and firm performance”, in Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 51, pp. 371-406. 
Cormack, D.S. (1991) The research process, Oxford: Black Scientific. 
225 
 
Coronella, S. (2007) The accountancy in Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Theoretical profiles and application proposals, Milan: Giuffré. Coronella, S. 
(2007) La ragioneria in Italia nella seconda metà del XIX secolo. Profili teorici e 
proposte applicative, Milan: Giuffré. 
Costanzo, P., Priori, M., and Sanguinetti, A. (2007) Governance and protection of savings. 
Best practices, rules and market communications, Milan: Vita & Pensiero. 
Costanzo, P., Priori, M., and Sanguinetti, A. (2007) Governance e tutela del 
risparmio. Best practice, regole e comunicazioni al mercato, Milan: Vita & 
Pensiero. 
Cotter, J., and Silvester, M. (2003) “Board and monitoring committee independence”, in 
Abacus, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 211- 232. 
Cotter, J., Shivdasani, A., and Zenner, M. (1997) “Do Independent Directors Enhance 
Target Shareholder Wealth during Tender Offers?”, in Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 43, pp. 195-218. 
Craswell, A., Francis, J., and Taylor, S. (1995) “Auditor Brand Name Reputations and 
Industry Specializations”, in Joumal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 20, pp. 
297-322. 
Cremers, K. J. M., and Nair, V. B. (2005) “Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices”, in 
The Journal of Finance, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 2859-2894. 
Creswell, J. W. (1994) Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Croci, E., and Grassi, R. (2013) “The economic effect of interlocking directorates in Italy: 
New evidence using centrality measures”, in Computational and Mathematical 
Organization Theory, forthcoming.  
Crouch, C., and Streek, W. (1997) Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping 
Convergence and Diversity. Thousands Oaks: Sage. 
Cuccu, F. (2011) Il sistema di controllo interno nelle società quotate, PhD Thesis, 
University of Sassari, Italy. 
Cyert, R. M., and March, J. G. (1963) A behavioral theory of the firm, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall.  
Daily, C. M. (1995) “The relationship between board composition and leadership structure 
and bankruptcy reorganization outcomes”, in Journal of Management, vol. 21, pp. 
1041-1056. 
Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. (1992) “The relationship between governance structure and 
corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms”, in Journal of Business Venturing, 
vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 375-386. 
Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. (1994a) “Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The 
impact of board composition and structure”, in Academy of Management Journal, 
vol. 37, pp. 1603-1617. 
Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. (1994b) “Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm: An 
empirical assessment”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 15, pp. 643-654. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., and Cannella, A. A. (2003), “Corporate governance: Decades 
of dialogue and data”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 371-
382. 
226 
 
Daily, C., Johnson, J., Ellstrand, A., and Dalton, D. (1998) “Compensation committee 
composition as a determinant of CEO compensation”, in Academy of Management 
Journal, vol. 41, pp. 209-220. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellestrand, A. E., and Johnson, J. L. (1998) “Meta-analytic 
reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance”, in 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 3, no. 19, pp. 269-290. 
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Ellstrand, A., and Johnston, J. (1999) “Number of directors and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 
42, no. 6, pp. 674-686. 
Dalton, D.R. and Kesner, I.F. (1987), “Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of 
Directors: An International Perspective”, in Journal of International Business 
Studies, vol. 18, pp. 33-42. 
Dalziel, T., Gentry, R. J., and Bowerman, M. (2011) “An integrated agency-resource 
dependence view of the influence of directors’ human and relational capital on 
firms’ R&D spending”, in Journal of Management Studies, vol. 48, pp. 1217-1242. 
Davidson, W. N., III, Nemec, C., and Worrell, D. L. (2001) “Succession planning vs. 
agency theory: A test of Harris and Helfat’s interpretation of plurality 
announcement market returns”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 22, pp. 179-
184. 
Davis, G. F. (1991) “Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the 
Intercorporate Network”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 36, pp. 583-613. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F., and Donaldson, L. (1997) “Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 20-47. 
Daynton, N. K. (1984) “Corporate governance: the other side of coin”, in Harvard 
Business Review, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 34-47. 
de Andres, P., and Vallelado, E. (2008) “Corporate governance in banking: The role of the 
board of directors”, in Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 32, pp. 2570–2580. 
de Andres, P., Azofra, V., and Lopez, F. J. (2005) “Corporate boards in OECD countries: 
Size, composition, compensation, functioning and effectiveness”, in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 13, pp. 197-210. 
Deaki, S., and Slinger, G. (1997) “Hostile takeovers, corporate law, and the theory of the 
firm”, in Journal of Law and Society, vol. 24, pp. 124-151.  
Deakin, S. (2011) “Corporate governance and financial crisis in the long run”, in 
Zumbansen, P., and Williams, C. (ed.) The Embedded Firm Corporate Governance, 
Labor Law and Financial Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981) “Auditor Size and Audit Quality”, in Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 183-199. 
DeFond, M. (1992) “The association between changes in client firm agency costs and 
auditor switching”, in Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, vol. 11, pp. 16-31. 
Deidda Gagliardo, E., and Bigoni, M. “Italy’s got Talent. How Italian leading companies 
in confectionary industry overcome the crisis”, in European Scientific Journal, vol. 
9, no. 34, pp. 35-59. 
Del Bene, L., Mucelli, A., and Spigarelli, F. (2005) “Management control system and 
ERPs in Italian healthcare organizations”, paper presented at European Accounting 
Association, 28
th
 Annual Congress Goteborg 18
th
-20
th
 March 2005. 
227 
 
Del Giudice, R., and Capizzano, P. (2006) “Conflicts of interest and corporate governance 
in the evaluation of the rating of banks”, in Liuc Papers, no. 184, pp. 1-28. 
Del Guercio, D., Dann, L., and Partch, M. (2003) “Governance and Boards of Directors in 
Closed-End Investment Companies”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 69, 
pp. 111-152. 
Demb, A., and Neubauer, F. F. (1992) The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Denis, D. J., and Sarin, A. (1997) “Ownership Structure and Top Executives Turnover”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 45, pp. 193-221. 
Denis, D. K., and McConnell, J. J. (2003) “International corporate governance”, in Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1-36. 
Denis, D., and Denis, D. (1995) “Performance changes following top managerial 
dismissals”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 50, pp. 1029-1057. 
Denzin, N. K. (1978) The Research Act, 2nd Edn, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Deutsch, Y., Keil, T., and Laamamen, T. (2011) “A Dual Agency View of Board 
Compensation: the Joint Effects of Outside Director and CEO Stock Options on 
Firm Risk”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 32, pp. 212-227. 
Devos, E., Prevost, A., and Puthenpurackal, J. (2009) “Are interlocked directors Effective 
Monitors?”, in Financial Management, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 861-887. 
Dey, A., Engel, E., and Liu, X. (2011) “CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split”, 
in Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 17, pp. 1595-1618. 
Dharwadkar, R., George, G., and Brandes, V. (2000) “Privatization in emerging 
economies: an agency theory perspective”, in Academy of Management Review, 
vol. 25, pp. 650-669.  
Di Betta, P., and Amenta, C., (2004) “Incentives in Corporate Governance: The Role of 
Self-Regulation”, in Symphonya Emerging Issues in Management, vol. 1, pp. 43-
57. 
Di Pietra, R, Grambovas, A., Raonic, I., and Riccaboni, A. (2008) “The effect of board size 
and busy directors on the market value of Italian companies”, in Journal of 
Management Governance, vol. 12, pp. 73-91. 
Di Toro, P. (2010) Corporate Governance, Standards of conduct for the government of the 
corporation, Milan: Gruppo24Ore. Di Toro, P. (2010) Corporate Governance, 
Principi di comportamento per il governo delle società di capitali, Milan: 
Gruppo24Ore. 
Dick, A., and Zingales, L. (2004) “Private Benefits of Control: An International 
comparison”, in The Journal of Finance, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 537-600. 
Dielman, T., and Rose, E. (1997) “Estimating and testing in least absolute value regression 
with serially correlated distribution”, in Annals of Operations Research, vol. 74, pp. 
239–257. 
Dobrzynski, J. H (1991) “Chairman and CEO: one hat too many”, Business Week, 18 
November, p. 124. 
Donaldons, P., and Preston, L. E. (1995) “The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
concepts, evidence, and implications”, in The Academy of Management Review, 
vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 65-91. 
228 
 
Donaldson, L., and Davis, J. H. (1991) “Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns”, in Australian Journal of Management, vol. 
16, pp. 49-64. 
Donker, H., and Zahir, S. (2008) “Toward and Impartial and Effective Corporate 
Governance Rating System”, in Corporate Governance: International Journal of 
Business Society, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 83-93. 
Douma, S., George, R., and Kabir, R. (2006) “Foreign and domestic ownership, business 
groups, and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market”, in 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 27, pp. 637-657. 
Drago, C., Millo, F., Ricciuti, R., and Satella, P. (2011) “The Role of Women in the Italian 
Network of Boards of Directors, 2003-2010”, Working Paper Series, no. 10, 
Department of Economics, University of Verona. 
Drobetz, W., Schillhofer, A., and Zimmermann, H. (2004) “Corporate Governance and 
Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany”, in European Financial 
Management, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 267-293. 
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., and Ozbas, O. (2010) “When are outside directors 
effective?”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 96, pp. 195-214. 
Duffy, M. E. (1985) “Designing research the qualitative – quantitative debate”, in Journal 
of Advanced Nursing, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 225-232. 
Duffy, M. E. (1987) “Methodological triangulation a vehicle for merging quantitative and 
qualitative methods”, in Image, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 130-133. 
Dulewicz, V., and Herbert, P. (2004) “Does the Composition and Practice of Boards of 
Directors Bear Any Relationship to the Performance of their Companies”, in 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 263-280. 
Duncan, R. (2005) “Fiddling the books: Where does the buck stop?” Paper presented at 
The Prime Minister’s Corporate Governance Summit. Available at: 
http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=piasdg_downloads_gov 
Dunn, P. and Sainty, B. (2009) “The relationship among board of director characteristics, 
corporate social performance and corporate financial performance”, in 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, vol. 5, no. 4, 407-423. 
Duska, R. F. (1992) “Why Be a Loyal Agent? A Systematic Ethical Analysis”, in Bowie, 
N. E., and Freeman, R. E. (ed.) Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Dwivedi, N., and Jain, A. K. (2005) “Corporate Governance and Performance of Indian 
Firms: The Effect of Board Size and Ownership”, in Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 161-172. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A. (2002) Management Research: An 
Introduction, 2
nd
 Edition, London: Sage. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A. (2008) Management Research: An 
Introduction, 3
rd
 Edition, London: Sage. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Lowe A. (1991) Management Research. An 
Introduction, London: Sage. 
Ebrahim, A. (2007) “Earnings Management and Board Activity: An Additional Evidence”, 
in Review of Accounting and Finance, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 42-58. 
229 
 
Eells, R. (1960) The Meaning of Modern Business: An Introduction to Philosophy of Large 
Corporate Enterprise, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Ehikioya, B. I. (2009) “Corporate governance structure and firm performance in 
developing economies: evidence from Nigeria”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 9, 
no. 3, pp. 231-243. 
Einsenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Well, M. T. (1998) “Larger board size and decreasing 
firm value in small firms”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 48, pp. 342-
353. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989) “Agency theory: an assessment and review”, in Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 14, pp. 57-74. 
El Mir, A., and Seboui, S. (2008) “Corporate governance and the relationship between 
EVA and created shareholder value”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 
46-58. 
Elali, W. (2006) “Contemporaneous relationship between EVA and shareholder value”, in 
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, vol. 2, pp. 237-253. 
Elloumi, F., and GueyieJ-P. (2001) “Financial distress and corporate governance: an 
empirical analysis”, in Corporate Governance, Vol. 1, no. 1, pp.15 – 23. 
Ellstrand, L., Tihanyi, L., and Johnson, J. L. (2002) “Board structure and international 
political risk”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 45, pp. 769-777. 
Elsayed, K. (2007) “Does CEO duality really affect corporate performance?”, in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 15, pp. 1203-1214. 
Elsayed, K. (2011) “Board size and corporate performance: the missing role of board 
leadership structure”, in Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 15, pp. 415-
446. 
Elsayed, K., and Paton, D. (2009) “The impact of financial performance on environmental 
policy: Does firm life cycle matter?”, in Business Strategy and the Environment, 
vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 397-413. 
Emmons, W. R., and Schmid, F. A. (1999) “Corporate Governance And Corporate 
Performance”, working paper 018A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Enriques L. (2003) “Codes of Corporate Governance, Company Law and Ownership 
Structures: some preliminary considerations”, in Banca, Impresa e Società, no. 1, 
pp. 114-120. Enriques L. (2003) “Codici di Corporate Governance, diritto 
societario e assetti proprietari: alcune considerazioni preliminary”, in Banca, 
Impresa e Società, no. 1, pp. 114-120. 
Enriques, L, and Volpin, P. (2007) “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe”, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 117-140. 
Epstein, M. J. (2012) “Governing globally convergence, differentiation, or bridging”, in 
Davila, A., Epstein, M. J., and Manzoni, J. F. (ed.) Performance Measurement and 
Management Control: Global Issues, Bingley: Emerald. 
Erickson, J., Park, Y. W., Reising, J., and Shin, H. H. (2005) “Board composition and firm 
value under concentrated ownership: the Canadian evidence”, in Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 387-410. 
Estrin, S., and Prevezer, M. (2010) “The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate 
Governance: Brazil, Russia, India and China Compared”, in Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, no. 1, pp. 41-67. 
230 
 
Evans, C. R., and Dion, K. L. (1991) “Group cohesion and performance: a meta-analysis”, 
in Small Group Research, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 175-86. 
Evered, R., and Louis, M. R. (1981) “Alternative perspectives in the organizational 
sciences: ‘Inquiry from the inside’ and ‘inquiry from the outside’”, in Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 6, pp. 385-395. 
Ezzamel, M., and Watson, R. (1993) “Organizational Form, Ownership Structure and 
Corporate Performance: A Contextual Empirical Analysis of UK companies, in 
British Journal of Management, vol. 4, pp. 161-176. 
Ezzamel, M., and Watson, R. (2002) “Pay Comparability across and within UK Boards: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Pay Cash Awards to CEOs and other Members”, in 
Journal of Management, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 207-232. 
Fabbri A., (1998) “Governance Criticalness and problems regarding Italian listed 
companies”, in Airoldi, G., and Forestieri, G. (ed.) (1998) Corporate Governance. 
Analysis and Perspective of Italian case, Milan: EtasLibri. Fabbri A., (1998) 
“Situazioni di criticità e problemi di governance relativi alle società quotate 
italiane”, in Airoldi, G., and Forestieri, G. (ed.) (1998) Corporate Governance. 
Analisi e Prospettive del caso Italiano, Milan: EtasLibri. 
Fabbrini, G., and Montrone, A. (2006) Business Economics, vol I, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Fabbrini, G., and Montrone, A. (2006) Economia aziendale, vol I, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. 
Fabiani, S., Pellegrini, G., Romagnolo, E., and Signorini, L. F. (2000) “Efficiency and 
Localisation: the Case of Italian Districts”, in Bagella, M., and Becchetti, L. (ed.) 
The Competitive Advantage of Industrial Districts Contrbutions to Eoconomics, 
New York: Springer. 
Faleye, O. (2004) “Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure’’,  
working paper, College of Business Administration, Northeastern University, 
Boston. 
Faleye, O. (2007) “Does one hat fill all? The case of corporate leadership structure”, in 
Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 239-259. 
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., and Hoitash, U. (2011) “The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring”, 
in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 101, pp. 160-181. 
Fama, E. F. (1980) “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, in Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 288-307. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983a) “Separation of ownership and control”, in Journal 
of Law and Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 301-325. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983b) “Agency problems and residual claims” in Journal 
of Law and Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 327-349. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1985) “Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions”, 
in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 101-119. 
Fauzi, F., and Locke, S. (2012) “Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: A Study Of New Zealand Listed-Firms”, in Asian Academy of 
Management Journal of Accounting And Finance, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 43–67. 
Fee, C. E., and Hadlock, C. J. (2004) “Management Turnover Across the Corporate 
Hierarchy”, in Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 3-38. 
231 
 
Fellegara, A. M. (2008) Government, control and corporate information in business 
groups, Milan: McGraw-Hill. 
Felo, A. J., Krishnamurthy, S., and Solieri, S. A. (2003) “Audit Committee Characteristics 
and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis”, working 
paper. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=401240 
Felton, R. (2004), “How to separate the roles of chairman and CEO”, in The Mckinsey 
Quarterly, no. 4. 
Ferraris Franceschi, R. (2008) “The Company: discriminating characters, management 
policies, structures and problems of economic governance”, in Cavalieri, E., and 
Ferraris Franceschi, R. Business Economics, vol.1, Turin: Giappichelli. Ferraris 
Franceschi, R. (2008) “L’azienda: caratteri discriminanti, criteri di gestione, 
strutture e problemi di governo economico”, in Cavalieri, E., and Ferraris 
Franceschi, R. Economia Aziendale, vol.1, Turin: Giappichelli. 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., and Sutton, R. I. (2005) “Economics language and assumptions: 
How theories can become self-fulfilling”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 
30, pp. 8-24. 
Ferrarrini, G., and Giudici, P. (2005) “Financial Scandals and the Role of Private 
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case”, in European Corporate Governance Institute, 
no. 40, pp. 2-57. 
Ferreira, D. (2010) “Board Diversity”, in Baker, H. K., and Anderson, R. (ed.) Corporate 
Governance. A synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, USA: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M., and Raposo, C. (2011) “Board Structures and Price 
Informativeness”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 99, pp. 523-545. 
Ferris, S., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. (2003) “Too busy to mind the business? 
Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments”, in Journal of Finance, 
vol. 58, pp. 1087-1111. 
Fich, E. M. (2005) “Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from 
Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms”, in Journal of Business, vol. 78, no. 
5, pp. 1943-1971. 
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2007) “Financial fraud, director reputation, and 
shareholder wealth”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 86, pp. 306-336. 
Fich, E., and Shivdasani, A. (2006) “Are busy boards effective monitors?”, in Journal of 
Finance, vol. 61, pp. 624-689. 
Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y. C., and Piesse, J. (2005) “Corporate Governance and Performance 
in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan”, in Academy 
of Management Journal, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 257. 
Finkelstein, S., and D’Aveni, R. (1994) “CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How 
boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command”, in 
Academy of Management Journal, vol. 37, pp. 1079-1108. 
Finkelstein, S., and Hambrick, D. (1996) Strategic leadership: top executives and their 
effects on organization. Minneapolis: West Publishing. 
Finkelstein, S., and Mooney, A. C. (2003) “Not the usual suspects: How to use board 
process to make boards better”, in Academy of Management Executive, vol. 17, no. 
2, pp. 101-113. 
232 
 
Fiori G., and Tiscini, R. (2005) Corporate governance, regulation and transparency of 
corporate accounting, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Fiori G., and Tiscini, R. (2005) 
Corporate governance, regolamentazione contabile e trasparenza dell’informativa 
aziendale, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Fiori, G. (2003) Corporate Governance and quality of firm financial disclosure, Milan: 
Giuffrè. Fiori, G. (2003) Corporate Governance e qualità dell’informativa esterna 
d’impresa, Milan: Giuffrè. 
Fizel, J. L., and Louie, K. K. T. (1990) “CEO retention, firm performance and corporate 
governance”, in Managerial and Decisional Economics, pp. 167-176. 
Flint, D. (1988) Philosophy and Principles of Auditing, London: Macmillan Press. 
Florackis, C., and Ozkan, A. (2004) “Agency Costs and Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms: Evidence for UK Firms”, working Paper, University of York, UK.  
Forbes, D. P., and Milliken, F. J. (1999) “Cognition and corporate governance: 
understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups”, in Academy 
of Management Review, vol. 24, pp. 492. 
Forestieri, G., and Iannotta, G. (2005) “The investment banking business and the problems 
of corporate governance”, in Forestieri, G. (ed.) Corporate and investment banking, 
Milan: Egea. Forestieri, G., and Iannotta, G. (2005) “L’attività di investment 
banking e i problemi della corporate governance”, in Forestieri, G. (ed.) Corporate 
e investment banking, Milan : Egea. 
Fortuna, F. (2001) Corporate Governance. Subjects, models and systems, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. Fortuna, F. (2001) Corporate Governance. Soggetti, modelli e 
sistemi, Milan: FrancoAngeli.  
Fortuna, F. (2010) Corporate governance in the nationally and internationally experience. 
Aspects of comparative and evolutionary profiles, Bologna: Il Mulino. Fortuna F. 
(2010), La corporate governance nell’esperienza nazionale e internazionale, 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Fosberg, R. (1989) “Outside directors and managerial monitoring”, in Akron Business and 
Economic Review, vol. 20, pp. 24-32. 
Foucalt, M. (1982) “The subject of power”, in Critical Inquiry, vol. 8, pp. 777-795. 
Francis, J. R., and Wang, D. (2008) “The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 
Audits on Earnings Quality around the World?”, in Contemporary Accounting 
Research, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 157-191. 
Francis, J. R., and Yu, M. D. (2009) “Big 4 office size and audit quality”, in The 
Accounting Review, vol. 84, no. 5, pp. 1521-1552. 
Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K, and Pereira, R. (2003) “The role of accounting and auditing 
in corporate governance and the development of financial markets around the 
world”, in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, vol. 10, pp. 1-30. 
Francis, J., and Krishnan, J. (1995) “Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting 
Conservatism”, in Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 16, pp. 135-165. 
Francis, J., and Wilson, E. (1988) “Auditor changes: A join test of theories relating to 
agency costs and auditor differentiation”, in The Accounting Review, vol. 63, pp. 
663-682. 
233 
 
Francis, J., Maydew, E., and Sparks, H. C. (1999) “The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the 
Credible Reporting of Accruals”, in Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 
vol. 18, pp. 17-34. 
Franks, J., and Mayer, C. (1997) “Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany 
and France”, in Chew, D. H. (ed.) Studies in International Corporate Finance and 
Governance Systems, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Franks, J., Mayer., C., and Rennebbog, L. (1996), The role of large share stakes in poorly 
performing companies in the UK, mimeo 1.96, pp. 1-28. 
Franks, J., Mayer., C., and Renneboog, L. (2001), “Who disciplines management in poorly 
performing companies?”, in Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 10, no. 3/4, 
pp. 209-248. 
Fredrickson, J. W., Hambrick, C. D., and Baumrin, S. (1988) “A model of CEO dismissal”, 
in Academy of Management Review, vol. 13, pp. 255-270.  
Freeman, E. R. (1984) Strategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach, London: Pitman. 
Freeman, E. R. (1994) “The politics of stakeholder theory”, in Business Ethics Quarterly, 
vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 409-421. 
Freeman, E. R. (1999) “Response: Divergent Stakeholder Theory”, in Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 233-236. 
Freeman, E. R. (2010) Strategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach, reprinted, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Freeman, E. R., Wicks, A. C., and Parmar, B. (2004) “Stakeholder Theory and the 
Corporate Objective Revisited”, in Organisation Science, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 364-
369. 
French, J. R. B. Jr, and Raven, B. (1959) “The bases of social power”, in Cartwright, D. 
(ed.) Studies in Social Power, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 
Frésard, L., and Valta, P. (2012) “Competitive pressure and corporate policies”, working 
paper, University of Maryland. 
Froeb, L. M., and Mccann, B. T. (2009) Managerial Economics: A problem solving 
approach, South-Western, USA: Cengage Learning. 
Gabrielsson, J., and Huse, M. (2004) “Context, behavior, and evaluations: Challenges in 
research on boards and governance”, in International Studies of Management and 
Organizations, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 11-36. 
Gandini, G. (2004) Internal auditing and risk management in corporate governance, 
Milan: FrancoAngeli. Gandini, G. (2004) Internal auditing e gestione dei rischi nel 
governo aziendale, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Gandini, G., Astori, R., and Cassano, R. (2009) “Structures of Corporate Governance in 
Italy and Comparison at European Level”, in International Review of Business 
Research Papers, vol. 5, pp. 441-453. 
Garay, U., Gonzàlez, M. (2008) “Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The case of 
Venezuela”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 3, no.16, pp. 194-209. 
Garcìa-Sanchez, I. M. (2010) “The effectiveness of corporate governance: Board structure 
and business technical efficiency in Spain”, in Central European Journal of 
Operations Research, vol. 18, pp. 311-339. 
234 
 
Garratt, B. (2007a) Corporate Governance and Board Development, Cass Business 
School, London City University. 
Garratt, B. (2007b) Thin on Top, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
Gasparri, G. (2013) Internal Controls of the Listed Companies. Features of Italian Law 
and Unsolved Problems, Milan: Quaderni Giuridici, Consob.  
Gerlach, M. L. (1992) Alliance capitalism: The social organization of Japanese Business, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
German Code of Corporate Governance (2002). Available at: http://www.corporate-
governance-code.de/index-e.html 
Giannessi, E. (1979) Accounting notes, concerned with rural firm, Pisa: Pacini. Giannessi, 
E. (1979), Appunti di economia aziendale, con particolare riferimento alle aziende 
agricole, Pisa: Pacini. 
Giddens, A. (1984) The constitution of society, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1993) “The assent of man: The mental representation and control of belief”, 
in Wegner, D. M., and Pennebaker, J. W. (Eds.), Handbook of mental control, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Gillan, S. L. (2006) “Recent developments in corporate governance: An overview”, in 
Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 381-402. 
Gillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., and Starks, L. T. (2006) “Tradeoffs in corporate governance: 
evidence from board structures and charter provisions, working papers series”. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=917544 
Gilson, R. J. (2001) “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of form or 
function”, in American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 49, pp. 329-357. 
Gilson, R. J., and Gordon, J. N. (2003) “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”, working 
paper no. 228, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, 
New York. Available at: 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_lis
ting?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=81114&rtcontentdisposition=filename%
3DWP228.pdf 
Gilson, S. C. (1990) “Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders”, in Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 27, pp. 955-387. 
Giovannini, R. (2010) “Corporate governance, family ownership and performance”, in 
Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 14, pp. 145-166. 
Giroud, X., and Mueller, H. (2010) “Does corporate governance matter in competitive 
industries?”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 95, pp. 312-331. 
Glaser, B. G., and Strauss, A. L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003) “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”, 
in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 1, pp. 107-155. 
Gonzalez, M., and Garay, U. (2003) “Research Proposal for Corporate Governance in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: The case of Board of Directors in Venezuela”. 
Instituto de Estudios Superriores de Administration. Available at: 
http://www.iadb.org/res/laresnetwork/projects/pr224proposal.pdf 
235 
 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., and Boekar, W. (1994) “The effect of board size and diversity 
on strategic change”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 15 no. 3, pp. 241-250. 
Goodwin, J., and Seow, J. L. (2000) “Corporate governance in Singapore: perceptions of 
investors, directors and auditors”, in Accounting and Business Review, vol. 7 no. 1, 
pp. 39-68. 
Gopinath, C., Siciliano, J. L., and Murray, R. L. (1994) “Changing role of the board of 
directors: in search of a new strategic identity”, in The Mid-Atlantic Journal of 
Business, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 175-175. 
Gordon, J. N., and Roe, M. J. (2004) “Introduction”, in Gordon, J. N., and Roe, M. J. (ed.) 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gramling, A. A., Maletta, M. J., Schneider, A., and Church, B. K. (2004) “The role of the 
internal audit function in corporate governance: A synthesis of the extant internal 
auditing literature and directions for future research”, in Journal of Accounting 
Literature, vol. 23, pp. 194-244. 
Gray, I., and Manson, S. (2011) The Audit Process: Principles, Practice and Cases, 5
th
 
edition, Stamford: Cengage Learning EMEA. 
Greene, W. H. (2003) Econometric Analysis, 5
th
 Edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Gregory, H. I., and Simmelkjaer II, R. T. (2002) “Corporate Study of Corporate 
Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Members States”, A 
report for the European Commission Internal Market Directorate Generale, Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges LLP. Available at: 
http://www.odce.ie/Portals/0/Documents/Company%20law%20and%20you/Corpor
ate%20Governance/corp-gov-codes-rpt-part1_en.pdf 
Gregory, H. J., and Simmelkjaer II, R. T. (2002) Comparative Study of Corporate 
Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Member States. Weil: 
Gotshal & Manges. 
Groenewegen, J. (2000) “European integration and changing corporate governance 
structures: the case of France”, in Journal of Economic Issue, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 
471-479. 
Guatri, L., and Vicari, S. (1994) Firm system and capitalism by comparison. Value 
creation in different contests, Milan: Egea. Guatri, L., and Vicari, S. (1994) Sistemi 
d’impresa e capitalismi a confronto. Creazione di valore in diversi contesti, Milan: 
Egea. 
Guba, E., and Lincoln, Y. (1994) “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Methods”, in 
Denzin, N., and Lincoln, Y. (ed.) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Gubitta, P., and Gianecchini, M. (2002) “Governance and Flexibility in Family - Owned 
SMEs”, in Family Business Review, no. 4, pp. 277-299. 
Guest, P. (2009) “The Impact of Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from the 
UK”, The European Journal of Finance, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 385-404. 
Gugler, K. (ed.) (2005) Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003) Basic Econometric, 4
th
 Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
236 
 
Gulati, R., and Sytch, M. (2007) “Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence in 
interorganizational Relationships: Effects of Embeddedness on a Manudacturer’s 
Performance in Procurement Relationship”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, 
vol. 52, pp. 32-69. 
Habbash, M. (2010) “The Effectiveness Of Corporate Governance And External Audit On 
Constraining Earnings Management Practice In The Uk”, in Durham theses, 
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/448/  
Haleblian, J., and Rajagopalan, N. (2006) “A Cognitive Model of CEO Dismissal: 
Understanding the Influence of Board Perceptions, Attributions and Efficacy 
Beliefs”, in Journal of Management Studies, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 1009-1026. 
Hall, P. A., and Gingerich, D. W. (2001) “Varieties of capitalism and institutional 
complementarities in the macroeconomy: An empirical analysis”. Paper presented 
at the American Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco. 
Hall, P. A., and Soskice, D. (2001) Varieties of Capitalisms. The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford. 
Hambrick, D. C., Werder, A. V., and Zajac, E. J. (2008) “New Directions in Corporate 
Governance Research”, in Organization Science, vol. 19, pp. 381-385. 
Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R (2004) “The end of history for corporate law”, in 
Gordon, J. N., and Roe, M. J. (ed.) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harris, D., and Helfat, C. E. (1998) “CEO duality, succession, capabilities and agency 
theory: commentary and research agenda”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 
19, no. 9, pp. 901-904. 
Harris, M., and Raviv, A. (2008) “A Theory of Board Control and Size”, in Review of 
Financial Studies, vol. 21, pp. 1797-1832. 
Harrison, J. E., and Freeman, R. E. (1999) “Stakeholders, Social Responsibility, and 
Performance Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Perspectives”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 479-485. 
Hart, O. (1995) “Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications”, in Economic 
Journal, vol. 105, pp. 678- 689. 
Hart, O. (1995) Firms, contracts and financial structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Haunschild, P. R., and Beckman, C. M. (1998) “When Do Interlocks Matter? Alternate 
Sources of Information and Interlock Influence”, in Administrative Science 
Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 815-844. 
He, J. Y., and Wang, H. C. (2009) “Innovative knowledge assets and economic 
performance: The asymmetric roles of incentives and monitoring”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 52, pp. 919-938. 
Healy, P., and Wahlen, J. (1999) “A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting”, in Accounting Horizons, pp. 365-383. 
Helmich, D. L. (1974) “Organizational Growth and Succession Patterns”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 17, pp. 771-775. 
Helmich, D. L., and W. B. Brown (1972) “Successor Type and Organizational Change in 
the Corporate Enterprise”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 17, pp. 371-
381. 
237 
 
Hempel, C. (1966) Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.  
Hendry, J. (2005) “Beyond self-interest: Agency theory and the board in a satisfying 
world”, in British Journal of Management, vol. 16, pp. 55-63. 
Hermalin, B. E. (1994) “Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical 
Firms Choose Different Incentives for their Mangers”, in The RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 4, no. 25, pp. 518-537. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Wallace, N. E. (2001) “Firm performance and executive 
compensation in the savings and loan industry”, in Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 139-170. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (1988) “The Determinants of Board Composition”, 
in Journal of Economics, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 589-606. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (1991) “The effects of board composition and direct 
incentives on firm performance”, in Financial Management, vol. 20, pp. 101-112. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (2003) “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature”, in Economic Policy 
Review, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 7-26. 
Herman, E. S. (1981) Corporate control, Corporate power, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hermanson, S. R., and Rittenberg, L. E. (2003) “Internal audit and organizational 
governance”, in Bailey, A. D., Gramling, A. A., and Ramamoorti, S. (ed.) Research 
Opportunities in Internal Auditing, Altamonte Springs (FL): The Institute of 
Internal Auditors. 
Heugens, P., Van Oosterhout, J. H., and Van Essen, M. (2009) “Meta-analyzing ownership 
concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained 
understanding”, in Asia Pacific Journal of Management, no. 3, pp. 361-609.  
Hill, C. W., and Snell, S. A. (1989) “Effects of ownership structure and control on 
corporate productivity”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 25-
46. 
Hillman, A. J., and Dalziel, T. (2003) “Boards of directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource dependency perspectives”, in Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 383-396. 
Hillman, A. J., and Keim, D. G. (2001) “Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and 
social issues: what's the bottom line?”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 22, 
no. 2, pp. 125-139. 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., and Paetzold, R. L. (2000) “The Resource Dependence 
Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaption of Board Composition in Response 
to Environmental Change”, in Journal of Management Studies, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 
235-256. 
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., and Palia, D. (1999) “Understanding the Determinants 
of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 53, pp. 353-384. 
Hirsch; P., and Friedman, R. (1986) “Collaboration or paradigm shift? Economic vs 
behavioural thinking about policy?, in Pearce, J., and Robinson, R. (ed.) Best 
papers proceedings, Chicago: Academy of Management. 
238 
 
Hochle, D. (2007) “Robust Standard Errors for Panel Data Sets with Cross-Sectional 
Dependence”, in Stata Journal, vol. 7, pp. 281-312. 
Holden, M. T., and Lynch, P. (2004) “Choosing the Appropriate Methodology: 
Understanding Research Philosophy”, in The Marketing Review, no. 4, pp. 397-
409. 
Holderness, C. G. (2003) “A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control”, in Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 51-64. 
Hopt, K. J., and Leyens, P. C. (2004) “Board Models in Europe – Recent Developments of 
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Italy”, in European Company & Financial Law Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 
pp. 135-168.  
Hoque, Z. (2006) Methodological Issues in Accounting Research: Theories, Methods and 
Issues, London: Spiramus Press Ltd. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Arthurs, J. D., White, R. E., and Wyatt, C. (2013) “Multiple Agency 
Theory. An Emerging Perspective on Corporate Governance”, in Wright, M., 
Siegel, D. S., Keasey, K., Filatotchev, I. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of Corporate 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Castleton, M. W., and Withers, M. C. (2009) “Complementarity in 
Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive 
Compensation”, in Academy of Management Perspective, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 57-74. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., and Grossman, W. (2002) “Conflicting 
voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance 
on corporate innovation strategies, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 45, 
no. 4, pp. 697-716. 
Hossain, M., Prevost, A. K., and Rao, R. P. (2001) “Corporate Governance in New 
Zealand: The effect of the 1993 Companies Act on the relation between board 
composition and firm performance”, in Pacific Basin Finance Journal, vol. 9, pp. 
119-145. 
Hsiao, C. (2002) Analysis of Panel Data, 2
nd
 Edition, New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hsieh, T. J., Yeh, R. S., and Chen, Y. J. (2010) “Business Group Characteristics and 
Affiliated Firm Innovation: the Case of Taiwan”, in Industrial Marketing 
Management, vol. 39, pp. 560-570.  
Hsu, H. (2010) “The Relationship between Board Characteristics and Financial 
Performance: An Empirical Study of United States Initial Public Offerings”, in 
International Journal of Management, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 332-341. 
Hughes, J., and Sharrock, W. (1997) The Philosophy of Social Research, 3rd edition, 
Essex: Pearson. 
Hung, H. (1998) “A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards”, in 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 6, pp. 101-111. 
Huse, M. (2003) “Renewing management and governance: New Paradigms of 
governance?”, in Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 7, pp. 211-221. 
Huse, M. (2005a) “Accountability and Creating Accountability: a Framework for 
Exploring Behavioral Perspectives of Corporate Governance”, in British Journal of 
Management, vol. 1, no. 16, pp. 65-79. 
239 
 
Huse, M. (2005b) “Corporate governance: understanding important contingencies”, in 
"Corporate Ownership & Governance", vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 41-50. 
Huse, M. (2007) Boards, governance and value creation: The human side of corporate 
governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Huse, M. (2009) “Exploring methods and concepts in studies of board processes”, in Huse, 
M. (ed.) The value creating board: Corporate governance and organizational 
behaviour, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Huse, M., Hoskisson, R., Zattoni, A., Viganò, R. (2011) “New perspectives on board 
research: changing the research agenda”, in Journal of Management and 
Governance, vol. 15, pp. 5-28. 
Huse, M., Nielsen, S. T., and Hagen, I. M. (2009) “Women and Employee Elected Board 
Members, and Their Contributions to Board Control Tasks”, in Journal of Business 
Ethics, vol. 89, no. 4, pp. 581–597. 
Hussey, J., and Hussey, R. (1997) Business Research, Houndmills: MacMillan Business. 
Huther, J. (1997) “An empirical test of the effect of board size on firm efficiency”, in 
Economics Letters, vol. 54, pp. 259-264. 
Ibrahim, A. A and Samad, A. (2006) “Corporate governance in Pakistan: Analysis of 
current challenges and recommendations for future reforms”, in Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 323-332.  
IIARF (Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation) (2003) Internal Audit 
Reporting Relationships: Serving Two Masters, Altamonte Springs, FL: Institute of 
Internal Auditors. Available at www.theiia.org 
Ingley, C. B., and Van der Walt, N. T. (2001) “The Strategic Board: The Changing Role of 
Directors in Developing and Maintaining Corporate Capability”, in Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 174-185. 
Italian Code of Corporate Governance (2006). Available at: 
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/regolamenti/corporategovernance/corporat
egovernance.htm 
Italian Code of Corporate Governance (2011). Available at: 
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/regolamenti/corporategovernance/corporat
egovernance.htm 
Jackling, B., and Johl, S. (2009) “Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
India’s Top Companies”, in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 
17, no. 4, pp. 492-509. 
Jackson, G. (2005) “Stakeholders under Pressure: corporate governance and labour 
management in Germany and Japan”, in An International Review, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 
419-428. 
Jansson, E. (2005) “The stakeholder model: the influence of ownership and governance 
structure”, in Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 1-13. 
Japanese Code of Corporate Governance (2001). Available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=70 
Jensen, M. (1993) “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 48, pp. 831-880. 
240 
 
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. (1976) “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
cost and ownership structure”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 
305-350. 
Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. (1995) “Specific and general knowledge and organizational 
structure”, in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 8, pp. 4-18. 
Jick, T. D. (1979) “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in 
Action”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 602-611. 
Johnson, J., Daily, C., and Ellstrand, A. (1996) “Boards of Directors: A Review and 
Research Agenda”, in Journal of Management, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 409-438. 
Johnson, L., and Pillai, V. K. (2010) “Reproductive health and Millennium Development 
Goals: sustaining and planning for target attainment”, in International Journal of 
Sustainable Society, no. 2, pp. 17-25. 
Johnson, P., and Harris, D. (2002) “Qualitative and Quantitative Issues in Research 
Design”, in Partington, D. (ed.) Essential Skills for Management Research, London: 
Sage. 
Johnson, P., Jamal, K., and Berryman, R. (1991) “Effects of framing on auditor decisions”, 
in Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 50, pp. 75-105.  
Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., and Hitt, M. A. (1993) “Board of directors involvement 
in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and 
characteristics”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 14, pp. 3-50. 
Jones, T. M. (1995 ) “Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and 
economics, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 20, pp. 404-437. 
Jonsson, E. I. (2007) The Role of Boards of Directors and the Relationship with 
Organisational Performance, Unpublished Monogram, Henley Management 
College, London. 
Judge, P., and Reinhardt, A. (1997) “Seething shareholders”, Business Week, 9 June, p. 38. 
Judge, W. Q., and Zeithamal, C. P. (1992) “Institutional and strategic choice perspective 
on the board involvement in the strategic decision process”, in The Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 766-794. 
Jungmann, C. (2007) “The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-
Tier Board systems-Evidence from the UK and Germany”, in European Company 
and Financial Law Review, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 426-474. 
Kakabadse, N., and Kakabadse, A. (2004) “Pension funds governance: An overview of the 
role of trustees”, in International Journal Of Business Governance And Ethics, vol. 
1, no. 1, pp. 3-26. 
Kalbers, L. P., and Fogarty, T. J. (1998) “Organizational and Economic Explanations of 
Audit Committee Oversight”, in Journal of Managerial Issues, vol. 10, pp. 129-
151. 
Kamran, A., Hossain, M., and Adams, M. B. (2006) “The Effects of Board Composition 
and Board Size on the Informativeness of Annual Accounting Earnings”, in 
Corporate Governance: an International Review, vol. 14, no., pp.418-431. 
Kang, E., and Zardkoohi, A. (2005) “Board Leadership structure and Firm Performance”, 
in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 785-799. 
241 
 
Kaplan, A. (1964) The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioural Science, 
Scranton: PA. 
Kaplan, S. (1994a)”Top executive rewards ad firm performance: A comparison of Japan 
and United States”, in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, pp. 510-546. 
Kaplan, S. (1994b) “Top Executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany”, in 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 10, pp. 142-159. 
Kaplan, S. N., and Minton, B. A. (1994) “Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards. 
Determinants and implications for managers”, in Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 26, pp. 225-258. 
Kaplan, S., and Reishus, D. (1990) “Outside directorship and corporate performance”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 389-410. 
Kaplan, S., Martel, F., and Stromberg, P. (2004) “How do legal differences and learning 
affect financial contracts?”, working paper, University of Chicago. 
Kathuria, V., and Dash, S. (1999) “Board size and corporate financial performance: an 
investigation”, in Vikalpa, vol. 24, n. 3, pp. 11-17. 
Kaufman, A., and Englander, E. (2005) “A team production model of corporate 
governance”, in Academy of Management Executive, vol. 19, pp. 9-22. 
Kaymak, T., and Bektas, B. (2008) “East Meets West? Board Characteristics in an 
Emerging Market: Evidence from Turkish Banks”, in Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 550-561. 
Kennedy, P. (2003) A guide of Econometrics, 5
th
 Edition, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press. 
Kesner, I. F. (1988) “Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: an 
investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender”, in Academy of Management 
Journal, vol. 31, pp. 66-84. 
Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., and Carlsson, K. (2005) “Why Study Emerging Markets”. 
Available at: http://hbr.org/product/why-study-emerging-markets/an/706422-HCB-
ENG 
Kiel, G. C., and Nicholson, G. (2003) “Board composition and corporate performance: 
how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate 
governance”, in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 
pp. 189-205. 
Kiel, G. C., and Nicholson, G. J. (2005) “Evaluating boards and directors”, in Corporate 
Governance, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 613-631. 
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009) “The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, in 
Financial Market Trends, pp. 1-30. 
Klapper, L. F., and Love, I. (2004) “Corporate Governance, investor protection, and 
performance in emerging markets”, in Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 10, no. 5, 
pp. 703-728. 
Klein, A. (1998) “Firm performance and board committee structure”, in Journal of Law 
and Economics, vol. 1, no. 41, pp. 275-304. 
Klein, A. (2002) “Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management”, in Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 375-
401. 
242 
 
Klein, P., Shapiro, D., and Young, J. (2004) “Board independence and the family-owned 
firm”, in Canadian Investment Review, vol. 17, pp. 8-12.  
Klein, P., Shapiro, D., and Young, J. (2005) “Corporate governance, family ownership and 
firm value: the Canadian evidence”, in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, vol. 13, pp. 769-784. 
Kluge, N. (2005) “Corporate governance with co-determination. A Key element of the 
European social model”, in European Review of Labour and Research, vol. 11, no. 
2, pp. 163-177. 
Knapp, M. C. (1987) “An Empirical Study of Audit Committees Support for Auditors 
Involved in Technical Disputes With Client Management”, in The Accounting 
Review, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 578- 588.  
Knosnik, R. D. (1987) “Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate 
governance”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 32, pp. 163-185. 
Kochhar, R., and David, P. (1996) “Institutional investors and firm innovation: A test of 
competing hypotheses”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 17, pp. 73-84.  
Kochhar, R., and Hitt, M. A. (1998) “Linking corporate strategy to capital structure: 
Diversification strategy, type and source of financing”, in Strategic Management 
Journal, vol. 19, pp. 601-610. 
Koerniadi, H., and Tourani-Rad, A. (2012) “Does Board Independence Matter? Evidence 
from New Zealand”, in Australian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, vol. 
6, no. 2, pp. 3-18. 
Kohler, A. (1990) “National Effort Needed to Save the Non-Banks”, in Australian 
Financial Review, July 3
rd
. 
Kohler, U., and Kreuter, F. (2009) Data Analysis Using Stata, 2
nd
 Edition, USA: Stata 
Press. 
Kole, S. (1997) “The complexity of composition contracts”, in Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 79-104. 
Kose, J., and Senbet, L. (1998) “Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness”, in 
Journal of Banking & Finance, n. 4, pp. 371-403. 
Kosnik, R. D. (1987) “Greenmail: a study of board performance in corporate governance”, 
in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 163-185. 
Kraiczy, N. (2013) “An Analysis of Innovation Related Top Management Team Behaviors 
and Family Firm-Specific Characteristics”, in Innovation in Small and Medium-
Sized Family firms. 
Krause, R., and Semadeni, M. (2013) “Apprentice, departure, and demotion: An 
examination of the three types of CEO–board chair separation”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 56, pp. 805-826. 
Krause, R., Semadeni, M., and Cannella Jr, A. (2014) “CEO Duality: A Review and 
Research Agenda”, in Journal of Management, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 256-286. 
Krishnan, G. V. (2003) “Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain Earnings 
Management?”, in Accounting Horizons, Supplement, pp. 1-16. 
Krivogorsky, V. (2006) “Ownership, board structure, and performance in continental 
Europe”, in International Journal of Accounting, vol. 41, pp. 176-196. 
243 
 
Kuhn, T. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Kumar, N., and Singh, J. P. (2013) “Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm 
value: some empirical findings from India”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 13, no. 
1, pp. 88-98. 
La Porta, F., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (2000) “Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance”, in Journal of Financial Economics, no. 58, pp. 3-27. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny (2002), “Investor Protection 
and Corporate Valuation”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 57, pp. 1147-1170. 
Lacchini, M. (2002) Corporate governance and company accounts in the context of 
reform, Turin: Giappichelli. Lacchini, M. (2002)Corporate governance e bilanci 
d’impresa nella prospettiva della riforma, Turin: Giappichelli. 
Laing, D., and Weir, C. M. (1999) “Governance structures, size and corporate performance 
in UK firms”, in Management Decision, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 457-464. 
Lam, T. Y., and Lee, S. K. (2008) “CEO duality and firm performance: evidence from 
Hong Kong”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 299-316. 
Lan, L. L., and Heracleous, L. (2010) “Rethinking agency theory: the view from law”, in 
Academy of Management Review, no. 35, pp. 294-314. 
Lange, D., Boivie, S., and Westphal, J. D. (2011),“Predicting organizational identification 
at the CEO level”, in Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting of the Academy 
of Management, no. 59, pp. 1-6. 
Lange, H. P., and Sharpe, I. G. (1995) “Monitoring Costs and Ownership Concentration: 
Australian Evidence”, in Applied Financial Economics, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 441-447. 
Langevoort, D. C. (2001) “The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the 
unintended consequences of independence and accountability”, in Georgetown Law 
Journal, vol. 89, no. 4, pp. 797-832. 
Lanoo, K. (1995) “Corporate Governance in Europe”, CEPS Working Party Report, report 
no. 12, Center for European Policy Studies.  
Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., and Wang, C. C. (2011) “Boardroom centrality and firm 
performance”, working paper no. 84, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at 
Stanford University. 
Larker, D. F., Richardson, S. A., and Tuna, İ. (2007) “Corporate Governance, Accounting 
Outcomes and Organizational Performance”, in The Accounting Review, no. 4, pp. 
963-1008. 
Larmou, S., and Vafeas, N. (2010) “The relation between board size and firm performance 
in firms with a history of poor operating performance”, in Journal of Management 
and Governance, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 61-85. 
Larson, A. (1992) “Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings. A Study of the Governance 
of Exchange Relationships”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, n. 37, pp. 76-
104. 
Lasfer, M. A. (2002) “Board Structure and Agency Costs”, EFMA 2002 London Meetings 
Cass Business School Research Paper. 
Lawrence, J., and Stapledon, G. (1999) “Do independent directors add value?” Research 
Report CCLSR, University of Melbourne. 
244 
 
Lazzari, V. (2001) “Corporate Governance: Foundations, controversial aspects and future 
prospects”, in Economics & Management, no. 3, pp. 71-84. 
Leach, M. (1990) “Philosophical choice”, in Journal of Education, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 16-18. 
Learmount, S. (2002) “Theorizing corporate governance: New organizational alternatives”, 
unpublished working paper. ESRC Center for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge. 
Leblanc, R., and Gillies, J. (2005) Inside the Boardroom: How Boards Really Work and 
the Upcoming Revolution in Corporate Governance, Canada: Wiley. 
Leedy, P. D. (1989) Practical Research: Planning and Design, 5
th
 edition, New York: 
Macmillian Publishing Company. 
Lehn, K. M., Patro, S., and Zhao, M. (2009) “Determinants of the Size and Composition of 
US Corporate Boards: 1935-2000”, in Financial Management, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 
747-780. 
Lehn, K., Patro, S., and Zhao, M. (2007) “Governance Indices and Valuation: Which 
causes Which?”, in Journal of Corporate Finance, no. 13, pp. 907-928. 
Lennox, C., and Pittman, J. A. (2010) “Big Five Audits and Accounting Fraud”, in 
Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 209-247. 
Levine, R. (1997), “Financial development and economic growth: Views and agenda”, in 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol.35, pp. 688-726.  
Levine, R. (1999), “Foreign Bank Entry and Capital Control Liberalization: Effects on 
Growth and Stability”, University of Minnesota, mimeo. 
Levrau, A., and Van Den Berghe, L. (2007a) “Corporate Governance and Board 
Effectiveness: Beyond Formalism”, in The Icfai Journal of Corporate Governance, 
vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 55-85. 
Levrau, A., and Van Den Berghe, L. (2007b) “Identifying key determinants of eccefctive 
boards of directors”, in Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series, Vlerick Leuven 
Gent Management School, no. 11, pp. 1-58 
Lewellen, S., and Metrick, A. (2010) “Corporate Governance and equity prices: Are results 
robust to industry adjustment”, discussion paper, working paper, Yale of 
Management. 
Li, H., and Li, J. (2009) “Top management team conflict and entrepreneurial strategy 
making in China. Asia Pacific”, in Journal of Management, vol. 26, pp. 263-283. 
Lieder, J. (2010) “The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism”, in 
German Law Journal, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 115-158. 
Lin, J., Li, J., and Yang, J. (2006) “The Effect of Audit Committee Performance on 
Earnings Quality”, in Managerial Auditing Journal, vol. 21, no. 9, pp. 921–33. 
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., and Yang, T. (2008) “The determinants of board structure”, in 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 87, pp. 308-328. 
Lindenberg, E., and Ross, S. (1981) “Tobin’q ratio and industrial organization”, in Journal 
of Business, vol. 54, pp. 1-32. 
Lins, K., and Servaes, H. (1999) “International Evidence on the Value of Corporate 
Diversification”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 54, pp. 2215-2240. 
Lipton, M., and Lorsch, J. W. (1992) “A modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance”, in Business Lawyer, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 59-77. 
245 
 
Llewelyn, S. (2003) “What counts as “Theory” in Qualitative Management and 
Accounting Research” in Accounting and Accountability Research, vol. 16, no. 4, 
pp. 662-708. 
Loderer, C., and Peyer, U. (2002) “Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices”, 
in European Financial Management, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 165-192. 
Lorino, P. (1992) Strategic Management Control, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Lorino, P. (1992) 
Il controllo di gestione strategico. La gestione per attività, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Lorsch, J. W., and MacIver, E. (1989) Pawns or Potentates – The Reality of America’s 
Corporate Boards. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.  
Lubatkin, M. H., (2005) “A theory of the firm only a microeconomist could love”, in 
Journal of Management Inquiry, vol. 14, pp. 213-216. 
Lubatkin, M. H., Lane, P. J., Collin, S. O., and Very, P. (2005) “Origins of corporate 
governance in the USA, Sweden, and France”, in Organization Studies, vol. 26, pp. 
867-888. 
Lubrano, M. (2007) Corporate Governance in Brazil: Observations on 2000-2007 and 
comparisons with other Latin American and BRIC markets, IFC / World Bank 
Corporate Governance Dept, Washington. 
Luo, Y. (2006) Global dimensions of corporate governance, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
Luthans, F., and Davis, T. R. V. (1982) “An Idiographic Approach to Organizational 
Behavior Research: The Use of Single Case Experimental Designs and Direct 
Measures”, in Academy of Management, pp. 380-391. 
Lynall, M. D., Golden, B. R., and Hillman, A. J. (2003) “Board composition from 
adolescence to maturity: A multi-theoretical view”, in Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 28, pp. 416–431. 
Maassen, G. F. (1999) An International Comparison of Corporate Governance Models, 3
rd
 
Edition, Amsterdam: Spencer Stuart. 
Mace, M. (1971) Directors: Myth and Reality, Boston: Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration. 
Madonna, S., Cestari, G., and Maran, L. (2014) “The 1771 and 1824 reforms of the 
University of Ferrara: Foucauldian issues and the balance between central and local 
interests”, in Accounting History, forthcoming. 
Maher, M., and Andersson, T. (1999) “Corporate Governance: Effects on firm 
performance and Economic Growth”, in Organisation forEconomic Co-Operation 
and Devolpment. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/2090569.pdf 
Mak, Y. T., and Kusnadi, Y. (2005) “Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative 
relationship between board size and firm value”, in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
vol. 13, pp. 301-318. 
Mak, Y. T., and Rousch, M. L. (2000) “Factors affecting the characteristics of board of 
directors: an empirical study of New Zealand initial public offering firms”, in 
Journal of Business Research, vol. 47, pp. 147-159.  
Mak, Y. T., and Yuanto, K. (2003) “Board Size Really Matters: Further Evidence on the 
Negative Relationship Between Board Size and Firm Value”, Pulses by Singapore 
Stock Exchange. 
246 
 
Malguzzi, A. (2006) “Controls System and Information Flow of Listed companies. Internal 
audit role”, paper presented at Conference “Controls System and Information Flow 
of Listed Companies”, Milan Chartered Accountant, 13th October 2006. Malguzzi, 
A. (2006) “Il sistema dei controlli e il flusso delle informazioni nelle società 
quotate”, paper presented at Conference “Il sistema dei controlli e il flusso delle 
informazioni nelle società quotate”, Milan Chartered Accountant, 13th October 
2006. 
Mallette, P., and Fowler, K. L. (1992) “Effects of Board Composition and Stock 
Ownership on the Adoption of "Poison Pills"”, in The Academy of Management 
Journal, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 1010-1035. 
Mallin, C. A. (2004) Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mallin, C. A. (2010) Corporate Governance, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Managena, M., and Pike, R. (2005) “The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial 
expertise and size on interim financial disclosures”, in Accounting and Business 
Research, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 327-349. 
Marra, A., and Rizzo, A. (2010) “Corporate Governance, firm performance and earnings 
quality of Italian firms”, Rapporto di ricerca, SDA Bocconi – Osservatorio di 
Revisione, April 2010. Marra, A., and Rizzo, A. (2010) “Corporate Governance, 
performance aziendale e qualità degli utili delle aziende italiane”, Rapporto di 
ricerca, SDA Bocconi – Osservatorio di Revisione, April 2010. 
Martynova, M., and Renneboog, L. (2010) “Corporate Governance Index: Convergence 
and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulation”, Center Discussion 
Paper Series, no. 2010-17. 
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., and Xie, F. (2009) “Agency Problems at Dual-Class 
Companies”, in The Journal of Finance, vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1697-1727. 
Masulis, R.W., and Mobbs, S. (2009), “Are all inside directors the same? Do they entrench 
CEOs or facilitate more informed board decisions?”, ECGI Finance Working 
Paper, No. 249/2009. 
Mathiesen, H. (2002) Managerial Ownership and Financial Performance, PhD Thesis, 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Ph.D, Department of International 
Economics and Management. 
Matten, D., and Moon, J. (2004) “Corporate Social responsibility”, in Journal of Business 
Ethics, no. 4, pp. 323-337. 
Mazzotta, R. (2007) Corporate Governance and Firm performance. An analysis on 
Italians listed companies, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Mazzotta, R. (2007) La corporate 
governance e le performance aziendali. Un’analisi sulle società quotate italiane, 
Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
McCall, S. (2003) “Reconciling “consulting” under GAO and the IIA audit standards”, in 
Journal of Government Financial Management, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 32-38. 
McConnell, J. J., and Servaes, H. (1990) “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and 
Corporate Value”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 25, pp. 595-612. 
McCraw, T. K. (1990) “In Retrospect: Berle and Means Reviews”, in American History, 
vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 578-596. 
McGregor, D. (1960 ) The Human Side of Enterprise, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
247 
 
McIntyre
 M. L., and Murphy, S. A. (2007) “Board of director effectiveness committees”, 
in International Business Governance and Ethics, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 461-472. 
McKee, J. (2005) “Enhancing Shareholder value”, Report on Board Assessment Workshop 
for GCCs and CSAs. 
McKelvey, B. (2006) “Comment on Van De Ven and Johnson's 'Engaged Scholarship': 
Nice Try, But ...”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 31, pp. 822-829. 
McKnight, P. J., and Weir, C. (2009) “Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms 
and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data 
analysis”, in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, vol. 2, no. 49, pp. 
139-158. 
McMullen, D., and Raghundan, K. (1996) “Enhancing Audit Committee Effectiveness”, in 
Journal of Accountancy, vol. 182, pp. 79-81. 
Mehran, H. (1995) “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm 
Performance”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 38, pp. 163-185. 
Melis, A. (1999) Corporate Governance. An empirical analysis of the Italian situation in a 
European perspective, Turin: Giappichelli.  
Melis, A. (2000) “Corporate Governance in Italy”, in Corporate Governance: An 
International Review vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 347-355. 
Melis, A. (2004) “Financial reporting, corporate communication and governance”, in 
Corporate Ownership & Control, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 31-37. 
Melis, A. (2005) “Corporate Governance Failures: to what extent is Parmalat a particularly 
Italian Case?”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 478-488. 
Melville, R. (2003) “The contribution Internal Auditors Make the Strategy Management”, 
in International Journal of Accounting, no. 7, pp. 209-222. 
Melville, R., Jaichandani, K., and Teckchandani, N. (2011) “Where corporate governance 
and better firm performance meet: Empirical Evidence of Public Listed Companies 
in the GCC Region”, 9th Internal Auditing and Corporate Governance conference 
in London, April 2011. 
Mennicken, A., and Power, M. (2013) “Auditing and Corporate Governance” in Wright, 
M., Siegel, D. S., Keasey, K., Filatotchev, I. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of 
Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Menon, K., and Williams, J. D. (1994) “The use of audit committees for monitoring”, in 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, no. 13, pp. 121-139. 
Merchant, K. A., and Van der Stede, W. A. (2007) Management Control Systems. 
Performance Measurement, Evaluation and Incentives, USA: Pearson Education. 
Merton, R. K. (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: Free Press. 
Meruzzi, G. (2011) General clauses of corporation law, Padova: Cedam. Meruzzi, G. 
(2011) Le clausole generali nel diritto societario, Cedam: Padova. 
Miguel, A., Pindado, J., and de La Torre, C. (2001) “Ownership Structure and Firm Value: 
New Evidence from the Spanish Corporate Governance System", working Paper, 
EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings. 
Miles, M. B., and Huberman, A. M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis, 2nd edition, 
London: Sage. 
248 
 
Millstein, I. (1992) The limits of Corporate Power: Existing Contraints on the Exercise of 
Corporate Discretion, New York: Macmillan.  
Minichilli A., Gabrielsson J., and Huse M. (2007) “Board Evaluations: Making a Fit 
Between the Purpose and the System”, in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 609-622. 
Mintz, S. M. (2005) “Corporate Governance in an International Context: legal systems, 
financing patterns and cultural variables”, in Corporate Governance. An 
International Review, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 582-597. 
Mintzberg, H. (1983) “The Case for Corporate Social Responsibility”, in Journal of 
Business Strategy, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 3-15. 
Mio, C. (2005) Corporate social responsibility and control system: towards integration, 
Milan: FrancoAngeli. Mio, C. (2005) Corporate social responsability e sistema di 
controllo: verso l’integrazione, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1983) “Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between 
management and boards of directors in a large American corporations”, in Academy 
of Management Review, vol. 8, pp. 426-435. 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1996) “What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of 
research on interlocking directorates”, in Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 22, no. 
1, pp. 271-298.  
Molteni, M. (2004) Social responsibility and corporate performance, Milan: Vita e 
Pensiero. Molteni, M. (2004) Responsabilità sociale e performance d’impresa, 
Milan: Vita e Pensiero. 
Molteni, M. (ed.) (1997) The corporate governance systems in large Italian companies, 
Milan: Egea. Molteni, M. (ed.) (1997) I sistemi di corporate governance nelle 
grandi imprese italiane, Milan: Egea. 
Molz, R. (1988) Steps to strategic management: A guide for entrepreneurs, Plano (Texas): 
Wordware. 
Monda, B., and Giorgino, M. (2013) “Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value in 
Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis in Five Countries (France, Italy, Japan, UK, 
USA)”, in Munich Personal RePEc Archive, paper no. 45429. Available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45429/ 
Monks, R. A. G., and Minnow, N. (2008) Corporate governance, 4
th
 edition., Chichester: 
John Wiley & Wiley.  
Monks, R. A. G., and Minow, N. (1995) Corporate Governance, Cambridge: Blackwell 
Business. 
Monks, R. A. G., and Minow, N. (2004) Corporate Governance,3
rd
 edition, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Montefiori, C. (2009) Corporate governance and independent directors. State-Owned 
Listed companies, Rome: Aracne. Montefiori, C. (2009) La corporate governance e 
gli amministratori indipendenti. Le società quotate a controllo pubblico, Rome: 
Aracne. 
Montrone, A. (2004) The consolidated financial statements. Standards Evolution and 
methodology for its preparation, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Montrone, A. (2004) Il 
bilancio consolidato. Evoluzione normative e metodologia di redazione, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. 
249 
 
Montrone, A. (2005) The group financial statements between national and international 
accounting standards. Profiles evolutionary and comparative, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. Montrone, A. (2005) Il bilancio di gruppo tra normativa nazionale e 
principi contabili internazionali. Profili evolutivi e comparativa, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. 
Morck, R., and Yeung, B. (2003) “Agency problem in large family business groups”, in 
Entrepreneurship theory and practice, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 367-382. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1988) “Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 20, pp. 
293-315. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1989) “Alternative mechanisms for corporate 
control”, in American Economic Review, vol. 79, pp. 842-852. 
Morden, T. (2007) Principles of Strategic Management, London: Ashgate. 
Morera, U. (2007) “The Chairman of Supervisory Board”, in Alessi, R., Abriani, N., and 
Morera, E. U. (ed.) The Supervisory Board. New rules, Milan: Giuffè.  
Morgan, G., and Smircich, L. (1980) “The Case of Qualitative Research”, in Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 5, pp. 491-500. 
Mork, R., Strangeland, D. A., and Yeung, B. (2000) “Inherited wealth, corporate control 
and economic growth: The Canadian disease?”, NBER Working paper 6814. 
Moro, Visconti, R. (2001) The Governance in the Groups and in the corporate network, 
Milan: EtasLibri. 
Morvan, Y. (1985) Fondements d’économie industrielle, Paris: Economica. 
Mueller, G. C., and Barker, V. L. (1997) “Upper echelons and board characteristics of 
turnaround and nonturnaround declining firms”, in Journal of Business Research, 
vol. 39, pp. 119-134. 
Mura, R. (2007) “Do Non-Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from 
UK Panel Data”, in Financial Management, vol. 36, no. 3, pp.81-112. 
Namoga, M. O. (2011) Corporate Governance and board performance: empirical 
evidence from Pacific Island contries, PhD thesis, James Cook University. 
Available at: http://eprints.jcu.edu.au/18929/ 
Nanka-Bruce, D. (2009) “Corporate Governance and multi-dimensional performance”, 
Doctoral Thesis, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials, Departament 
d’Economia de l’Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 
Nelson, T. (2003) “The persistence of founder influence: Management, ownership, and 
performance effects at initial public offering”, in Strategic Management Journal, 
vol. 24, pp. 707-724. 
Neuman, W. (1997) Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches, 
Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon. 
Nicholson, G. I., and Kiel, G. C. (2004a) “Breakthrough Board Performance: How to 
Harness Your Board’s Intellectual Capital, in Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 5-23. 
Nicholson, G. I., and Kiel, G. C. (2004b) “A framework for diagnosis board effectiveness”, 
in Corporate Governance, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 442-460. 
250 
 
Nicholson, G., and Kiel, G. (2007) “Can Directors Impact Performance? A Case Based 
Test of Three Theories of Corporate Governance”, in Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 585-608. 
Nickell, S. (1996) “Competition and corporate performance”, in Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 104, pp. 724-746. 
Non, M., and Franses, P. H. (2007) “Interlocking boards and firm performance: evidence 
from a new panel database”, discussion paper, TI 2007-034/2 Tinbergen Institute. 
Nordberg, D. (2007) “Rebalancing the Board’s Agenda”, in Journal of General 
Management, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 35-52.  
Nordberg, D. (2011) Corporate Governance. Principles and Issues, London: Sage. 
Noreen, E. (1988) “The economics of ethics. A new perspective on agency theory”, in 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 13, pp. 359-370. 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge: University Press. 
North, D. C. (1992) “Institutions and Economic Theory”, in American Economist, vol. 36, 
no. 1, pp. 3-6. 
Norton, D., and Kaplan, R. (1996) The balanced scorecard. Translating strategy into 
action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Nottage, L., Wolff, L., and Anderson, K. (2008) Corporate Governance in the 21st 
Century: Japan's Gradual, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
O’Connel, V., and Cramer, N. (2010) “The relationship between firm performance and 
board characteristics in Ireland”, in European Management Journal, vol. 28, pp. 
387-399. 
O’Keefe, T., King, R., and Gaver, K. (1994) “Audit fee, industry specialization, and 
compliance with GAAS reporting standards”, in Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory, no. pp. 53-70. 
O’Neal, D., and Thomas, H. (1995) “Directors’ networks/director selection: The board’s 
strategic role”, in European Management Journal, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 79-90. 
Ocasio, W. (1994) “Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in 
US industrial corporations 196-1990”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 39, 
pp. 285-312. 
Ødegaard, B. A., and Bøhren, O. (2003) “Governance and Performance Revisited”, in 
European Corporate Governance, Sandvika, finance, working paper edition. 
OECD (2004), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf 
Olson, J. F., and Adams, M. T. (2010) “Composing a Balanced and Effective Board to 
Meet New Governance Mandates”, in The business Lawyer, vol. 59, pp. 422-452. 
Onetto, E. A. (2007) “Agency problems and the board of directors”, in Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, pp. 414-417. 
Owtscharov, A. (2007) The German system of finance and corporate governance: 
Gateways to change and implications for firm performance, University of St. 
Gallen, Studentendruckerei, Zurich. Available at: 
http://www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/3306/$FILE/dis3306.pdf 
251 
 
Paletta, A. (2008) The internal audit in corporate governance: principles, methods and 
experiences, Bologna: Il Mulino. Paletta, A. (2008) Il controllo interno nella 
corporate governance: principi, metodi ed esperienze, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Palmer, D. (1983) “Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate 
Coordination”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 40-55. 
Palmon, O., and Wald, J. K. (2002) “Are two heads better than one? The impact of changes 
in management structure on performance by firm size’’, in Journal of Corporate 
Finance, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 213-226. 
Palmrose, Z. V. (1986) “Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence”, in Journal of 
Accounting Research, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 97-110. 
Palmrose, Z. V. (1988) “An Analysis of Auditor Legislation and Audit Service Quality”, in 
The Accounting Review, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 37-62. 
Palpacuer, F. (2006) “The global sourcing patters of French clothing retailers”, in 
Environment and Planning, vol. 28, no. 12, pp. 2271-2283. 
Parbonetti, A. (2006) Corporate Governance. Configuration Issues for the Government 
and reflections on trends in business, Milan: Giuffré. Parbonetti, A. (2006) 
Corporate Governance. Problemi di configurazione dell’organo di governo e 
riflessi sugli andamenti aziendali, Milan: Giuffré. 
Parker, S. (1997) “The effect of audit committees on financial reporting”, Unpublished 
dissertation, University of Oregon. 
Parkinson, J. E. (1993) Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Pathiban, D., and Rahul, K. (1996) “Barriers to Effective Corporate Governance by 
Institutional Investors: Implication for Theory and Practice”, in European 
Management Journal, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 457-466. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd edition, Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications. 
Pearce, J. A., and Zahra, S. A. (1992) “Board composition from a strategic contingency 
perspective”, in Journal of Management Studies, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 411-438. 
Pedhazur, E. J., and Schmelkin, L. P. (1991) Measurement, design, and analysis: An 
integrated approach, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publications. 
Peel, M. J., and O’Donnell, E. (1995) “Board structure, corporate performance and auditor 
independence”, in Corporate Governance – An International Review”, vol. 3, pp. 
207-217. 
Peij, S. C., Bezemer, P. J., and Maassen, G. F. (2012) “The effectiveness of supervisory 
boards: an exploratory study of challenges in Dutch boardrooms”, EURAM 
conference 2012, Rotterdam. 
Pendleton, A. (2005) “How far does the United Kingdom have a market-based system of 
corporate governance?”, in Competition and Change, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 107-126. 
Peng, M. W. (2004) “Outside directors and firm performance during institutional 
transition”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 25, pp. 453-471. 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., and Chen, H. (2009) “The institution-based view as 
a third leg for a strategy tripod”, in Academy of Management Perspectives, vol. 23, 
no. 3, pp. 63-81. 
252 
 
Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., and Li, X. (2007) “CEO duality and firm performance during 
China’s institutional transitions”, in Management and Organization Review, vol. 3, 
pp. 205-225. 
Perna, R. (1998) Public Company and corporate democracy, Bologna: Il Mulino. Perna, R. 
(1998) Public Company e democrazia societaria, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Perry, T., and Peyer, U. (2005) “Board seat accumulation by executives: a shareholder’s 
perspective”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 2083-2123.  
Petersen, T. (2004) “Analysis Panel Data: Fixed and Random Effects Models” in Hardy, 
M., and Bryman, A. (ed.) Handbook of Data Analysis, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Petra, S. T. (2005) “Do outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards?”, in 
Corporate governance, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 55-64. 
Petrovic, J. (2008) “Unlocking the role of a board director: a review of the literature”, in 
Management Decision, vol. 46, no. 9, pp. 1373-1392. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1992) “On Studying managerial elites”, in Strategic Management 
Journal, vol. 13, pp. 163-182. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972) “Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The 
Organization and its Environment”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, no. 2, pp. 
218-228.  
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. R. (1978) The External Control of Organizations. A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper & Row. 
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. R. (2003) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper and Row. 
Pham, P. K., Suchard, J., and Zein, J (2007) “Corporate governance, cost of capital and 
performance: Evidence form Australian firms”, working paper, School of Banking 
and Finance. University of New South Wales. 
Phillips, P. P., and Phillips, J. J. (2008) ROI Fundamentals: Why and When to Measure 
Return on Investment, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Pi, L., and Timme, S. G. (1993) “Corporate control and bank efficiency”, in Journal of 
Banking and Finance, vol. 17, pp. 515-530. 
Pilotti, L., and Rullani, E. (2007) “Corporate Governance and the knowledge society 
between theory and practice”, in Synergies, no. 73-74, pp. 43-86. 
Pincus, K., Rusbarsky, M., and Wong, J. (1989) “Voluntary formation of corporate audit 
committees among NASDAQ firms”, in Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 
no. 8, pp. 239-265.  
Piore, M., and Sabel, C. (1984) The second industrial divide, New York: Basic Books. 
Poddighe, F. (2001) The firm in the institutional phase, Pisa: Plus Edition. Poddighe, F. 
(2001), L’azienda nella fase istituzionale, Pisa: Plus Edition  
Podestà, S. (1993) “Neo-managerialism and theory of value. Reflections on Aoki”, in 
Finanza, Marketing e Produzione, no. 1. Podestà, S. (1993) “Neomanagerialismo e 
teoria del valore. Riflessioni su Aoki”, in Finanza, Marketing e Produzione, n. 1, 
1993. 
Popper, K. (1994) The Myth of the Framework, London: Routhledge. 
Porter, M. E. (1995). “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City”, in Harvard Business 
Review, pp. 55- 71.  
253 
 
Post, J. E., Preston, L. E., and Sachs, S. (2002) “Managing the Extended Enterprise: The 
New Stakeholder View”, in California Management Review, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 6-
28. 
Postma, T. J. B. M., Vans Ees, H., and Sterken, E. (2003) “Board Composition and firm 
performance in the Netherlands”, in Eastern Economic Journal, vol. 29, pp. 41-58. 
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pozzoli, S. (1996) Key success Factors. Analysis about strategy and control, Padova: 
Cedam. Pozzoli, S. (1996) Fattori critici di successo. Un’analisi ai fini di strategia 
e controllo, Padova: Cedam. 
Pratt, M. G., and Foreman, P. O. (2000) “Classifying managerial responses to multiple 
organizational identities”, in The Academy of Management Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 
pp. 18-42. 
Proietti, L. (2007) “The multiple meanings of "governance": towards a clarification in the 
optical business management”, in Synergies, no. 73-74, pp. 345. 
Puchniak, W. D. (2003) “The 2002 Reform of the Management of Large Corporations in 
Japan: A Race to Somewhere?”, in Australian Journal of Asian Law, vol. 5, no. 1, 
pp. 42-49. 
Pugliese, A. (2008) Evolutionary paths of corporate governance, Padua: CEDAM. 
Pye, A. (2000) “Changing Scenes In, From and Outside the Board Room: UK Corporate 
Governance in Practice from 1989-1999”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 8, pp. 
335-346. 
Pye, A., and Pettigrew, P. (2005) “Studying Board Context, Processes and Dynamics”, in 
British Journal of Management, vol. 16, pp. 27-38. 
Quagli, A. (2004) Communicating the future, Financial Disclosure of Italian Listed 
Companies, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Quagli, A. (2004) Comunicare il futuro, 
L’informativa economico-finanziaria di tipo previsionale delle società quotate 
italiane, Milan: FrancoAngeli. 
Quigley, T. J., and Hambrick, D. C. (2012) “When the former CEO stays on as board 
chair: Effects on successor discretion, strategic change, and performance”, in 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 33, pp. 834-859. 
Raheja, C. (2005) “Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate 
boards,” in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 40, pp. 283-305. 
Rajan, R. G., and Zingales, L. (1998b) “Power in Theory of the firm”, in Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, vol. 113, no. 2, pp. 387-432. 
Rajan, R., and Zingales, L. (1998a) “Financial dependence and growth”, in American 
Economic Review, no. 4, pp. 559-586. 
Rasmussen, J. L., and Huse, M. (2011) “Corporate governance in Norway: women and 
employee-elected board member, in Mallin, C. A. (ed.) Handbook on International 
Corporate Governance: Country Analyeses, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Rechner, P. L., and Dalton, D. R. (1989) “The impact of CEO as board chairperson on 
corporate performance: Evidence vs. rhetoric”, in Academy of Management 
Executive, vol. 3, pp. 141-143. 
254 
 
Rechner, P. L., and Dalton, D. R. (1991) “CEO duality and organizational performance: a 
longitudinal analysis”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 155-
160. 
Reddy, K., Locke, S. M., and Scrimgeour, F. G. (2010) “The efficacy of principle-based 
corporate governance practices and firm financial performance: An empirical 
investigation”, in International Journal of Managerial Finance, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 
190-219. 
Reddy, K., Locke, S. M., Scrimgeour, F. G., and Gunasekarage, A. (2008), “Corporate 
governance practices of small cap companies and their financial performance: an 
empirical study in New Zealand”, in International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 51-78. 
Regalli, M., Ielasi, F., and Soana, M. G. (2011) “Measuring corporate governance: 
objectives and solutions by comparison”, in Forum Bancaria, no. 3, pp. 20-38. 
Reichert, J. (2008) “Experience with the SE in Germany”, in Utrecht Law Review, vol. 4, 
no. 1, pp. 22-37. 
Remenyi, D (1990) “Strategic Information Systems Current Practice and Guidelines”, 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Henley Management College, United 
Kingdom. 
Remenyi, D. (1995) So You Want to Be an Academic Researcher in Business and 
Management Studies, Henley Management College. 
Remenyi, D. (1998) Doing Research in Business and Management: An Introduction to 
Process and Method, London: Sage. 
Remenyi, D., Money, A., Sherwood-Smith, M., and Irani, Z. (2000) The Effective 
Measurement and Management of IT Costs and Benefits, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinenmann. 
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A., and Swartz, E. (1998) Doing Research in Business 
and Management: An Introduction to Process and Method, London: Sage. 
Renton, T. (1999) Standards for the Board, Institute of Directors, London: Director 
Publications. 
Renton, T. (1999) Standards for the Board, London: Institute of Directors. 
Reynolds, J. K., and Francis, J. R. (2001) “Does size matter? The influence of large clients 
on office-level auditor reporting decisions”, in Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, vol. 30, pp. 375-400. 
Rhoades, D. L., Rechner, P. L., and Sundaramurthy, C. (2001) “A meta-analysis of board 
leadership structure and financial performance: are two heads better than one?”, in 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 311-319. 
Rhodes, M., and Van Apeldoorn, B. (1997) “Capitalism versus capitalism in Western 
Europe”, in Rhodes, M., Heywood, P., and Wright, V. (ed.) Developments in 
Western European Politics, New York: St Martin’s Press.  
Ricciardi, A (2002) “The strategic management of the company”, in Fabbrini, G., and 
Montrone, A. (ed.) Business Administration. Foundations and evolution of the 
discipline, Milano: Franco Angeli. Ricciardi, A. (2002) “La gestione strategica 
dell’impresa”, in Fabbrini, G., and Montrone, A. (ed.) Economia aziendale. 
Fondamenti ed evoluzione della disciplina, Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
255 
 
Rinaldi, A., and Vasta, M. (2005) “The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952–1972: new 
evidence using the interlocking directorates technique”, in Financial History 
Review, vol. 12, pp. 173-198. 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., and Stiles, R. (2005) “Beyond agency conceptions of the work of 
the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom”, in British 
Journal of Management, vol. 16, pp. 5-26. 
Robson, C. (2002) Real World Research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-
researchers, 2
nd
 Edition, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Roe, M. (1994) Weak Owners, Strong Managers, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Romano, R. (2005) “Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate 
Governance?”, in New York University Law and Economics, Working Papers. 
Paper 16. Available at: http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/16 
Rosenau, P. M. (1992) Post-modernism and the Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads, and 
Intrusions, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt J. G. (1990) “Outside directors, board independence, and 
shareholder wealth”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 175-
191. 
Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt J. G. (1997) “Inside directors, board effectiveness and 
shareholder wealth”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 44, pp. 229-250. 
Rossi, G. (2001) “Can the so-called rules of "corporate governance" influence the 
behaviour of managers?”, in Rivista delle società, vol. 46, p. 8. Rossi, G. (2001) 
“Le c.d. regole di "corporate governance" sono in grado di incidere sul 
comportamento degli amministratori?”, in Rivista delle società, vol. 46, p. 8. 
Rousseeuw, P., and Leroy, A. (2003) Robust regression and outliers detection, New 
Jersey: John Wiley. 
Rudestam, K. E., and Newton, R. R. (1992) Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive 
Guide to Content and Process, Newbury Park: Sage. 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., and Keller, P. (2006) “Board characteristics and involvement in 
strategic decision making; evidence from Swiss companies”, in Journal of 
Management Studies, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 1201-1226. 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P., and Hu, Y. (2006) “The determinants and 
effects of board nomination committees”, in Journal of Management and 
Governance, vol. 2, no. 10, pp. 119-148.  
Ruud, T. F. (2003) “The internal audit function: and integral part of organizational 
governance”, in Bailey, A., Gramling, A., and Ramamoorti, S. (ed.) Research 
Opportunities in Internal Auditing, Altamonte Springs: IIA - The Institute of 
Internal Auditors. 
Sajid, G., Muhammad, S., Nasir, R., and Farman, A. (2012) “Agency cost, corporate 
governance and ownership structure: the case of Pakistan”, Air university 
Islamabad, MPRA, paper no. 42418. Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/42418/ 
Salvioni, D. M. (2007) Corporate governance, control and transparency, Milan: 
FrancoAngeli. Salvioni, D. M. (2007) Corporate governance, controllo e 
trasparenza, Milano: FrancoAngeli.  
256 
 
Salvioni, D. M. (2010) “Intangible Assets and Internal Controls in Global Companies”, in 
Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management, no. 2, pp. 39-51. 
Santella, P., Drago, C., and Polo, A. (2007) “The Italian Chamber of Lords sits on Listed 
Company Boards: an Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Companies Boards from 
1998 to 2006”, MPRA, paper n. 2265. 
Santella, P., Drago, C., Polo, A. and Gagliardi, E. (2008) “A Comparison of the Director 
Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States”, MPRA, paper n. 16397. 
Santesso, E. (2010) Lessons in business administration, Milan: Giuffrè. Santesso, E. 
(2010) Lezioni di economia aziendale, Milano: Giuffrè.  
Sarantakos, S. (2005), Social Research, 3
rd
 Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Saunderes, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2007) Research Method for Business 
Students, Essex: Prentice-Hall. 
Saunders, M. and Lewis, P. (2003) Research Methods for Business Students, Essex: 
Pearson Education Limited. 
Schein, E. H. (1983) “The role of the founder in the creation of organisational culture”, in 
Organisational Dynamics, vol. 12, pp. 13-28. 
Schellenger, M. H., Wood, D. D., and Tashakori, A. (1989) “Board of Director 
Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and Dividend Policy”, in Journal of 
Management, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 457-467. 
Schilling, F. (2001) “Corporate Governance in Germany: the Move to Shareholder Value”, 
in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 9, pp. 148-151.  
Schulze W. S., Lubatkin M. H., Dino N. R., (2003), “Toward a theory of agency and 
altruism in family firms”, in Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 18, pp. 473-490. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., and Buchholtz, A. K. (2001) “Agency 
relationship in family firms: theory and evidence”, in Organizational Science, vol. 
12, no. 2, 99-116. 
Sciarelli, S. (2002) Economics and management. Economics and Governance, vol. I, 2nd 
edition, Padua: Cedam. Sciarelli, S. (2002) Economia e gestione dell’impresa. 
Economia e governo dell’impresa, vol. I, 2a edizione, Padova: Cedam. 
Selim, G., Woodward, S., and Allegrini, M. (2009) “Internal Auditing and Consulting 
Practice: A Comparison between UK/Ireland and Italy”, in International Journal of 
Auditing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 9-25. 
Shakir, R. (2008) “Board size, board composition and property firm performance”, in 
Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Shen, W. (2003) “The dynamics of the CEO–board relationship: An evolutionary 
perspective”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 28, pp. 466-476. 
Sherwin, L. (2003) “Building an effective board”, in Bank Accounting and Finance, vol. 
16, no. 5, pp. 22-28. 
Shivdasani, A. (1993) “Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers”, in 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 16, pp. 167-195. 
Shivdasani, A. and Yermack, D. (1999) “CEO involvement in the selection of new board 
members: an empirical analysis”, in Journal of Finance, vol. 54, pp. 1829-1853. 
257 
 
Shleifer, A., and Summers, L. (1988) “Breach of trust in hostile takeovers”, in Auerbach, 
A. (ed.) Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishney, R. W. (1997) “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, in The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 737-783. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1986) “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, in 
The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 461-488. 
Short, H. (1994) “Ownership, Control, Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms”, 
in Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 203-249. 
Sierra Garcia, L., Ruiz Barbadillo, E., and Orta Pe´rez, M. (2012) “Audit committee and 
internal audit and the quality of earnings: empirical evidence from Spanish 
companies”, in Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 16, pp. 305-331. 
Silverman, D. (2005) Doing Qualitative Research, 2
nd
 edition, London: Sage. 
Simunic, D., and Stein, M. (1987) Product differentiation in auditing: Auditor choice in 
the market for unseasoned new issues, Research monograph no. 13, Vancouver: 
Canadian Certified General Accountants’ Research Foundation.  
Singh, A. (1992) “Corporate Take-Overs”, in Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. 
(ed.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, London: Macmillan. 
Sirmans, G. S., Friday, H. S., and Price, R. M. (2006) “Do Management Changes Matter? 
An Empirical Investigation of REIT Performance”, in Journal of Real Estate 
Research, vol. 28, pp. 132-148. 
Soana, M. G., Stefanelli, V. (2009) “Il modello dualistico nelle società italiane non 
bancarie quotate”, in Casiraghi, R., Negri Clementi, G., and Schwizer, P (ed.) Il 
modello dualistico. Dalla norma all’attuazione, Milano: Il Sole 24 Ore. 
Solomon, J. (2007), Corporate Governance and Accountability, 2
nd
 edition, West Sussex: 
John Wiley & Son. 
Solomon, J. (2011) Corporate Governance and Accountability, 3
rd
 edition, West Sussex: 
John Wiley & Son. 
Solomon, J., and Solomon A., (2004) Corporate Governance and Accountability, 
Chichester: John Wiley & Son. 
Sommer, A. A. Jr (1991) “Auditing audit committees: an educational opportunity for 
auditors”, in Accounting Horizons, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 91-93. 
Song, J., and Windram, B. (2004) “Benchmarking Audit Committee Effectiveness in 
Financial Reporting”, in International Journal of Auditing, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 195-
207. 
Sonnerfeld, J. A. (2002) “What makes great boards great?”, in Harvard Business Review, 
vol. 80, no. 9, pp. 106-113. 
Sorci, C., and Faldetta, G. (2008) Groups of companies as an instrument of government, 
Milan: Giuffre. Sorci, C., and Faldetta, G. (2008) I gruppi come strumento di 
governo delle aziende, Milano: Giuffrè. 
Spencer, A. (1983) On the edge of organisation: the role of outside director, New York: 
Wiley. 
Spira, L. (1999) “Ceremonies of governance: perspectives on the role of the Audit 
Committee”, in Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 3, pp. 231-260. 
258 
 
Spira, L. F., and Page, M. (2003) “Risk management. The reinvention of internal control 
and the changing role on internal audit”, in Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 640-661. 
Sridharan, U. V., and Marsinko, A. (1997) “Ceo duality in the paper and forest products 
industry”, in Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 59-
65. 
Stein, J. (1988) “Takeover threat and managerial myopia”, in Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 96, no. 4, pp. 337-342. 
Stein, J. (1989) “Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate 
behavior”, in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, no. 4, pp. 655-669. 
Sternberg, E. (1997) “The defects of stakeholders theory”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 
5, no. 1, pp. 3-10. 
Stiles, P., and Taylor, B. (2001) Boards at work – how directors view their roles and 
responsibilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stoeberl, P. A., and Sherony, B. C. (1985) “Board Efficiency and Effectiveness”, in 
Mattar, M., and Ball, M. (ed.) Handbook for Corporate Directors, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Storey, D. (1994) Understanding the small business sector, New York: Routledge. 
Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. (1994) “Grounded theory methodology”, in Denzin, N. K., and 
Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 273-285). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Sudarsanam, S., and Broadhurst, T. (2012) “Corporate governance convergence in 
Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for 
London Stock Exchange”, in Journal of Management and Governance, vol. 16, no. 
36, pp. 235-268. 
Sundaram, R. K., and Banks, J. S. (1993) “Adverse selection and moral hazard in a 
repeated elections model”, in Barnett, W. A., Hinich, M. J., and Schoefielf, N. J. 
(ed.) Political economy. Institutions, competition and representation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sundaramurthy, C., and Lewis, M. (2003) “Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of 
governance”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 28, pp. 397-415. 
Switzer, L. N., and Cao, Y. (2011) “Shareholder interests vs board of director members’ 
interests and company performance. A new look”, in Review of Accounting and 
Finance, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 228-245. 
Taylor, P. N. (2010) Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Companies Act 2006, PhD 
Thesis at Birkbeck College, London. 
Thompson, J. D. (1967) Organization in Action, New York: Harper and Row. 
Ticehurst, G. W., and Veal, A. J. (1999) Business Research Methods: A Managerial 
Approach, Australia: Addison Wesley Longman.  
Tirole, J. (1986) “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in 
Organizations”, in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 2, pp. 181-
214. 
259 
 
Tiscini, R., and Di Donato, F. (2005) “The relation between accounting frauds and 
corporate governance systems: an analysis of recent scandals”, in Global Business 
and Finance Review, pp. 1-16. 
Treadway Commission Report (1987) Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. Available at: http://www.coso.org/publications/ncffr.pdf 
Tricker, B. (2009) Corporate Governance. Principles, Policies, and Practices, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Tricker, R. I. (1984) Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Powers in British 
Companies and Their Board of Directors, Aldershot: Gower. 
Tricker, R. I. (2000) Corporate Governance, Aldershot: Ashcroft Publishing. 
Turnbull (1997) “Corporate Governance: its scope, concern and theories”, in Corporate 
Governance: an International Review, no. 4, pp.180-200.  
UK Code of Corporate Governance (2012). Available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-
Code.aspx 
US Code of Corporate Governance (2012). Available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php 
Useem, M. (1984) The Inner Circle, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Vafeas, N. (1999) “Board meeting frequency and firm performance”, in Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 113-142. 
Vafeas, N., and Theodorou, E. (1998) ‘‘The relationship between board structure and firm 
performance in the UK’’, in The British Accounting Review, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 383-
407. 
Vagliasindi, M. (2008) “The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned 
Enterprises in Developing Countries”, in The World Bank Sustainable Development 
Network, Policy Research Working Paper no. 4579.  
Valenti, M., Luce, R. and Mayfiled, C. (2011) “The effects of firm performance on 
corporate governance”, in Management Research Review, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 266-
283. 
Van de Berghe, L. A. A., and Levrau, A. (2004) “Evaluating Boards of Directors: What 
Constitutes a Good Corporate Board?”, in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 461-477. 
Van de Ven, A. H. (1992) “Suggestions for Studying Strategy Process: A Research Note”, 
in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 13, pp. 84-93. 
Van de Ven, A. H., and Johnson, P. E. (2006) “Knowledge for theory and practice”, in 
Academy of Management Review, vol. 31, pp. 802–821. 
Van Ees, H., Gabrielsson, J., and Huse, M. (2009) “Towards a Behavioral Theory of 
Boards and Corporate Governance”, in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 307-319. 
Van Hamel, J., Van Wijk, H., De Rooij, A., and Bruel, M. (1998) “Boardroom Dynamics – 
Lessons in Governance”, in Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 
6, pp. 193-201 and 284-288. 
Vancil, R. F. (1987) Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession, Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press.  
260 
 
Verschoor, C. C. (1989) “A case study of audit committee ineffectiveness at Sundstrand”, 
in Internal Auditing, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 11-19. 
Verschoor, C. C. (1990) “Miniscribe: a new example of audit committee ineffectiveness”, 
in Internal Auditing, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 13-19. 
Vinten, G., and Lee, C. (1993) “Audit committees and corporate control”, in Managerial 
Auditing Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 25-30. 
Volpin, P. F. (2002) “Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top 
executive turnover in Italy”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 
61-90. 
Waldo, C. N. (1985) Board of Directors: Their Changing Roles, Structure, and 
Information Needs, New York: Quorum.  
Walsh, J. P., and Seward, J. K. (1990) “On the efficiency of Internal and External 
corporate control mechanisms”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 15, pp. 
421-456. 
Wang, Y., and Oliver, J. (2009) “Board composition and firm performance variance: 
Australian evidence”, in Accounting Research Journal, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 196-212. 
Warner, J., Watts, R., and Wreuck, K. (1988) “Stock Prices and Management Changes”, in 
Journal of Finance, vol. 20, pp. 461-492. 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. (1986) Positive Accounting Theory, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Waymire, T. R. S. (2008) “Internal and External Control Mechanisms: The Impact of 
Alignment on Market and Operating Performance”, PhD Theses, University of 
Arcansas. 
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society, vol. 1, no. 10 cited in Searle, C. (1998) 
Researching Society and Culture, London: Sage, p. 16. 
Weimer, J., and Pape, J. C. (1999) “A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance”, in 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 7, pp. 152-166. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) “Outside directors and CEO turnover”, in Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 20, pp. 431-460. 
Westphal, J. D. (1999) “Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioural and performance 
consequences of CEO-board social ties”, in Academy of Management Journal, vol. 
42, pp. 7-24. 
Westphal, J. D., and Bednar, M. D. (2005) “Pluralistic ignorance in corporate boards and 
firms’ strategic persistence in response to low firm performance”, in Administrative 
Science Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 68-76. 
Williams, M., and May, T. (1996) Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Research, 
London: UCL Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1998) “Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance”, in Journal of 
Finance, vol. 43, pp. 567-591. 
Williamson, O. E. (1998) The mechanisms of governance. The cost economics of 
transition: concepts, tools, applications, Milan: FrancoAngeli. Williamson, O. E. 
(1998) I meccanismi del governo. L’economia dei costi di transizione: concetti, 
strumenti, applicazioni, Milano: FrancoAngeli. 
261 
 
Wiseman, R. M., and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) “A behavioral agency model of 
managerial risk taking”, in Academy of Management Review, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 
133-153. 
Woidtke, T. (2002) “Agents Watching Agents? Evidence from pension Fund Ownership 
and Firm Value”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 63, pp. 99-131. 
Wooldridge, J. (2006) Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach, 3
rd
 Edition, 
Mason: Thomas South-Western. 
Worrell, D. L., Nemec, C., and Davidson, W. N., III. (1997) “One hat too many: Key 
executive plurality and shareholder wealth”, in Strategic Management Journal, vol. 
18, pp. 499-507. 
Wright, M., Siegel, D. S., Keasey, K., Filatotchev, I. (2013) (ed.) The Oxford handbook of 
Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wright, S., and Wright, A. (1997) “The effect of industry specialization on hypothesis 
generation and audit planning decisions”, in Behavioral Research in Accounting, 
vol. 9, pp. 273-294. 
Wu, H. (2008) “How do board-CEO relationships influence the performance of new 
product introduction? Moving from to single to interdependent explanations”, in 
Corporate Governance, vol. 16, no. 2., pp. 77-79. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W., and DaDalt, P. (2003) “Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Roles of the Board and the Audit Committee”, in Journal of 
Corporate Finance, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 295-317. 
Yammeesri, J., and Herath, S. K. (2010) ‘‘Board characteristics and corporate value: 
evidence from Thailand’’, in Corporate Governance, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 279-292. 
Yang, T., and Zhao, S. (2013) “CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Evidence from an 
Exogenous Shock to the Competitive Environment”. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177403 
Yermack, D. (1996) “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors”, in Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 40, pp. 185-211. 
Yermack, D. (2004) ‘‘Remuneration, retention and reputation incentives for outside 
directors’’, in The Journal of Finance, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 2281-2308. 
Zahra, S. A. (1996) “Governance, ownership, and corporate entrepreneurship: The 
moderating impact of industry technological opportunities”, in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 39, pp. 1713-1735. 
Zahra, S., and Pearce, J. (1989) “Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: 
a review and integrate model”, in Journal of Management, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 291-
334. 
Zajac, E. J., and Westphal, J. D. (1996) “Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the 
dynamics of the board interlocks”, in Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 41, pp. 
507-529. 
Zangrandi, A. (2008) Economics of public companies. Management and Change, Milan: 
Egea. 
Zappa, G. (1957) The business income, second edition, Milan: Giuffrè. 
Zattoni, A. (1999) “The structure of Corporate Groups: The Italian Case”, in Corporate 
Governance - An International review, no. 7, pp. 38-48.  
262 
 
Zattoni, A. (2000) Management and Governance business groups, Milan: Egea. Zattoni, A. 
(2000) Economia e governo dei gruppi di imprese, Milan: Egea.  
Zattoni, A. (2004) The Italian companies institutional asset, Milan: Egea. Zattoni, A. 
(2004) L’assetto istituzionale delle imprese italiane, Milan: Egea 
Zattoni, A. (2005) The institutional structure of Italian companies, Milan: Egea. Zattoni, 
A. (2005), L’assetto istituzionale delle imprese italiane, Milan: Egea. 
Zattoni, A. (2006) Corporate Governance, Milan: Egea. 
Zattoni, A., and Cuomo, F. (2008) “Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A 
Comparison of Institutional and Efficiency Perspectives”, in Corporate 
Governance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 1-15. 
Zattoni, A., Minichelli, A., Pugliese, A. (2010) “The impact of internal and external 
conditions on the role of the BoD: an empirical analysis on the major Italian 
companies”, in Fortuna, F. (ed.) Corporate governance in the experience nationally 
and internationally. Aspects of comparative and evolutionary profiles, Bologna: Il 
Mulino. Zattoni, A., Minichelli, A., Pugliese, A. (2010) L’impatto delle condizioni 
interne ed esterne sul ruolo del CDA: un’analisi empirica sulle grandi imprese 
italiane, in Fortuna, F. (ed.) La Corporate Governance nell’esperienza nazionale 
ed internazionale. Aspetti comparativi e profili evolutivi, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Zingales, L. (1995) “Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public”, in Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 425-448. 
Zingales, L. (1998) “Corporate Governance”, in Newman, P. (ed.) The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London: Macmillam. 
Zona, F., and Zattoni, A. (2007) “Beyond the Black Box of Demography: board processes 
and task effectiveness within Italian Firms”, in Corporate Governance, vol. 5, pp. 
852-864. 
 
  
263 
 
APPENDICES 
 
STATA 10 OUTPUT 
 
(1) MODEL 
. correlate  roe boardsize 
(obs=144) 
 
             |      roe boards~e 
-------------+------------------ 
         roe |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1953   1.0000 
 
 
. reg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     124 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,   118) =   50.70 
       Model |  15640.6185     5   3128.1237           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  7280.21768   118    61.69676           R-squared     =  0.6824 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6689 
       Total |  22920.8362   123  186.348262           Root MSE      =  7.8547 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.4117314   .3435219    -1.20   0.233    -1.091998    .2685356 
firmleverage |   15.57433   4.602394     3.38   0.001     6.460337    24.68832 
         roa |   1.460037   .1064761    13.71   0.000     1.249186    1.670889 
lntotalasset |    2.44473   .9234796     2.65   0.009      .615989    4.273471 
capitalint~y |   2.140032   .6204058     3.45   0.001     .9114601    3.368605 
       _cons |  -38.25426   9.348386    -4.09   0.000    -56.76661   -19.74191 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5066                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2196                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.1988                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,71)            =     14.58 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4542                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -1.856303   1.203841    -1.54   0.128    -4.256694    .5440878 
firmleverage |  -26.95668   9.240549    -2.92   0.005    -45.38181   -8.531545 
         roa |   1.361252   .2046318     6.65   0.000     .9532282    1.769277 
lntotalasset |  -1.441648   3.583565    -0.40   0.689    -8.587073    5.703777 
capitalint~y |   .1520901   .8678803     0.18   0.861    -1.578414    1.882594 
       _cons |   48.97175   42.61412     1.15   0.254    -35.99839    133.9419 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     sigma_u |  12.978275 
     sigma_e |  5.4667774 
         rho |  .84930686   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 71) =     3.67              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, re theta 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3820                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7397                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.6708                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =    162.90 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.2817   0.2817     0.4880     0.4880   0.4880 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.4896995   .4528489    -1.08   0.280    -1.377267     .397868 
firmleverage |   7.891845    5.59169     1.41   0.158    -3.067666    18.85136 
         roa |   1.458761   .1245784    11.71   0.000     1.214591     1.70293 
lntotalasset |   2.491562   1.217784     2.05   0.041     .1047496    4.878375 
capitalint~y |   1.292582   .6162818     2.10   0.036     .0846917    2.500472 
       _cons |  -32.72381   12.80523    -2.56   0.011     -57.8216   -7.626032 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.2945905 
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     sigma_e |  5.4667774 
         rho |  .48400363   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, fe 
 
. estimate store fixed 
unrecognized command:  estimate 
r(199); 
 
. estimates store fixed 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, re 
 
. estimates store random 
 
. hausman fixed random 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -1.856303    -.4896995       -1.366604         1.11542 
firmleverage |   -26.95668     7.891845       -34.84852         7.35668 
         roa |    1.361252     1.458761       -.0975083        .1623403 
lntotalasset |   -1.441648     2.491562        -3.93321        3.370302 
capitalint~y |    .1520901     1.292582       -1.140492        .6110753 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
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                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       33.42 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, re 
 
. xttest0 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        roe[company2,t] = Xb + u[company2] + e[company2,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                     roe |   186.3483       13.65094 
                       e |   29.88565       5.466777 
                       u |   28.03269        5.29459 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =     7.93 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0049 
 
 
xtreg  roe boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, fe vce 
(cluster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5066                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2196                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.1988                                        max =         3 
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                                                F(5,47)            =     13.71 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4542                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -1.856303    1.18728    -1.56   0.125    -4.244802    .5321952 
firmleverage |  -26.95668   18.03651    -1.49   0.142    -63.24145    9.328094 
         roa |   1.361252   .3673366     3.71   0.001     .6222666    2.100238 
lntotalasset |  -1.441648   4.349771    -0.33   0.742    -10.19226    7.308961 
capitalint~y |   .1520901    .977499     0.16   0.877    -1.814384    2.118564 
       _cons |   48.97175   46.12662     1.06   0.294    -43.82304    141.7665 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  12.978275 
     sigma_e |  5.4667774 
         rho |  .84930686   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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(2) MODEL 
. correlate  roe boardsize ceodualitydummy 
(obs=144) 
 
             |      roe boards~e ceodua~y 
-------------+--------------------------- 
         roe |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1953   1.0000 
ceoduality~y |  -0.0149  -0.1012   1.0000 
 
 
. reg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     124 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   117) =   42.61 
       Model |  15725.0695     6  2620.84491           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   7195.7667   117  61.5022795           R-squared     =  0.6861 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6700 
       Total |  22920.8362   123  186.348262           Root MSE      =  7.8423 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.4267647   .3432199    -1.24   0.216    -1.106494    .2529644 
ceoduality~y |   1.835989   1.566799     1.17   0.244    -1.266975    4.938953 
firmleverage |   15.84462    4.60092     3.44   0.001     6.732744    24.95651 
         roa |   1.438466   .1078902    13.33   0.000     1.224795    1.652137 
lntotalasset |   2.825486   .9776021     2.89   0.005     .8893962    4.761576 
capitalint~y |    2.14324   .6194332     3.46   0.001     .9164847    3.369995 
       _cons |  -43.61885   10.39593    -4.20   0.000    -64.20745   -23.03026 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5274                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1620                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.1471                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,70)            =     13.02 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5532                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -2.09047   1.194099    -1.75   0.084    -4.472026    .2910857 
ceoduality~y |    4.56657   2.603466     1.75   0.084    -.6258784    9.759018 
firmleverage |  -29.87637   9.259159    -3.23   0.002    -48.34318   -11.40956 
         roa |   1.338003   .2021383     6.62   0.000      .934851    1.741155 
lntotalasset |  -1.519384   3.532558    -0.43   0.668    -8.564849    5.526081 
capitalint~y |   .0713025   .8566991     0.08   0.934     -1.63733    1.779935 
       _cons |   51.85048   42.03632     1.23   0.222    -31.98831    135.6893 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  14.347975 
     sigma_e |  5.3885421 
         rho |  .87638872   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 70) =     3.78              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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. xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, re theta 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3861                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7375                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.6725                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =    160.09 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.2926   0.2926     0.4997     0.4997   0.4997 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.5112886    .459622    -1.11   0.266    -1.412131     .389554 
ceoduality~y |   1.190834   1.827933     0.65   0.515    -2.391848    4.773516 
firmleverage |   7.534262   5.645248     1.33   0.182    -3.530221    18.59874 
         roa |   1.448506   .1264765    11.45   0.000     1.200617    1.696396 
lntotalasset |   2.723892   1.281254     2.13   0.034     .2126816    5.235103 
capitalint~y |   1.274128    .617813     2.06   0.039     .0632365    2.485019 
       _cons |  -35.61114   13.84422    -2.57   0.010     -62.7453   -8.476971 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.3847353 
     sigma_e |  5.3885421 
         rho |  .49964664   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, fe 
 
. estimates store fixed 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, re 
 
. estimates store random 
 
. hausman fixed random 
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                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |    -2.09047    -.5112886       -1.579181        1.102098 
ceoduality~y |     4.56657     1.190834        3.375736        1.853833 
firmleverage |   -29.87637     7.534262       -37.41064        7.339155 
         roa |    1.338003     1.448506       -.1105032         .157682 
lntotalasset |   -1.519384     2.723892       -4.243276        3.292014 
capitalint~y |    .0713025     1.274128       -1.202825        .5934984 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       39.54 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, re 
 
. xttest0 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        roe[company2,t] = Xb + u[company2] + e[company2,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                     roe |   186.3483       13.65094 
                       e |   29.03639       5.388542 
                       u |   28.99537       5.384735 
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        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =     6.81 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0091 
 
. xtreg  roe boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, fe vce (cluster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       124 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5274                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1620                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.1471                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,47)            =     15.64 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5532                        Prob > F           =    0.000 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
             |               Robust 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -2.09047   1.225065    -1.71   0.095    -4.554983    .3740429 
ceoduality~y |    4.56657   2.933366     1.56   0.126    -1.334601    10.46774 
firmleverage |  -29.87637   15.51854    -1.93   0.060    -61.09564    1.342892 
         roa |   1.338003   .3573244     3.74   0.000     .6191592    2.056847 
lntotalasset |  -1.519384   4.021135    -0.38   0.707    -9.608864    6.570096 
capitalint~y |   .0713025   .9705447     0.07   0.942    -1.881182    2.023787 
       _cons |   51.85048   44.04572     1.18   0.245    -36.75808     140.459 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  14.347975 
     sigma_e |  5.3885421 
         rho |  .87638872   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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(3) MODEL 
. correlate  roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy 
(obs=144) 
 
             |      roe boards~e auditc~y big4du~y 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
         roe |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1953   1.0000 
auditcomme~y |  -0.0303   0.1231   1.0000 
   big4dummy |   0.2517   0.3094  -0.0933   1.0000 
 
 
. reg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     125 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,   119) =   39.38 
       Model |  14297.8463     5  2859.56925           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  8640.39351   119  72.6083488           R-squared     =  0.6233 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6075 
       Total |  22938.2398   124  184.985805           Root MSE      =  8.5211 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -.213007   .3415897    -0.62   0.534    -.8893887    .4633747 
auditcomme~y |   1.061177   3.976548     0.27   0.790    -6.812785     8.93514 
   big4dummy |    3.51364   2.070998     1.70   0.092    -.5871434    7.614423 
firmleverage |   17.14967   4.360555     3.93   0.000     8.515337    25.78401 
         roa |   1.475713   .1151122    12.82   0.000     1.247779    1.703647 
       _cons |   -12.0627   5.097614    -2.37   0.020    -22.15648   -1.968913 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
276 
 
 
. xtreg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5142                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2452                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.2335                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,72)            =     15.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4162                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -1.876758   .8997373    -2.09   0.041    -3.670352   -.0831645 
auditcomme~y |  -6.670061   4.757063    -1.40   0.165    -16.15309    2.812971 
   big4dummy |   .5783773   6.671021     0.09   0.931    -12.72006    13.87681 
firmleverage |  -27.53681   9.015582    -3.05   0.003    -45.50905   -9.564575 
         roa |    1.32143   .1958562     6.75   0.000     .9309978    1.711862 
       _cons |   38.25141   11.31885     3.38   0.001      15.6877    60.81513 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  12.507698 
     sigma_e |  5.3934867 
         rho |  .84320944   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 72) =     4.79              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa, re 
theta 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
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R-sq:  within  = 0.3836                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6700                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.5983                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =    130.00 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.3452   0.3452     0.5526     0.5526   0.5526 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.3823429    .450431    -0.85   0.396    -1.265171    .5004857 
auditcomme~y |  -3.830084   4.210955    -0.91   0.363     -12.0834    4.423236 
   big4dummy |   3.077058   2.867497     1.07   0.283    -2.543133    8.697249 
firmleverage |   7.302012   5.595552     1.30   0.192    -3.665069    18.26909 
         roa |   1.446149   .1316835    10.98   0.000     1.188054    1.704244 
       _cons |   .4093873   6.210685     0.07   0.947    -11.76333    12.58211 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  6.2251798 
     sigma_e |  5.3934867 
         rho |  .57121757   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. quietly xtreg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa, 
fe 
 
. estimates store fixed 
 
. quietly xtreg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa, 
re 
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. estimates store random 
 
. hausman fixed random 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -1.876758    -.3823429       -1.494415        .7788704 
auditcomme~y |   -6.670061    -3.830084       -2.839977        2.213032 
   big4dummy |    .5783773     3.077058       -2.498681        6.023287 
firmleverage |   -27.53681     7.302012       -34.83882        7.068983 
         roa |     1.32143     1.446149       -.1247193        .1449797 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       33.30 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
. xtreg   roe boardsize  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy firmleverage  roa, fe vce 
(cluster company2) 
note: robust covariance is not full rank; F test numerator degrees of freedom is 
4 instead of 5 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5142                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2452                                        avg =       2.6 
279 
 
       overall = 0.2335                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(4,47)            =      4.89 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4162                        Prob > F           =    0.0022 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -1.876758   .5428453    -3.46   0.001    -2.968822   -.7846943 
auditcomme~y |  -6.670061   4.173499    -1.60   0.117    -15.06606    1.725936 
   big4dummy |   .5783773   1.600048     0.36   0.719    -2.640504    3.797258 
firmleverage |  -27.53681   17.49355    -1.57   0.122     -62.7293    7.655675 
         roa |    1.32143   .3350928     3.94   0.000     .6473104     1.99555 
       _cons |   38.25141    12.8402     2.98   0.005     12.42026    64.08256 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  12.507698 
     sigma_e |  5.3934867 
         rho |  .84320944   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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(4) MODEL 
 
 
. correlate  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors ceodualitydummy 
(obs=143) 
 
             |      roe      ids execut~s nonexe~s ceodua~y 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
         roe |   1.0000 
         ids |   0.0980   1.0000 
executived~s |   0.0065   0.2529   1.0000 
nonexecuti~s |   0.1688   0.0710  -0.4076   1.0000 
ceoduality~y |  -0.0112  -0.0941  -0.0282  -0.0480   1.0000 
 
 
. reg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  ceodualitydummy 
firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     125 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   116) =   26.62 
       Model |  14850.0707     8  1856.25883           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  8088.16911   116  69.7255958           R-squared     =  0.6474 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6231 
       Total |  22938.2398   124  184.985805           Root MSE      =  8.3502 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         ids |   -1.21785   .9197663    -1.32   0.188    -3.039563    .6038635 
executived~s |  -.0725298   .7006131    -0.10   0.918    -1.460182    1.315123 
nonexecuti~s |  -.2779999    .425542    -0.65   0.515    -1.120839    .5648396 
ceoduality~y |   1.940055   1.711964     1.13   0.259    -1.450706    5.330815 
firmleverage |   12.82028   4.890887     2.62   0.010      3.13326     22.5073 
lntotalasset |   3.086276   1.041754     2.96   0.004      1.02295    5.149601 
YearAccept~e |  -.4986206   .3607853    -1.38   0.170    -1.213201    .2159602 
         roa |   1.410247   .1156863    12.19   0.000     1.181115    1.639378 
       _cons |   -39.0875    11.3766    -3.44   0.001    -61.62028   -16.55471 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  ceodualitydummy 
firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5251                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2199                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.2021                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(8,69)            =      9.54 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4894                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         ids |  -2.119013   1.635689    -1.30   0.199    -5.382123    1.144096 
executived~s |  -2.358839   1.382522    -1.71   0.092    -5.116895    .3992164 
nonexecuti~s |  -1.968755   1.087067    -1.81   0.074    -4.137395    .1998852 
ceoduality~y |   5.068885   2.747527     1.84   0.069    -.4122803    10.55005 
firmleverage |  -29.57142   9.422089    -3.14   0.002    -48.36797   -10.77486 
lntotalasset |   .2983063   4.052472     0.07   0.942    -7.786154    8.382767 
YearAccept~e |  -.4775907   .8201789    -0.58   0.562    -2.113803    1.158621 
         roa |   1.308784   .2136318     6.13   0.000     .8826005    1.734968 
       _cons |   32.33362   49.29284     0.66   0.514     -66.0029    130.6701 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13.315136 
     sigma_e |  5.4472398 
         rho |  .85663091   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 69) =     4.33              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  ceodualitydummy 
firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, re theta 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4202                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.6876                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.6264                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(8)       =    141.16 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
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------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.3484   0.3484     0.5557     0.5557   0.5557 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         ids |   -.372181   1.022962    -0.36   0.716    -2.377149    1.632787 
executived~s |  -.7334057   .8457415    -0.87   0.386    -2.391029    .9242172 
nonexecuti~s |  -.7406843   .5487027    -1.35   0.177    -1.816122    .3347532 
ceoduality~y |    1.85656   1.952367     0.95   0.342    -1.970008    5.683129 
firmleverage |   2.257999   5.915849     0.38   0.703    -9.336852    13.85285 
lntotalasset |   3.243113   1.371447     2.36   0.018     .5551269    5.931099 
YearAccept~e |  -.8160859    .429932    -1.90   0.058    -1.658737    .0265654 
         roa |   1.408693   .1316072    10.70   0.000     1.150748    1.666639 
       _cons |  -32.77036   15.09678    -2.17   0.030    -62.35951    -3.18121 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  6.3414273 
     sigma_e |  5.4472398 
         rho |  .57541754   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  
ceodualitydummy firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, f 
> e 
 
. estimates store fixed 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  
ceodualitydummy firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, re 
. estimates store random 
. hausman fixed random 
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                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         ids |   -2.119013     -.372181       -1.746832        1.276333 
executived~s |   -2.358839    -.7334057       -1.625434        1.093658 
nonexecuti~s |   -1.968755    -.7406843       -1.228071        .9384248 
ceoduality~y |    5.068885      1.85656        3.212325        1.933175 
firmleverage |   -29.57142     2.257999       -31.82942        7.333382 
lntotalasset |    .2983063     3.243113       -2.944807        3.813353 
YearAccept~e |   -.4775907    -.8160859        .3384951         .698464 
         roa |    1.308784     1.408693       -.0999091        .1682798 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       26.30 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0009 
 
. quietly xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  
ceodualitydummy firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, r 
> e 
 
. xttest0 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        roe[company2,t] = Xb + u[company2] + e[company2,t] 
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        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                     roe |   184.9858       13.60095 
                       e |   29.67242        5.44724 
                       u |    40.2137       6.341427 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =    14.40 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0001 
 
. xtreg  roe ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors  ceodualitydummy 
firmleverage lntotalasset   YearAcceptCode roa, fe vce (c 
> luster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5251                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.2199                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.2021                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(8,47)            =     10.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4894                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         ids |  -2.119013   1.065663    -1.99   0.053     -4.26285    .0248234 
executived~s |  -2.358839   1.378463    -1.71   0.094    -5.131949    .4142709 
nonexecuti~s |  -1.968755   .9043147    -2.18   0.035    -3.788002   -.1495086 
ceoduality~y |   5.068885   3.339515     1.52   0.136    -1.649352    11.78712 
firmleverage |  -29.57142   16.15406    -1.83   0.074     -62.0692    2.926362 
lntotalasset |   .2983063   3.712212     0.08   0.936    -7.169701    7.766313 
YearAccept~e |  -.4775907   1.047974    -0.46   0.651    -2.585842    1.630661 
         roa |   1.308784   .3642693     3.59   0.001      .575969      2.0416 
       _cons |   32.33362   44.65149     0.72   0.473    -57.49359    122.1608 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13.315136 
     sigma_e |  5.4472398 
         rho |  .85663091   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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(5) MODEL 
. correlate roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids 
(obs=144) 
 
             |      roe auditc~y big4du~y      ids 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
         roe |   1.0000 
auditcomme~y |  -0.0506   1.0000 
   big4dummy |   0.2546  -0.0848   1.0000 
         ids |   0.0979   0.0764   0.3216   1.0000 
 
 
. reg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     126 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   118) =    4.17 
       Model |  4575.79396     7  653.684852           Prob > F      =  0.0004 
    Residual |  18496.2844   118  156.748173           R-squared     =  0.1983 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1508 
       Total |  23072.0784   125  184.576627           Root MSE      =   12.52 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |  -4.844982   5.811094    -0.83   0.406    -16.35253    6.662567 
   big4dummy |   4.157872   3.386308     1.23   0.222     -2.54794    10.86368 
         ids |    .151333   1.373508     0.11   0.912    -2.568586    2.871252 
firmleverage |   3.431751   7.303033     0.47   0.639    -11.03024    17.89374 
lntotalasset |   3.908316   1.507074     2.59   0.011     .9238979    6.892733 
capitalint~y |   2.486941    .992672     2.51   0.014     .5211801    4.452702 
YearAccept~e |  -.7461489   .5282388    -1.41   0.160    -1.792206    .2999077 
       _cons |  -37.51923   16.61782    -2.26   0.026    -70.42703   -4.611428 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2339                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1125                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0634                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(7,71)            =      3.10 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7957                        Prob > F           =    0.0066 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |  -10.31354   6.162319    -1.67   0.099    -22.60085    1.973775 
   big4dummy |  -4.565908   8.677795    -0.53   0.600    -21.86894    12.73712 
         ids |   -2.29745   1.807068    -1.27   0.208     -5.90064    1.305741 
firmleverage |  -33.11587   11.77098    -2.81   0.006    -56.58653   -9.645213 
lntotalasset |  -5.349245   5.087134    -1.05   0.297     -15.4927    4.794212 
capitalint~y |   1.739299   .8475857     2.05   0.044     .0492607    3.429336 
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YearAccept~e |    .949092   .9834201     0.97   0.338    -1.011792    2.909976 
       _cons |   109.2139    61.4724     1.78   0.080    -13.35853    231.7864 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  20.283125 
     sigma_e |   6.957835 
         rho |  .89471571   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 71) =     6.62              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, re theta 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       126 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1221                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1140                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.1542                                        max =         3 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =     16.41 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0216 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.4841   0.4841     0.6716     0.6716   0.6716 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |    -7.3105   5.517417    -1.32   0.185    -18.12444    3.503438 
   big4dummy |   2.258336   4.689894     0.48   0.630    -6.933687    11.45036 
         ids |  -.6512815     1.4695    -0.44   0.658    -3.531449    2.228886 
firmleverage |  -9.159389   8.543527    -1.07   0.284     -25.9044    7.585617 
lntotalasset |   3.769896   2.072269     1.82   0.069    -.2916767    7.831469 
capitalint~y |   1.786715    .794908     2.25   0.025     .2287235    3.344706 
YearAccept~e |  -.9530413   .6004399    -1.59   0.112    -2.129882    .2237992 
       _cons |  -20.17474   23.20382    -0.87   0.385     -65.6534    25.30392 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  11.553676 
     sigma_e |   6.957835 
         rho |  .73385507   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. quietly xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, fe 
 
. estimates store fixed 
 
. quietly xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, re 
 
. estimates store random 
 
. hausman fixed random 
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                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |   -10.31354      -7.3105       -3.003039        2.744501 
   big4dummy |   -4.565908     2.258336       -6.824244        7.301303 
         ids |    -2.29745    -.6512815       -1.646168        1.051695 
firmleverage |   -33.11587    -9.159389       -23.95648        8.097162 
lntotalasset |   -5.349245     3.769896       -9.119141        4.645927 
capitalint~y |    1.739299     1.786715       -.0474161        .2941475 
YearAccept~e |     .949092    -.9530413        1.902133        .7788369 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       15.79 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0271 
 
. quietly xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, re 
 
. xttest0 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        roe[company2,t] = Xb + u[company2] + e[company2,t] 
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        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                     roe |   184.5766        13.5859 
                       e |   48.41147       6.957835 
                       u |   133.4874       11.55368 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =    29.17 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
 
. xtreg roe  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, fe vce (cluster company2) 
note: robust covariance is not full rank; F test numerator degrees of freedom is 
6 instead of 7 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       126 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2339                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1125                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0634                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,47)            =     51.40 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7957                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
  
293 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         roe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |  -10.31354   1.844535    -5.59   0.000    -14.02427   -6.602814 
   big4dummy |  -4.565908    1.47187    -3.10   0.003    -7.526929   -1.604887 
         ids |   -2.29745   2.063288    -1.11   0.271     -6.44825    1.853351 
firmleverage |  -33.11587   23.04797    -1.44   0.157     -79.4824    13.25066 
lntotalasset |  -5.349245   5.232698    -1.02   0.312    -15.87608    5.177586 
capitalint~y |   1.739299   .7637535     2.28   0.027     .2028246    3.275773 
YearAccept~e |    .949092   1.010967     0.94   0.353    -1.084711    2.982895 
       _cons |   109.2139   57.65614     1.89   0.064     -6.77524    225.2031 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  20.283125 
     sigma_e |   6.957835 
         rho |  .89471571   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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(6) model 
 
. correlate  tobinsq boardsize 
(obs=141) 
 
             |  tobinsq boards~e 
-------------+------------------ 
     tobinsq |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1339   1.0000 
 
xtreg   tobinsq boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       123 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2221                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1161                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0902                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,70)            =      4.00 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6287                        Prob > F           =    0.0030 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -.001415   .1179329    -0.01   0.990    -.2366248    .2337949 
firmleverage |   1.714012   .9527924     1.80   0.076    -.1862725    3.614296 
         roa |    .064846   .0234568     2.76   0.007     .0180628    .1116291 
lntotalasset |  -1.084004   .3488293    -3.11   0.003    -1.779722   -.3882862 
capitalint~y |  -.0878199   .0855237    -1.03   0.308    -.2583916    .0827518 
       _cons |   13.62978   4.149859     3.28   0.002     5.353151    21.90642 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.2282213 
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     sigma_e |  .53213253 
         rho |  .84195668   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 70) =     6.23              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
xtreg   tobinsq boardsize firmleverage roa lntotalasset capitalintensity, fe vce 
(cluster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       123 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2221                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1161                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0902                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,47)            =      6.77 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6287                        Prob > F           =    0.0001 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |   -.001415   .0641991    -0.02   0.983    -.1305669     .127737 
firmleverage |   1.714012   1.457934     1.18   0.246    -1.218974    4.646998 
         roa |    .064846   .0156854     4.13   0.000     .0332911    .0964009 
lntotalasset |  -1.084004   .3138529    -3.45   0.001    -1.715395   -.4526137 
capitalint~y |  -.0878199   .0575887    -1.52   0.134    -.2036734    .0280337 
       _cons |   13.62978   3.052563     4.47   0.000     7.488819    19.77075 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.2282213 
     sigma_e |  .53213253 
         rho |  .84195668   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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(7) Model 
. correlate  tobinsq boardsize  ceodualitydummy 
(obs=141) 
 
             |  tobinsq boards~e ceodua~y 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     tobinsq |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1339   1.0000 
ceoduality~y |  -0.0274  -0.1359   1.0000 
 
. xtreg tobinsq boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       123 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2237                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1107                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0862                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,69)            =      3.31 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6455                        Prob > F           =    0.0063 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.0060076   .1192952    -0.05   0.960    -.2439949    .2319797 
ceoduality~y |   .0972271   .2594861     0.37   0.709    -.4204336    .6148877 
firmleverage |   1.642559   .9774793     1.68   0.097    -.3074588    3.592577 
         roa |   .0639848   .0237138     2.70   0.009      .016677    .1112926 
lntotalasset |  -1.085727   .3510211    -3.09   0.003    -1.785995   -.3854587 
capitalint~y |   -.089146   .0861265    -1.04   0.304    -.2609636    .0826716 
       _cons |   13.69566   4.179276     3.28   0.002     5.358231    22.03309 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     sigma_u |  1.2478668 
     sigma_e |  .53543025 
         rho |  .84451856   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 69) =     6.10              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
. xtreg tobinsq boardsize  ceodualitydummy firmleverage roa lntotalasset 
capitalintensity, fe vce (cluster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       123 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2237                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.1107                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0862                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,47)            =     10.21 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6455                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.0060076   .0641983    -0.09   0.926    -.1351579    .1231426 
ceoduality~y |   .0972271   .2558647     0.38   0.706    -.4175064    .6119605 
firmleverage |   1.642559   1.320109     1.24   0.220    -1.013158    4.298276 
         roa |   .0639848   .0139544     4.59   0.000     .0359121    .0920575 
lntotalasset |  -1.085727   .3092585    -3.51   0.001    -1.707875   -.4635788 
capitalint~y |   -.089146   .0577776    -1.54   0.130    -.2053795    .0270875 
       _cons |   13.69566   3.103557     4.41   0.000     7.452108    19.93921 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.2478668 
     sigma_e |  .53543025 
         rho |  .84451856   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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(8) Model 
correlate  tobinsq boardsize auditcommetteedummy big4dummy 
(obs=141) 
 
             |  tobinsq boards~e auditc~y big4du~y 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |   1.0000 
   boardsize |   0.1339   1.0000 
auditcomme~y |   0.0651   0.1253   1.0000 
   big4dummy |   0.0285   0.3060  -0.0847   1.0000 
 
. xtreg  tobinsq boardsize auditcommetteedummy big4dummy  firmleverage, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       141 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0073                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0130                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(4,85)            =      0.16 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1984                        Prob > F           =    0.9599 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.0178886   .0901178    -0.20   0.843    -.1970668    .1612897 
auditcomme~y |   -.077079   .4950325    -0.16   0.877    -1.061336    .9071783 
   big4dummy |   .1235336    .689711     0.18   0.858    -1.247797    1.494864 
firmleverage |   .6033737   .8142101     0.74   0.461    -1.015494    2.222241 
       _cons |   1.478582   1.078022     1.37   0.174    -.6648159    3.621979 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1025346 
     sigma_e |  .56194596 
         rho |  .79378978   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 85) =     9.35              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg  tobinsq boardsize auditcommetteedummy big4dummy  firmleverage, fe vce 
(cluster company2) 
note: robust covariance is not full rank; F test numerator degrees of freedom is 
3 instead of 4 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       141 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0073                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0130                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0071                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(3,51)            =      0.73 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1984                        Prob > F           =    0.5374 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 52 clusters in company2) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   boardsize |  -.0178886   .0299378    -0.60   0.553    -.0779913    .0422142 
auditcomme~y |   -.077079   .0725545    -1.06   0.293    -.2227383    .0685803 
   big4dummy |   .1235336   .0148315     8.33   0.000     .0937581    .1533091 
firmleverage |   .6033737   1.241874     0.49   0.629    -1.889793    3.096541 
       _cons |   1.478582   .6614519     2.24   0.030     .1506614    2.806502 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1025346 
     sigma_e |  .56194596 
         rho |  .79378978   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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(9) Model 
. correlate  tobinsq  ids executivedirectors  nonexecutivedirectors 
ceodualitydummy 
(obs=141) 
 
             |  tobinsq      ids execut~s nonexe~s ceodua~y 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
     tobinsq |   1.0000 
         ids |  -0.0218   1.0000 
executived~s |  -0.0236   0.2804   1.0000 
nonexecuti~s |   0.1695   0.0338  -0.4068   1.0000 
ceoduality~y |  -0.0274  -0.1348  -0.0274  -0.0712   1.0000 
 
. xtreg  tobinsq  ceodualitydummy ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors 
firmleverage, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       141 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0182                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0121                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0077                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,84)            =      0.31 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2537                        Prob > F           =    0.9053 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ceoduality~y |   .1162588   .2543467     0.46   0.649    -.3895375     .622055 
         ids |  -.1345574   .1426763    -0.94   0.348    -.4182848    .1491701 
executived~s |  -.0205967   .1319611    -0.16   0.876    -.2830158    .2418224 
nonexecuti~s |  -.0335565   .1038089    -0.32   0.747    -.2399918    .1728788 
firmleverage |   .6440582   .8326157     0.77   0.441    -1.011689    2.299806 
       _cons |   1.838487   .8879766     2.07   0.041     .0726484    3.604326 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1148329 
     sigma_e |  .56217351 
         rho |  .79726679   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 84) =     9.25              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtreg  tobinsq  ceodualitydummy ids executivedirectors nonexecutivedirectors 
firmleverage, fe vce (cluster company2) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       141 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0182                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0121                                        avg =       2.7 
       overall = 0.0077                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(5,51)            =      0.87 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2537                        Prob > F           =    0.5110 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 52 clusters in company2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ceoduality~y |   .1162588   .3172164     0.37   0.716    -.5205798    .7530973 
         ids |  -.1345574   .0784501    -1.72   0.092    -.2920526    .0229379 
executived~s |  -.0205967   .0648565    -0.32   0.752    -.1508015    .1096082 
nonexecuti~s |  -.0335565   .0486882    -0.69   0.494    -.1313022    .0641892 
firmleverage |   .6440582   1.126538     0.57   0.570    -1.617561    2.905677 
       _cons |   1.838487   .6558474     2.80   0.007     .5218187    3.155156 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1148329 
     sigma_e |  .56217351 
         rho |  .79726679   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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(10) Model 
             |  tobinsq auditc~y big4du~y      ids 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |   1.0000 
auditcomme~y |   0.0646   1.0000 
   big4dummy |   0.0273  -0.0840   1.0000 
         ids |  -0.0217   0.0805   0.3020   1.0000 
 
. xtreg tobinsq  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1470                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0393                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0227                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(7,70)            =      1.72 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7580                        Prob > F           =    0.1175 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |  -.0856577   .4942689    -0.17   0.863    -1.071446    .9001305 
   big4dummy |   .1814037   .6959402     0.26   0.795    -1.206605    1.569413 
         ids |  -.1314131   .1476004    -0.89   0.376    -.4257928    .1629667 
firmleverage |    .947701   .9845345     0.96   0.339    -1.015891    2.911293 
lntotalasset |  -1.203235   .4083725    -2.95   0.004    -2.017708   -.3887617 
capitalint~y |  -.0610774    .068008    -0.90   0.372    -.1967151    .0745603 
YearAccept~e |    .051766   .0796635     0.65   0.518    -.1071178    .2106498 
       _cons |    16.0521   4.933139     3.25   0.002     6.213262    25.89093 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4220345 
     sigma_e |  .55800191 
         rho |  .86656966   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(47, 70) =     5.11              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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. xtreg tobinsq  auditcommetteedummy big4dummy ids  firmleverage lntotalasset 
capitalintensity YearAcceptCode, fe vce (cluster company2) 
note: robust covariance is not full rank; F test numerator degrees of freedom is 
6 instead of 7 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       125 
Group variable: company2                        Number of groups   =        48 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1470                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0393                                        avg =       2.6 
       overall = 0.0227                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,47)            =     13.04 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7580                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in company2) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     tobinsq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
auditcomme~y |  -.0856577   .1246645    -0.69   0.495    -.3364504     .165135 
   big4dummy |   .1814037   .1298048     1.40   0.169      -.07973    .4425373 
         ids |  -.1314131   .0587344    -2.24   0.030    -.2495715   -.0132547 
firmleverage |    .947701   1.565615     0.61   0.548     -2.20191    4.097312 
lntotalasset |  -1.203235   .3801551    -3.17   0.003    -1.968008   -.4384616 
capitalint~y |  -.0610774   .0374015    -1.63   0.109    -.1363195    .0141647 
YearAccept~e |    .051766   .0872311     0.59   0.556    -.1237204    .2272524 
       _cons |    16.0521   4.068808     3.95   0.000     7.866711    24.23748 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4220345 
     sigma_e |  .55800191 
         rho |  .86656966   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
